Droit international général

 

As previously announced, we are launching the second online symposium on recent developments in African private international law. As part of this symposium, a series of blog posts addressing various aspects of recent developments in African private international law will be published on this platform over the coming days.

We open the series with a blog post by Abubakri Yekini (Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Manchester) and Chukwuma Samuel Adesina Okoli (Assistant Professor in Commercial Conflict of Laws at the University of Birmingham and Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries at the University of Johannesburg), focusing on the recognition and enforcement of international judgments in Nigeria.

 

 1. Introduction

Questions surrounding the recognition and enforcement of judgments have become increasingly prominent in Nigeria, both in academic writing and in practice (Yekini, 2017; Okoli and Oppong, 2021; Olawoyin, 2014; Adigun, 2019; Bamodu, 2012; Olaniyan, 2014; Amucheazi et al, 2024; PN Okoli, 2016). This development is not surprising. Nigerian individuals, companies, and public authorities are now routinely involved in disputes with cross-border elements, whether arising from international trade, investment, migration, or human rights litigation.

Nigeria operates a common law system governed by a written Constitution. The Constitution carefully allocates governmental powers among the three branches of government. Section 6 vests judicial power in the courts, while section 4 assigns legislative power to the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. Courts therefore play a central role in the interpretation and development of the law, but always within clearly defined constitutional limits. The Constitution and statutes enacted by the legislature form the bedrock of domestic law.

This constitutional structure has direct implications for the status of international law in Nigeria. Section 12 of the Constitution makes it clear that treaties and other international legal instruments do not become part of Nigerian law merely because Nigeria has signed or agreed to them at the international level. For such instruments to have domestic force, they must be enacted by an Act of the National Assembly. This position has long been settled and repeatedly affirmed by the courts (see Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) NGSC 3).

Private international law in Nigeria largely remains judge-made, inherited from English common law as part of the received English law. Within this framework, courts have articulated principles governing when foreign judgments may be recognised, when they may be enforced, and when enforcement must be refused (Toepher Inc of New York v. Edokpolor (1965) All NLR 301; Macaulay v RZB of Austria (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 282; Mudasiru & Ors v. Onyearu & Ors (2013) LPELR; GILAR Cosmetics Store v Africa Reinsurance Corporation (2025) LPELR-80701 (SC)).

Alongside these common law principles, there are two principal statutory regimes dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Willbros West Africa Inc v Mcdonnel Contract Mining Ltd (2015) All FWLR 310, 342). The statutory registration scheme is governed by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1922 (“1922 Ordinance”) and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1960 (“1960 Act”), but the latter is not yet in force (Macaulay v RZB of Austria (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 282; Ekpenyong v. A.G and Minister of Justice of the Federation (2022) LPELR-57801(CA)). These frameworks have traditionally been applied to judgments of courts established under the laws of foreign states.

More recently, Nigerian courts have been confronted with judgments of international and regional courts created by treaty, most notably the ECOWAS Court of Justice (CBN v Gegenheimer & Anor (2025) LPELR-81477 (CA)). These courts are not courts of foreign states in the ordinary sense. Their jurisdiction derives from agreements between states, and they operate within legal systems that exist alongside, rather than within, national judicial structures. The fact that the ECOWAS Court sits in Abuja does not alter this position; it is not part of the Nigerian judicature as enumerated under section 6(5) of the Constitution.

Judgments of international courts therefore raise questions that are different in kind from those posed by judgments of foreign national courts. International courts increasingly hear cases involving Nigerian parties and Nigerian institutions. Claimants who succeed before such bodies understandably would seek to enforce their judgments before Nigerian courts, particularly where the international legal framework does not provide a direct enforcement mechanism.

It is against this background that this short article examines the recognition and enforcement of international court judgments in Nigeria. It does so by situating recent judicial developments within Nigeria’s existing constitutional and legal framework and by questioning whether current approaches are consistent with the limits imposed by that framework.

 

2. The Existing Enforcement Frameworks in Nigerian Law

There are two main mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria. A brief overview of these mechanisms is necessary to appreciate the kinds of judgments Nigerian law already recognises and, equally importantly, those it does not.

 

a. Common law enforcement of foreign judgments

At common law, a foreign judgment may be enforced in Nigeria by bringing an action on the judgment itself. The judgment is treated as creating an obligation, often described as a debt, which the judgment creditor may seek to recover (Toepher Inc of New York v. Edokpolor (1965) All NLR 301; Willbros West Africa Inc v Mcdonnel Contract Mining Ltd (2015) All FWLR 310, 342). Over time, Nigerian courts have identified conditions that must be satisfied before this route is available. These include whether the foreign court had jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, whether the judgment is final and conclusive, and whether it was obtained in circumstances consistent with basic requirements of fairness (Yekini; Okoli and Oppong)).

This common law route has always been limited in scope. It was developed to deal with judgments of foreign national courts operating within recognised state legal systems. Its underlying assumptions are rooted in territoriality and sovereignty. Jurisdiction at common law is assessed through concepts such as presence, residence, or submission within the territory of a sovereign state (Adams v. Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433). Service of process, which founds the jurisdiction of the foreign court, is itself an exercise of sovereign authority.

The common law therefore assumes a relationship between two national legal orders: the foreign court that issued the judgment and the Nigerian court asked to give it effect. International courts do not fit easily within this framework. They are not organs of any single state. Their authority derives from treaties through which states agree to submit particular categories of disputes to an international judicial body. The legal force of their judgments exists, first and foremost, at the international level. Whether such judgments can have domestic effect depends on how each state structures the relationship between its domestic law and international obligations.

Some commentators have suggested that common law principles could be extended to accommodate international court judgments (Adigun, 2019). Others have acknowledged this possibility while also highlighting the uncertainties it would create  (Oppong and Niro, 2014). Whatever the merits of these arguments, the critical point for present purposes is that the common law enforcement of judgments was never designed with international courts in mind. Extending it in this direction would require courts to resolve questions for which the common law offers no clear answers. Which international courts would qualify? Would ratification of the relevant treaty be sufficient, or would domestication be required? What defences would be available, and whose public policy would apply? (Oppong and Niro).

In the absence of legislative guidance, courts would be left to answer these questions on an ad hoc basis. That would place courts in the position of deciding which international obligations should have domestic force and on what terms. In Nigeria’s constitutional framework, that is a role more properly reserved for the legislature. Unlike jurisdictions where courts are constitutionally mandated to engage in continuous development of the common law, Nigerian courts have traditionally exercised caution, particularly where the subject matter is affected by express constitutional provisions such as section 12 (cf Art 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC) where the South African Constitutional Court enforced a judgment of the Southern African Development Community Tribunal against Zimbabwe by developing the common law regime. See also the Zimbabwean case of Gramara (Private) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No: X-ref HC 5483/09 (High Court, Zimbabwe, 2010).

 

b. Statutory regimes for foreign judgments

 The limitations of the common law action on a judgment have long been recognised. Because the judgment creditor must commence fresh proceedings, jurisdiction must be established against the judgment debtor, and procedural obstacles may delay or frustrate enforcement (Yekini, 2017; Okoli and Oppong). To address these concerns, Nigerian law provides for statutory registration of foreign judgments in defined circumstances.

Two principal statutes govern this area. The first is the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Ordinance 1922, Cap. 175, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 (“1922 Ordinance”). This statute applies on a reciprocal basis to judgments from a limited number of jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Barbados, Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago, Newfoundland (Canada), New South Wales and Victoria (Australia). Its scope is narrow and largely historical, but it remains in force.

The second is the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1960, Cap. F35, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (“1960 Act”). The Act was intended to replace the 1922 Ordinance and to provide a more comprehensive framework for reciprocal enforcement. It proceeds on the basis of reciprocity. Judgments from foreign countries may be registered and enforced only where the Minister of Justice is satisfied that reciprocal treatment will be accorded to Nigerian judgments and issues an order designating the relevant country and its superior courts (section 3(1)(a)).

Although Nigerian courts have, in practice, permitted registration under the 1960 Act notwithstanding the absence of formal designation (Kerian Ikpara Obasi v. Mikson Establishment Industries Ltd [2016] All FWLR 811), the structure of the Act would still not accommodate international courts judgments. It is concerned with judgments of courts of foreign states. It does not purport to regulate the enforcement of decisions of international courts created by treaty. The requirement of designation reflects a deliberate choice to tie enforcement to prior executive action i.e designation, rather than leaving the matter to judicial discretion. A similar conclusion was reached by the Ghanaian court in Chude Mba v The Republic of Ghana, Suit No HRCM/376/15 (decided 2 February 2016), where the applicant sought to enforce an ECOWAS Court judgment in Ghana. The court noted that “the ECOWAS Community Court is not stated as one of the courts to which the legislation applies” (see Oppong, 2017) for a fuller discussion of the case).

 

c. Treaty-based enforcement

 Beyond these reciprocal regimes, Nigerian law recognises that international judgments may be enforceable where the National Assembly has chosen to give direct effect to international obligations through legislation. Arbitration provides the clearest illustration.

Nigeria signed the ICSID Convention in 1965 and enacted the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Enforcement of Awards) Act in 1967 to give domestic effect to its obligations. That Act provides that ICSID awards are enforceable as if they were judgments of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The result is a clear and mandatory enforcement regime that leaves little room for doubt or judicial improvisation. A similar approach is reflected in the Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023, which governs the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards more generally.

These examples reflect the dualist framework set by the Constitution. Where international obligations are intended to produce direct domestic effects, legislation provides the necessary legal authority. The legislature defines the scope of enforcement and the procedures to be followed. Courts are then required to apply the law as enacted. Therefore, it is crystal clear that Nigerian law has always treated the enforcement of judgments as a matter requiring domestic legal framework. This provides the backdrop against which the enforcement of international court judgments must be assessed.

 

3. CBN V. Gegenheimer & Anor (2025) LPELR-81477(CA) – The Nigerian Case

In May 2025, the Nigerian Court of Appeal had the opportunity, for the first time as far as we are aware, to engage directly with the question of the enforcement of international court judgments in Nigeria. The case arose from a monetary judgment of ?63,650,925.00 and USD 10,000 made by the ECOWAS Court of Justice against Nigerian authorities following a successful human rights claim. The judgment creditor subsequently approached the Federal High Court to register and enforce that award, which ultimately led to garnishee proceedings against funds held by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

For present purposes, the central issue was whether Nigerian courts had jurisdiction to enforce a judgment of the ECOWAS Court. More specifically, one of the complaints before the Court of Appeal was whether the 1st Respondent had complied with the conditions precedent for the enforcement the ECOWAS judgment, notwithstanding the requirements stated in section 4 of the 1960 Act, particularly the requirement relating to the conversion of foreign currency into Naira, and whether the judgment could be enforced in the absence of express domestic legislation authorising such enforcement.

The Court of Appeal answered these questions in the affirmative. In doing so, it reasoned as follows:

It is of common knowledge that the ECOWAS Court of Justice, established in 1991 and located in Abuja, hears cases from West African States, including Nigeria. It was created pursuant to Articles 6 and 15 of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS. Its organisational framework, functioning, powers, and applicable procedures are set out in Protocol A/P1/7/91 of 6 July 1991; Supplementary Protocol A/SP21/01/05 of 19 January 2005; Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of 14 June 2006; Regulation of 3 June 2002; and Supplementary Regulation C/Reg.2/06/06 of 13 June 2006. In other words, its jurisdiction covers Nigeria. Accordingly, the argument by learned counsel for the Appellant that Nigeria did not domesticate the ECOWAS Court Treaty, Protocol, and Supplementary Protocols is lame.

 

The Court further observed that the ECOWAS Court Protocol, particularly the 1991 Protocol as amended by the 2005 Supplementary Protocol, establishes the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice as the principal legal organ of ECOWAS, outlines its mandate, jurisdiction, functioning, and procedures, grants it competence over human rights violations within member states, and allows individuals to approach the Court directly without exhausting local remedies.

The Court also upheld the trial court’s conclusion that non-compliance with section 4(3) of the 1960 Act does not rob the court of jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.

What appears clear from the decision is that the ECOWAS judgment was effectively registered and enforced on the basis of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP21/01/05 of 19 January 2005, Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of 14 June 2006, Regulation of 3 June 2002, and Supplementary Regulation C/Reg.2/06/06 of 13 June 2006, with a passing reference to the 1960 Act to indicate that the judgment nothing under the Act robs the court off its jurisdiction.

That reasoning is difficult to sustain. The first difficulty lies in the Court’s treatment of domestication. The fact that Nigeria has accepted the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court answers the international question of competence; it does not answer the domestic question of enforcement. Jurisdiction determines whether the Court may hear a case and issue a judgment at the international level. It does not determine whether that judgment can be enforced within Nigeria. These are distinct matters. In a dualist constitutional system, the latter inquiry depends on the existence of domestic law authorising enforcement.

The Court did not identify any Nigerian statute that performs this function. Instead, it relied on the existence of ECOWAS instruments themselves. This approach blurs the distinction between international obligation and domestic law. It assumes that once Nigeria is bound internationally, domestic courts may act without further domestication. That assumption runs directly against Nigeria’s constitutional structure, particularly section 12 of the Constitution.

Equally problematic is the suggestion that the physical location of the ECOWAS Court in Abuja makes any legal difference. International courts frequently sit within the territory of member states without becoming part of the host state’s judicial system. The ECOWAS Court is not a Nigerian court, at least within the meaning of section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, and its judgments are not Nigerian judgments. Treating them as such because the Court sits in Abuja has no legal foundation. Jurisdiction at the international level determines whether a court may hear a case; it does not determine whether its judgment can be executed against assets or institutions within Nigeria. Physical location is therefore irrelevant. A court may sit in Abuja and still operate entirely outside the Nigerian legal system, as is the case with the ECOWAS Court.

The second difficulty concerns the Court’s reference to the 1960 Act. The proceedings proceeded as though the ECOWAS judgment could be situated within Nigeria’s foreign judgment enforcement regime. Yet, as discussed earlier, the Act was designed to deal with judgments of courts of foreign states and operates on the basis of reciprocity. The ECOWAS Court does not, and could not realistically, fall within that category. It is not a court of a foreign country, and it has never been designated under the Act. One would therefore have expected the Court to be explicit that the Act does not apply to the judgment in question. Instead, citing provisions of the Act in determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction risks creating the impression that the statutory regime is equally applicable to questions arising from the enforcement of international court judgments. This is an impression that is difficult to reconcile with the structure of the legislation.

This critique should not be misunderstood. It is not a denial of Nigeria’s international obligations, nor is it an argument that successful claimants before international courts should be left without remedies. The point being made is that domestic courts must act within the established legal framework, particularly in an area where foreign judgments do not have direct force of law except as permitted by statute or common law.

Ghanaian courts have consistently emphasised the country’s dualist constitutional structure, under which international and regional judgments are not binding domestically unless the underlying treaty or enforcement framework has been incorporated into Ghanaian law by legislation. In Republic v High Court (Commercial Division), ex parte Attorney General and NML Capital Ltd Civil Motion No. J5/10/2013 (unreported), the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of domestic legislation giving effect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), orders of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were not binding on Ghana, notwithstanding Ghana’s international obligations. Similarly, in Chude Mba v Republic of Ghana (supra), where enforcement of an ECOWAS Community Court judgment was sought, the High Court confined its analysis strictly to the statutory regime, namely the Courts Act 1993, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004, and the Foreign Judgments and Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Instrument 1993, and concluded that enforcement was unavailable because the regime depends on reciprocity and presidential designation of the foreign court, which were absent. Notably, in both instances the courts did not consider the common law regime for the recognition or enforcement of foreign or international judgments, treating the issue as one governed exclusively by statute and constitutional principles of dualism.

A similar outcome was reached in a very recent case in Anudo Ochieng Anudo v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania,  where the High Court of Tanzania declined to register and enforce a judgment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, holding that such judgments fall outside the scope of Tanzania’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap. 8 of the Laws of Tanzania, 2019). The court, inter alia, ruled that the Act applies only to judgments of foreign superior courts designated by ministerial notice and does not extend to international or regional courts established by treaty, including the African Court. Because the applicant anchored his claim exclusively on the Act and did not plead constitutional or international law as an independent basis for enforcement, the court held itself bound by the pleadings and precedent confirming that African Court judgments cannot be enforced under the statutory regime absent express legislative authorisation.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in CBN v Gegenheimer, with respect, is therefore a misnomer, as it lacks a solid legal foundation within Nigeria’s existing constitutional and statutory framework. Whether judgments of international courts ought to be enforceable in Nigeria is ultimately a question for the legislature. Until such laws are enacted, courts should be cautious about assuming powers they have not been granted.

 

4. Conclusion

It is clear that judgments of international courts are not enforceable in Nigeria in the absence of specific legal framework permitting their enforcement. The position is well illustrated by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Enforcement of Awards) Act 1967 and, more recently, the Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023, both of which demonstrate how Nigeria gives domestic effect to international obligations when it intends to do so.

The common law route is ill-suited to international court judgments. It was developed for judgments of foreign state courts and rests on assumptions of territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty that do not translate easily to treaty-based international courts. Extending it in this direction would leave courts to determine, without legislative guidance, which international judgments are enforceable and on what terms.

The decision in CBN v Gegenheimer is distinctive because it concerns the ECOWAS Court, a regional court whose jurisdiction Nigeria has accepted and whose role in access to justice is well recognised. Even so, acceptance of jurisdiction at the international level does not resolve the domestic enforcement question. Section 12 of the Constitution remains a barrier to direct enforcement in the absence of domestication. For that reason, the decision may yet face serious difficulty if the issue reaches the Supreme Court.

Beyond the ECOWAS context, it is difficult to see how judgments of other international courts could presently be enforced in Nigeria without similar legislative intervention. If international court judgments are to have domestic effect, the solution lies not in judicial improvisation, but in clear legislative action.

 

 

A hearing in case C-799/24, Babcock Montajes, will take place on 4 February 2026. The Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) has referred to the Court a question on the interaction between articles 25 and 36 of the Brussels I bis regulation, and on the relevance of res judicata for the purposes of recognition: 1. Is the term ‘judgment’ in […]

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)

The fourth and last issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2025 has just been released. It contains four articles, eight case notes, and six book reviews. In line with the Revue Critique’s policy, the doctrinal part will soon be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

In the first article, Prof. Andrea Bonomi (Université de Lausanne) conducts an in-depth analysis of “Le droit suisse des successions internationales : heurs et malheurs de la récente réforme” (The Swiss law of international successions: the good and bad fortunes of the recent reform). Described by the author as a true “compromise” à la Suisse, the reform introduces original solutions, which are discussed as follows:

By a statute adopted on 23 December 2023 and entered into force on 1 January 2025, Switzerland has recently reformed its private international law rules in matters of international succession. Inspired by a highly commendable objective of harmonisation, this legislative revision will undoubtedly improve coordination between Swiss law and the European Succession Regulation. This objective is achieved both through a unilateral alignment of certain Swiss rules with those of the European Regulation and through a strengthening of the autonomy of the de cujus. Certain solutions are original and would deserve to be considered by the European legislator in the context of a future revision of the Regulation. However, during its legislative process, the initial draft encountered unforeseen resistance, which led, with regard to forced heirship, to a distinctly Swiss compromise that deprives the reform of part of its effectiveness and coherence.

In the second article, Prof. Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg) shares “Quelques réflexions sur la notion de juridiction en droit judiciaire européen” (Some thoughts on the concept of jurisdiction in European judicial rules). Surveying both European regulations and case law, the contribution provides a comprehensive overview of this important issue and suggests avenues for reflection to arrive at a consistent and effective approach. Its abstract reads as follows:

The dejudicialization of private law has led the European lawmaker to extend the benefits of European regulations on private international law to non-judicial authorities by broadly defining the concept of ‘court’ within the meaning of these texts. At the same time, the European Court of Justice has embarked on a process of restricting the same concept by excluding decisions rendered by judicial authorities not exercising judicial functions. This contribution examines the varied definitions adopted by the different regulations and questions the appropriateness of the direction taken by case law within the framework of the Succession Regulation. It concludes by proposing a return to a purely organic criterion for decisions rendered by judicial authorities.

In the third article, Dr. Melynda BouAoun (Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth & Université La Sagesse) reports on “La légitimation d’un enfant né hors mariage au Liban : une décision audacieuse marquant l’ouverture du système juridique libanais aux systèmes étrangers” (The legitimization of a child born out of wedlock in Lebanon: a bold decision marking the opening of the Lebanese legal system to foreign systems). The groundbreaking ruling gives the author an opportunity to share though-provoking observations on Lebanese family law regarding both jurisdiction and conflict of laws in a pluralist system. They are introduced as follows:

On March 13, 2025, the First Instance Court of Mount Lebanon, competent in matters of personal status and family law, delivered a remarkable decision by recognizing as legitimate a child born out of wedlock to a Lebanese couple belonging to two different religious communities, Shiite and Druze. This article aims to comment on this bold decision, which stands out at a time when issues of filiation — and personal status matters more broadly — continue, in principle, to fall within the jurisdiction of religious authorities in the Lebanese legal system.

The last article is authored by Dr. Emeric Prévost (Université de Kyushu, amongst other affiliations in France and Japan), commenting on “La loi applicable aux droits réels sur bitcoins. A propos d’une décision japonaise” (The law applicable to right in rem over bitcoins. About a Japanese decision). It offers a roadmap for navigating the complex issues raised by the private international regulation of blockchain, which could certainly inspire jurisdictions beyond the archipelago’s waters. The article’s abstract reads as follows:

The decision of 25 April 2024 of the Tokyo District Court is particularly significant in that it is the first to address, under Japanese private international law, the issue of the law applicable to proprietary rights over bitcoins. While a general principle of proximity appears to be affirmed, the judges also expressly refer to the lex situs rule in order to resolve the conflit mobile situation arising from the transfer of bitcoins from one legal system to another. In addition to implicitly recognising the movable nature of bitcoins, the judgment further emphasises the effective control that holders of the private key associated with a unique public address on the Bitcoin network can exercise over the corresponding crypto-assets. The Tokyo judges thus treat control of the private key both as a connecting factor for locating the disputed bitcoins and as an essential condition for property rights created under a foreign law to produce any effect within the Japanese legal order. Finally, the decision also highlights the difficulties in establishing a causal link between alleged breaches of an intermediary’s due diligence obligations and the violation of property rights over crypto- assets such as bitcoins. The decision therefore offers both valuable insights into the current state of the law and an outlook on possible future developments for the private international law of digital finance and crypto- assets.

Since 1957, the fourth issue of the Revue critique includes its annual Bibliographical Index that provides readers with the possibly most comprehensive list of publications in the various branches of private international law from the previous year. Thanks to contributions from Prof. Alejandra Blanquet (Université Paris-Est Créteil), Prof. Christine Budzikiewicz (Phillips-Universität Marburg), Prof. Béligh Elbalti (Osaka University), Prof. Pietro Franzina (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore), Prof. Louise Merrett (Cambridge), and Prof. Symeon Symeonides (Willamette University), the 2024 Bibliographic Index will soon be available on the publisher’s website. This multilingual Index includes a large general section devoted to private international law, a special section on international arbitration, and a section dedicated to case law panorama. For 2024, it features a particularly rich segment on Devoir de vigilance (Corporate Due Diligence), but also numerous references on the year’s hottest topics such as Election de for (Choice of court) or Filiation (Filiation).

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.

 

It is not uncommon for African and foreign scholars of private international law (PIL) to lament the current state of the field in Africa. Until the early years of the 21st century, PIL was widely regarded, often with little hesitation, as ‘a neglected and highly underdeveloped subject in Africa’.[i] Professor Forsyth famously described it as a ‘Cinderella subject, seldom studied and little understood’.[ii] This limited scholarly attention is reflected, for instance, in the treatment of African PIL in the Hague Academy courses, which include only 4 courses specifically devoted to PIL in Africa, the most recent of which dates back to 1993.[iii] Since then, a number of pleas for greater attention to PIL in Africa,[iv] as well as calls for enhanced cooperation with African countries to ensure better involvement and inclusiveness,[v] have been voiced.[vi]

The last fifteen years, however, have witnessed a noticeable increase in scholarly interest and institutional engagement with PIL in Africa. This is reflected first in the growing body of academic publications,[vii] and the emergence of initiatives aimed at articulating and strengthening an African perspective on the discipline. These include, among others, the publication of the African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts, and the organization of a series of online workshops on ‘Private International Law in Africa’.

At the institutional level, since 2011, 6 African States have become Members of the HCCH, with Namibia and Rwanda joining respectively in 2021 and 2025, bringing the total number of African HCCH Member States to 9. The recent opening of a regional office for Africa in Morocco further underscores the growing institutional presence and engagement of the HCCH on the African continent.

More importantly, 33 years after the last Hague Academy Course devoted to PIL in Africa, the subject will once again be addressed within the framework of the Hague Academy. In the forthcoming Summer Courses, Prof. Richard Oppong will indeed deliver a course on the ‘Internationalism in Anglophone Africa’s Commercial Conflict of Laws’ This undoubtedly marks a significant milestone in the renewed visibility and recognition of PIL on the African continent.

There is, however, one aspect that remains relatively underemphasised: the rich and diverse, yet still understudied, body of African case law on PIL. This ‘hidden treasure’ demonstrates a simple, but often overlooked, fact: Africa is deeply connected to the rest of the world. From Chinese and Brazilian judgments being recognised in Mozambique, to Indonesian and Texan judgments being considered by courts in Uganda, or Canadian judgments sought to be enforced in Egypt; from Malawian courts applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to many other remarkable decisions across the continent, African courts are actively engaging with transnational legal issues, including international jurisdiction and applicable law in employment contracts, the validity of foreign marriages, and cases of international child abduction. This case law also reveals the challenges faced by courts across the continent, which are often called upon to deal with complex issues using outdated or inadequate legal frameworks. Far from confirming the widespread perception of a stagnating field, judicial practice in Africa shows that important, and often fascinating, developments are taking place across the continent, developments that deserve far greater scholarly attention and engagement. Only through sustained scholarly engagement, by studying, commenting on, and comparing judicial approaches, and by highlighting shortcomings in existing legal frameworks and practices, can Africa develop a strong and distinctive voice in the field of PIL.

This is precisely the purpose of the present online symposium. Building on an established tradition of this blog, Conflictoflaws.net will host the second online symposium on African private international law.[viii] The main objective of the symposium is to shed light on selected aspects of recent developments in private international law in Africa. A number of scholars known for their active commitment to the development of private international law on the African continent have kindly agreed to comment on some of these cases or to share their views on what, in their opinion, best illustrates the diversity of private international law in Africa.

The symposium will run over the coming days and will feature contributions addressing a wide range of themes and African jurisdictions. These include the following:

1. Chukwuma Okoli (University of Birmingham) and Abubakri Yekini (University of Manchester, Uk), on the recognition and enforcement of international court judgments in Nigeria
2. Béligh Elbalti (The University of Osaka, Japan), on the enforcement of a Chinese judgment in Mozambique
3. Boris Awa (Kigali Independent University, Rwanda), on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the CEMAC region
4. Solomon Okorley (University of Johannesburg, South Africa), on the application of the 1980 HCCH Convention in South Africa
5. Anam Abdul-Majid (Advocate and Head of Corporate and Commercial Department, KSM Advocates, Nairobi, Kenya), on international jurisdiction in employment contracts in Kenya
6. Theophilus Edwin Coleman (University at Buffalo School of Law, New York), on proof of foreign law and fragility of foreign marriages in Ghanian courts
7. Elisa Rinaldi (University of Pretoria, South Africa), on Cross-border employment, contract and delictual liability merge in the South Africa

As aptly pointed out by Professor Oppong, ‘there is a need for greater international engagement with African perspectives on [PIL]. There is also a need to attract more people to researching and writing on the subject in Africa.’[ix] In line with these observations, we likewise hope that this initiative ‘will contribute to both greater international engagement with, and increased participation in, private international law in Africa’.[x] Therefore, we encourage readers, in Africa and elsewhere, to actively engage with this initiative by sharing their views or by highlighting other developments of which they are aware. We also hope that this initiative will encourage researchers in Africa and beyond to make fuller use of the available resources and case law, and to comment on them, whether in the form of blog posts or scholarly contributions in academic journals.

This platform remains open and welcoming to such contributions.

 

Béligh Elbalti & Chukwuma S.A. Okoli

 

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[i] Richard F. Oppong, ‘Private International Law in Africa: The Past, Present, and Future’ 55 AJCL (2007) 678.

[ii] Christophe F. Forsyth, Private International Law – The Modern Roman-Dutch Law including the Jurisdiction of the High Courts (5th ed., Juta, 2012) 46-47.

[iii] Abd-El-Kader Boye, ‘Le statut personnel dans le droit international privé des pays africains au sud du Sahara: conceptions et solutions des conflits de lois: le poids de la tradition négro-africaine personnaliste’, 238 Recueil des Cours  (1993) ; U U. Uche, ‘Conflict of Laws in a Multi-Ethnic Setting: Lessons from Anglophone Africa’, 228 Recueil des Cours (1991) ; Salah El Dine Tarazi, La solution des problèmes de statut personnel dans le droit des pays arabes et africains 159 Recueil des Cours (1978) ; and Ph. Francescakis, ‘Problèmes de droit international privé de l’Afrique noire indépendante’, 112 Recueil des Cours (1964).

[iv] Richard F. Oppong, ‘Private International Law and the African Economic Community: A Plea for Greater Attention’ 55 ICLQ (2006) 911.

[v] Richard F. Oppong, ‘The Hague Conference and the Development of Private International Law in Africa: A Plea for Cooperation’ 8 YPIL (2006) 189.

[vi] Orji Agwu Uka, ‘A call for the wider study of Private International Law in Africa: A Review of Private International Law In Nigeria’, on this blog; Chukwuma Okoli, ‘Private International Law in Africa: A Comparative Lessons’, on this blog.

[vii] Jan Neels, ‘List of Publications on South African Private International Law as from 2020’, on this blog; Chukwuma Okoli, ‘Private International Law in Africa: A Comparative Lessons’, on this blog.

[viii] The first online symposium organized on this blog was devoted to Private international law in Nigeria. The symposium features interesting contributions by Chukwuma S. A. Okoli and Richard Oppong, Anthony Kennedy,Richard M. Mlambe, Abubakri Yekini and Orji Agwu Uka.

[ix] Richard F. Oppong, ‘Private International Law Scholarship in Africa (1884-2009)’ 58 AJCL (2010) 326.

[x] Oppong, Ibid.

Posted on behalf of Jason Mitchell, barrister at Maitland Chambers in London and at Group 621 in Johannesburg.

An Australian, Hannon, wants to book a Southern African safari with his partner, Murti, as a surprise birthday gift. He sees one he likes on an Australian travel website. Hannon fills in the online form.

It turns out that the website is just the agent for a South African company, Drifters Adventours. Drifters emailed Hannon the price and payment details. Attached to the email is a brochure. The brochure says, “Drifters do not accept responsibility for any loss, injury, damage, accident, fatality, delay or inconvenience experienced while on tour.” The brochure also says, “You will be required to complete and sign a full indemnity prior to your tour departure.”

Fast forward a few months, and Hannon and Murti arrive in Cape Town. At some point, Hannon signs an indemnity (for himself and, purportedly, on Murti’s behalf too). Murti is none the wiser. The indemnity excludes Drifters’s liability for everything and anything. It also states, “This contract between Drifters and the client will be deemed to be the only contract between Drifters and the client The place and conclusion of contract will always be taken as South Africa, and any disputes, claims, or actions brought against Drifters can only be made under South African jurisdiction, and the parties agree to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the South African Courts.”

Hannon and Murti, and a few others in the tour group, take their seats on the converted Toyota safari truck. After a few days along South Africa’s west coast, they reach Namibia. A few days later, they arrive in Botswana. One day, while in Botswana, Murti got out of her seat to fetch something from a locker at the back of the truck (the brochure said she could). Murti tripped and fell against a window. The window fell from its frame. Murti hit the road.

Murti sued Drifters in Johannesburg. Drifters pointed to the exclusion of liability in the first disclaimer in the brochure and in the second disclaimer that Hannon signed. The High Court found for Murti, holding that the first disclaimer was too vague (even if it were binding on Murti) and that Hannon did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Murti to the second disclaimer. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. The Court agreed with the High Court’s findings that there was no evidence that Murti agreed to the first disclaimer and that Hannon did not have authority to bind Murti to the second disclaimer. The Court also held that Drifters did not adequately draw the disclaimers to Murti’s attention in the way that s.49 of the Consumer Protection Act requires.

So far so good. But why does South African law apply? The Court doesn’t say. It can’t be because of the dispute resolution clause in the second disclaimer: after all, the court just found that the disclaimer does not bind Murti (and besides, there is no choice of South African law in what is a largely incoherent clause). This is a(nother) regrettable oversight. It is by no means obvious that South African law applies. The delict likely occurred in Botswana (Murti alleged that negligent driving caused her injuries, though she also alleged a negligent failure to maintain the truck and a negligent failure to warn). Just last year, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that “[t]he law applicable to a delict shall be the lex loci delicti, but the lex loci delicti may be displaced in favour of the law of the country with a manifestly closer, significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties” (then-Acting Justice Koen, who wrote this judgment, signed onto that judgment).

If the accident happened in Botswana, then, as a starting point, Botswana law should apply. Although Drifters is a South African company and the tour began and ended in South Africa, it is not evident that South Africa has a manifestly closer, significant relationship to the accident and the parties involved. These are the only factors that point towards South Africa.

The closest the Court comes to a conflict of laws analysis is its conclusion (and it’s just that: a conclusion) that the (South African) Consumer Protection Act applies because, under s.5(1), the Act applies to “every transaction occurring within the Republic”. It is, of course, possible for the forum to apply its own statute to override an otherwise applicable law (or overriding mandatory provisions, in the Rome language). But, as I have argued elsewhere, much more is needed than Parliament simply saying, ‘This Act applies to anything that happens in the Republic’: see To override, and when? A comparative evaluation of the doctrine of mandatory rules in South African private international law is found in the 2013 SALJ 757, where a better example is section 47 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, which states that “the protection provided to consumers … applies irrespective of the legal system applicable to the agreement in question.” Like before, maybe the Court would have gotten to the same answer with a copy of Forsyth’s Private International Law close by (that is, a careful conflicts analysis could point to South African law anyway, or Botswana law could be the same, or the Court could have applied the Consumer Protection Act as a mandatory rule). But that’s not really the point. When litigation involves foreign elements—Australians on holiday, a South African tour guide, a car crash in Botswana—courts should be alive to the possibility that another law governs.

This post has been written by Dr Mykola Lazeranko, postdoctoral fellow at KU Leuven Law. I am most grateful for his contribution. Of note is that Mykola’s aim is not to highlight whether the Russian courts are correct in their approach; rather to document their private international law methodology.

Geert.

 

Introduction

Mid-December 2025, news outlets across Europe and beyond reported that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation had initiated proceedings against Euroclear in the Moscow Arbitration Court, seeking approximately USD 229 billion in relation to frozen Russian assets (see Guardian, Reuters, VRT news, etc.). On 17 December 2025, the court issued a ruling accepting the statement of claim for consideration and scheduled a court hearing for 16 January 2026 (see here).

On 16 January 2026, the court issued several procedural rulings. In particular, it dismissed Euroclear’s application for strike-out (formally ‘application to have the statement of claim left without consideration’), it granted Euroclear’s application to adjourn the preliminary hearing, and it granted the application of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation for the proceedings to be conducted in camera on the grounds that the case involves secreta commercii.

The next hearing is scheduled for 4 March 2026.

While the European Commission earlier dismissed the claim as ‘speculative’ and groundless, the litigation forms part of a broader pattern: since 2022, Russian courts have witnessed a steady increase in claims against Euroclear arising from sanctions-related asset freezes. By mid-January 2026, just short of 200 claims against Euroclear had been filed across Russia.

This post examines the private international law (PIL) dimension of this litigation, using the core, ‘trigger’ case of Bank Saint Petersburg v Euroclear. Its aim is to analyze how the courts grounded their reasoning to reject arguments of Euroclear that EU and Belgian law is applicable, and how it built sanctions-related case-law against Euroclear based on Russian law.

The Trigger Case: Bank “Saint-Petersburg” v. Euroclear

The Euroclear-related litigation began with case No. А40-205635/2022, filed in September 2022 before the Moscow Arbitration Court by Bank “Saint-Petersburg” PJSC.The bank sought compensation for losses it attributed to Euroclear’s blocking of funds following the imposition of EU sanctions.

In February 2023, the court of first instance granted the claim, awarding the bank USD 107,085,768.65 and EUR 488,994.50 in damages, alongside litigation costs. On appeal, the claimant withdrew the euro-denominated portion, and in May 2023, the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeal upheld the decision for the USD portion. It also clarified that payment should be made in Russian roubles according to the exchange rate on the date of payment.

From the outset, the issue of applicable law was central. Euroclear stated that the dispute fell under EU law and Belgian law, invoking the regulatory framework governing its activities and the contractual arrangements between Euroclear and the Russian National Settlement Depository (NSD).

Consolidation of Defendants: From NSD and Euroclear to Euroclear Alone

Initially, the claim was brought jointly against Russia’s National Settlement Depository – NSD and Euroclear. From a PIL perspective, such a combination of domestic and foreign defendants could have implications for both jurisdiction and applicable law.

However, during the proceedings the claimant withdrew its claim against NSD. The court further emphasised that NSD could not be a defendant in this case because the claimant and NSD were bound by an arbitration agreement providing for dispute resolution before the Arbitration Centre at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Consequently, the claims against NSD were left without consideration, and Euroclear remained the sole defendant.

The court made it clear that the mere involvement of a foreign party does not provide grounds to disregard an arbitration agreement. Had the claims against NSD and Euroclear been brought separately, the court noted, those would not have fallen within its jurisdiction.

PIL: First Instance

 Public Order as a Consideration

Relying on Article 1193 of the Russian Civil Code, the court noted that foreign law must yield to Russian law when the consequences of its application would have obviously been in conflict with the fundamentals of law and order (public order, ordre public) of the Russian Federation. The court stressed that when deciding whether it is necessary to apply the ordre public exception, the court should proceed not from a contradiction between the content of the foreign rule and the fundamental principles of the legal order (i.e. not from a review of the substance of foreign law), but from the unacceptability, for the forum state, of the consequences resulting from the application of the foreign law provision.

The court also stated that according to the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court (informational letter No. 156 of 26 February 2013), ‘public order’ encompasses fundamental legal principles of the highest imperative authority, universality, and particular social and public significance, forming the foundation of the state’s economic, political, and legal system. Among these principles is the prohibition of actions explicitly forbidden by peremptory norms of Russian law (Art. 1192 of the Civil Code) when such actions threaten the sovereignty or security of the state.

Applying this standard, the court held that EU sanctions preventing the transfer of funds to the bank were incompatible with fundamental constitutional principles. Under Article 55(3) of the Russian Constitution, restrictions on the exercise of rights by Russian legal entities may be imposed only by federal law. Russian legislation does not compel compliance with foreign sanctions, hence, judicial enforcement of EU sanctions would contravene Russian public order.

The court stated that liability for harm in Russian law is a private-law construct, grounded in principles of fairness, proportionality, and fault. Proportionality, directly mentioned in the aforementioned informational letter No. 156 of 26 February 2013 of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court, is considered part of Russian public order.

The court further emphasised the prohibition of abuse of rights. Drawing on the Resolution of the plenum of the Russian Supreme Court of  23 June 2015, No. 25 “About application of some provisions of the Section I of part one of the Civil code of the Russian Federation by courts”, it noted that exercising a right in a manner that causes harm to others, particularly through unlawful means, constitutes abuse. Material damage, including the diminution of economic value or the need for additional expenditures, falls within this category. The court cited the ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 28 November 2017, No. 309-ЭС-13269, in case No. А07-27391/2016, indicating it as a source where it is noted that the breach of the prohibition on abuse of rights constitutes violation of the principles of public order of the Russian Federation.

The court also relied on statutory and constitutional authorities concerning sanctions: the Federal Law “On Measures (Countermeasures) in Response to Unfriendly Actions of the USA and (or) other Foreign States”, which identifies foreign sanctions targeting Russia as threatening territorial integrity and economic stability, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated 13 February 2018 No. 8-П, where the court held that a right whose exercise depends on compliance with sanctions imposed against Russia or its economic entities by any state, outside proper international legal procedures and contrary to multilateral treaties to which Russia is a party, cannot be protected by the courts.

Non-Contractual Nature of the Claim

Euroclear argued that Belgian law should govern because of the contractual arrangements with NSD. The court rejected this, noting that the claims were non-contractual in nature, arising from harm caused by Euroclear’s actions, and therefore outside the scope of any contractual choice of law. The applicable law must be determined according to the conflict-of-law rules governing obligations arising from harm.

Lex Loci Damni and Foreseeability

Article 1219 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from harm are governed by the law of the place where the harmful act occurred, or, if the harm occurs elsewhere, the law of the place where the damage materialised, provided the harm was foreseeable.

The court found that the damage occurred in Russia, and Euroclear knew or ought to have known that blocking the funds would harm Russian entities. Sanctions were expressly directed at Russia, and Euroclear had been informed of the impact.

The court referred to paragraph 52 of the Plenum Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 24 dated 9 July 2019, “On the Application of Private International Law Norms by Courts of the Russian Federation”, which provides that if a claim arises from harm caused by an act or other circumstance that occurred on the territory of the Russian Federation, or if the harm materialized on the territory of the Russian Federation, the court may apply Russian law to the relations between the parties.

Accordingly, the court stated that since the consequences of the harm caused by the actions (or inaction) of Euroclear occurred on the territory of the Russian Federation, and Defendant was aware of the location where the harm would materialize, the applicable law governing these relations is the law of the Russian Federation.

Closest Connection

Finally, the court applied the subsidiary rule of closest connection (Article 1186 of the Civil Code), considering that the legal relationship is most closely connected with the Russian Federation for the following reasons:

• • Bank Saint Petersburg, as a banking organization registered in the Russian Federation, is claiming damages (actual loss) in its favour to fulfill its obligations to a wide range of parties, including both individuals and legal entities;
  • The harm caused by the unjustified actions (or omissions) of Euroclear since March 2022 is substantial, affecting not only the claimant but also specific individuals and legal entities, as well as the economy of the state;
  • The issuers of the securities for which funds were not transferred to the Bank are predominantly Russian entities;
  • The agreement between the NSD and the Bank is governed by Russian law, and NSD’s obligations were not fulfilled due to Euroclear’s actions (or omissions) that were inconsistent with Russian legislation.

These factors, the court concluded, outweighed the arguments relied upon by Euroclear.

PIL: Appellate Review

 In its May 2023 judgment, the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeal endorsed the reasoning of the first-instance court concerning the PIL, further systematising its approach.

Emphasising Articles 247–249 of the Arbitration Procedure Code and Supreme Court Plenum Resolution No. 23 (2017), the appellate court further assessed jurisdiction and connection to Russia:

• • The bank’s main activity is in Russia, oriented toward Russian clients.
  • Key evidence resides with NRD, Russia’s central depository, subject to Russian law and supervision.
  • The securities involved were issued by Russian entities, and Euroclear’s actions had a significant economic impact domestically.
  • Euroclear maintains accounts in Russia.

The court in its judgment indicated that with regard to the present case, the arbitration court of the Russian Federation has jurisdiction to hear the Bank’s claims on the basis of the following:

• • Bank “Saint-Petersburg” PJSC, as a banking institution registered in the Russian Federation, seeks recovery of losses in its own favour for the purpose of performing its obligations towards a wide range of persons, including both individuals and legal entities.
  • The claimant’s principal business activities are carried out in the territory of the Russian Federation and are oriented towards Russian individuals and legal entities.
  • The damage caused to the Bank by the unjustified actions (or omissions) of Euroclear Bank SA/NV, commencing in March 2022, is substantial and affects not only the claimant, but also its clients and the economy of the state.
  • The main evidence confirming the need to transfer funds in favour of Bank “Saint-Petersburg” PJSC is held by the NSD on the territory of the Russian Federation. NSD, as a Russian legal entity, possesses the key evidence in the present dispute.
  • The obligations arising in connection with the Eurobonds for which funds were not transferred to the Bank involve predominantly Russian issuers.
  • The agreement between NSD and the Bank is governed by Russian law, and NSD’s obligations were not performed as a result of actions (or omissions) of Euroclear Bank SA/NV that were inconsistent with Russian legislation.
  • NSD, as the party obliged to transfer funds to the Bank, is registered in the Russian Federation, holds the status of Russia’s central securities depository, and its activities are regulated by Russian law and supervised by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
  • Euroclear Bank SA/NV maintains bank accounts within the territory of the Russian Federation.

The appellate court stated that the court of first instance in its consideration of the case correctly established that the law applicable to the present dispute is the law of the Russian Federation, and that the arbitration court of the Russian Federation has jurisdiction to hear the Bank’s claim against Euroclear. As  indicated in its ruling, the occurrence of damage within the territory of the Russian Federation constitutes an additional basis for the jurisdiction of the Russian arbitration court.

Overall, the appellate court’s decision did not introduce new substantive arguments but, to some extent, supported and further formalised the PIL reasoning, creating a guide for the large number of Euroclear-related claims in Russia.

Conclusion

The Bank Saint Petersburg v Euroclear litigation demonstrates the Russian courts’ interpretation and application of PIL principles in a sanctions context. Key takeaways include:

1. 1. Public order (ordre public) considerations override foreign law where enforcement would conflict with fundamental constitutional or statutory principles.
   2. Non-contractual claims arising from harm are governed by the law of the place where harm occurs, rather than contractual choice-of-law clauses.
   3. Lex loci damni and foreseeability determine applicable law when harm has consequences in another state.
   4. Closest connection serves as a subsidiary test, weighing factors such as the parties’ domicile, the location of harm, and the economic and legal context.

In Euroclear-related disputes, the Russian courts have constantly rejected arguments delivered by Euroclear to apply EU and Belgian law, establishing Russian law as the governing law for sanctions-related claims, which represents the interplay between private international law and the enforcement of cross-border sanctions.

At present, the court register shows around 190 cases across the Russian Federation against Euroclear. All of these cases were initiated after the decision in Bank Saint Petersburg v Euroclear, and in the majority of them final judgments have already been rendered (as a rule, the claims against Euroclear are upheld). The reasoning supporting the jurisdiction of the Russian courts and the application of Russian law in all such cases mirrors that adopted in this ‘trigger’ case.

Mykola.

Michele Angelo Lupoi and Davide Castagno (both university of Bologna) have posted The Yearbook of the Ravenna Summer School on Cross-Border Litigation and International Arbitration 2024 Edition on SSRN. The abstract reads: This yearbook collects papers presented at the 2024 edition of the Ravenna Summer School on Cross-border litigation and international arbitration, organised by the […]

On 5 and 6 March 2026, the Faculty of Law at Lund University will host a conference entitled Collaboration in International Family Law. The event will bring together leading academics and practitioners to explore how cooperation between key actors functions in international family law, from both national and comparative perspectives. The first day (from 14 […]

The recently published Part 4 of the Juridical Review for 2025 contains articles based on the International Perspectives on Scots Law seminar series held at the University of Stirling during 2023/2024. Some of these articles will be of interest to private international law aficionados:

‘The Pre-enactment Legislative Review Process in Scotland’ by Robert Brett Taylor and Adelyn L.M. Wilson (University of Strathclyde);

‘Taking the Transnational Nature of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Seriously: A Private International Law Perspective’ by Mihail Danov (University of Exeter);

‘The Evolution of Business and Human Rights Litigation against Multinational Companies’ by Mukarrum Ahmed (University of Lancaster);

‘Parties’ Intention and the Future Internationalisation of Scottish Arbitration – A Review of Scottish cases post 2010′ by Hong-Lin Yu (University of Stirling);

‘The Art of Persuasion: Embracing the Auld enemy and Beyond’ by Dr Mo Egan (University of Stirling).

The following information was kindly shared with us by the editors of the JLMI.

The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) welcomes submissions for its third issue of 2025.

The Call for Papers for this 3rd issue is devoted to Digital markets, consumer autonomy and consumer welfare.

You can find the call with all the details at the following link:

Digital markets, consumer autonomy and consumer welfare

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of abstract (around 800 words) or draft articles to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it within 25 february 2026. The publication of the issue is set for the end of November 2026.

For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, you can contact us by email at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

Visit our website to read the full announcement.

The following information was kindly shared with us by De Gryuter Brill.

The Hague Academy is a renowned international institution dedicated to the study and teaching of public and private international law. Supported and recognized by the United Nations, the Academy aims to foster rigorous and impartial analysis of legal issues arising from international relations. Its courses address both theoretical and practical dimensions of international law, including legislation and case law. In principle, all courses are published in the Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law in the language in which they were originally delivered. The courses on private international law that were published in 2025 are:

• Volume 451: Garcimartin, F.: Responses to a Legally Fragmented World: A Private Law Perspective (General Course of Private International Law)
• Volume 449: Esplugues, C.: New Dimensions in the Application of Foreign Law by Courts (and Arbitrators) and Non-Judicial Authorities
• Volume 446: Dickinson, A.: Natural Justice in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
• Volume 446: McLachlan, C.: On the Interface Between Public and Private International Law (General Course on International Law)
• Volume 445: Rodríguez Benot, A.: Le régime économique des couples en droit international privé

For a full listing, including the courses on public international law and international arbitration, please visit The Hague Academy Collected Courses Online / Recueil des cours de l’Académie de La Haye en ligne.

On 9 February 2026, the French Cour de Cassation will hold a one-day symposium titled Revisiting the international element in contracts (Revisiter l’internationalité du contrat). The event is organised by the Société de Législation Comparée, the Cour de Cassation and the academic research unit GREDEG (Côte d’Azur University), and is coordinated by Gustavo Cerqueira (Côte d’Azur […]

On 20 November 2025, the European Commission (EC) released a communication titled DigitalJustice@2030. It features the EU Digital Justice Strategy for 2025-2030 announced in May 2025 in a call for evidence (reported here). Building on the EU Council’s e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028 (presented here), the new EC Strategy maps the main actions to be conducted the next five […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

I have given background to Limby v Dyson when I discussed the important jurisdictional decisions. Current post deals with case management issues held by Pepperall J in Limbu & Ors v Dyson Technology Ltd & Ors [2026] EWHC 38 (KB).

The judgment is crucial for the discussion of equality of arms in supply chain due diligence claims, an issue which as the judge in current case also points out, was part of the forum non considerations at the time of the jurisdictional challenge. The judge’s considerations [8] re access to justice, costs, realism viz law firms contingency fees (and a side note on the barristers in the case, who of course act as single, self-employed risk takers viz the recoverability of their time spent) are an example of realism, empathy, concern for the rule of law and appreciation of real-life impact.

A first important issue under consideration comes down to whether the judge would order the case to first proceed with lead claimants, having to prove their working conditions etc, or rather, as defendants suggested, cut to the chase (claimants’ counsel called it ‘answering the siren song) as to Dyson’s knowledge and control of the circumstances in which claimants found themselves, with factual circumstances assumed for the purpose of the liability trial. [31] ff the judge explains while he rejects the latter (incl the difficulty of any appeal judges having to hear an appeal on the basis of assumed rather than proven facts) and he distinguishes the case management in Municipio on this point. [44] ff the claim in unjust enrichment is not going to trial now, for here the judge finds it impossible to split the issues of liability for and the assessment of the extent of any unjust enrichment (the latter requiring costly forensic evidence).

Focusing on one more element of the case-management: the request, which was granted, for ‘specific’ disclosure of a number of specific documents, even prior to what is known as ‘first disclosure’. There is an asymmetry of information between the parties as to what was reported to and known by Dyson. The judge ordered disclosure of 5 specific documents (the existence of which was revealed in related libel proceedings against Channel 4 journalists).

A judgment of much note, and another round hard fought by claimants, underscoring their need for tenacity and for support by level-headed lawyers.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, Chapter 7.

 

On Tuesday, February 3, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST). Stellina Jolly (South Asian University) will speak, in English, about the topic

“Forging a Path for Climate Justice: Integrating Public and Private International Law in Transboundary Litigation in India”

Cross-border climate litigation, gaining traction globally, requires active engagement with private international law for effective dispute adjudication. Although Indian climate jurisprudence has not yet substantively addressed cross-border disputes, emerging trends suggest that this scenario may soon evolve. The talk analyses three plausible litigation scenarios involving Indian and foreign parties to assess the readiness of Indian private international law in addressing transboundary climate harm. Firstly, Indian plaintiffs filing cases in foreign jurisdictions against transnational corporations headquartered abroad, alleging climate-related harm caused within India; secondly, foreign plaintiffs filing cases before Indian courts for the harm caused by Indian transnational corporations in their jurisdictions; thirdly, foreign plaintiffs filing cases before Indian courts for the transboundary harm caused by Indian companies as a result of their Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The talk evaluates the adequacy of Indian private international law in addressing cross-border climate cases and proposes incorporating environmental and human rights considerations in the determination of choice of law.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

In a judgment of 9 September 2025 the Danish Supreme Court clarified how Danish private international law determines the applicable law in recourse claims between insurance agencies and vehicle owners after an international traffic accident. The Court confirmed that, in the absence of codified conflict-of-laws rules, the starting point is the law of the place […]

A new collective volume entitled “La circolazione dello statuto personale / La circulation du statut personnel” has recently been published by Pacini Giuridica. Edited by Gustavo Cerqueira (Nice), Nicolas Nord (Strasbourg) and Claudio Scognamiglio (Rome), the book brings together the proceedings of an international conference held on 19 January 2024 in Rome, in the prestigious Giallombardo Hall of the Italian Court of Cassation.

The conference and the resulting volume stem from a joint initiative supported by several leading institutions in the fields of private law, comparative law and private international law: the Société de législation comparée (Comparative Methodology of Civil Law Section), the Associazione Civilisti Italiani and the International Commission on Civil Status (CIEC), with the support of the of the Italian Court of Cassation and the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Nice.

The volume addresses the circulation of personal status in a broad sense, at a time when increasing mobility of persons, the continuous renewal of issues relating to personal status, and sustained legislative and judicial activity across jurisdictions make this topic more relevant than ever. Rather than focusing on a single issue, the contributors adopt a comprehensive approach encompassing civil status in cross-border situations, personal identification, family relationships, filiation, and nationality. Taken together, these areas reflect the contemporary legal conception of the person, shaped by complex family ties and by the dynamics of cross-border recognition.

With contributions from scholars and practitioners from France, Italie and Switzerland, the book offers a genuinely civil, international and comparative perspective. Its bilingual Italian-French format further enhances its accessibility and comparative value for a European private international law readership. The richness of the discussions reproduced in the volume confirms the relevance of the chosen approach and makes a significant contribution to ongoing scholarly debates on the circulation of personal status.

Further information on the book is available on the publisher’s website. 

 

English translation of fate Table of Contents:

 

Preface
Foreword Introduction
Nicolas Nord, The Circulation of Personal Status: Introductory Report

Civil Status and Cross-Border Situations

Gustavo Cerqueira, Civil Status and Borders
Francesco Salerno, The Paradigm of Substantive Values in the Extraterritorial Relevance of Personal Status
Marion Ho-Dac, Personal Status and International Cooperation: Attraction, Diversity and Obstacles

Identification of the Person

Giovanni Di Rosa, Identification of the Person: The Circulation of Surnames
Fernanda Munschy, The Cross-Border Circulation of Modified Gender Identity: From Attribution to Free Choice
Francesca Bartolini, The Circulation of a Person’s Sex: Attribution, Rectification and Autonomy

Union of Persons

Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, The Circulation of Registered Partnerships: Tensions between Terminological Unity and Conceptual Diversity
Alessandra Spangaro, The Circulation of Registered Unions: Between Terminological Unity and Conceptual Diversity
Enrico Al Mureden, Same-Sex Marriage and Its Circulation: Between the Rights of the Couple, the Protection of the Child and the Prohibition of Surrogacy
Ilaria Pretelli and Renzo Calvigioni, Unions Celebrated Abroad: Certificates of Capacity and the Opportunities Offered by the New CIEC Convention No. 35

Filiation

Gordon Choisel, Filiation Based on Parenthood, or the Reversal of French International Public Policy
Mirzia Bianca, The Proliferation of Models of Parenthood: Reflections on De Facto Parenthood
Sylvain Bollée, Surrogacy: Spontaneous Circulation and Imposed Circulation
Roberto Senigaglia, The Circulation of Filiation Status Arising from Surrogacy Practices Established in EU and Non-EU States: The Case for a Differentiated Approach

Nationality

Hugues Fulchiron, Nationality and the Circulation of Personal Status: The Multiplication of Contemporary Issues
Sabine Corneloup, Evidentiary Difficulties and Obstacles to the Circulation of Status in Matters of Nationality

Conclusions
Liliana Rossi Carleo, The Circulation of Personal Status: Concluding Remarks

 

On 30 December 2025, Directive (EU) 2025/2647 amending Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Directives (EU) 2015/2302, (EU) 2019/2161 and (EU) 2020/1828 following the discontinuation of the European Online Dispute Resolution Platform has been published on the Official Journal of the European Union. Directive (EU) 2025/2647 introduces important changes to […]

The latest issue of the Journal of Private International Law (Volume 21, Issue 3) features seven articles. Elena Rodríguez-Pineau, Cross-border Insolvency Avoidance Actions in the EU: A Necessary Reflection, 393-416 After 25 years, the European Union can boast of having harmonised EU cross-border insolvencies in a Regulation (recasted once). The EU is presently addressing substantive harmonisation of insolvency […]

The Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission has recently published a fourth edition of the Compendium of European Union legislation on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. This document is extremely valuable and its updated publication is to be welcomed. In a common judicial area, marked by a tradition of written […]