AG Collins delivered yesterday his opinion in Case C‑430/21 (RS), which is about the Rule of Law in Romania.
Suggested decision : « The principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, precludes a provision or a practice of national law of a Member State according to which national courts have no jurisdiction to examine the conformity with EU law of a provision of national law that has been found to be constitutional by a decision of the constitutional court of that Member State. That same principle precludes the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the application of disciplinary penalties in respect of a judge arising from such an examination ».
Khalifeh v Blom Bank SAL [2021] EWHC 3399 (QB) is the second High Court judgment in the space of a few weeks to involve Lebanese Banks and the application of the protective regime for consumers in EU private international law. (See earlier Bitar v Banque Libano-Francaise).
Foxton J explains why there is such activity: difficult financial conditions faced by Lebanese banks and their customers at the current time, and the practical impossibility of transferring foreign currency out of Lebanon, caused acute anguish for those with foreign currency accounts in Lebanese banks. Understandably they have explored every avenue open to them in an effort to access their hard-won savings.
Jurisdiction would seem not to be in dispute (presumably given the presence of non-exclusive choice of court in a general agreement), applicable law is. Even in consumer contracts, Article 6 Rome I allows parties to the contract to chose applicable law – except such choice must not deprive the consumer of the protection of the mandatory elements of the law that would apply had no choice been made: that ‘default law’, per Article 6(1) Rome I, is the law of the consumer’s habitual residence.
Whether choice of law has been made is to be determined in accordance with Article 3, which proscribes that choice of law must be either nominatim, or ‘clearly demonstrated’ by the circumstances of the case. The latter is often referred to as ‘implicit’ choice of law although there is nothing truly implicit about it: choice of law cannot be made happenstance, it must have been made clearly (even if not in so many words). [47] ff the judge considers whether ‘implicit’ choice has been made, referring to Avonwick, and holds [66] that there was, namely in favour of Lebanese law. He concludes this as a combined effect of
a jurisdiction clause in a related, general agreement which he found to be exclusive [63] in favour of Beirut; I have to say I do not think the judgment engages satisfactorily with the argument that this hybrid clause itself is questionable under the lex causae (including consumer law) that would have to apply to it;
the express reference to an agreement to comply with and facilitate the enforcement of identified provisions of Lebanese law; and
the express choice of Lebanese law in a closely related and interwoven contract.
Clearly some of this analysis is fact-specific and subjective however in my view the lex causae element of hybrid choice of court has more beef to the bone.
As for the issue of ‘activities directed at’ the UK, this is discussed [68] ff. First up is an interesting discussion on the relevant time at which the habitual residence of the consumer has to be considered. In light ia of CJEU Commerzbank, which presumably was not available at the time of the discussion, I would suggest the conclusion [73] that the temporal element needs to be fixed at the very beginning, to avoid see-sawing and dépeçage, may need revisiting.
In terms of the actual directing of activities, Pammer /Alpenhof of course is discussed as is Emrek. Having discussed the evidence, the conclusion [105] ff is that there was no direction of activities.
As a result, the remainder of the judgment deals with the substantive issues under Lebanese law.
I do not know whether permission to appeal has been sought. There are sections in the judgment that in my view would merit it.
Geert.
EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.9.2.7, 2.270 ff; Heading 3.2.4, Heading 3.2.5.
Khalifeh v Blom Bank SAL [2021] EWHC 3399 (QB) (17 December 2021)
'Implied' choice of (Lebanese) law under A3 Rome I, held no consumer contract under A6 Rome I (contrast with https://t.co/cCLpRV7EGphttps://t.co/3pGSujhBYQ
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 17, 2021
Many thanks Haco van der Houven van Oordt for flagging an (anonymised) judgment by the Den Bosch Court of Appeal, in which it refused to recognise the punitive damages element of a US (Tennessee) judgment. Damages had been awarded after a horse trainer based in The Netherlands, who had been tasked to look after and train the horse of the US based claimant, had subsequently been tasked to sell the horse and in doing so hid part of the sale price from the owner. Half a million dollar was awarded, of which exactly half in punitive damages.
The judge follows the Gazprom criteria for recognition and enforcement in The Netherlands and only objected to the punitive damages element. A bid by claimants (heirs of the meanwhile deceased owner) to argue recoverability of a chunk of the punitive damages slice, arguing that it was compensation for lawyers’ fees in the US proceedings, failed: the Dutch held that costs compensation are not ordinarily part of the punitive element of the damages and that transcripts of the US judgment and proceedings certainly did not reveal any trace of that argument.
Not an extraordinary judgment. But an instructional one.
Geert.
Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc & Ors v Zhunus & Ors [2021] EWHC 3462 (Comm), sees Henshaw J unpicking the follow-up to a trial of applications and claims made by the Claimants for the purpose of enforcing an unsatisfied judgment for approximately US$300 million, handed down in December 2017.
The relevant part of the complex judgment, for the purposes of the blog, is a ‘tracing claim’: claimant argue that monies stolen from them by one of the defendants can be traced or followed into a variety of assets said to be held by companies within Cypriot trusts structures for the benefit of said defendant and his family. What is being traced are shares in Exillon, an oil company which Mr Arip developed after he fled Kazakhstan for Dubai. The proceeds of the shares went partially into the purchase of real estate, with another (substantial) part remaining liquid in a Swiss bank account.
Defendants submit that the tracing claim is governed by Kazakh law, and that that law does not recognise the concept of tracing. The judge, with respect, and perhaps he was echoing submissions, takes a rather unstructured approach to the conflict of laws analysis from which the judgment subsequently never recovers. Many first instance judgments in the UK intuitively start by quoting a relevant section from Dicey (whose 16th ed I am told might be out end of 2022), and then somehow engineer the analysis around it. In the case at issue, the Dicey rule that is zoomed in on [85], is disputes over real property, which are subject to lex situs (lex rei sitae). At [88] the judge then refers to Akers v Samba in which the Supreme Court, albeit at the jurisdictional level, held “the situs or location of shares and of any equitable interest in them is the jurisdiction where the company is incorporated or the shares are registered”. [89]:
It would follow that, insofar as relevant, questions of title to the Exillon shares, whose proceeds (a) were used to purchase the Properties and (b) remain in the form of the £72 million in the BJB account in Switzerland, would be likely to be governed by Manx law, Exillon having been incorporated in the Isle of Man. A possible alternative would be English law on the basis that the shares were traded on the London Stock Exchange. The parties have in any event agreed that, so far as relevant to these claims, Manx law is the same as English law.
[91] some role for Kazakh law is suggested to still exist when considering whether the English law preconditions for a tracing claim are met. ‘It is generally a pre-condition of tracing in equity that there be a fiduciary relationship which calls the equitable jurisdiction into being’. [92] The law applicable to a cause of action or issue determines whether a person is required to hold property on constructive or resulting trust, hence it is necessary to consider whether duties imposed by the relevant foreign law are to be regarded as fiduciary.
Only in an afterthought [94] does the judge consider the lex causae governing unjust enrichment, equitable claims and negotiorum gestio, per Rome II as retained in UK law (and in Dicey). [The judgment is not in fact clear on when the claim was introduced and therefore might be subject to acquired as opposed to retained EU law].
The lex causae for the qualification of the current claims (proprietary restitution) as one of these entries in Rome II [96] is matter of factly presented as English law. [99] the judge dismisses the relevance of the succinct Rome II analysis for, harking back to his first reference to Dicey, the fundamental nature of the Claimants’ claim in the present case is held to be a proprietary one hence Dicey’s lex situs rule is said to apply without a need to consider Rome II.
Surely the right order is to qualify the claim, using autonomous EU interpretation, under (retained) Rome I cq Rome II and with reference to CJEU authority- with of course some of the recent qualification issues following CJEU Hrvatske Sume thrown in. Subsequently to only consider the English common law to the extent statutorily retained EU law does not govern the issue. The approach in the judgment is unsatisfactory and in that respect joins Fetch.AI Lrd & Anor v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors [2021] EWHC 2254 (Comm) , which Amy Held and Matthias Lehmann discuss critically this morning.
Geert.
Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc & Ors v Zhunus & Ors [2021] EWHC 3462 (Comm) (21 December 2021)
Includes somewhat fuzzy discussion of applicable law to (share) tracing and ownership claims, as well as unjust enrichment etc and Rome IIhttps://t.co/6GCjwBJCqY
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 22, 2021
I am hoping to tackle some of the pre-Christmas queue this week, kicking off with the Opinion (no English version available) of Pikamae AG in C-568/20 J v H Limited. The case concerns the enforcement of a 2019 decision of the England & Wales High Court [I believe that judgment is Arab Jordan Investment Bank Plc & Anor v Sharbain [2019] EWHC 860 (Comm). The dates do not quite correspond (6 days of) but the amounts and line of argument do].
Clearly the UK were still a Member State at the time. The English decision was based, in turn, on two Jordanian judgments of 2013. It had rejected, on the basis of the English common law (judgments issued outside the EU are not subject to EU recognition and enforcement rules), the arguments against enforcement in the UK. The judge subsequently issued an Article 53 Brussels Ia certificate.
The issue is not whether a judgment merely confirming a non-EU judgment, may be covered by Article 53 Brussels Ia. CJEU Owens Bank has already held they cannot (see Handbook, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.573). The issue is rather whether, exequatur having been abandoned in Brussels Ia, arguments as to whether the judgment in the State of origin be at all covered by Brussels Ia, may be raised by way of an Article 45 objection to recognition and enforcement.
CJEU Diageo Brands, among others, has confirmed the narrow window for refusal of recognition on the basis of ordre public. The AG suggests wrong decisions on the scope of application of BIa, leading to incorrect A53 certificates, may fall within that category. Far from upsetting the principle of mutual trust, he suggests it is a necessary ‘safety valve’, a “soupape de sécurité » (40) which assist with said mutual trust. The AG qualifies the opinion by suggesting the issuing of an A53 certificate for a judgment that merely enforces an ex-EU judgment, is a grave error in the scope of application of the Regulation.
Should the CJEU confirm, discussion of course will ensue as to what are clear errors in the scope of application, or indeed in the very interpretation of Brussels Ia.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, Heading 2.2.17.1.
Opinion Pikamae AG yday, #CJEU C-568/20
Member State court may refuse recognition of other MS (UK, pre #Brexit) High Court judgment if said judgment merely enforces judgment from a third State, Jordan. Brussels Ia Title 3 'judgments' must emanate from a MShttps://t.co/NkJ6zh9FU9
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 17, 2021
Mahmudov & Anor v Sanzberro & Ors [2021] EWHC 3433 (QB) tackles the issue of libel tourism. As Collins Rice J puts it [3]
underlying the contest of law is a contest of two mainstream policies embodied in modern defamation law: on the one hand, the need for the law to keep up with the borderless realities of the internet, and on the other the need for international libel to be dealt with by the courts best able fairly to do so (or, to put it less neutrally, to prevent ‘libel tourism’).
The case is held under Brussels Ia for the claim was introduced on 31 December 2020, ‘IP completion day’. Parties mostly seem at loggerheads over the implications of CJEU C-509/09 eDate. Claimants suggest eDate establishes a stand-alone full jurisdictional gateway for the Member State where the aggrieved has his or its centre of interests – CoI. Defendant claims [19]
there is still a binary choice, as per Shevill: to sue either (a) where a defendant is domiciled or (b) where a completed tort (the harmful event) occurred. The effect of eDate, they say, is that claimants taking the second route in their CoI country can now get global relief rather than being limited to compensation for harm arising in that individual state. CoI is not jurisdictional in the pure sense of introducing a freestanding basis for bringing an action somewhere; it is jurisdictional only to the limited or secondary (but nevertheless important) extent of the nature and quantum of the relief that may be sought.
Parties oddly seem in agreement that Shevill v Presse Alliance (No.2) [1996] AC 959 reaffirmed ([11] in Mahumdov]
that what constituted the ‘harmful event’ was to be determined by the national court applying its own substantive law. In other words, the preliminary jurisdictional question for the High Court in a libel case brought against a non-domiciled defendant was whether a claimant could show to the requisite standard that all the components of a tort actionable in the UK were present
I find that debatable to say the least, and in fact that consensus has an important impact on the judge’s final conclusion, which rejects CoI as a stand-alone gateway: [28] the judge sides with the defendants for the claimant’s reading would imply ‘an autonomous meaning of the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ ‘. The latter, many might argue, must be the implication of the CJEU’s overall application of Brussels Ia. At [34] Napag Trading is offered in support however the judge I feel in Mahmudov should have made a clearer distinction (as the judge did in Napag Trading) between the EU-governed jurisdictional gateway for tort, and the (England and Wales) governed Civil Procedure Rules test for a ‘good arguable case’. As I note in my review of Napag Trading, these CPR rules may still form a formidable procedural hurdle, however properly distinguishing between them is important, among others for costs reasons.
Geert.
Mahmudov & Anor v Sanzberro & Ors [2021] EWHC 3433 (QB) (17 December 2021)#libel tourism
Held E&W courts do not have jurisdiction per #CJEU Brussels Ia, Shevill, eDate etchttps://t.co/9vP1s5TJZd
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 20, 2021
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