Droit international général

On 18 June 2025 the European Commission opened an infringement procedure under Article 258 of the TFEU against Malta (INFR(2025)2100), alleging that Malta is failing to comply with its obligations under the Brussels I bis Regulation with respect to litigation in matters related to gambling. Following the formal notice sent by the Commission, the Maltese […]

The French Cour de Cassation will host a conference on the recast of the Brussels I bis Regulation on Monday, 23 June 2025, from 3.30 pm to 6.30 pm. The conference is organised by Marie-Elodie Ancel (University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas) and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), following the 2023-2024 seminar series on the recast of […]

It is a real pleasure to share a new essay by Professor Symeon C. Symeonides, written on the occasion of his retirement after fifty remarkable years in the field of conflict of laws. The essay, eloquently titled Reflections from Fifty Years in the Conflicts Vineyard, was presented as part of a symposium held in his honor in May 2024 at Willamette University College of Law, and sponsored by the AALS Section on Conflict of Laws.

The abstract of the essay reads:

This essay was written on the occasion of a Symposium titled “50 Years in the Conflicts Vineyard,” which was held in the author’s honor in May 2024 at Willamette University Law School and sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. For this reason, the essay is inevitably autobiographical. The author reflects on some transformative events that occurred during his fifty-year labor in teaching, writing, and legislating in the field of conflict of laws, the teachers, mentors, and authors who have influenced him, and the lessons he has learned.

The essay is inevitably personal — and all the more moving for it. Professor Symeonides takes the reader not only through some of the transformative moments in his five-decade career, as described in the abstract, but also through the challenges, passions, joys, and moments of sorrow that have marked both his personal and professional life.

As he writes:

“Fifty years of anything is a long time. Fifty years in conflicts law, if you love this field as much as I do, feels like a walk in the park. That is how I feel about my fifty years of laboring in this vineyard. It’s been a great ride.”

Reading this piece felt like yet another walk in the park with him, a chance to discover meaningful moments from his life and his extraordinary career as a giant in the field. Readers will undoubtedly find many passages that catch their attention or resonate with their own experiences.

On a personal note, I first discovered Professor Symeonides’ work as a master’s student in Tunisia. I remember copying Part II on jurisdiction and foreign judgments of his book Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, International – Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn., 1998), co-authored with Wendy Collins Perdue and Arthur von Mehren, and trying hard to learn from it. It was difficult, since – as a Tunisian student – I was not used to the casebook style. But from that moment on, I began following Professor Symeonides’ scholarship. His writings have long served as a source of insight and inspiration (see on this blog, Ralf Michaels, Symeonides’ 30th (and last) Annual Survey of Choice of Law).

The essay offers much to reflect on, but one detail stood out to me in particular: Professor Symeonides – together with another Conflict “Gentile Giant”, the late Professor von Mehren – once commented on a draft of the 1998 Tunisian Code of Private International Law (see p. 17, fn. 66). This is something I could not have imagined even in my wildest dreams. As someone with a deep interest in this area, that historical note meant a great deal to me.

My warmest thanks to Symeon for sharing this piece, and – more broadly – for the inspiration, kindness, and intellectual generosity he has shown throughout his extraordinary career.

 

Béligh Elbalti

The author of this post is Rob Rooman, PhD Researcher at KULeuven. Ever since its adoption, the future of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence (hereinafter, the CS3D) has been unsure. The Directive in general is facing significant political resistance, and […]

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

X v Y ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2025:1020 at the court of Den Haag, acting upon appeal is an interesting ‘residual’ application of the Rome I Regulation 593/2008 and an excellent case to appreciate ordre public.

The parties had married in Iran in 2009. The divorce was established by the courts at The Hague in 2022. Jurisdiction is established under Regulation 2016/1103 (‘Rome IVa) and [5.1], with respect to the dower, under residual Dutch law.

The first instance court held that no lis pendens could be accepted with concurrent divorce proceedings in Iran, due to there not being a recognition Treaty with Iran under which any Iranian finding can be recognised and enforced in The Netherlands. This part of the ruling had not been appealed.

The court also held that the parties’ prenuptial arrangements must be enforced, and that ordre public considerations do not prevent that.

The prenup gave the wife a 50% share in the husband’s estate, unless it was the wife who initiated divorce proceedings; and it included the husband’s dower arrangements, consisting of a (modest) cash payment and additionally 150 Bahar-Azadi gold coins. Payment is indeed by way of dower and not dowry as I had first erroneously reported on X, Bluesky and Linkedin. Thank you Béligh Elbalti for pointing out that a dowry is property or money brought by a bride to her husband or his family at the time of marriage. Islamic law seemingly does not recognise dowry. But it does recognise a dower: property or money provided by a husband for his wife.

The first instance court argued that ordre public must be applied in ad hoc fashion rather than across the board; that the wife had negotiated a pre-nup which canceled out the ordinarily applicable rule that spouses do not share their property, instead each keeping their separate property, both that brought into the marriage and that acquired before it; that therefore if the wife initiated the divorce, she was brought back to the situation as exists had there not been a prenup (and the same situation which applied to the man at any rate); and that the Dutch legal order’s objection to the pressure the man may therefore put on the wife to initiate the divorce, is not of such an intense nature as to offend ordre public. 

As for the dower, the first instance court held that 110 coins be paid immediately and a further 40 when the ex-husband’s financial arrangements so allow: this followed from the application of Iranian law, as clarified by expert report,  that any dower above 110 coins may be postponed to take account of the husband’s financial situation. 

The appeal court looked at the applicable law issue from a more explicit international /European angle than the first instance court.

For the matrimonial property issue (the 50% issue), the court, like the parties, applies the 1978 Hague Convention. Consequently Iranian law applies. Rather than the first instance court’s assessment of ordre public viz the Dutch provisions on same, the appeal court tests it against Article 14 of the Hague Convention, yet it comes to the same conclusion. Like the first instance court it does so with much reference to the standard Iranian practice. [5.10] ff it holds obiter that even if the provision were to offend Dutch ordre public, the impact of that finding would give the wife an inalienable right to 50% of the husband’s share (not reciprocated for the husband) which in turn would offend ordre public for it would go directly against Iranian law’s intention both party autonomy and protection for the wife: viz that latter element the court points out that in accordance with the applicable Dutch law provisions for maintenance, the wife will be looked after, on top of the dower entitlement which the court addresses next, [5.13] ff:

Rome I A1(2)b excludes “obligations arising out of family relationships and relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have comparable effects, including maintenance obligations” and in (c) it excludes “obligations arising out of matrimonial property regimes, property regimes of relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have comparable effects to marriage, and wills and succession”.

The dower element of the claim in the case clearly is not covered by Rome I itself. However The Netherlands, like for instance Belgium, applies Rome I ‘even when it does not apply’ – as long the dower can be considered a contract under the relevant Dutch PrivIntLaw provision (not: the Rome I autonomous interpretation) which the court [5.14] holds it is. [5.17] That the cash payments have been made, is not contested.

The husband claims that the wife divorced him by khul, or khula, with relinquishment of the dower. The court [5.21] disagrees. The divorce is subject to Dutch law, which does not have a khul-type procedure. As for the ordre public arguments under Dutch law (which apply here; contrary to the matriomonial property issues where as noted above, the Hague Convention applies) the appeal court confirms the lower court’s findings. A dower is part and parcel of Iranian law. The case at hand does not offend Dutch ordre public with such intensity that payment of the dower must be dismissed.

[5.21] finally the court holds that parties do not consider that the dower payments of the gold coins are covered by Iranian export sanctions.

An interesting case.

Geert.

1/2 Interesting application of Rome I to dowry per Iranian marriageRome applies residually despite exclusion of family property law: Dutch PrivIntLaw revives itNo ordre public objection to payment in fullNo relinquishment by wife seeing as Dutch law, applicable to the divorce,

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-06-14T07:46:05.099Z

In light of the Commission’s report on the Brussels Ia Regulation (first discussed here by Xandra Kramer), ConflictofLaws.net will be hosting an ad-hoc virtual roundtable

on Tuesday, 8 July 2025, 12pm–1.30pm (CEST).

The conversation will focus on the report published by the Commission on 2 June and its implications for a possible future reform of the Regulation.

The event will feature the following panellists:

Andrew Dickinson
University of Oxford

Stefano Dominelli
University of Genoa

Pietro Franzina
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan

Thalia Kruger
University of Antwerp

Tobias Lutzi
University of Augsburg

Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.

Warmest congratulations to Dr. Carlos Santaló Goris on the publication of his book, The Application of the European Account Preservation Order in Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. A Comparative-Empirical Analysis (Nomos, 2025).

This scholarly work offers a timely and much-needed exploration of the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO), the first cross-border civil interim measure at EU level. Conceived to enable the provisional attachment of debtors’ bank accounts across Member States, the EAPO aspires to procedural uniformity. Yet, as this study so lucidly demonstrates, its application remains deeply embedded in national procedural systems, giving rise to significant divergences and legal complexity.

With admirable clarity, analytical depth, and empirical rigour, Dr. Santaló Goris leads the reader through this intricate legal terrain. By examining, in particular, the operation of the EAPO in three distinct jurisdictions – Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain – his manuscript illustrates the practical challenges posed by procedural fragmentation while offering valuable guidance for navigating the instrument across legal systems.

This manuscript stands out as a thoughtful and impactful contribution to the field of European civil procedure. What distinguishes it most is its remarkable ability to bridge legal theory and judicial practice. Through a combination of comparative analysis, stakeholder perspectives, and data-driven insights, it offers a comprehensive and balanced account of how the European Account Preservation Order operates in practice, making it an indispensable resource for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike.

Congratulations, Carlos, on this well-deserved accomplishment!

More information on this book is available here.

The author of this post is Nishat Hyder-Rahman, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, MSCA Impact Fellowship Programme, Department of Private and Economic Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.  She is also a volunteer researcher at GlobalARRK and presented findings from the GlobalARRK report in panel 2 of the conference. The views expressed in this post are the author’s own, […]

The Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen is organising a webinar on Cross-Border Protection of Children under the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention: Practical Perspectives from Contracting States. The event will be held on 30 June & 1 July and is part of a research project led by Professor Katarina Trimmings, which evaluates the effectiveness of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention in the UK and other Contracting States. See webinar registration and further details Cross-Border Protection of Children: The 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention | School of Law – University of Aberdeen This research project examines the legal framework for the cross-border protection of children, focusing on the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (‘the 1996 Hague Convention’). www.abdn.ac.uk

Last week (7 June 2025), I had this extraordinary opportunity to give a presentation at the 138th Annual Conference of the Japanese Association of Private International Law, which took place at Seinan Gakuin Daigaku, Fukuoka – Japan. The theme of my presentation was “Private International Law and Colonialism.” In this talk, I shared some preliminary thoughts on a topic that is both extraordinarily rich and complex. The following note offers some initial reflections based on that presentation (with a few adjustments) with the aim of contributing to ongoing discussion and encouraging deeper reflection.

 

Introduction

The relationship between colonialism and law has been the subject of active debate across various fields, including legal anthropology and comparative law. Key themes include the impact of colonial rule on legal systems in colonized regions, the inherently violent nature of colonialism, and the possibilities for decolonization. This relationship has also received particular attention in the field of international law. Numerous studies have examined how colonialism shaped the very structure of the international legal order, as well as the theoretical justifications for its expansion into regions regarded as “non-Western” or “uncivilized.” In contrast, the field of private international law (PIL) has, until now, rarely engaged directly with the theme of colonialism (see however the various previous posts on this blog). To be sure, some studies on the development of PIL in the 19th century or on the asymmetrical treatment of cross-border legal relationships do touch upon issues linked to colonialism. However, these works do not place the relationship between PIL and colonialism at the center of their analysis.

This note proposes to revisit PIL in light of its historical relationship with colonialism. It aims to explore the ways in which PIL was developed in a context shaped by deep legal and political inequalities, and to consider how this context informed both the theory and practice of the field. It also aims to highlight the complex role that PIL has played historically, not only as a framework that contributed to the stabilization of unequal relations, but also as an instrument that certain states used to affirm their legal and political autonomy.

 

I. Why Colonialism Matters to PIL

To begin with, it is important to understand why examining PIL in light of colonialism is both relevant and necessary.

 

1. Explanatory Value

First, studying the historical links between PIL and colonialism allows us to better understand how the field developed. As is commonly known, PIL claims to rest on the principles of equal sovereignty and neutral legal reasoning. However, this conventional understanding of PIL is incomplete. In reality, PIL particularly developed during a period when global relations were anything but equal. The nineteenth century, which saw the rapid expansion of colonial powers across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, was also the period during which many of the foundational premises and principles of PIL took shape. Accordingly, while PIL may appear neutral and universal in theory, its development was deeply embedded in a historical context shaped by colonial expansion and domination. This context was characterized, both in law and in practice, by profound asymmetries in power that underpinned the very structures of colonial rule. Understanding this historical backdrop sheds light on how PIL has developed to become the discipline that we know today.

 

2. Inclusiveness and Diversity in Legal Scholarship

Second, analyzing PIL through the lens of colonial history encourages a broader and more inclusive understanding of the field. Traditional narratives have privileged European (Western) legal thought, focusing on figures such as Huber, Story, Savigny, and many others. However, other regions also experienced legal developments that shaped their approaches to cross-border legal issues. It must be admitted that these developments have been often largely overlooked or simply dismissed. Paying attention to these neglected histories can open the way for a richer and more diverse understanding of what PIL is and can be.

 

3. Relevance for Contemporary Practice

Third, reflecting on these issues helps illuminate the traces of these historical patterns that may persist in current legal practices often in a hidden form under “universal” and/or “neutral” approaches. Even today, some assumptions embedded in PIL may reflect older hierarchies. For example, recent tendencies towards lex forism to the detriment of the law that is most closely connected to the case, or the expansive use of public policy or overriding mandatory rules may reproduce asymmetries that have long histories. In some areas, such as the regulation of transnational business and human rights, rules that appear neutral may obscure power relations rooted in earlier eras or based on old-fashioned conceptions. Rather than undermining PIL’s relevance, recognizing the background of such dynamics enables a better adaptation of this field to present realities.

 

II. Scope of Analyses

The focus here is on the traditional form of conflict-of-law issues that arise between “sovereign” states, even though these relations were often marked by legal inequality, as reflected in the structure of colonial domination. It does not deal with the classical question of “colonial conflict of laws” in the strict sense, that is, legal conflicts arising from the coexistence of multiple legal orders within a single political entity composed of the metropole and its colonized territories. Such a “conflict” arose as a result of annexation (such as the annexation of Algeria by France or the acquisition of Taiwan and Korea by Japan) or direct occupation (such as the French occupation of Indochina, or the Dutch occupation of Indonesia). This type of conflicts, despite the similarity they may have with the classical conflict of laws, are more appropriately understood as belonging to the domain of “interpersonal law” or “internal (quasi-)private international law”, or what was sometimes referred to as “inter-racial conflict of laws”.

 

III. The Paradox: Legal Equality vs. Colonial Hierarchy

To understand the relationship between PIL and colonialism, we need to briefly consider their respective characteristics and foundational premises.

PIL, as a legal discipline, is concerned with cross-border private legal relations. It deals with matters such as the jurisdiction of courts, the applicable law in transnational disputes, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Its theoretical foundation lies in the idea of sovereign equality and legal neutrality. In this respect, PIL has long been regarded as a technical and neutral discipline providing the rules and mechanisms for resolving private legal disputes involving foreign elements. For much of its development, PIL has maintained an image of formal objectivity and universality, seemingly detached from the political considerations and ideological battles that have shaped other areas of legal thought, although contemporary developments show that this has not always been the case.

Colonialism, on the other hand, rests on the very denial of sovereign equality. Colonialism, broadly defined, refers to systemic domination by one power over another, encompassing political, legal, economic, and cultural dimensions. It creates and institutionalizes structural inequalities between dominating and dominated societies. Colonialism comes in many forms: annexation (e.g., Algeria by France), protectorates (e.g., Tunisia), or semi-colonial arrangements (e.g., Japan, Thailand, Ottman Empire or China under unequal treaties). In this sense, at its core, colonialism was a system of unilateral domination through discourses of civilizational superiority in which one power imposed its authority over another.

Therefore, the fact that PIL, which rests on the idea of sovereign equality, was particularly developed in a colonial context marked inequality and domination, gives rise to a key question: How did PIL, which is premised on equality, coexist with, and arguably help sustain, a global colonial world order defined by legal inequality?

 

IV. The Pre-Colonial Period – From Personality of Law to Legal Hierarchy:

As mentioned above, PIL was shaped and disseminated during the height of colonial expansion in the 19th century. However, before this colonial period, it is worth noting that, in societies with limited external legal interaction (e.g., Tokugawa Japan), PIL was largely absent. In contrast, regions like China or the Ottoman Empire, and even in Europe had systems based on personality of law, where legal norms were tied to an individual’s religion or ethnicity, and disputes involving foreign subjects (usually foreign merchants) administered through forms of consular jurisdiction.

Later, while European countries succeeded in replacing this system with one based on PIL mechanism, the dynamics were quite different under colonial conditions. In places like Japan, the old system of personality of law based on the idea of “extraterritoriality” and “consular jurisdiction” was introduced under foreign pressure, when Japan was effectively forced to abandon its policy of isolation and open up to international commerce within the framework or unequal treaties imposed by Western powers. In regions like the Ottoman Empire and China, this system was not only preserved but exacerbated leading to serious encroachments on legal sovereignty and increasing the dominance of foreign powers over domestic legal and commercial affairs. In all regions, this system was institutionalized by the conclusion of the so-called “capitulations” or “unequal treaties” giving extraterritorial legal and jurisdictional privileges to Western colonial powers, which in some countries has developed to the introduction of foreign courts (e.g. French courts in Tunisia) or mixed courts (e.g. Egypt).

Such an evolution raises an important question: why did European countries, having replaced the system of consular jurisdiction with a PIL-based system among themselves, choose not to apply the same model in their legal dealings with “non-European” countries?

 

V. The “Civilized vs. Uncivilized” Divide

 

1. The Role of PIL in the Formation of the Modern International Order – Asymmetrical treatment based on the notion of “civilization”

In the 19th century, as colonial powers expanded their reach, they also laid the foundations of what became the modern system of international law. Within this framework, the concept of the “family of civilized nations” was used to determine which states could participate in international legal relations on an equal footing, including the application of “private” international law. Legal systems that were seen as having met the standard of “civilization” were granted full recognition under the newly emerged international system. Other states were either excluded or subjected to hierarchical arrangements.

This legal stratification had practical effects. Among “civilized” nations, the principles of PIL (including the applicability of foreign law) applied. But with regard to other nations, these principles were either weakened or suspended. Courts in Europe often refused to recognize laws from countries deemed “non-civilized,” sometimes on grounds such as the rules applicable in the “non-civilized” country could not be categorized as “law” for the purpose of PIL, or its incompatibility with public policy. In this way, PIL developed a dual structure: one that applied fully among recognized sovereigns, and another – if any at all – that applied toward others.

 

2. Extraterritoriality in Practice in “non-Civilized” Countries and the Exclusion of PIL

Outside Europe, one notable feature of legal practice in so-called “non-civilized” countries during the colonial period was the system of extraterritoriality. In these jurisdictions, Western powers maintained consular jurisdiction, which allowed their nationals to be governed not by local law but by their own national legal systems. This arrangement was grounded in the principle of the personality of law and institutionalized through the capitulations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and through unequal treaties in Asia.

While the precise structure and operation of these regimes varied from one country to another, they shared a fundamental feature: legal disputes involving Western nationals were handled, entirely or partially, under Western laws. Rules of PIL were effectively bypassed.

Moreover, originally, consular jurisdiction was limited to citizens and nationals of Western countries. However, over time, it was extended to cover protégés (local individuals granted protection by foreign powers) as well as assimilés (non-European nationals who were treated as European for the purpose of legal protection). This extension further curtailed the jurisdiction of local courts, such as religious, customary, or national courts of the colonized states, which became confined to resolving disputes between locals with no international dimension. By contrast, cases involving Western nationals or their protégés were routinely referred to consular courts, or where existed, to foreign courts (e.g. French courts in Tunisia) and mixed courts (such as those in Egypt).

The inequality embedded in this system was particularly evident in the enforcement of judgments: rulings issued by local courts required exequatur in order to have effect before consular or foreign courts. Meanwhile, judgments rendered by foreign courts, notably those of the colonizing power, were typically recognized and enforced without the need for any such procedure.

 

VI. PIL as a tool for emancipation from colonial chains

Interestingly, in the 20th century, as formerly colonized countries sought to assert their sovereignty, PIL became a means to achieve legal and political recognition. To be accepted as equal members of the international community, these states had to show that their legal systems conformed to the standards expected of “civilized” nations. This included establishing reliable legal institutions, codifying laws, and—crucially—adopting PIL statutes.

Japan’s experience in the late nineteenth century is illustrative. Faced with unequal treaties that limited its sovereignty and imposed extraterritoriality, Japan undertook a sweeping legal reform. In 1898, it adopted a modern PIL statute (the Horei), which played a key role in demonstrating its legal capacity and led to the renegotiation of those treaties. A comparable process took place in Egypt, where the Treaty of Montreux (1937) marked the beginning of a twelve-year transitional period leading to the abolition of consular and mixed jurisdictions. During this time (1937–1949), Egypt undertook major legal reforms aimed at restoring full judicial sovereignty. It was in this context that both the Egyptian Civil Code and the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure were drafted and promulgated in 1949. These codifications included not only substantive and procedural rules, but also incorporated provisions on choice of law, international jurisdiction, and the enforcement of foreign judgments.

 

Conclusion: A Dual Legacy

As the foregoing demonstrates, PIL played a complex and at times contradictory role. It was shaped in a context of inequality, and it often served to justify and perpetuate hierarchical legal relations. Yet it also provided a framework through which some states could engage with and eventually reshape the global legal order. In this dual capacity, PIL reflects both the challenges and possibilities of legal systems operating in a world marked by deep historical asymmetries.

Today, PIL is regarded as a universal framework, taught and applied in jurisdictions around the world. But its history reminds us that legal universality often rests on specific historical and political conditions. By examining how these conditions influenced the formation and application of PIL, we gain a clearer understanding of the discipline and can begin to identify paths toward a more genuinely inclusive and balanced legal system.

Understanding this past is not about assigning blame, but about gaining clarity. By exploring how PIL has operated across different times and contexts, we equip ourselves to improve its capacity to serve all legal systems and individuals fairly. That, in the end, is what will make PIL truly universal.

In 2024 the French Cour de cassation submitted a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice on a subject with ties to private international law, although none of the questions raised focuses formally on a private international law instrument. The case (C-350/24) is still ongoing. The request explaining the circumstances and legal […]

Written by Yip Man (Professor of Law, Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University)

To bolster Singapore’s position as an international dispute resolution hub, the Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Bill[1] was introduced in Parliament on 14 October 2024 to establish the International Committee of the Singapore International Commercial Court (the SICC), a standalone body, to hear prescribed civil appeals and related proceedings from prescribed foreign jurisdictions.[2] The Bill was passed by Parliament on 12 November 2024. The Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Act 2024 (the “International Committee Act”) is uncommenced.[3]

The establishment of this transnational appeal mechanism followed the signing of a bilateral treaty between the Government of Singapore and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on 20 March 2024. This treaty concerned collaboration between the two jurisdictions on two key matters: 1) the establishment of the Bahrain International Commercial Court (the BICC); and 2) the setting up of a mechanism for appeals from the BICC to be heard by the SICC.[4]  The remit of the International Committee of the SICC is not limited to appeals from the BICC. Arrangements between Singapore and other foreign jurisdictions may be made for appeals on certain class of civil judgments from a court of the originating foreign jurisdiction to lie to Singapore.

A standalone body

The International Committee Act makes clear that the International Committee is not a court of Singapore. Nor does it exercise the judicial power of Singapore. However, the International Committee will leverage ‘the close relationship with the SICC’, for instance, the International Committee proceedings will take place in Singapore and it may use the resources and facilities of the Supreme Court of Singapore.[5]

Constitution

The International Committee will comprise the Chief Justice (who shall be the President of the Committee), the Judges, Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the International Judges of the SICC, as well as ad hoc members drawn from the court of the jurisdiction from which the appeal arose.[6]

Jurisdiction and Powers

Where arrangements have been made between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction for appeals on certain civil matters to lie to Singapore, jurisdiction regulations will be promulgated to give effect to these arrangements (including what jurisdiction and powers the International Committee will have) and designate the International Committee as the appellate body to hear these appeals.[7] In other words, the Act envisages and allows for different collaborative arrangements to be entered into between Singapore and different foreign jurisdictions.[8]The contents of the jurisdictional regulations “will be subject to inter-governmental negotiations”.[9] The International Committee has jurisdiction to decide any question about its own jurisdiction.[10]

 Hearings and Procedure  

Save for contrary provision in the jurisdiction regulations or relevant procedural rules, the International Committee will sit in public.[11]  The Chief Justice may make rules to govern the procedure and practice to be followed by the International Committee and the registry, including matters concerning: documents-based hearings; for the International Committee to sit in private; costs; the means by which facts may be proved and the way in which factual, exert or opinion evidence may be adduced for the proceedings, etc.[12]

Legal Representation

Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers and legal experts registered to appear before the SICC may also appear before the International Committee. The SICC model of registration for foreign lawyers and law experts will be extended to apply to the International Committee. Amendments to the Legal Professional Act 1966 will be made to give effect the aforesaid arrangements.[13]

Enforcement of orders and judgments of the International Committee

A judgment or order of the International Committee on an appeal from a court of a foreign jurisdiction is considered a foreign judgment or order from that foreign jurisdiction.[14] Enforcement of the judgment or order in Singapore will follow the existing rules or mechanisms applicable to that jurisdiction,[15] unless the judgment or order does not have effect under the law of that foreign jurisdiction.[16]

Finality of Decision

To ensure finality, a decision of the International Committee is “final and may not be appealed or reviewed by any court”.[17]

The International Committee of the SICC is expected to be launched very soon. That it is not a Singapore court, and coupled with the fact that foreign judges could be appointed to hear the proceedings, strengthens the positioning of the International Committee as a truly international (Singapore-based) dispute resolution mechanism.

[1]  https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/36-2024/Published/20241014?DocDate=20241014

[2] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/enhancing-singapore-s-offerings-as-an-international-dispute-resolution-hub-with-the-sicc-ic-bill/

[3] https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/SICCICA2024/Uncommenced/20250612233557?DocDate=20241210

[4] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/press-releases/singapore-bahrain-sign-treaty-on-appeals-from-bicc/

[5] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/

[6] The International Committee Act, section 4.

[7] The International Committee Act, section 6.

[8] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 35.

[9] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 25.

[10] The International Committee Act, section 7(2).

[11] The International Committee Act, section 8(2).

[12] The International Committee Act, section 10(2).

[13] The International Committee Act, section 14.

[14] The International Committee Act, section 13(1)(a).

[15] The International Committee Act, section 13(1)(b).

[16] The International Committee Act, section 13(2).

[17] The International Committee Act, section 12. See also https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/, paragraph 28 (it is made clear that the decision of the International Committee may not be reviewed by “any court in Singapore”).

The Ulrik Huber Institute for Private International Law is delighted to announce a special one-day conference entitled:

The Next 25 Years of Private International Law: What Does the World Need?

This conference marks a significant occasion: the celebration of Professor Mathijs ten Wolde’s 25-year tenure as a professor and director of the Ulrik Huber Institute. In honour of his contribution to the field and his mentorship of generations of legal scholars, the event will bring together former PhD students and distinguished colleagues from across the globe to reflect on the future direction of private international law.

Key Themes Include:

• The role of private international law in a changing world;
• Evolving cross-border legal frameworks (e.g. EU Regulations and HccH Conventions);
• Regional vs. global harmonisation efforts;
• The impact of digitalisation;
• New frontiers in family, commercial, IP, transport and procedural law.

We warmly invite all scholars, practitioners and students with an interest in private international law to join us for this day of dialogue and celebration. More information, including the conference programme, is available via the following link: https://www.rug.nl/rechten/agenda/2025/the-next-25-years

On 5 June 2025, the Law Commission of England and Wales published a consultation paper (paper; summary) making proposals for reform on certain rules of private international law that apply in the context of digital assets and electronic trade documents. The Commission also made proposals for reform of section 72 of the Bills of Exchange […]

Written by Yip Man (Professor of Law, Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University)

To bolster Singapore’s position as an international dispute resolution hub, the Singapore International Commercial Court (International Committee) Bill (the International Committee Bill)[1] was introduced in Parliament on 14 October 2024 to establish the International Committee of the Singapore International Commercial Court (the SICC), a standalone body, to hear prescribed civil appeals and related proceedings from prescribed foreign jurisdictions.[2] The establishment of this transnational appeal mechanism followed the signing of a bilateral treaty between the Government of Singapore and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on 20 March 2024. This treaty concerned collaboration between the two jurisdictions on two key matters: 1) the establishment of the Bahrain International Commercial Court (the BICC); and 2) the setting up of a mechanism for appeals from the BICC to be heard by the SICC.[3] The remit of the International Committee of the SICC is not limited to appeals from the BICC. Arrangements between Singapore and other foreign jurisdictions may be made for appeals on certain class of civil judgments from a court of the originating foreign jurisdiction to lie to Singapore.

A standalone body

The International Committee Bill makes clear that the International Committee, when established, will not be a court of Singapore. Nor will it exercise the judicial power of Singapore. However, the International Committee will leverage ‘the close relationship with the SICC’, for instance, the International Committee proceedings will take place in Singapore and it may use the resources and facilities of the Supreme Court of Singapore.[4]

Constitution

The International Committee will comprise the Chief Justice (who shall be the President of the Committee), the Judges, Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the International Judges of the SICC, as well as ad hoc members drawn from the court of the jurisdiction from which the appeal arose.[5]

Jurisdiction and Powers

Where arrangements have been made between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction for appeals on certain civil matters to lie to Singapore, jurisdiction regulations will be promulgated to give effect to these arrangements (including what jurisdiction and powers the International Committee will have) and designate the International Committee as the appellate body to hear these appeals.[6] In other words, the Bill envisages and allows for different collaborative arrangements to be entered into between Singapore and different foreign jurisdictions.[7] The contents of the jurisdictional regulations “will be subject to inter-governmental negotiations”.[8] The International Committee has jurisdiction to decide any question about its own jurisdiction.[9]

 Hearings and Procedure  

Save for contrary provision in the jurisdiction regulations or relevant procedural rules, the International Committee will sit in public.[10]  The Chief Justice may make rules to govern the procedure and practice to be followed by the International Committee and the registry, including matters concerning: documents-based hearings; for the International Committee to sit in private; costs; the means by which facts may be proved and the way in which factual, exert or opinion evidence may be adduced for the proceedings, etc.[11]

Legal Representation

Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers and legal experts registered to appear before the SICC may also appear before the International Committee. The SICC model of registration for foreign lawyers and law experts will be extended to apply to the International Committee. Amendments to the Legal Professional Act 1966 will be made to give effect the aforesaid arrangements.[12]

Enforcement of orders and judgments of the International Committee

A judgment or order of the International Committee on an appeal from a court of a foreign jurisdiction is considered a foreign judgment or order from that foreign jurisdiction.[13] Enforcement of the judgment or order in Singapore will follow the existing rules or mechanisms applicable to that jurisdiction,[14] unless the judgment or order does not have effect under the law of that foreign jurisdiction.[15]

Finality of Decision

To ensure finality, a decision of the International Committee is “final and may not be appealed or reviewed by any court”.[16]

The International Committee of the SICC is expected to be launched very soon. That it is not a Singapore court, and coupled with the fact that foreign judges could be appointed to hear the proceedings, strengthens the positioning of the International Committee as a truly international (Singapore-based) dispute resolution mechanism.

 

[1]  https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/36-2024/Published/20241014?DocDate=20241014

[2] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/enhancing-singapore-s-offerings-as-an-international-dispute-resolution-hub-with-the-sicc-ic-bill/

[3] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/press-releases/singapore-bahrain-sign-treaty-on-appeals-from-bicc/

[4] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/

[5] The International Committee Bill, section 4.

[6] The International Committee Bill, section 6.

[7] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 35.

[8] https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/ paragraph 25.

[9] The International Committee Bill, section 7(2).

[10] The International Committee Bill, section 8(2).

[11] The International Committee Bill, section 10(2).

[12] The International Committee Bill, section 14.

[13] The International Committee Bill, section 13(1)(a).

[14] The International Committee Bill, section 13(1)(b).

[15] The International Committee Bill, section 13(2).

[16] The International Committee Bill, section 12. See also https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/second-reading-speech-by-minister-of-state-murali-pillai-on-sicc-bill/, paragraph 28 (it is made clear that the decision of the International Committee may not be reviewed by “any court in Singapore”).

 

The newest issue of the RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht) has been published. Since 2024, RabelsZ has been an open access publication, with all articles freely available to readers online. The second issue of 2025 contains four German-language articles on comparative and private international law. Here are their titles and English abstracts, […]

The Ulrik Huber Institute for Private International Law will host on 23 June 2025 a one-day conference in English entitled: The Next 25 Years of Private International Law: What Does the World Need? The event is held on the occasion of Mathijs ten Wolde’s 25-year tenure as a professor and director of the Institute and […]

This post was contributed by Fabien Marchadier, who is a professor of private international law at the University of Poitiers. On 28 May 2025, the Cour de cassation delivered its judgment in Real Madrid Club de Fútbol v. Société éditrice Le Monde following the preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union […]

Last month the book The Heroes of the Judicial Periphery: Court Experts, Court Clerks, and Other Actors in the Shadows, edited by Alan Uzelac and Stefaan Voet (Hart/Bloomsbury Publising, 2025) was published. The book highlights the role of perhaps less prominent, but nevertheless important actors in (international) judicial procedures from a national, comparative and/or international perspective.

The European Civil Justice Centre (Erasmus School of Law) hosts a seminar in collaboration with the editors to launch the book on 4th July 2025 from 10-12 CEST.

Discussions on civil justice mostly focus on procedural rules, and the role of courts, parties and lawyers. This book addresses other actors that are often overlooked in academic and policy debates. It assesses the role of court experts, court clerks and court staff, and other actors on the ‘judicial periphery’ who play an important role and often co-determine the pace, outcome, and tone of the judicial process.

The knowledge and skills of experts may be indispensable at times, but it is among the most expensive, complicated and time-consuming means of evidence. The judges adjudicate, but where experts are involved in the process, they have a decisive impact on the outcome of litigation. Therefore, a principal focus of the book is on experts and how they are appointed, managed, and remunerated across Europe and the world.

The editors will discuss topical issues highlighting these ‘actors in the shadows’ and key experts will present their ideas based on the key findings of the book chapters, followed by discussion.

Registration for free here (hosted through Eventbrite)

Speakers & program:

10.00 Opening and welcome: Xandra Kramer

10.05 Alan Uzelac & Stefaan Voet – Heroes of the Judicial Periphery

10.15 Juraj Brozovic – The Case of Judicial Advisors in Croatia

10.30 Camilla Bernt – Expert Evidence in Custody Disputes and Child Protection Cases

10.50 Discussion

11.05 Michael Stürner – Experts on Foreign Law in German Civil Procedure

11.30 Adriani Dori & Xandra Kramer – The Role of Third-Party Funders in the Shadow of the Procedure

11.45 Discussion

 

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

Thank you Alain Devers for alerting us to the Supreme Court’s decision in follow-up of the CJEU judgment in Case C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club  de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA which I discussed here.

On 28 May the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal’s refusal of recognition is annulled, and needs to be reconsidered by a different court of appeal. Its annulment is based squarely on the court of appeal not having properly considered the elements identified by the CJEU. Evidently, the final judgment may still lead to the same result, but will have to be justified differently if that is the route that will be taken.

[33] it notes that the court of appeal had reviewed the substance of the Spanish courts’ findings, in reassessing whether the French journalists and editor had acted with disregard for their professional duties and in reevaluating both the seriousness of their disregard and the impact this had on the aggrieved.

[39] it refers to the court of appeal’s ordre public finding which had not considered the seriousness of the infringement as held by the Spanish courts.

[45] the court of appeal is faulted for not having considered the financial means of the journalist in question, in considering whether the recognition and enforcement would have an impact on free speech: this is one of the criteria the CJEU had held as being relevant.

[51] the same consideration is made viz the newspaper itself.

[57] the court of appeal should have considered, as now instructed by the CJEU, the distinction between the reputation of a legal cq natural person (the former lacking the ‘moral’ element of impacting on the ‘dignity’ of the person).

The CJEU had given very specific instructions to the national judges in cases like these and I am not sure that is the way to go. As Szpunar AG had noted in his Opinion in the case, the relevant CJEU authorities prior to current case hitherto had engaged with procedural law ordre public exceptions, rather than substantive rules such as here fundamental rights. The obvious downside of that route is that national courts may now be tempted nay feel obliged to refer to the CJEU to seek substantive instruction for the ordre public assessment of other rights, too, leading to Kirchberg having to give specific instructions for umpteen scenarios. Not what Brussels Ia intended, me thinks.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.