Conflictoflaws

Many thanks to Karim Hammami for the tip-off

 

I. Introduction

Once in the 20th century, the so-called “Nevada Divorces” captured the attention of private international law scholars around the world, particularly regarding their recognition abroad. Today, a similar phenomenon is emerging with the so-called “Utah Zoom Wedding.” So, what exactly is this phenomenon?

This term refers to a legal and innovative practice, which gained prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereby couples — even if physically located outside the United States — can legally marry under Utah law through a fully online ceremony, typically conducted via Zoom.

This type of marriage has become increasingly popular in countries like Israel and Lebanon (see infra), where only religious marriages governed by recognized personal status laws are permitted. In such systems, interfaith marriages are often not allowed or are significantly restricted, depending on the religious communities involved. Traditionally, couples seeking a civil marriage had to travel abroad in order to conclude one that could later be recognized upon their return. The Utah Zoom Wedding offers a more accessible and convenient alternative, allowing couples to contract a civil marriage remotely without leaving their home country.

The inevitable question then becomes the validity of such a marriage abroad, particularly in the couple’s home country. It is in this respect that the decision of the Beirut Civil Court dated 22 May 2025, commented below, provides a valuable case study from a comparative law perspective. It sheds light on the legal reasoning adopted by Lebanese courts when dealing with marriages concluded online under foreign law, and illustrates the broader challenges of transnational recognition of non-traditional marriage forms in plural legal systems.

 

II. The Case: X v. The State of Lebanon

1. Facts

The case concerns the registration in Lebanon of a marriage concluded online via Zoom in the State of Utah, United States. The concerned parties, X (the plaintiff) and A (his wife) appear to be Lebanese nationals domiciled in Lebanon (while parts of the factual background in the decision refer to X alone as being domiciled in Lebanon, the court’s reasoning suggests that both X and A were domiciled there. Accordingly, the analysis that follows adopts the court’s understanding). In March 2022, while both parties were physically present in Lebanon, they entered into a marriage remotely via videoconference, officiated by a legally authorized officiant under the laws of the State of Utah. The ceremony was conducted in the presence of two witnesses (X’s brother and sister).

Following the marriage, X submitted an authenticated copy of a Utah-issued marriage certificate, along with other required documents, to the Lebanese Consulate General in Los Angeles. The Consulate registered the certificate and transmitted it through official channels to Lebanon for registration in the civil registry. However, the Lebanese authorities ultimately refused to register the marriage. The refusal was based on several grounds, including, inter alia, the fact that the spouses were physically present in Lebanon at the time of the ceremony, thus requiring the application of Lebanese law.

After unsuccessful attempts to have the decision reconsidered, X filed a claim before the Beirut Civil Court against the State of Lebanon, challenging the authorities’ refusal to register his marriage.

 

2. Parties’ Arguments

Before the Court, the main issue concerned the validity of the marriage. According to X, Article 25 of Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936 provides that a civil marriage contracted abroad is valid in form if it is conducted in accordance with the legal procedures of the country in which it was concluded. X argued that the validity of a marriage concluded abroad in conformity with the formal requirements of the law of the place of celebration should be upheld, even if the spouses were residing in and physically present in Lebanon at the time of the marriage.

On the Lebanese State’s side, it was argued, inter alia, that although, under the Lebanese law, the recognition of validity of marriages concluded abroad is permitted, such recognition remains subject to the essential formal and substantive requirements of marriage under Lebanese law. It was also contended that the principles of private international law cannot be invoked to bypass the formal requirements imposed by Lebanese law on marriage contracts, particularly when the purpose is to have the marriage registered in the Lebanese civil registry. Accordingly, since the parties were physically present in Lebanon at the time the marriage was concluded, Lebanon should be considered the place of celebration, and the marriage must therefore be governed exclusively by Lebanese law.

 

3. The Ruling (relevant parts only)

After giving a constitutional dimension to the issue and recalling the applicable legal texts, notably Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936, the court ruled as follows:

“The Legislative Decree No. 60 mentioned above [……] recognizes the validity of marriages contracted abroad in any form, as Article 25 thereof provides that “a marriage contracted abroad is deemed valid in terms of form if it complies with the formal legal requirements in force in the country where it was concluded.” This made it possible for Lebanese citizens to contract civil marriages abroad and to have all their legal effects recognized, provided that the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the legal formalities of the country where it was contracted and therefore subjected to civil law [……].

Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to examine the conditions set out in Article 25 and what it intended by “a marriage contracted abroad,” particularly in light of the Lebanese State’s claim that the Lebanese national must travel abroad and be physically present outside Lebanon and that the marriage must be celebrated in a foreign country [……].

In order to answer this question, several preliminary considerations must be addressed, which form the basis for determining the appropriate legal response in this context. These include:

• The principle of party autonomy in contracts and the freedom to choose the applicable law is a cornerstone of international contracts. This principle stems from the right of individuals to govern their legal relationships under a law they freely and expressly choose. This equally applies to the possibility for the couple to choose the most appropriate law governing their marital relationship, when they choose to marry civilly under the laws of a country that recognizes civil marriage.
• Lebanese case law has consistently recognized the validity of civil marriages contracted abroad, subjecting such marriages, both as to form and substance, to the civil law of the country of celebration, regardless of the spouses’ other connections to that country [……]. This implies an implicit recognition that Lebanese law leaves room for the spouses’ autonomy in choosing the form of their marriage and the law governing their marriage.
• Legal provisions are general and abstract, and cannot be interpreted in a way that creates discrimination or inequality among citizens [……]. Therefore, adopting a literal interpretation of the term “abroad” to require the physical presence of the spouses outside Lebanese territory at the time of the marriage, as advocated by the State of Lebanon, would result in unequal treatment among Lebanese citizens. This is because, under such an interpretation, civil marriage would only be practically available to those with the financial means to travel abroad. Such a result would fail to provide a genuine solution to the issue of denying certain citizens the right to civil marriage.
• Subjecting a civil marriage contract to a law chosen by the parties does not contravene Lebanese public policy in personal status matters. This is because, once the marriage is celebrated in accordance with the formalities admitted in the chosen country, it does not affect the laws and rights of Lebanon’s religious communities or alter them. On the contrary, it constitutes recognition of a constitutionally protected right [right to marriage] that deserves safeguarding, and that the recognition of this right serves public policy. Furthermore, the multiplicity of personal status regimes in Lebanon due to the existence of various religious communities practically broadens the scope for accepting foreign laws chosen by the parties. However, Lebanese courts retain the power to review the chosen law to ensure that it does not contain provisions that violate Lebanese public policy, and this without considering the principle of party autonomy, in and of itself, to be contrary to public policy.[…]

Based on the foregoing [……], the key issue is whether the marriage contract between X and A, which was entered into in accordance with the law of the State of Utah via online videoconference while both were actually and physically present in Lebanon, can be executed in Lebanon.

[……]

Utah law [……] expressly allows the celebration of marriage between two persons not physically present in the state. [……]

[U.S. law] clearly provides that the marriage is deemed to have taken place in Utah, even if both parties are physically located abroad, as long as the officiant is in Utah and the permission to conclude the marriage was issued there. Accordingly, under [Utah State’s] law, de jure, the locus celebrationis of marriage is Utah. This means that the marriage’s formal validity shall be governed by Utah law, not Lebanese law, in accordance with the principle locus regit actum. [……]

Therefore, based on all of the above, X and A concluded a civil marriage abroad pursuant to Article 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60. The fact that they were physically located in Lebanon at the time of celebration does not alter the fact that the locus celebrationis of the marriage was de jure the State of Utah, based on the spouses’ clear, explicit and informed choice of the law of marriage in the State of Utah. Accordingly, the marriage contract at issue in this dispute satisfies the formal requirements of the jurisdiction in which it was concluded (Utah), and must therefore be deemed valid under Article 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60. […..]

Consequently, the administration’s refusal to register the marriage contract at issue is legally unfounded, as the contract satisfies both the formal and substantive requirements of the law of the state in which it was concluded.

 

III. Comments

 

1. Implication of the Marriage Legal Framework on the Law applicable to marriage in Lebanon

In Lebanon, the only form of marriage currently available for couples is a religious marriage conducted before one of the officially recognized religious communities. However, couples who wish to avoid a religious marriage are allowed to travel abroad—typically to countries like Cyprus or Turkey—to have a civil marriage, and the later have it recognized in Lebanon. This is a consequence of the judicial and administrative interpretation of the law applicable to marriage in Lebanon, according to which, a marriage concluded abroad is recognized in Lebanon if it had been concluded in any of the forms recognized by the foreign legal system (Art. 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936. See Marie-Claude Najm Kobeh, “Lebanon” in J Basedow et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law – Vol. III (Edward Elgar, 2017) 2271). The marriage thus concluded will be governed by the foreign civil law of the country of celebration, irrespective of any connection between the spouses and the foreign country in question, such as domicile or residence. In this sense, Lebanese citizens enjoy a real freedom to opt for a civil marriage recognized under foreign law. The only exception, however, is when both parties are Muslims, in which the relevant rules of Islamic law apply (Najm, op. cit., 2271-72).

 

2. “Remote Marriage” in Lebanon

According to one commentator (Nizar Saghia, “Hukm qada’i yuqirr bi-sihhat al-zawaj al-madani “‘an bu‘d” [A Judicial Ruling Recognizes the Validity of a “Remote” Civil Marriage]), the “remote marriage” issue began in 2021 when a couple took advantage of a provision in Utah law allowing online marriages—an option made attractive by COVID-19 travel restrictions, financial hardship, and passport renewal delays. Their success in registering the marriage in Lebanon inspired others, with around 70 such marriages recorded in 2022. In response, the Directorate General of Personal Status began refusing to register these marriages, citing public policy concerns. Faced with this, many couples opted for a second marriage, either abroad (e.g., Cyprus or Turkey) or through a religious ceremony before a recognized sect in Lebanon. Some couples, however, – like in the present case – decided to challenge the refusal of the Lebanese authorities in court, seeking recognition of their marriage.

 

3. Significance of the Decision

The significance of this decision lies in the court’s readiness to broaden the already wide freedom couples have to choose the law governing their marriage. Already under the established legal practice in Lebanon, it was admitted that Lebanese private international law adopts a broad subjectivist view of party autonomy in civil marriage, allowing spouses to choose a foreign law without any requirement of connection to it (Pierre Gannagé, “La pénétration de l’autonomie de la volonté dans le droit international privé de la famille” Rev. crit. 1992, 439). The decision commented on here pushes that principle further: the court goes beyond the literal reading of Article 25 and applies it to remote marriages conducted under foreign law before foreign officials, even when the spouses remain physically in Lebanon.

This extension is striking. First, it should be noted that, under Lebanese private international law, it is generally admitted that “[t]he locus regis actum rule governing the formal conditions of marriage is ……extended to cover the consequences of marriage”, including filiation, parental authority, maintenance, custody and even divorce and separation (Najm, op. cit., 2272). Now, it suffices for a simple click online, and the payment of minimal fees to have the marital relationship of the spouses governed by the law of foreign State, despite the absence of any connection, whatsoever, with the foreign legal system in question (except for internet connection).

Second, and more interesting, such an excessively broad view of party autonomy does not seem to be always accepted, particularly, in the field of contracts (Gannagé, op. cit.). For instance, it is not clear whether a genuine choice of law in purely domestic civil or commercial contracts would be permitted at all (see, however, Marie-Claude Najm Kobeh, “Lebanon”, in D. Girsberger et al. (eds.), Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (OUP 2021) 579, referring to the possibility of incorporation by way of reference).

The classical justification of such a “liberalism” is often explained by the Lebanese state’s failure to introduce even an optional civil marriage law. As a result, Lebanese citizens are effectively granted a genuine right to choose a foreign civil status of their choice (Gannagé, op. cit., 438), and, now this choice can be exercised without ever leaving the comfort of their own homes.

Finally, it worth indicating that the court’s decision has been widely welcomed by proponents of civil marriage in Lebanon, as well as by human rights and individual freedom advocates (see e.g., the position of EuroMed Rights, describing the decision as opening up “an unprecedented space for individuals not affiliated with any religion”). However, it remains to be seen how this decision will affect the general principles of private international law, both in Lebanon and beyond, particularly when the validity of such Zoom Weddings, concluded without any connection to the place of celebration, is challenged abroad.

Legal fragmentation slows down the scaling up of the Critical Raw Materials-battery value chains to meet the demands of the green transition. Digital Product Passports (DPPs) should serve as an effective digital traceability tool for business compliance, rather than creating a green barrier.

UNECE and UN/CEFACT are proud to release our White Paper for public review, offering a deep dive into:

1. Legal conflicts across the Critical Raw Materials-battery international and cross-sector value chains (jurisdiction, applicable law, and enforcement)
2.  Traceability across critical raw materials like cobalt, copper, lithium & nickel
3. Gaps in international cooperation, especially between the EU, China, the U.S., and Australia
4.  Practical principles to bridge legal divides and support SMEs and the Global South

The paper proposes five key principles for improving legal interoperability:

1. Leverage existing legal and trade frameworks
2. Respect mandatory laws and public policy exceptions
3. Maintain certainty and predictability
4. Ensure inclusivity for SMEs and developing countries
5. Achieve mutual recognition across jurisdictions

The white paper is subject to a 14-day public review until Monday, 30 June 2025. Please use the Public Comment Log provided to facilitate the preparation of a Disposition Log by the Project Team. Download the full paper and provide your comments here:
https://uncefact.unece.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=24933171

For the works leading to this white paper, see here and here. 

 

The Faculty of Law at Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany) invites applications for a Junior Professorship (W1 Tenure Track to W2) in Private Law and Private International Law, to be filled as of 1 October 2026.

Candidates are expected to conduct research and teaching in Private Law and Private International Law broadly understood (including in particular International Family and Succession Law, International Civil Procedure, International Dispute Resolution, International Commercial Arbitration).

This position is part of the Faculty’s strategic effort to further strengthen its international profile as well as its commitment to foundational legal research. Applicants should demonstrate academic excellence, international visibility and have teaching experience at university level.

Candidates must hold a first law degree (ideally from Germany) and a PhD in (private international) law from either Germany or abroad. In addition, proficiency in German (native speaker level) is required as the position requires teaching and participation in academic self-governance in German.

Applications (letter of motivation, CV, list of publications and presentations, relevant academic transcripts and certificates, teaching evaluations) should be submitted to the Dean of Humboldt Law both by postal and by electronic mail (in one pdf) by 11 July 2025 under the reference number JP/003/25:

Dean of the Faculty of Law
Prof. Dr. Philipp Dann
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Unter den Linden 6
10099 Berlin
Germany

Email: dekan.rewi@hu-berlin.de

Further information on the tenure track framework at Humboldt University is available here at https://hu.berlin/tenuretrack-katalog.

The following post is reproduced from a recent update by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI). 
Many thanks to Catherine Shen for sharing the information.

 

In a judgment (2023) Hu 01 Xie Wai Ren No. 28 dated January 8, 2025, the Shanghai International Commercial Court (Shanghai Court) recognized and enforced an order given by the General Division of the Singapore High Court after finding reciprocity between China and Singapore in the recognition and enforcement of each other’s civil and commercial judgments.

The Singapore order

Zhao, the applicant in the enforcement proceeding before the Shanghai Court, and Ye, the respondent, entered into a loan agreement in December 2013 where Zhao agreed to lend Ye HKD 10 million. The money was transferred to Ye in April 2014. As Ye failed to repay the money as agreed on time, Zhao filed a lawsuit in the Singapore High Court.

On August 23, 2022, the General Division of the Singapore High Court (General Division) gave Oder HC/ORC5055/2022 which states, among others, that all subsequent proceedings of the matter will be stayed, except that the parties have the right to apply for enforcement without the need for any new proceeding to be issued and that Ye must repay Zhao an outstanding amount of close to HKD 9.5 million over three tranches.

Subsequently on June 16, 2023, the General Division gave Order HC/ORC2766/2023 which, among others, orders Ye to repay Zhao an amount of approximately HKD 9.3 million that was still outstanding, pay Zhao interest on judgment debt at the annual rate of 5.33% and bear SGD 2,500 in costs. Order HC/ORC2766/2023 states that it is the final order from the General Division with regard to the Tomlin order in HC/ORC5055/2022.

The China ruling

As Ye still failed to make repayment pursuant to Order HC/ORC2766/2023, Zhao applied to the Shanghai Court for recognition and enforcement of Order HC/ORC2776/2023. Ye is found to own real estate in Shanghai.

China and Singapore have not entered into any bilateral agreement on the recognition and enforcement of each other’s civil and commercial judgments. Nor have they joined any international treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Accordingly this application needs to be reviewed based on whether reciprocity exists between Chinese and Singaporean courts. The Shanghai Court found that reciprocity exists on the basis of the Memorandum of Guidance between the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of Singapore on Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments in Commercial Cases as well as past precedents where the courts of the two countries have recognized and enforced each other’s civil and commercial judgments. Zhao cited as support in her application [2014] SGHC 16 where the Singapore High Court recognized a judgment from the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court as well as (2017) Zhe 03 Xie Wai Ren No. 7 where the Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court recognized a Singapore civil judgment.

The Shanghai Court accordingly rendered a ruling to recognize and enforce Order HC/ORC2776/2023.

The original Chinese judgment can be read here. We thank Dr Yu Meng for alerting us to this judgment.

More about ABLI’s work on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Asia can be found here and here.

 

It is a real pleasure to share a new essay by Professor Symeon C. Symeonides, written on the occasion of his retirement after fifty remarkable years in the field of conflict of laws. The essay, eloquently titled Reflections from Fifty Years in the Conflicts Vineyard, was presented as part of a symposium held in his honor in May 2024 at Willamette University College of Law, and sponsored by the AALS Section on Conflict of Laws.

The abstract of the essay reads:

This essay was written on the occasion of a Symposium titled “50 Years in the Conflicts Vineyard,” which was held in the author’s honor in May 2024 at Willamette University Law School and sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. For this reason, the essay is inevitably autobiographical. The author reflects on some transformative events that occurred during his fifty-year labor in teaching, writing, and legislating in the field of conflict of laws, the teachers, mentors, and authors who have influenced him, and the lessons he has learned.

The essay is inevitably personal — and all the more moving for it. Professor Symeonides takes the reader not only through some of the transformative moments in his five-decade career, as described in the abstract, but also through the challenges, passions, joys, and moments of sorrow that have marked both his personal and professional life.

As he writes:

“Fifty years of anything is a long time. Fifty years in conflicts law, if you love this field as much as I do, feels like a walk in the park. That is how I feel about my fifty years of laboring in this vineyard. It’s been a great ride.”

Reading this piece felt like yet another walk in the park with him, a chance to discover meaningful moments from his life and his extraordinary career as a giant in the field. Readers will undoubtedly find many passages that catch their attention or resonate with their own experiences.

On a personal note, I first discovered Professor Symeonides’ work as a master’s student in Tunisia. I remember copying Part II on jurisdiction and foreign judgments of his book Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, International – Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn., 1998), co-authored with Wendy Collins Perdue and Arthur von Mehren, and trying hard to learn from it. It was difficult, since – as a Tunisian student – I was not used to the casebook style. But from that moment on, I began following Professor Symeonides’ scholarship. His writings have long served as a source of insight and inspiration (see on this blog, Ralf Michaels, Symeonides’ 30th (and last) Annual Survey of Choice of Law).

The essay offers much to reflect on, but one detail stood out to me in particular: Professor Symeonides – together with another Conflict “Gentile Giant”, the late Professor von Mehren – once commented on a draft of the 1998 Tunisian Code of Private International Law (see p. 17, fn. 66). This is something I could not have imagined even in my wildest dreams. As someone with a deep interest in this area, that historical note meant a great deal to me.

My warmest thanks to Symeon for sharing this piece, and – more broadly – for the inspiration, kindness, and intellectual generosity he has shown throughout his extraordinary career.

 

Béligh Elbalti

In light of the Commission’s report on the Brussels Ia Regulation (first discussed here by Xandra Kramer), ConflictofLaws.net will be hosting an ad-hoc virtual roundtable

on Tuesday, 8 July 2025, 12pm–1.30pm (CEST).

The conversation will focus on the report published by the Commission on 2 June and its implications for a possible future reform of the Regulation.

The event will feature the following panellists:

Andrew Dickinson
University of Oxford

Stefano Dominelli
University of Genoa

Pietro Franzina
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan

Thalia Kruger
University of Antwerp

Tobias Lutzi
University of Augsburg

Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.

Warmest congratulations to Dr. Carlos Santaló Goris on the publication of his book, The Application of the European Account Preservation Order in Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. A Comparative-Empirical Analysis (Nomos, 2025).

This scholarly work offers a timely and much-needed exploration of the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO), the first cross-border civil interim measure at EU level. Conceived to enable the provisional attachment of debtors’ bank accounts across Member States, the EAPO aspires to procedural uniformity. Yet, as this study so lucidly demonstrates, its application remains deeply embedded in national procedural systems, giving rise to significant divergences and legal complexity.

With admirable clarity, analytical depth, and empirical rigour, Dr. Santaló Goris leads the reader through this intricate legal terrain. By examining, in particular, the operation of the EAPO in three distinct jurisdictions – Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain – his manuscript illustrates the practical challenges posed by procedural fragmentation while offering valuable guidance for navigating the instrument across legal systems.

This manuscript stands out as a thoughtful and impactful contribution to the field of European civil procedure. What distinguishes it most is its remarkable ability to bridge legal theory and judicial practice. Through a combination of comparative analysis, stakeholder perspectives, and data-driven insights, it offers a comprehensive and balanced account of how the European Account Preservation Order operates in practice, making it an indispensable resource for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike.

Congratulations, Carlos, on this well-deserved accomplishment!

More information on this book is available here.

The Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen is organising a webinar on Cross-Border Protection of Children under the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention: Practical Perspectives from Contracting States. The event will be held on 30 June & 1 July and is part of a research project led by Professor Katarina Trimmings, which evaluates the effectiveness of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention in the UK and other Contracting States. See webinar registration and further details Cross-Border Protection of Children: The 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention | School of Law – University of Aberdeen This research project examines the legal framework for the cross-border protection of children, focusing on the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (‘the 1996 Hague Convention’). www.abdn.ac.uk

Last week (7 June 2025), I had this extraordinary opportunity to give a presentation at the 138th Annual Conference of the Japanese Association of Private International Law, which took place at Seinan Gakuin Daigaku, Fukuoka – Japan. The theme of my presentation was “Private International Law and Colonialism.” In this talk, I shared some preliminary thoughts on a topic that is both extraordinarily rich and complex. The following note offers some initial reflections based on that presentation (with a few adjustments) with the aim of contributing to ongoing discussion and encouraging deeper reflection.

 

Introduction

The relationship between colonialism and law has been the subject of active debate across various fields, including legal anthropology and comparative law. Key themes include the impact of colonial rule on legal systems in colonized regions, the inherently violent nature of colonialism, and the possibilities for decolonization. This relationship has also received particular attention in the field of international law. Numerous studies have examined how colonialism shaped the very structure of the international legal order, as well as the theoretical justifications for its expansion into regions regarded as “non-Western” or “uncivilized.” In contrast, the field of private international law (PIL) has, until now, rarely engaged directly with the theme of colonialism (see however the various previous posts on this blog). To be sure, some studies on the development of PIL in the 19th century or on the asymmetrical treatment of cross-border legal relationships do touch upon issues linked to colonialism. However, these works do not place the relationship between PIL and colonialism at the center of their analysis.

This note proposes to revisit PIL in light of its historical relationship with colonialism. It aims to explore the ways in which PIL was developed in a context shaped by deep legal and political inequalities, and to consider how this context informed both the theory and practice of the field. It also aims to highlight the complex role that PIL has played historically, not only as a framework that contributed to the stabilization of unequal relations, but also as an instrument that certain states used to affirm their legal and political autonomy.

 

I. Why Colonialism Matters to PIL

To begin with, it is important to understand why examining PIL in light of colonialism is both relevant and necessary.

 

1. Explanatory Value

First, studying the historical links between PIL and colonialism allows us to better understand how the field developed. As is commonly known, PIL claims to rest on the principles of equal sovereignty and neutral legal reasoning. However, this conventional understanding of PIL is incomplete. In reality, PIL particularly developed during a period when global relations were anything but equal. The nineteenth century, which saw the rapid expansion of colonial powers across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, was also the period during which many of the foundational premises and principles of PIL took shape. Accordingly, while PIL may appear neutral and universal in theory, its development was deeply embedded in a historical context shaped by colonial expansion and domination. This context was characterized, both in law and in practice, by profound asymmetries in power that underpinned the very structures of colonial rule. Understanding this historical backdrop sheds light on how PIL has developed to become the discipline that we know today.

 

2. Inclusiveness and Diversity in Legal Scholarship

Second, analyzing PIL through the lens of colonial history encourages a broader and more inclusive understanding of the field. Traditional narratives have privileged European (Western) legal thought, focusing on figures such as Huber, Story, Savigny, and many others. However, other regions also experienced legal developments that shaped their approaches to cross-border legal issues. It must be admitted that these developments have been often largely overlooked or simply dismissed. Paying attention to these neglected histories can open the way for a richer and more diverse understanding of what PIL is and can be.

 

3. Relevance for Contemporary Practice

Third, reflecting on these issues helps illuminate the traces of these historical patterns that may persist in current legal practices often in a hidden form under “universal” and/or “neutral” approaches. Even today, some assumptions embedded in PIL may reflect older hierarchies. For example, recent tendencies towards lex forism to the detriment of the law that is most closely connected to the case, or the expansive use of public policy or overriding mandatory rules may reproduce asymmetries that have long histories. In some areas, such as the regulation of transnational business and human rights, rules that appear neutral may obscure power relations rooted in earlier eras or based on old-fashioned conceptions. Rather than undermining PIL’s relevance, recognizing the background of such dynamics enables a better adaptation of this field to present realities.

 

II. Scope of Analyses

The focus here is on the traditional form of conflict-of-law issues that arise between “sovereign” states, even though these relations were often marked by legal inequality, as reflected in the structure of colonial domination. It does not deal with the classical question of “colonial conflict of laws” in the strict sense, that is, legal conflicts arising from the coexistence of multiple legal orders within a single political entity composed of the metropole and its colonized territories. Such a “conflict” arose as a result of annexation (such as the annexation of Algeria by France or the acquisition of Taiwan and Korea by Japan) or direct occupation (such as the French occupation of Indochina, or the Dutch occupation of Indonesia). This type of conflicts, despite the similarity they may have with the classical conflict of laws, are more appropriately understood as belonging to the domain of “interpersonal law” or “internal (quasi-)private international law”, or what was sometimes referred to as “inter-racial conflict of laws”.

 

III. The Paradox: Legal Equality vs. Colonial Hierarchy

To understand the relationship between PIL and colonialism, we need to briefly consider their respective characteristics and foundational premises.

PIL, as a legal discipline, is concerned with cross-border private legal relations. It deals with matters such as the jurisdiction of courts, the applicable law in transnational disputes, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Its theoretical foundation lies in the idea of sovereign equality and legal neutrality. In this respect, PIL has long been regarded as a technical and neutral discipline providing the rules and mechanisms for resolving private legal disputes involving foreign elements. For much of its development, PIL has maintained an image of formal objectivity and universality, seemingly detached from the political considerations and ideological battles that have shaped other areas of legal thought, although contemporary developments show that this has not always been the case.

Colonialism, on the other hand, rests on the very denial of sovereign equality. Colonialism, broadly defined, refers to systemic domination by one power over another, encompassing political, legal, economic, and cultural dimensions. It creates and institutionalizes structural inequalities between dominating and dominated societies. Colonialism comes in many forms: annexation (e.g., Algeria by France), protectorates (e.g., Tunisia), or semi-colonial arrangements (e.g., Japan, Thailand, Ottman Empire or China under unequal treaties). In this sense, at its core, colonialism was a system of unilateral domination through discourses of civilizational superiority in which one power imposed its authority over another.

Therefore, the fact that PIL, which rests on the idea of sovereign equality, was particularly developed in a colonial context marked inequality and domination, gives rise to a key question: How did PIL, which is premised on equality, coexist with, and arguably help sustain, a global colonial world order defined by legal inequality?

 

IV. The Pre-Colonial Period – From Personality of Law to Legal Hierarchy:

As mentioned above, PIL was shaped and disseminated during the height of colonial expansion in the 19th century. However, before this colonial period, it is worth noting that, in societies with limited external legal interaction (e.g., Tokugawa Japan), PIL was largely absent. In contrast, regions like China or the Ottoman Empire, and even in Europe had systems based on personality of law, where legal norms were tied to an individual’s religion or ethnicity, and disputes involving foreign subjects (usually foreign merchants) administered through forms of consular jurisdiction.

Later, while European countries succeeded in replacing this system with one based on PIL mechanism, the dynamics were quite different under colonial conditions. In places like Japan, the old system of personality of law based on the idea of “extraterritoriality” and “consular jurisdiction” was introduced under foreign pressure, when Japan was effectively forced to abandon its policy of isolation and open up to international commerce within the framework or unequal treaties imposed by Western powers. In regions like the Ottoman Empire and China, this system was not only preserved but exacerbated leading to serious encroachments on legal sovereignty and increasing the dominance of foreign powers over domestic legal and commercial affairs. In all regions, this system was institutionalized by the conclusion of the so-called “capitulations” or “unequal treaties” giving extraterritorial legal and jurisdictional privileges to Western colonial powers, which in some countries has developed to the introduction of foreign courts (e.g. French courts in Tunisia) or mixed courts (e.g. Egypt).

Such an evolution raises an important question: why did European countries, having replaced the system of consular jurisdiction with a PIL-based system among themselves, choose not to apply the same model in their legal dealings with “non-European” countries?

 

V. The “Civilized vs. Uncivilized” Divide

 

1. The Role of PIL in the Formation of the Modern International Order – Asymmetrical treatment based on the notion of “civilization”

In the 19th century, as colonial powers expanded their reach, they also laid the foundations of what became the modern system of international law. Within this framework, the concept of the “family of civilized nations” was used to determine which states could participate in international legal relations on an equal footing, including the application of “private” international law. Legal systems that were seen as having met the standard of “civilization” were granted full recognition under the newly emerged international system. Other states were either excluded or subjected to hierarchical arrangements.

This legal stratification had practical effects. Among “civilized” nations, the principles of PIL (including the applicability of foreign law) applied. But with regard to other nations, these principles were either weakened or suspended. Courts in Europe often refused to recognize laws from countries deemed “non-civilized,” sometimes on grounds such as the rules applicable in the “non-civilized” country could not be categorized as “law” for the purpose of PIL, or its incompatibility with public policy. In this way, PIL developed a dual structure: one that applied fully among recognized sovereigns, and another – if any at all – that applied toward others.

 

2. Extraterritoriality in Practice in “non-Civilized” Countries and the Exclusion of PIL

Outside Europe, one notable feature of legal practice in so-called “non-civilized” countries during the colonial period was the system of extraterritoriality. In these jurisdictions, Western powers maintained consular jurisdiction, which allowed their nationals to be governed not by local law but by their own national legal systems. This arrangement was grounded in the principle of the personality of law and institutionalized through the capitulations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and through unequal treaties in Asia.

While the precise structure and operation of these regimes varied from one country to another, they shared a fundamental feature: legal disputes involving Western nationals were handled, entirely or partially, under Western laws. Rules of PIL were effectively bypassed.

Moreover, originally, consular jurisdiction was limited to citizens and nationals of Western countries. However, over time, it was extended to cover protégés (local individuals granted protection by foreign powers) as well as assimilés (non-European nationals who were treated as European for the purpose of legal protection). This extension further curtailed the jurisdiction of local courts, such as religious, customary, or national courts of the colonized states, which became confined to resolving disputes between locals with no international dimension. By contrast, cases involving Western nationals or their protégés were routinely referred to consular courts, or where existed, to foreign courts (e.g. French courts in Tunisia) and mixed courts (such as those in Egypt).

The inequality embedded in this system was particularly evident in the enforcement of judgments: rulings issued by local courts required exequatur in order to have effect before consular or foreign courts. Meanwhile, judgments rendered by foreign courts, notably those of the colonizing power, were typically recognized and enforced without the need for any such procedure.

 

VI. PIL as a tool for emancipation from colonial chains

Interestingly, in the 20th century, as formerly colonized countries sought to assert their sovereignty, PIL became a means to achieve legal and political recognition. To be accepted as equal members of the international community, these states had to show that their legal systems conformed to the standards expected of “civilized” nations. This included establishing reliable legal institutions, codifying laws, and—crucially—adopting PIL statutes.

Japan’s experience in the late nineteenth century is illustrative. Faced with unequal treaties that limited its sovereignty and imposed extraterritoriality, Japan undertook a sweeping legal reform. In 1898, it adopted a modern PIL statute (the Horei), which played a key role in demonstrating its legal capacity and led to the renegotiation of those treaties. A comparable process took place in Egypt, where the Treaty of Montreux (1937) marked the beginning of a twelve-year transitional period leading to the abolition of consular and mixed jurisdictions. During this time (1937–1949), Egypt undertook major legal reforms aimed at restoring full judicial sovereignty. It was in this context that both the Egyptian Civil Code and the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure were drafted and promulgated in 1949. These codifications included not only substantive and procedural rules, but also incorporated provisions on choice of law, international jurisdiction, and the enforcement of foreign judgments.

 

Conclusion: A Dual Legacy

As the foregoing demonstrates, PIL played a complex and at times contradictory role. It was shaped in a context of inequality, and it often served to justify and perpetuate hierarchical legal relations. Yet it also provided a framework through which some states could engage with and eventually reshape the global legal order. In this dual capacity, PIL reflects both the challenges and possibilities of legal systems operating in a world marked by deep historical asymmetries.

Today, PIL is regarded as a universal framework, taught and applied in jurisdictions around the world. But its history reminds us that legal universality often rests on specific historical and political conditions. By examining how these conditions influenced the formation and application of PIL, we gain a clearer understanding of the discipline and can begin to identify paths toward a more genuinely inclusive and balanced legal system.

Understanding this past is not about assigning blame, but about gaining clarity. By exploring how PIL has operated across different times and contexts, we equip ourselves to improve its capacity to serve all legal systems and individuals fairly. That, in the end, is what will make PIL truly universal.

Written by Yip Man (Professor of Law, Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University)

To bolster Singapore’s position as an international dispute resolution hub, the Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Bill[1] was introduced in Parliament on 14 October 2024 to establish the International Committee of the Singapore International Commercial Court (the SICC), a standalone body, to hear prescribed civil appeals and related proceedings from prescribed foreign jurisdictions.[2] The Bill was passed by Parliament on 12 November 2024. The Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Act 2024 (the “International Committee Act”) is uncommenced.[3]

The establishment of this transnational appeal mechanism followed the signing of a bilateral treaty between the Government of Singapore and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on 20 March 2024. This treaty concerned collaboration between the two jurisdictions on two key matters: 1) the establishment of the Bahrain International Commercial Court (the BICC); and 2) the setting up of a mechanism for appeals from the BICC to be heard by the SICC.[4]  The remit of the International Committee of the SICC is not limited to appeals from the BICC. Arrangements between Singapore and other foreign jurisdictions may be made for appeals on certain class of civil judgments from a court of the originating foreign jurisdiction to lie to Singapore.

A standalone body

The International Committee Act makes clear that the International Committee is not a court of Singapore. Nor does it exercise the judicial power of Singapore. However, the International Committee will leverage ‘the close relationship with the SICC’, for instance, the International Committee proceedings will take place in Singapore and it may use the resources and facilities of the Supreme Court of Singapore.[5]

Constitution

The International Committee will comprise the Chief Justice (who shall be the President of the Committee), the Judges, Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the International Judges of the SICC, as well as ad hoc members drawn from the court of the jurisdiction from which the appeal arose.[6]

Jurisdiction and Powers

Where arrangements have been made between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction for appeals on certain civil matters to lie to Singapore, jurisdiction regulations will be promulgated to give effect to these arrangements (including what jurisdiction and powers the International Committee will have) and designate the International Committee as the appellate body to hear these appeals.[7] In other words, the Act envisages and allows for different collaborative arrangements to be entered into between Singapore and different foreign jurisdictions.[8]The contents of the jurisdictional regulations “will be subject to inter-governmental negotiations”.[9] The International Committee has jurisdiction to decide any question about its own jurisdiction.[10]

 Hearings and Procedure  

Save for contrary provision in the jurisdiction regulations or relevant procedural rules, the International Committee will sit in public.[11]  The Chief Justice may make rules to govern the procedure and practice to be followed by the International Committee and the registry, including matters concerning: documents-based hearings; for the International Committee to sit in private; costs; the means by which facts may be proved and the way in which factual, exert or opinion evidence may be adduced for the proceedings, etc.[12]

Legal Representation

Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers and legal experts registered to appear before the SICC may also appear before the International Committee. The SICC model of registration for foreign lawyers and law experts will be extended to apply to the International Committee. Amendments to the Legal Professional Act 1966 will be made to give effect the aforesaid arrangements.[13]

Enforcement of orders and judgments of the International Committee

A judgment or order of the International Committee on an appeal from a court of a foreign jurisdiction is considered a foreign judgment or order from that foreign jurisdiction.[14] Enforcement of the judgment or order in Singapore will follow the existing rules or mechanisms applicable to that jurisdiction,[15] unless the judgment or order does not have effect under the law of that foreign jurisdiction.[16]

Finality of Decision

To ensure finality, a decision of the International Committee is “final and may not be appealed or reviewed by any court”.[17]

The International Committee of the SICC is expected to be launched very soon. That it is not a Singapore court, and coupled with the fact that foreign judges could be appointed to hear the proceedings, strengthens the positioning of the International Committee as a truly international (Singapore-based) dispute resolution mechanism.

[1]  https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/36-2024/Published/20241014?DocDate=20241014

[2] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/enhancing-singapore-s-offerings-as-an-international-dispute-resolution-hub-with-the-sicc-ic-bill/

[3] https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/SICCICA2024/Uncommenced/20250612233557?DocDate=20241210

[4] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/press-releases/singapore-bahrain-sign-treaty-on-appeals-from-bicc/

[5] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/

[6] The International Committee Act, section 4.

[7] The International Committee Act, section 6.

[8] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 35.

[9] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 25.

[10] The International Committee Act, section 7(2).

[11] The International Committee Act, section 8(2).

[12] The International Committee Act, section 10(2).

[13] The International Committee Act, section 14.

[14] The International Committee Act, section 13(1)(a).

[15] The International Committee Act, section 13(1)(b).

[16] The International Committee Act, section 13(2).

[17] The International Committee Act, section 12. See also https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/, paragraph 28 (it is made clear that the decision of the International Committee may not be reviewed by “any court in Singapore”).

The Ulrik Huber Institute for Private International Law is delighted to announce a special one-day conference entitled:

The Next 25 Years of Private International Law: What Does the World Need?

This conference marks a significant occasion: the celebration of Professor Mathijs ten Wolde’s 25-year tenure as a professor and director of the Ulrik Huber Institute. In honour of his contribution to the field and his mentorship of generations of legal scholars, the event will bring together former PhD students and distinguished colleagues from across the globe to reflect on the future direction of private international law.

Key Themes Include:

• The role of private international law in a changing world;
• Evolving cross-border legal frameworks (e.g. EU Regulations and HccH Conventions);
• Regional vs. global harmonisation efforts;
• The impact of digitalisation;
• New frontiers in family, commercial, IP, transport and procedural law.

We warmly invite all scholars, practitioners and students with an interest in private international law to join us for this day of dialogue and celebration. More information, including the conference programme, is available via the following link: https://www.rug.nl/rechten/agenda/2025/the-next-25-years

Written by Yip Man (Professor of Law, Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University)

To bolster Singapore’s position as an international dispute resolution hub, the Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Bill (the International Committee Bill)[1] was introduced in Parliament on 14 October 2024 to establish the International Committee of the Singapore International Commercial Court (the SICC), a standalone body, to hear prescribed civil appeals and related proceedings from prescribed foreign jurisdictions.[2] The establishment of this transnational appeal mechanism followed the signing of a bilateral treaty between the Government of Singapore and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on 20 March 2024. This treaty concerned collaboration between the two jurisdictions on two key matters: 1) the establishment of the Bahrain International Commercial Court (the BICC); and 2) the setting up of a mechanism for appeals from the BICC to be heard by the SICC.[3] The remit of the International Committee of the SICC is not limited to appeals from the BICC. Arrangements between Singapore and other foreign jurisdictions may be made for appeals on certain class of civil judgments from a court of the originating foreign jurisdiction to lie to Singapore.

A standalone body

The International Committee Bill makes clear that the International Committee, when established, will not be a court of Singapore. Nor will it exercise the judicial power of Singapore. However, the International Committee will leverage ‘the close relationship with the SICC’, for instance, the International Committee proceedings will take place in Singapore and it may use the resources and facilities of the Supreme Court of Singapore.[4]

Constitution

The International Committee will comprise the Chief Justice (who shall be the President of the Committee), the Judges, Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the International Judges of the SICC, as well as ad hoc members drawn from the court of the jurisdiction from which the appeal arose.[5]

Jurisdiction and Powers

Where arrangements have been made between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction for appeals on certain civil matters to lie to Singapore, jurisdiction regulations will be promulgated to give effect to these arrangements (including what jurisdiction and powers the International Committee will have) and designate the International Committee as the appellate body to hear these appeals.[6] In other words, the Bill envisages and allows for different collaborative arrangements to be entered into between Singapore and different foreign jurisdictions.[7] The contents of the jurisdictional regulations “will be subject to inter-governmental negotiations”.[8] The International Committee has jurisdiction to decide any question about its own jurisdiction.[9]

 Hearings and Procedure  

Save for contrary provision in the jurisdiction regulations or relevant procedural rules, the International Committee will sit in public.[10]  The Chief Justice may make rules to govern the procedure and practice to be followed by the International Committee and the registry, including matters concerning: documents-based hearings; for the International Committee to sit in private; costs; the means by which facts may be proved and the way in which factual, exert or opinion evidence may be adduced for the proceedings, etc.[11]

Legal Representation

Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers and legal experts registered to appear before the SICC may also appear before the International Committee. The SICC model of registration for foreign lawyers and law experts will be extended to apply to the International Committee. Amendments to the Legal Professional Act 1966 will be made to give effect the aforesaid arrangements.[12]

Enforcement of orders and judgments of the International Committee

A judgment or order of the International Committee on an appeal from a court of a foreign jurisdiction is considered a foreign judgment or order from that foreign jurisdiction.[13] Enforcement of the judgment or order in Singapore will follow the existing rules or mechanisms applicable to that jurisdiction,[14] unless the judgment or order does not have effect under the law of that foreign jurisdiction.[15]

Finality of Decision

To ensure finality, a decision of the International Committee is “final and may not be appealed or reviewed by any court”.[16]

The International Committee of the SICC is expected to be launched very soon. That it is not a Singapore court, and coupled with the fact that foreign judges could be appointed to hear the proceedings, strengthens the positioning of the International Committee as a truly international (Singapore-based) dispute resolution mechanism.

 

[1]  https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/36-2024/Published/20241014?DocDate=20241014

[2] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/enhancing-singapore-s-offerings-as-an-international-dispute-resolution-hub-with-the-sicc-ic-bill/

[3] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/press-releases/singapore-bahrain-sign-treaty-on-appeals-from-bicc/

[4] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/

[5] The International Committee Bill, section 4.

[6] The International Committee Bill, section 6.

[7] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 35.

[8] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 25.

[9] The International Committee Bill, section 7(2).

[10] The International Committee Bill, section 8(2).

[11] The International Committee Bill, section 10(2).

[12] The International Committee Bill, section 14.

[13] The International Committee Bill, section 13(1)(a).

[14] The International Committee Bill, section 13(1)(b).

[15] The International Committee Bill, section 13(2).

[16] The International Committee Bill, section 12. See also https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/, paragraph 28 (it is made clear that the decision of the International Committee may not be reviewed by “any court in Singapore”).

 

Last month the book The Heroes of the Judicial Periphery: Court Experts, Court Clerks, and Other Actors in the Shadows, edited by Alan Uzelac and Stefaan Voet (Hart/Bloomsbury Publising, 2025) was published. The book highlights the role of perhaps less prominent, but nevertheless important actors in (international) judicial procedures from a national, comparative and/or international perspective.

The European Civil Justice Centre (Erasmus School of Law) hosts a seminar in collaboration with the editors to launch the book on 4th July 2025 from 10-12 CEST.

Discussions on civil justice mostly focus on procedural rules, and the role of courts, parties and lawyers. This book addresses other actors that are often overlooked in academic and policy debates. It assesses the role of court experts, court clerks and court staff, and other actors on the ‘judicial periphery’ who play an important role and often co-determine the pace, outcome, and tone of the judicial process.

The knowledge and skills of experts may be indispensable at times, but it is among the most expensive, complicated and time-consuming means of evidence. The judges adjudicate, but where experts are involved in the process, they have a decisive impact on the outcome of litigation. Therefore, a principal focus of the book is on experts and how they are appointed, managed, and remunerated across Europe and the world.

The editors will discuss topical issues highlighting these ‘actors in the shadows’ and key experts will present their ideas based on the key findings of the book chapters, followed by discussion.

Registration for free here (hosted through Eventbrite)

Speakers & program:

10.00 Opening and welcome: Xandra Kramer

10.05 Alan Uzelac & Stefaan Voet – Heroes of the Judicial Periphery

10.15 Juraj Brozovic – The Case of Judicial Advisors in Croatia

10.30 Camilla Bernt – Expert Evidence in Custody Disputes and Child Protection Cases

10.50 Discussion

11.05 Michael Stürner – Experts on Foreign Law in German Civil Procedure

11.30 Adriani Dori & Xandra Kramer – The Role of Third-Party Funders in the Shadow of the Procedure

11.45 Discussion

 

A book on The New Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union was recently published. The book is edited by Dr. Emmanuel Guinchard (Liverpool John Moores University) and Prof. Carlo Panara (Leicester University) and may be accessed here.

Overview

• Covers the whole spectrum of the new relationship between the UK and the EU
• Contains original discussion and evaluations of the impact of Brexit on UK sovereignty
• Includes both topics covered in the recent agreements and topics that have been left in a grey area

About the book

Brexit has reshuffled the cards of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is a once in a lifetime event, which ended nearly 50 years of EU Membership. EU law as such no longer applies in the United Kingdom and British citizens and companies no longer benefit from its advantages. Part of the previous regime has however been maintained (at times with amendments) through the series of treaties negotiated between the UK and the EU in 2019 and 2020, in particular the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 2020, to which the 2023 Windsor Agreement can be added. The end result is a legal regime which is perhaps even more complex than EU law itself. This book aims to provide the reader with a clarification of this legal regime as well as provide context to it and suggestions to improve it. All key topics are covered, such as citizens of the EU in the UK and British citizens in the EU, trade in goods and in services, criminal justice, public procurement, Northern Ireland, the UK overseas territories, the dispute settlement, security and defence, international trade agreements of the UK post-Brexit, environmental protection, European civil justice, financial services, education and research, and the European offices of the UK local authorities and devolved administrations after Brexit. All the chapters follow, wherever possible, the same triadic structure. The first part looks at the regime prior to Brexit; the second part analyses the current regime; and the third part discusses ongoing and predictable trends. The concluding chapter attempts to identify some themes likely to impact on the forthcoming preparation of the 2026 review.

The European Commission’s recent Omnibus proposes a significant change to the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). Article 29(7) of the original CSDDD requires Member States to implement its rules on civil liability rules so that these rules apply as overriding mandatory provisions, if the law applicable to the claim is not a law of a Member State. The Omnibus package proposes to delete art. 29(7) CSDDD. As a result, Member States will no longer be obliged to implement CSDDD’s rules on liability as overriding mandatory provisions.

The Omnibus

On 26 February 2025 the European Commission presented the so-called Omnibus. It is a proposal to simplify reporting and compliance in the fields of ESG and corporate societal responsibility (COM(2025) 81 final). Subject to approval by the European Parliament and the Council, Member States will have to implement the changes introduced by the Omnibus by 31 December 2025. The updated instruments will be effective from 1 January 2026.

The Omnibus amends several existing instruments, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which entered into force on 25 July 2024. The Omnibus postpones the deadline for the CSDDD’s implementation to 26 July 2027; and the deadline for companies covered by the directive’s scope to be compliant is postponed to 26 July 2028.

CSDDD: civil liability by overriding mandatory provisions

Art. 29 CSDDD provides a harmonised EU uniform liability regime for breaches of due diligence in (cross-border) supply chains. While the CSDDD contains no rules on international jurisdiction (see the blogpost by Ralf Michaels on this matter here), the directive explicitly positions its provisions on civil liability within the conflict of laws. The current text of art. 29(7) CSDDD provides:

Member States shall ensure that the provisions of national law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of a Member State.

This provision requires that Member States implement the directive’s rules on civil liability so that they apply as overriding mandatory provisions (of national substantive law) if the claim is not governed by the law of a Member State. This rationale is also reiterated in Recital 90. The current text of the CSDDD allows for differences within the EU (between Member States’ regimes); these differences would not trigger the application of overriding mandatory provisions. The overriding mandatory character (of any Member State’s national civil liability regime based on the CSDDD) would only manifest itself when the applicable is the law of a third state. It is in relation to the latter situations, that the CSDDD has elevated the civil liability regime to the level of semi-public provisions.

Omnibus: no uniform civil liability regime; not by overriding mandatory provisions

The Omnibus restrains this ambition. Firstly, it contains a proposal to abolish an EU-wide harmonised liability regime. Secondly, it removes Member States’ obligation to implement the (remaining elements of the uniform) liability regime as overriding mandatory provisions. Under the Omnibus:

‘paragraph (12) amends Article 29 of the CSDDD as regards civil liability by deleting paragraph (1), paragraph (3), point (d) and paragraph (7), and changing paragraphs (2), (4) and (5).

• to remove the specific, EU-wide liability regime in the Directive

          (…)

• in view of the different rules and traditions that exist at national level when it comes to allowing representative action, to delete the specific requirement set out in the CSDDD in this regard (…)’
• for the same reason, by deleting the requirement for Member States to ensure that the liability rules are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of the Member State (…)’.

Motivation

The provisions that propose to abandon the EU-wide liability regime, quoted above, refers to the divergence in the regulation of representative actions across the EU Member States. The Explanatory Memorandum included in the Omnibus provides several other reasons of the proposal. One of the main reasons is the aim to reduce the ‘administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, in particular for SMEs’ (small and medium size enterprises). Although the Omnibus package amends instruments that cover primarily large economic players, the simplification aims to prevent a de facto shift of the compliance costs to smaller players, because ‘[t]he ability of the Union to preserve and protect its values depends amongst other things on the capacity of its economy to adapt and compete in an unstable and sometimes hostile geopolitical context,’ as stated in the document with reference to the reports on EU global competitiveness.

Implications

From the perspective of private international law, the original art. 29(7) CSDDD is certainly challenging. It is namely not entirely clear how the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules (based on art. 9 Rome I, and art. 16 Rome II Regulations) would apply to civil liability claims grounded in the rules implementing the directive. Nonetheless, the CSDDD approach might have the potential to open new avenues for further practical and conceptual development of this conflict-of-law doctrine in the future.

Currently, as the Omnibus explicitly rules out the overriding mandatory character of the (remaining parts of) the CSDDD civil liability regime, if the Omnibus is adopted, one would rather not expect from Member States’ legislatives or courts to elevate the regular domestic civil liability rules to the semi-public level of overriding mandatory provisions.

Today the European Commission published its eagerly awaited Commission Report on the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation (also referred to as Brussels I-bis), No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). The Report is accompanied by a Staff Working Document, detailing a number of selected topics addressed in the Report. The documents rely in particular on the extensive Evaluation Study that was published in January 2023 as well as the findings of the JUDGTRUST project and the resulting book.

The Report states that it is ‘generally agreed that the Regulation is a highly successful instrument’ and that the enhancements, including the abolition of the exequatur, have strengthened judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. Its overall ‘clear and simple’ rules are ‘highly appreciated amongst practitioners. The Report also emphasizes the essential role of the CJEU case law in interpreting and applying the rules. While several complex issues require clarification, given the ‘general satisfaction with the operation of the Regulation, any modifications should respond to real practical difficulties and should not lead to an overhaul of the well functioning system of the Regulation’, according to the Commission.

The Report addresses the scope of application laid down in Art. 1  (in particular the exclusion of arbitration) as well as a number of issues in applying Arts. 2 and 3, including definitions (in particular the term ‘judgment’ in relation to provision and protective measures, and definition of ‘court’ referring to the Pula Parking judgment, see here).

As regards the scope of the jurisdiction rules, the much debated issue of the (non) application to third-country defendants and possible extension is addressed. Topics pointed out in relation to the special, alternative jurisdiction rules in Arts. 7-9 include the increasingly broad interpretation of ‘matters relating to a contract’, determining the place of performance  of contractual obligations (Art. 7, para 1), and as regards torts (Art. 7, para 2) the often problematic determination of the place of damage of pure financial loss (similar to Rome II Regulation, see also here) and the application of the mosaic principle in cases regarding the violation of privacy rights. As to the latter, reference is also made to the (negative) implication in SLAPP cases and the Anti-SLAPP directive, which was adopted in 2024. A number of issues are pointed out in applying the consumer protective rules in Arts. 17-19, including the notion of ‘consumer’, the phrase ‘directing of commercial activity’, the exclusion of transport contracts as well as their non-applicability in collective redress actions, where cases are brought by a representative organisation. A few minor (formulation) issues in the application of Art 24 on exclusive jurisdiction are pointed out.

As regards the rules on recognition and enforcement, it is concluded that the system of the recast Regulation, which abolished the declaration of enforceability (exequatur) works generally well in practice and has had a positive effect on the costs and workload of courts. The Report refers to a number of CJEU rulings on the application of the public policy exception, including in the cases Diageo Brands, H Limited and most recently, the Real Madrid. The CJEU upheld the restrictive application of the public policy exception, though created room for its application in the latter case in which the violation of a fundamental right under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (freedom of press) was at stake.

Lastly, the Report reflects on the relationship with other instruments (Arts. 67-74), referencing in particular the Lugano Convention, the New York Convention, bilateral conventions of Member States with third states, and the establishment of the “United” (this should be “Unified”) Patent Court.

A number of important horizontal issues that are pointed out are that of the potential problematic application in collective redress cases, as is also clear from a number of rulings of the CJEU, and the impact of digitalisation, including the increase of digital content and blockchain technologies, and the digitalisation of judicial procedures.

In conclusion, the Commission will initiate ‘a formal review of the Regulation in order to consider and potentially prepare a proposal to amend or recast the Regulation in accordance with the Better Regulation rules’. Highlighted topics in this context are:

• (once again) the extension of the rules of jurisdiction to cover defendants not domiciled in a Member State
• provisions on the scope and definitions, in particular the exclusion of arbitration, the notion of ‘court or tribunal‘ and ‘provisional, including protective, measures‘
• simplifying and enhancing the effectiveness of the provisions on jurisdiction, in particular Arts. 7(1) on contracts and 7(2) on torts, as well as those on consumer contracts
• further streamlining and simplifying the rules on recognition and enforcement
• necessary procedural tools in relation to collective redress
• coordination between the Regulation and international instruments, and
• ways to modernise and simplify procedures as part of the digital reform of civil justice systems

To be continued!

Conflictoflaws will organise an online roundtable on designated topics of the report, following the succesful roundtable on Rome II – Stay tuned

The 20th Anniversary Conference of the Journal of Private International Law will take place at the Faculty of Laws of University College London between 11 and 13 September 2025.A

The conference organizers, Ugljesa Grusic (UCL) and Alex Mills (UCL), and the editors of the Journal, Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling) and Jonathan Harris (King’s College London), are pleased to announce that the conference programme is now available on the conference website.

The conference will include, in the customary manner, a mixture of parallel panel sessions (on Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning) and plenary sessions (on Friday).

A limited number of non-speaker tickets and conference dinner tickets are available via the conference website, with early bird fees until 1 July 2025.

EDITORIAL

In an increasingly globalized world—and especially within the framework of a unified market founded on economic freedom and the free movement and establishment of individuals and businesses—international sales have emerged as a cornerstone of the legal and economic order. They are not merely instruments for the acquisition of assets across borders; they also function as a key mechanism for fostering business growth and enhancing competitiveness through the expansion of commercial activity and client networks.
Given their fundamental role, international sales are subject to a broad and multi-layered legal framework at the international level. This complex regulatory landscape gives rise to a number of interpretative and practical challenges, particularly with regard to the interaction and prioritization of overlapping legal norms.
With these considerations in mind, our journal hosted an online event on 1 October 2025, aiming to shed light on the central legal issues surrounding international sales in the current international context. The scholarly contributions presented during that event are now published in this issue, enriched with doctrinal analysis and case law references, in the hope of contributing meaningfully to ongoing academic and professional discourse. It opens with a study by Professor Michael Sturner, Chair of Civil Law, Private & Procedural International Law and Comparative Law at the University of Konstanz and Judge at the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, entitled “The Right to Repair: A New Paradigm in EU Sales Law”. Judge Dimitrios Koulaxizis contributes an article examining “The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Relation to the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations”; Prof. Anastasios Valtoudis, Professor of Civil Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, addresses “Issues Concerning the Preconditions for the Application of the CISG – Delimitation in Light of Directive 2019/771 and Articles 534 et seq. of the Greek Civil Code”; Prof. Eugenia Dacoronia, Professor of Civil Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens, offers a critical reflection on “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – 30 Years On: Their Significance and Comparison with the Provisions of the Greek Civil Code”. The volume also includes the contribution of Associate Professor of Civil Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Timoleon Kosmidis, who explores “Natural Gas Supply: National Legislation and International Commercial Practice”.
The Praefatio of the issue hosts the valuable reflections of Professor Silvia Marino of the University of Insubria/Italy, on the complex issue of lis pendens and related actions in the context of family property disputes under European Union Private International Law (“Lis Pendens and Related Actions in European Union Private International Law on Family Property Issues”).
The case law section features a number of significant judicial decisions. Notably, it includes the important judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 4 October 2024, C-633/22, Real Madrid Club, addressing public policy as a ground for refusing the enforcement of a foreign judgment on account of an infringement of freedom of the press (commented by R. Tsertsidou). Also presented is the ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 29 November 2023, VIII ZR 7/23, which deals with the application of domestic mandatory rules even in the presence of a contractual choice of law, where the contractual relationship lacks a substantial connection to a foreign legal system (commented by N. Zaprianos). From the Greek courts, this issue includes: Athens Court of First Instance, judgment no. 3155/2022, concerning the possibility of reviewing the parties’ freedom to choose the competent court under the rule (Art. 281 grCC) prohibiting of abuse of rights (commented by S. Karameros); Athens Court of Appeal (Single-Member), judgment no. 2435/2024, concerning the recognition of a foreign adoption judgment issued in favor of a same-sex couple (commented by M. Gerasopoulou); and Piraeus Court of First Instance (Single-Member), judgments no. 3355/2023 and 11/2022, regarding the applicable law for the appointment of a special guardian to initiate a paternity challenge, pursuant to the 1996 Hague Convention (commented by G.-A. Georgiadis).
The scientific section of this issue includes a study by Associate Professor V. Kourtis (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), entitled “Issues of Intertemporal Law in Cross-Border Maintenance Claims within the European Area”. It also features the academic contribution of Judges P. Kapelouzos, St. Krassas, and M. Martinis, submitted in the context of the Themis Competition 2023, under the title “May I ‘book’ my forum delicti? Or else: The Objective Limits of Jurisdiction Clauses in Tort Cases”. The issue concludes with the regular quarterly review of the CJEU’s case law covering the period July–September 2024, edited by A. Anthimos.
Lex&Forum renews its scientific appointment with our readers for the next, 16th issue, with the central topic (Focus) on “Cross-border matrimonial and registered partnership property regimes”.

The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) welcomes submissions for its first issue of 2026.

The Call for Papers for this second issue is devoted to Tariffs: Emerging challenges in global trade.

You can find the call with all the details at this link.

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of an abstract (around 800 words) or draft articles to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it within 10 July 2025. The publication of the issue is set for the end of March, 2026.

For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, you can contact us by email at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

At the occasion on 5 June of the PhD Defence of Leontine Bruijnen on How can Private International Law bridge the Gap between the Recognition of Unknown Family Relations such as Kafala and Child Marriage for Family Law and Migration Law Purposes? , we are organising an expert seminar at the University of Antwerp and online:

Child marriage: root causes and questions of recognition:

11.00: Welcome and introduction by Thalia Kruger, University of Antwerp

11.10: The Role of Customs and Traditions in Addressing Child Marriages in Tanzania: A Human Rights-Based Approach, by Esther Kayamba, Mzumbe University and University of Antwerp

11.25: The link between climate change and child marriage in Tanzania, by Agripina Mbilinyi, Mzumbe University and University of Antwerp

11.40: Socio-cultural factors that Sustain Child Marriage at Quarit Wereda, Amhara Region, Ethiopia by Yitaktu Tibetu, Human Rights Lawyer, Senior Gender Adviser and councillor psychologist

12.00: Perspective from Europe by Bettina Heiderhoff, University of Münster and Trui Daem, PhD researcher Ghent University

12.20: Debate and Q&A

12.50: End

To register, please contact Thalia Kruger