EAPIL blog

Guillaume Laganière – Professor of Law at the Université du Québec à Montréal – has recently published a monograph (based on his doctoral dissertation) titled Liability for Transboundary Pollution at the Intersection of Public and Private International Law. The book was published by Hart Publishing within its series Hart Monographs in Transnational and International Law.

The publisher informs that:

This book focuses on how public and private international law address civil liability for transboundary pollution. In public international law, civil liability treaties promote the implementation of minimum procedural standards in domestic tort law. This approach implicitly relies on private international law to facilitate civil litigation against transboundary polluters. Yet this connection remains poorly understood. Filling the gap, this book engages in a meaningful dialogue between the two areas and explores how domestic private international law can reflect the policies developed in international environmental law. It begins with an investigation of civil liability in international environmental law. It then identifies preferable rules of civil jurisdiction, foreign judgments and choice of law for environmental damage, using Canadian private international law as a case study and making extensive references to European law. Liability for transboundary pollution is a contentious issue of the law, both in scholarship and practice: international lawyers both private and public as well as environmental lawyers will welcome this important work.

Table of contents may be consulted here.

The EAPIL founding conference is fast approaching! The conference will take place onsite in Aarhus on 2, 3 and 4 June 2022.

Those wishing to attend, are invited to register by 14 April 2022 at the latest. Please do so by filling the form available here. 

Registration fee is 100 Euros. Furthermore, you are very welcome to sign up for the conference dinner.

Law students without a final master degree in law can participate at a fee of 30 Euros (conference, including lunch and reception) and must register on the above link. If students wish to participate in the conference dinner, the separate conference dinner fee applies (see the registration link).

Participants who have previously chosen to transfer their registration/fee to the 2021 conference have been contacted directly by e-mail and offered to transfer their registration to 2022 or be reimbursed.

As there are other events in Aarhus during the days of the conference, it is strongly recommended that hotel reservations are made soon. Here are some suggestions in this regard.

This post was contributed by Guillaume Payan, who is Law Professor at the University of Toulon.

Under the direction of its president, Marc Schmitz, the International Union of Judicial Officers (UIHJ) has edited a code, published by Bruylant, on digital enforcement (Global Code of Digital Enforcement). This Global Code was officially presented at the 24th World Congress of this organisation, held in Dubai in November 2021 (as announced here).

The result of the work of the Scientific Council of the UIHJ, this Global Code is an extension of the Global Code of Enforcement published in 2015, dealing with very current issues related to the dematerialization of debtors’ assets.

As designed by the UIHJ, the Global Code of Digital Enforcement is not legally binding. Nevertheless, there is reason to think that it will have concrete consequences in national law and on the work of intergovernmental organisations. It promotes a balanced enforcement system, by defining global enforcement standards that respect fundamental rights.

Although it essentially provides for substantive rules, the issues of private international law are not ignored, in particular regarding the applicable law to enforcement and the international jurisdiction of enforcement agents.

One of the great interests of this publication is to address the interaction between enforcement procedures and the digitalisation of Justice from all its angles. Thus, not only are dematerialised enforcement procedures considered, but also the use of enforcement procedures on digital assets. As such, the issue of the seizure of crypto-assets is dealt with in a very timely manner.

Available in both French and English, the Global Code of Digital Enforcement is structured in 7 parts, which are preceded by a Preamble which clearly sets out the context of the work (“Enforcement in the digital age”).

The first two articles relate to “respect for fundamental rights” and respect for “the ethical principles of digital use”, such as respect for human dignity, non-discrimination or even respect for personal data. This choice must be approved because digitalisation should only be considered as a tool in the service of rights that are prior and superior to it. In other words, this digitalisation should not be an end in itself and can only be conceived with respect for human rights. There are also a series of guarantees aimed at protecting against the risks associated with the use of artificial intelligence. For example, the code establishes a right to appeal to a judge in order to sanction an irregularity, to control the proportionality of an enforcement measure or to compensate a damage. In addition, there are obligations imposed on various parties (e.g. foreign enforcement agents, debtors, third parties) to cooperate in enforcement.

The principle is that identified and accessible digital assets are seized in accordance with the law of their location, in compliance with the principle of territoriality of enforceability. With regard to unidentified or inaccessible digital assets, it is recommended to apply the law of the State that controls or ordered the enforcement.

The main idea here is to allow enforcement agents to use digital tools to carry out their activities. With good reason, the question of access to information on the debtor’s assets is considered in a comprehensive manner (in particular, access to dematerialised registers and the use of drones).

After outlining the general principles (such as the creation of dematerialised seizures, while maintaining physical non-digital seizures), the focus here is also on electronic access to data. To ensure efficiency, the possibility of electronic auctions is established. The rights of the parties are nevertheless preserved based on provisions relating to the security of digital procedures (e.g. secure cross-border communication).

In order to be able to carry out enforcement on digital assets, the procedures for locating and seizing them must be adapted. In this regard, it is specified, for example, that national laws should define seizure procedures adapted to digital assets and regulate their legal regime.

Artificial intelligence is intended to help enforcement agents to assess the appropriate enforcement measures. While guaranteeing the right to appeal to a judge to compensate any damage suffered during an automated enforcement, it is important to allow the enforcement agents the possibility of setting up a “smart enforcement” mechanism. The use of blockchain technology is also key for the enforcement agents, together with the debtor and the creditor, to set up an automated process of compulsory enforcement, particularly when payments are made by cryptocurrency.

Access to crypto-assets and the procedure for seize crypto-assets are successively detailed. For example, it is recommended to create a national crypto-assets register and an obligation for the debtor to declare his crypto-assets to the enforcement agent in charge of enforcement. In addition, a distinction is made between the seizure of crypto-assets in the hands of a third party (e.g. exchange platform) or the seizure in the hands of the debtor.

The VIII Congress of Private International Law of the University Carlos III of Madrid will take place on 12 and 13 May 2022. It will be devoted to Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction.

Those interested in presenting a paper are invited to submit the title of the paper and an abstract of a maximum of 800 words before 10 April 2022 at Congresodipr@uc3m.es.

The selected papers may also be published in the online journal Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional.

Further information on the Congress is available here.

Stefan Grundmann (Professor of Transnational Law and Theory at the European University Institute, Florence, and Professor of Private and Business Law at Humboldt-University, Berlin) and Mateusz Grochowshi (Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, and Fellow at the Information Society Project, Yale Law School) edited a book on European Contract Law and the Creation of Norms that has just been published with Intersentia.

The works contained in this volume sketch a broad landscape of sources of modern contract law, with a particular focus on European private law rules. With this the contributions seek to provide a better understanding of the identity of present-day contract law through an analysis of the multitude of social and economic dynamics that shape the normative landscape.

The blurb of the book reads as follows:

The book provides a broad and topical perspective of the sources of modern contract law. It examines the creation of contract law as a multi-pronged occurrence that involves diverse types of normative content and various actors. The book encompasses both a classical perspective on contract law as a state-created edifice and also delves into the setting of contractual rules by non-state actors. In so doing, the volume thoroughly analyses present-day developments to make sense of shifting attitudes towards the overall regulatory paradigm of contract law and those that reshape the classic view of the sources of contract law. The latter concerns, in particular, the digitalisation of markets and growing trends towards granularisation and personalisation of rules.

The book builds on the EU private law perspective as its primary point of reference. At the same time, its reach goes far beyond this domain to include in-depth analysis from the vantage points of general contract theory and comparative analysis. In so doing, it pays particular attention to theoretical foundations of sources of contract law and values that underpin them. By adopting such diversified perspectives, the book attempts to provide for a better understanding of the nature and functions of present-day contract law by capturing the multitude of social and economic dynamics that shape its normative landscape.

The volume gathers a unique and distinguished group of contributors from the EU, USA and Israel. They bring research experience from various areas of private law and contribute with diverse conceptual perspectives.

A summary of contents is available here.

The Charles De Visscher Center for International and European Law (CeDIE, UCLouvain, Belgium) will host a conference on Surrogacy and Private International Law, on 31 March 2022.

The conference aims at discussing the theoretical and practical debates on surrogacy, by presenting both the rules of domestic law (including a comparative law approach) and the rules of private international law, with an emphasis on the latter. It will also provide for an opportunity to revisit some of the issues related to the ethical and human rights implications of surrogacy.

Speakers will include legal and medical practitioners as well as academics.

Geneviève Schamps (Professeure, UCLouvain), Jehanne Sosson (Professeure, UCLouvain, avocat), Hugues Fulchiron (Professeur, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, Juge, Cour de cassation française), Patrick Wautelet (Professeur, ULiège), Petra Hammje (Professeure, Université de Nantes), Michelle Giroux (Professeure, Université d’Ottawa), Geoffrey Willems (Professeur, UCLouvain), Julie Mary (Assistante et doctorante, UCLouvain) , Amélie Panet (Maître de conférences, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3),Catherine de Bouyalski (Avocate au barreau de Bruxelles), Nicolas Gendrin (Juge, Tribunal de la famille de Namur), Florence Anciaux Henry de Faveaux (Conseiller, Cour d’appel de Mons), Géraldine Mathieu (Maître de conférences, Université de Namur & ULiège), Sylvie Sarolea (Professeure, UCLouvain, avocate), Caroline Mecary (Avocate aux barreaux de Paris & du Québec), Candice Autin (Médecin gynécologue, Responsable du centre de Procréation Médicalement Assistée au CHU Saint-Pierre), Jean-Philippe Cobbaut (Professeur, Université catholique de Lille & UCLouvain) and Jean-Yves Carlier (Professeur, UCLouvain & ULiège, avocat). 

The working language will be French.

The full programme is available here. Online registration is open here.

As announced a few days ago on this blog, a dedicated page has been created in the website of the European Association of Private International Law to collect information about funding or other opportunities offered to refugee scholars and scientists. Some opportunities are available to refugee scholars from any country, others to refugee scholars from Ukraine only, others still to refugee scholars from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.

The page is constantly updated. The latest update is now on-line.

Those aware of additional funding opportunities (including opportunities for remunerated work to be carried remotely from Ukraine or other places) are invited to get in touch with the Secretary General at secretary.general@eapil.org.

The editors of the Italian Review of International and Comparative Law (IRIC) welcomes papers from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their career for the Volume 1 of 2023.

Papers may cover any topic, under public international law, private law and comparative law, of the issues related to the interaction between the EU legal order and international arbitration, including:
– The influence of EU law on the concept of arbitrability.
– The exclusion of commercial arbitration from the Bruxelles I-bis Regulation.
– The legal consequences of Brexit on international arbitration in Europe.
– The circulation of judgments concerning international arbitration within the EU;
– The future evolution of ISDS in the EU.
– The regulation of international investments between the EU, its Member States and third countries.
– Treaty law issues concerning the validity and the effectiveness of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the use of public international law by the CJEU.
– The fate of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty.
– The application of EU law by international arbitrators.
– International investment law before EU Member States domestic courts.
– The enforcement of arbitral decisions concerning intra-EU BITs in EU and third countries.
– EU law as a form of public policy precluding the enforcement of arbitral decisions.
– The potential effects of the CJEU’s decisions concerning international commercial arbitration or ISDS.

Papers containing also a reference to Italy, or the Italian practice will be particularly appreciated.

The selection of papers will be based on the submission of abstracts of max. 1.000 words to iricsubmissions@gmail.com by 1 April 2022. Selected authors will be informed by 30 April 2022.

Final papers will have to be submitted by 15 September 2022 and may have the forms of essays, comments, case notes, recent developments and review essays; each of the latter has a different range of words allowed. Submitted abstracts will have to mention the tentative title of the paper and the form expecred to be used.

Further information available here.

Mathilde Codazzi, who is a master student at the university Paris II Panthéon-Assas, contributed to this post.

In a judgment of 3 November 2021, the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) confirmed the evolution of the French law of Sovereign Immunities after a statutory intervention in 2016 and its alignment on the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.

A Dutch judgment from 27 September 2000 ordered a public Iraqi company, Rasheed Bank, to pay various amounts to Citibank, an American company. On this ground, Citibank carried out a protective measure on Rasheed Bank’s accounts in France, which was later converted into an attachment procedure after the Dutch judgment was declared enforceable by French courts. The Iraqi company seized French courts to challenge the conversion.

There were two main issues arising in this case:

• Whether Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities required a connection between the assets attached and the claim, in addition to a connection between the goods and the entity against which the claim was brought, and
• Whether the creditor had to prove that the State voluntarily intended to allocate its property to a government non-commercial purpose,

Article 19(c) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (2004) provides that post-judgment measures of constraint may only be taken if and to the extent that (…) “it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum, provided that post-judgment measures of constraint may only be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed”.

In a judgment of 17 October 2019, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the conversion of the protective measure into an attachment procedure. After recalling the content of Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, the Court of Appeal ruled that there must be a connection between the assets attached, which must be linked to a private law transaction, and the entity against which the claim was brought. It then ruled that requiring a connection between the assets attached and the claim would be contrary to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and the right of access to justice, as it would disproportionately infringe the creditor’s right to enforce judgments, without pursuing a legitimate purpose.

The Court of Appeal also held that Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities does not require the creditor to demonstrate the State’s will to allocate the attached assets to a commercial purpose. It recalled the principle of unattacheability of State assets and that the burden of proof lies on the creditor, before finding that in light of the circumstances, the assets deposited on the accounts were to be allocated to ends other than government non-commercial purposes: the cash-deposit account was opened at a time where Rasheed Bank presented itself as independent from the Iraqi State and frequently performed commercial transactions, a use that cannot have changed since due to the freezing of Iraqi assets in 1990.

Rasheed Bank challenged this judgment on several grounds.

First, it argued that although Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities does not require a connection between the attached assets and the creditor’s claim to allow the seizure, it does not prohibit it either. According to the Iraqi public company, the Court of Appeal failed to give adequate reasons by ruling that requiring a link between the attached assets and the claim was contrary to Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Rasheed Bank claimed that since the UN Convention of Jurisdictional Immunities reflects customary international law, the Court of Appeal could not rule the requirement of a connection between the attached assets and the claim contrary to Article 6(1) of the ECHR without first verifying whether requiring this connection would be contrary to customary international law. It also sustained that the right to have access to justice of Article 6(1) ECHR may be restricted by a limitation whose purpose is legitimate and which is proportionate to this purpose; according to Rasheed Bank, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning lacks a legal basis as it failed to indicate how requiring a connection between the attached assets and the claim would infringe the creditor’s right to enforce judgments without pursuing a legitimate purpose.

Second, Rasheed Bank argued that by virtue of customary international law, in order to attach specifically used assets or assets used for other than government non-commercial purposes, the creditor must demonstrate the will of the State or of its emanation to allocate the attached assets to a commercial purpose.

The Supreme Court upheld entirely the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

It ruled that customary international law, as codified by Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, provides that apart from the situations where the State has expressly consented to post-judgment measures of constraint or allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim, his property or that of its emanations located on the territory of the forum may only be seized, pursuant to a judgment or an arbitral award, if it is “specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes” and have “a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed”. Hence the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had rightly ruled that the taking of post-judgment enforcement measures does not require a connection between the attached assets and the claim: they must only be connected to the entity against which the measures are carried out.

The Supreme Court also ruled that the Court of Appeal rightly inferred from the circumstances that the assets were not destined to a government non-commercial use, without shifting the burden of proof. It held that the account seized, because it was opened in the course of commercial transactions, was by nature intended to serve  ends other than non-commercial purposes.

The judgment must be viewed in the light of the recent reform of the French law of sovereign immunities.

Until 2016, the French law of immunities was entirely judge made. The leading case was Eurodif, where the Cour de cassation had ruled in 1984 that the scope of the immunity of enforcement of foreign states extended to all assets which did not have a connection with the commercial activity which gave rise to the claim. In other words, a claim arising from the trade of grain by a state could not be satisfied on assets affected to the oil activities of a state.

In 2016, the French Parliament adopted statutory provisions replicating Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities. These provisions are found in the French Code of civil enforcement proceedings (Code des procédures civiles d’exécution), in particular in Art. L. 111-1-2.

This case, however, did not fall within the temporal scope of these statutory provisions. This likely explains why the Court did not simply refer to them (as the Court of Appeal had), but rather applied directly Article 19 as customary international law. While many provisions of the Convention certainly reflect customary international law, whether Article 19 actually does is unclear, but the Cour de cassation has long shown that it has no intention of embarking into any nuanced analysis in this respect.

They key question arising in this case was whether Article 19 necessarily excludes the rule in Eurodif. The argument of the appeal was that Article 19 was silent, and thus neutral in this respect, and that the Court could have kept this long standing requirement. The argument is rejected, and the court rules that the old requirement of a connection between the attached assets and the claim is obsolete.

The Institute for Private International and Comparative Law of the University of Cologne, directed by Heinz-Peter Mansel, is looking to appoint one to two Research Assistant(s) (Wissenschaftliche/r Mitarbeiter/in) on fixed-term contracts for two years, with contract extension possible, based in Cologne. The successful candidate(s) can be appointed full time (39.83 hrs/week) or part-time (19.92 hrs/week), with the latter option allowing for the completion of a PhD thesis. A German State Exam in law with above-average marks is required. Proficiency in Dutch, Italian, Spanish or French an advantage.

Interested candidates are invited to send their application by 25 March 2022.

See here for further information.

On 15 March 2022, Marta Requejo (Référendaire at the CJEU; Professor of Private International Law at the University of La Laguna) will give a conference on the Brussels I bis Regulation at the Research Center for Private International and International Business Law in Paris (‘salle 102’).

The conference will be given in French (Le règlement Bruxelles I bis sous la loupe) at 6 pm online.

Participation is free. Details can be obtained from laurence.tacquard@u-paris2.fr.

The Center regularly holds conference from doctoral students who recently defended their doctorate at Paris I or Paris II University. It also occasionally holds conference from visiting professors at both universities. Podcasts of the latest conferences can be found here.

On 1 January 2021, the divorce between the United Kingdom and the European Union became effective. Where do we stand one year later?

The Spanish journal La Ley-Unión Europea chose this topic to celebrate its number 100 issue, published last February. Under the title “La Unión Europea tras el primer año del brexit” (The European Union one year after Brexit), this monograph gathers the analysis of almost 40 reputed Spanish law professors and professionals.

It is therefore marked by the wide range of subjects covered, all pertaining to legal areas affected by the withdrawal: transport, the world of business, international cooperation against tax fraud, VAT, social security of temporarily posted workers, environmental policies, intellectual property or cybersecurity…, and, of course, cross-border civil and commercial matters.

A timely topic, well chosen for a well-deserved celebration; and a widely shared conclusion to my question above. In a nutshell: first, although Brexit has by no means gone unnoticed (my experience: buy now a scientific book, have it shipped from the UK, and look at the custom fees), in many respects its consequences are still far from being ascertainable. Second, as regards legal production in areas not regulated by the Withdrawal Agreement, there is not much to report.

International cooperation in civil and commercial matters has undergone a substantial transformation since the UK left the European Union. Nonetheless, as Sixto Sánchez Lorenzo points out, to this day the practical impact of Brexit in cross-border relationships looks rather limited. At the same time, the lack, in the negotiating process, of a serious treatment of the issues raised by the breaking off of judicial cooperation in civil matters foretells a future scenario of “conventional patches and legal poultices” (my translation of the, most probably, non-translatable expression of the author: “remiendos convencionales y cataplasmas jurídicas”). The Supreme Court’s magistrate Juan María Díaz Fraile confirms, listing in detail EU instruments no longer applicable in the relations UK/EU, together with their replacements: international conventions or national law, as the case may be.

Further contributions provide illustrations in line with Professor Lorenzo’s views, mapping the muddled legal landscape academics have described and deplored since June 2016. No one can claim lack of knowledge of the risks, for cross-border commercial and personal relationships, of a Brexit without some kind of cooperation agreement. To no avail. Nothing has happened during 2021 to put a remedy, though it would be wrong to pretend nothing has happened: as we know, the “Lugano” way is over.

In terms of legal certainty, and for obvious reasons, the status quo post-Brexit appear at first sight less desperate where an already existing multilateral convention fills the gap. That is why Ángel Espiniella Menéndez describes post-Brexit cross-border insolvency as a “leap in the dark”, and regrets the absence of an international convention to make up for the loss of the European Insolvency Regulation.

But, in fact, the existence of conventions is unlikely to suffice. In relation to choice of court agreements, Pedro de Miguel Asensio recalls that the 2005 Hague Convention is binding on the EU and the UK. Nonetheless, he immediately notices the shortcomings of the instrument when compared to the Brussels Regulations. Similarly, Pilar Jiménez Blanco states: “Brexit has weakened the effectiveness of the choice of the British courts. Whether the practical evolution of the 2005 Hague Convention will compensate for this weakening is uncertain but doubtful, due to the very limitations of the convention” (my translation). In the field of family law, Santiago Álvarez says, referring to Regulation 2201/2003: “Its void can hardly be filled by the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction and the 1996 Hague Convention on  Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, which also bind all EU Member States. This change, despite some peculiar, very peculiar, opinions (…), is a step backwards, especially with regard to the illicit transfer or retention of a minor. The system of the Regulation is simply better than the one of the Convention” (my translation). Only in relation to the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations is the impact of Brexit less harsh, according to Manuel Penadés Fons: conflict of law rules can operate unilaterally and universally; the Rome I and Rome II Regulations have “remained” in the UK through the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and the (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 No. 834.

While the outcome of the analysis conducted and published may deceive, the effort made by the authors is by no means worthless. The threat of Brexit kept all us busy; so did the Withdrawal Agreement. Now we are “there”; the challenge is following up, looking in as much as possible at the reactions of all sides (EU, the UK – England and Wales or Scotland-, the single Member States) .

The special issue of La Ley-Unión Europea is preceded by an editorial by Professor Fernández Rozas, editor-in chief almost from the foundation. To all those who can read Spanish, I recommend joining him in his journey along the thirty-seven years of the journal: the same period Spain has been a EU Member State. With his distinctive style, Professor Rozas presents the history and evolution of the periodical in parallel to the most relevant developments of the European Communities, later the Union. To my mind, a piece of specific interest, in particular, to the younger generations of Spanish academics.

La Ley-Unión Europea is nowadays a well-established journal, characterized by a rare combination: a quickness of reaction to the legal developments in the European Union (something that only monthly monthlies can achieve), which is not detrimental to the quality of the contributions. Congratulations, Professor Rozas; go for the next hundred issues.

The EAPIL Board has been closely monitoring the evolving situation in Ukraine during the past two weeks and established contact with the Ukrainian members of EAPIL. Some members have left the country, others are still in Ukraine. All are in need of support.

Several academic institutions in Europe offer funding or have established scholarships for refugee scholars and scientists. The funding is either available for refugee scholars from any country, for refugee scholars from Ukraine only, or for refugee scholars from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. The EAPIL Board has collected information on those funding opportunities, which appear below. The list is certainly not complete. We, therefore, invite all readers of the blog to let us know if there are further funding opportunities not yet mentioned.

In addition, the EAPIL wishes to communicate that some members are looking for a way to finance their living through remunerated work. If you know of any opportunities (notably work that can be done remotely from Ukraine or other places) please let us know.

The list below is reproduced (and will be updated, as the case may be) here.

For all further details and information please get in touch with the Secretary General at secretary.general@eapil.org.

• ASEES
• The Ukraine Network
• Lviv Center
• German Funding for Researchers
• Israeli Universities’ Emergency Fellowships for Ukrainians

• Philipp Schwartz Initiative
  • Funding for refugee scholars and scientists from all countries
  • 24 (+12) months fellowship in Germany

• Volkswagen Stiftung
  • Funding for refugee scholars and scientists from Ukraine
  • Nomination for Ukrainian scholars due March 18

• Gerda Henkel Foundation
  • Grants totalling 2 million euros for Ukrainian (Belarussian and Russian) scholars

• DAFI (Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative) Scholarship programme
• Leibniz Institute for educational media fellowship (Braunschweig)
• Universität Bremen/Forschungsstelle Osteuropa
  • Funding for scholars from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (Hans Koschnick Stipendien)

• HessenFonds for refugees and researchers at risk
  • Funding for researchers at risk for 12 months
  • Nomination due by 23 March

• LMU Munich
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers at LMU

• University of Tübingen
  • 10 Research@Tübingen scholarships for Ukrainian scholars (for up to 12 months)

• Austrian Academy of Sciences (Austria)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• University of Graz (Austria)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Le Collège de France PAUSE Solidarity with Ukraine (France)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Swiss National Science Foundation (Switzerland)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• KU Leuven (Belgium)
  • KU Leuven is setting up a fund for the accommodation of Ukrainian students and researchers looking for shelter, or for necessary extensions of stay for those already at KU Leuven; contact: ukraine@kuleuven.be
• University of Reading (UK)
  • Sanctuary scholarships for refugee scholars

• Aarhus Institute for Advanced Studies (Denmark)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (Sweden)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Polish Academy of Sciences (Poland)
• Polish Young Academy PAS(Poland)
  • Help for scholars from Ukraine arriving in Poland

• Polish Sociological Association(Poland)
  • Organizes accommodation and transportation from the Polish border for Ukrainian scholars and others.

• NEP4DISSENT
  • EU-funded, international scholarly network dedicated to research on resistance and dissent in former socialist countries
  • Emergency Funding for Ukrainian scholars

• Threatened Scholars Integration Initiative (TSI)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian scholars

• Tel Aviv University Emergency Fund (Israel)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian students

• Scholars at Risk
  • Assists with placement, doesn’t fund scholars
• Article 26 Backpack at UC Davis
  • Provides digital storage of important academic documents for displaced scholars and students
• NAFSA Immigration Resources: Ukraine

The latest issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) has been published. As always, it contains a number of articles and case comments on issues of jurisdiction and applicable law (including one by me). The table of contents of the issue is available here. The following abstracts have been kindly provided to us.

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner, European Conflict of Law 2021: The Challenge of Digital Transformation

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2021 until December 2021. It gives information on newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

Wais, The Applicable Law in Cases of Collective Redress

Both the European and the German legislator have recently passed legislation aimed at establishing access to collective redress for consumers. As European conflict of law rules do not contain any specific rules on the applicable law in cases of collective redress, the existing rules should be applied in a way that enables consumers to effectively pursue collective actions. To that aim, Art. 4 (3) 1st S. Rome II-Regulation provides for the possibility to rely on the place of the event that has given rise to the damages as a connecting-factor for collective redress cases in which mass damages have occurred in different states. As a consequence of its application, all claims are governed by the same applicable law, thereby fostering the effectiveness of collective redress.

Lehmann, Locating Financial Loss and Collective Actions in Case of Defective Investor Information: The CJEU’s Judgment in VEB v BP

For the first time, the CJEU has ruled in VEB v BP on the court competent for deciding liability suits regarding misinformation on the secondary securities market. The judgment is also of utmost importance for the jurisdiction over collective actions. This contribution analyses the decision, puts it into larger context, and discusses its repercussions for future cases.

Pika, Letters of Comfort and Alternative Obligations under the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations

In its judgment of 25 November 2020 (7 U 147/19), the Higher Regional Court of Brandenburg ruled on special jurisdiction regarding letters of comfort under Article 7 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation. While the court left the decision between lit. a and lit. b of that Article open, it ruled that either way, the courts at the domicile of the creditor of the letter of comfort (in this case: the subsidiary) have no special jurisdiction. This article supports the court’s final conclusion. In addition, it assesses that Article 7 No. 1 lit. b Brussels I Regulation on services may apply to letters of comforts given the CJEU’s decision in Kareda (C-249/16).

Hess/A.J. Wille, Russian default interests before the District Court of Frankfort

In its judgment of February 2021, the Landgericht Frankfurt a.M., applying Russian law, awarded a three-month interest rate of 37% to a defendant domiciled in Germany. When examining public policy, the regional court assumed that there was little domestic connection (Inlandsbezug), as the case was about the repayment of a loan issued in Moscow for an investment in Russia. However, the authors point out that the debtor’s registered office in Hesse established a clear domestic connection. In addition, the case law of German courts interpreting public policy under Article 6 EGBGB should not be directly applied to the interpretation of Articles 9 and 21 of the Rome I Regulation.

Looschelders, Implied choice of law under the EU Succession Regulation – not just a transitional problem in connection with joint wills

The decision of the German Federal Supreme Court focuses on the question, under which conditions an implied choice of law may be assumed within the framework of the EU Succession Regulation (Regulation No 650/2012). In this particular case, an implied choice of German law as the law governing the binding effect of the joint will drawn up by the German testator and her predeceased Austrian husband was affirmed by reference to recital 39(2) of the EU Succession Regulation. Actually, the joint will of the spouses stipulated the binding effect as intended by German law. As the spouses had drawn up their will before the Regulation became applicable, the question of an implied choice of law arose in the context of transition. However, the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court will gain fundamental importance regarding future cases of implied choices of law for all types of dispositions of property upon death, too. Nevertheless, since the solution of the interpretation problem is not clear and unambiguous, a submission to the ECJ would have been necessary.

Reimann, Human Rights Litigation Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Crucial Role of the Act of State Doctrine

The Kashef case currently before the federal courts in New York shows that human rights litigation against corporate defendants in the United States is alive and well. Even after the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the Alien Tort Claims Act jurisdiction remains possible, though everything depends on the circumstances. And even after the Supreme Court’s virtual elimination of federal common law causes of action claims under state or foreign law remain possible, though they may entail complex choice-of-law issues.

Yet, so far, the most momentous decision in this litigation is the Court of Appeals’ rejection of the defendants’ potentially most powerful argument: the Court denied them shelter under the act of state doctrine. It did so most importantly because the alleged human rights abuses amounted to violations of jus cogens.

Coming from one of the most influential courts in the United States, the Second Circuit’s Kashef decision adds significant weight to the jus cogens argument against the act of state doctrine. As long as the Supreme Court remains silent on the issue, Kashef will stand as a prominent reference point for future cases. This is bad news for corporate defendants, good news for plaintiffs, and excellent news for the enforcement of human rights through civil litigation.

Samtleben, Paraguay: Choice of Law in international contracts

To date, Paraguay is the only country to have implemented into its national law the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts. Law No. 5393 of 2015, which closely follows the Hague model, owes its creation primarily to the fact that the Paraguayan delegate to the Hague was actively involved in drafting the Principles. Unlike the Principles, however, Law No. 5393 also regulates the law governing the contract in the absence of a choice of law, following the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts of Mexico. Contrary to the traditional rejection of party autonomy in Latin America, several Latin American countries have recently permitted choice of law in their international contract law. Paraguay has joined this trend with its new law, but it continues to maintain in procedural law that the jurisdiction of Paraguayan courts cannot be waived by party agreement.

The webinar What Measures Should the EU Adopt to Enhance the Protection of Adults in Europe? announced earlier on this blog, will take place, as scheduled, on 10 March 2022 from 5 pm to 7 pm.

The webinar has been organised by a Working Group charged by EAPIL with drafting a response to the public consultation that the European Commission has recently launched regarding an EU-wide protection of vulnerable adults. The purpose of the webinar is to present a preliminary draft response and receive feedback from interested experts, practitioners and stakeholders.

An e-mail with the details for joining the webinar has already been sent to the registered participants. If you have registered, but haven’t received this e-mail, please check your spam folder. If you need assistance, please write to pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

This post was contributed by Christine Bidaud, who is Professor at the University Jean Moulin – Lyon 3, co-director of the Family Law Center and member of the Research team Louis Josserand.

If there is one subject that divides not only jurists but also States, it is certainly surrogacy. Legal in some countries, prohibited in others, and unregulated in still others, each State develops its own law according to the social mores, values, and history of its society. But it is one thing to prohibit the practice of surrogacy on one’s own territory and another to consider the parenthood of a child born abroad by surrogacy. The French Cour de Cassation has well understood this.

Without going back over the details of the evolution of its case-law, it should be remembered that at first, the Cour de cassation refused to recognise or authorise the recognition in France of the parenthood of children born abroad by surrogacy (see Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 6 April 2011, n° 10-19053, Mennesson, n°09-66486, Labassée & n° 09-17130 and Cour de cassation, 13 September 2013, n°12-18315 & n°12-30138). The Court then accepted the partial transcription of the child’s foreign birth certificate in French civil status registers by limiting it to the biological parent (see Cour de Cassation, Plenary session, 3 July 2015, n°14-21323 & n°15-50002). The second parent, whether a man or a woman, had to adopt the child to establish his or her parenthood. Until the law of 21 February 2022, a requirement for such adoption was that the couple be married.

The Cour de Cassation then decided to go further. Even if in its opinion of 10 April 2019, the ECtHR did not require it, the Cour de Cassation decided to authorise the full transcription of the child’s foreign birth certificate in the French civil status registers. Initially presented as an exceptional solution justified by the circumstances of the Mennesson case, the Cour de Cassation finally generalised this solution (see Cour de cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 18 December 2019, n° 18-11815 & n° 18-12337 and recently Cour de cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 13 January 2021, n° 19-17929). The French case law seemed to be well established and yet…

The law on bioethics of 2 August 2021 reformed Article 47 of the Civil Code, which governs the evidentiary value of foreign civil status documents. Even if the evidentiary value of foreign civil status documents must be distinguished from the recognition of parenthood, the two issues are “dangerously” intertwined in the case-law and obviously in the mind of the legislator too. Wishing to put a stop to the case law of the Cour de Cassation, the French Senate had proposed an amendment to introduce a new Article 47-1 into the Civil Code. In essence, the text provided for a return to the previous case law of the Cour de Cassation: partial transcription of the biological parenthood link and adoption of the child by the other parent.

The French National Assembly rejected this amendment and instead amended Article 47 of the Civil Code. The text, which already provided that

‘All civil status records of French citizens and foreigners made in a foreign country and drawn up in the forms used in that country are considered as proof unless other records or documents held, external data, or elements drawn from the record itself establish, if necessary after all useful verifications, that this record is irregular, falsified, or that the facts declared therein do not correspond to reality’,

has been supplemented by the precision that

‘This (reality) is assessed in the light of French law.

The change seems minor at first glance, but it nevertheless calls for a whole series of observations.

The Senate amendment only concerned the transcription of birth certificates of children born abroad by surrogacy into French civil status registers. The new version of Article 47 of the Civil Code does not concern the transcription, but the evidentiary value of all foreign civil status records: birth certificates, as well as others (e.g. marriage, recognition, death, and certificates of stillborn babies). The text introduces a problematic confusion between evidentiary value and transcription of foreign civil status records. A foreign civil-status record does not need to be transcribed into French registers to have evidentiary value. It must only have been established following “the usual forms” of the foreign country (as laid down by the first sentence of Article 47 of the Civil Code). Moreover, it is impossible to require transcription in all cases because transcription of foreign records is only possible when the person(s) concerned by the record have French nationality.

The amendment proposed by the Senate was expressly aimed at surrogacy, which is a bioethical issue. However, Article 47 of the Civil Code relates to the evidentiary value of all foreign civil status records, whether they relate to French citizens or to persons of foreign nationality. What is thus the legitimacy of a new law relating to bioethics to reform this provision? For example, what link can exist between bioethics and a foreign marriage record?

In our opinion, the legal context of the reform of Article 47 is therefore inappropriate and even instrumentalised.

There is still one condition for foreign documents to be evidentiary: they must have been drawn up following the local rules of form. And there are still three grounds for overturning this presumption of evidentiary value: irregularity, falsification, and inconsistency of the facts contained in the document to reality. There is no change for the first two grounds of challenge pursuant to the new version of Article 47. “Irregularity” means that the act respects the foreign local forms. The “absence of falsification” implies that there must be no documentary fraud (e.g. erasure, pasting, or fraud carried out with different computer software), but also more elaborate fraud, sometimes carried out with the complicity of local authorities (one can think of ‘true-false’ records drawn up deceptively and inserted into foreign registers by unscrupulous foreign civil registrars).

The third ground for challenging the evidentiary value – “the lack of conformity of the facts with reality” – has been completed by the strange precision that this reality must be “assessed in the light of French law”. Until now, this condition was interpreted in terms of accuracy or inaccuracy: was the person born in that town? Did the person die on that date? It is logical, facts are true or false. What sense can be given to the requirement that the facts must be conform with reality “assessed in the light of French law”?

Keeping in mind that the goal of the text was to put an end to the case law of the French Cour de Cassation, we can only observe that the legislator makes a confusion between what is a fact and what is not. Parenthood is not a fact: it may result from the effect of the law, from a recognition act, from a possession of status, or from a judicial decision. The new version of Article 47, therefore, invites reasoning in terms of equivalence between what French law allows and what it does not allow. It is no longer a question of factual reality but of legal reality.

Reasoning in terms of legal reality means that we must check if the element of personal status established or constituted abroad has an equivalent in French law. And that must be done for each element that may compose the status of a person: facts such as dates and place of birth, but also everything else, i.e. marriage and parenthood. And how far should this research of equivalence be pushed? Should we, for example, require that marriages celebrated abroad have a civil form because it is the only one that exists in France? Such research would not make sense because it would be the same as considering that a foreign record relating to a marriage celebrated only in the religious form has no evidentiary value in France, even though this marriage would be considered valid. Since 1955, French case law has considered that this question belongs to the conditions of form of marriage and is therefore governed by foreign law (see Cour de cassation, 22 June 1955, Caraslanis). This rule is now written into the Civil Code.

The formulation of the text causes confusion between the evidentiary value of the records and the recognition of the status of persons. The civil status record is used to prove that an event concerning personal status occurred abroad, but this does not mean that this personal status will produce effects in France. With the new version of Article 47 of the Civil Code, everything is mixed up: the element of personal status is checked to ensure that it corresponds to the definition given by French law to give evidentiary value to the foreign civil status record.

The law on bioethics has opened up medically assisted procreation to women couples and single women (Art. 342-10 of the Civil Code). The new Article 342-11 of the Civil Code provides that “At the time of the consent [by the notary] provided in Article 342-10, the couple of women jointly recognises the child”. For the woman who gives birth, parenthood is established in accordance with Article 311-25 which lays down that “‘Regarding the mother, parenthood is established by her designation in the child’s birth certificate”. For the other woman, it is established by the joint acknowledgement provided in the first paragraph of this Article. This is given by one of the two women or, where applicable, by the person responsible for declaring the birth to the civil registrar, who indicates this in the birth certificate. Regarding the woman of the couple who is not carrying the child, she will therefore be the legal mother of the child from the moment of its birth because of prenatal recognition.

So today, it is possible under French law to be the legal mother of a child without having given birth to that child and without the need to use adoption.

When the couple who had recourse to surrogacy abroad is heterosexual, most of the time, the indications written in the foreign birth certificate will only specify “mother:…” and “father:…”. It will not mention whether the woman has or has not given birth. It will only give the identity of the mother. Therefore, the foreign record will not contain any factual inaccuracies. To check if the indications are in conformity with the legal reality assessed in the light of French law, it is then necessary to verify whether French law allows the registration of a woman as a mother without having given birth and without having adopted the child. And this is now possible since the Bioethics Law of 2 August 2021…

The Cour de Cassation is therefore not required to change its case law in this situation. It can continue to transcribe these birth certificates in the French civil status registers. The situation is more problematic regarding men’s couples. In this case, there will be two fathers in the foreign birth certificate. To ensure that this record corresponds to the legal reality assessed under the light of French law, the Civil Code should contain a provision that allows the establishment of a double link of paternal parenthood from the child’s birth, without using adoption. And this provision does not exist. Therefore, it should no longer be possible to transcribe these foreign birth certificates in French civil status registers!

The ECtHR does not systematically condemn States that do not allow the recognition or reconstruction of a parenthood link towards the non-biological parent who has had recourse to surrogacy abroad if the child has a family life with his or her parents. However, special circumstances are required and in its advisory opinion of 10 April 2019, the ECtHR stated that the parenthood link between the child and the intended mother must be established, including through adoption, but that there was no obligation for States to transcribe the child’s full birth certificate. This opinion was issued to surrogacy carried out by a different-sex couple but is perfectly transposable to same-sex couples.

If the French Cour de Cassation only allows the transcription of foreign birth certificates of children born from surrogacy when the parents are of different genders, there would certainly be discrimination between heterosexual and homosexual couples and even more between children who are all born abroad by surrogacy. It is difficult to see how France could not be condemned again by the ECtHR… And the recent Pancharevo Case of the CJEU (analysed here on the blog) can only add arguments in the direction of maintaining the current case law of the French Cour de Cassation.

This post was written by Paul Eichmüller and Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld, University of Vienna.

In a recent decision, the Austrian Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation of Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation. It found that the latter provision does not establish an obligation to initiate probate proceedings ex officio in states having subsidiary jurisdiction. A national Austrian provision concerning the issue of these assets to third countries was thus considered in conformity with EU law, although Article 10(2) explicitly provides that the Member State shall have “jurisdiction to rule on those assets”. The court’s apparent classification of these questions as an acte clair is doubtful.

The Austrian courts were seized by a Canadian company. It was tasked by the Canadian courts to manage the estate of a German citizen, who had moved to Toronto where he established his habitual residence and eventually died in 2017. The deceased had a bank account in Austria where he and his son had jointly rented two safes containing gold “of substantial value”. The Canadian company then brought a request that the gold and the savings should be transferred to it so that it may become part of the general estate in Canada. However, the son opposed this request with regard to the gold on the basis that it was in fact in his own property and not in the deceased’s.

The court of first instance decided to transfer the money and the gold to the Canadian company, which was to hand it to the heirs as assessed in Canada. Concerning jurisdiction, the court based its decision on Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation. The fact that it simply transferred the assets and did not conduct substantive probate proceedings was based on § 150 AußStrG (Austrian Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act) – prescribing exactly this course of action in cases of Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation. Appealing this decision, the son desired a full rejection of the claim on the grounds that § 150 AußStrG would be contrary to Article 10(2) and is thus not to be applied. The gold and the money should be handed to the heirs by Austrian courts themselves and not simply be transferred to the Canadian authorities (i.e. the authorised company).

The Supreme Court ruled that issuing assets of the estate located in Austria, as long as no probate proceedings have been requested, does not violate Article 10(2) of the Regulation. This is laid down in § 150 AußStrG, which prescribes that upon request of a legitimised party, the assets must be transferred to the state in which the deceased had their last habitual residence. Its main argument was that the Succession Regulation does not oblige the competent Member States to initiate proceedings ex officio (para 31; also citing Hertel in Rauscher, EuZPR-EuIPR [2016] Art 23 EuErbVO para 49).

Furthermore, the objective of Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation would not be thwarted by the Austrian provision, since § 150 AußStrG provides for the issue of assets only if no application for probate proceedings in Austria had been filed. Thus, the legal interests of the parties are protected and the subsidiary jurisdiction stipulated in Article 10(2) is respected. Issuing the assets would be a mere recognition of the foreign (Canadian) decision which legitimised the company to demand their transfer. As this decision originates in a third country, neither the Succession Regulation nor other acts of EU law are inapplicable to such a recognition (para 21).

The Supreme Court considered this assessment of the legal situation and the conformity with EU law to be sufficiently evident, so that a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU was not deemed necessary.

To the extent that the jurisdiction established by Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation is not combined with an obligation to initiate probate proceedings ex officio, the Supreme Court’s decision is to be followed.

In this respect, the procedural autonomy of the Member States is not restricted by EU law, thus the Regulation does not specify whether proceedings ought to be initiated either of the court’s own motion or upon application. The Regulation recognises the different procedural treatment of succession cases in the Member States, which is explicitly outlined, e.g., in Recital 29 (“Where succession proceedings are not opened by a court of its own motion”) and Article 14(c) (“if the proceedings are opened of the court’s own motion”) of the Succession Regulation. Hence, in contrast to probate proceedings in Austria, which are always initiated ex officio, other Member States (such as e.g. Germany, Belgium or Sweden) provide for the transfer of assets to the heirs ex lege without any proceedings being necessary. Therefore, a provision which prescribes that probate proceedings are initiated only on application in all cases where jurisdiction is based on Article 10(2) of the Succession Regulation (such as § 143 AußStrG in Austria) does indeed not violate EU law.

However, by issuing the gold and the savings to Canada, the Austrian authorities effectively transfer the jurisdiction for substantive probate proceedings over these assets to the Canadian authorities. This rejection of the Austrian jurisdiction over the assets located in its territory would happen outside the system of the Succession Regulation – which provides a transfer of jurisdiction in the cases listed in Article 6, but not whenever the court chooses to do so.

While the Succession Regulation does not prescribe how jurisdiction shall be exercised by a particular Member State, it does indeed prescribe that it must be exercised. The Austrian Supreme Court reasons that such a transfer is permissible because it does not interfere with the objectives of the regulation, as the alleged heirs could have brought a request to hold probate proceedings in Austria before anyway (para 27, 33). Yet, it thereby neglects that the transfer of jurisdiction would be final and thus deprives the heirs of the possibility to request proceedings in Austria at a later point in time. The Austrian courts may well choose to remain inactive until proceedings are requested, but then they have to remain exactly that – inactive. Hence, § 150 AußStrG – prescribing the opposite – is incompatible with EU law. While there might well be a case to see this differently, these arguments and the extensive criticism that has justly been raised about this issue by numerous respected Austrian scholars would have at least required a preliminary reference and leave the issue for the CJEU to decide.

The other reason given by the Supreme Court in support of its decision is the fact that it is bound by the recognition of the Canadian (third-state) judgment, which as such falls outside the scope of the Succession Regulation. Yet even when starting from the premise that the Canadian decision needs to be recognised, this will not necessarily result in an obligation of the Austrian authorities to transfer to the assets to Canada.

The decision of the Canadian Court confers upon the company the right (and duty) to collect the deceased’s assets as the estate trustee (para 2) – which is the standard for succession cases in Ontario. However, it did not directly decide on how the succession affects the assets. Recognising the company’s authorisation to receive the assets (i.e. its right of action) is only one of the requirements that need to be fulfilled so that the assets can be transferred to Canada. Yet, the Austrian courts still have to assess whether issuing the assets to a third state is consistent with Austrian law (including EU law).

The analysis shows that the legal question is far from clear and a preliminary reference to the CJEU would therefore have been necessary. While the Supreme Court was correct in its assessment that an ex officio initiation of probate proceedings is not required by the succession regulation, the rest of its judgment cannot be followed from this premise.

The Special Interest Group on Family and Succession Law of the European Law Institute will host a series of webinars on the Application of the EU Succession Regulation in the Member States, organised by a sub-group on Succession Law chaired by Gregor Christandl of the University of Graz.

The five webinars in the series will take place between March and June 2022 and will shed light on the actual practice regarding cross border succession cases in the Member States.

The reporters will open the webinars with short introductory statements and will then take part in a lively panel discussion on the application of the EU Succession Regulation in their respective jurisdictions. The results of these webinars will be presented as comparative reports at an online conference in September 2022. 

A message from Organizers and the programmme is available here.

Attendance is free of charge. A ZOOM link will be sent to those who register at zivilrecht@uni-graz.at.

The EAPIL Young Research Network is looking forward to welcoming the academic and research community to the beautiful city of Dubrovnik on 14 and 15 May 2022 for a closing conference on the EAPIL Young Research Network’s third research project with the title: Jurisdiction Over Non-EU Defendants – Should the Brussels Ia Regulation be Extended?

The research project aimed at facilitating a critical discussion of the possibility envisaged in Article 79 of the Brussels I bis Regulation of extending the personal scope of the jurisdictional rules contained in the Regulation.

The conference will include a presentation of the research project and its core results as well as discussions with the representatives of the European Commission, the Hague Conference on Private International Law and leading scholars. The Conference will be held at the Inter-University Centre located at the address Don Frana Bulića 4, in close vicinity of the Dubrovnik historical centre.

There is no fee for attending the conference and we are providing limited assistance in booking the most appropriate accommodation (as explained in the application form).

Please direct all inquiries regarding the conference to youngresearch@eapil.org.

The Conference Program is available here; the Application Form here.

On 2 March 2022 the US signed the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters. Five more States have already signed the Convention, namely Costa Rica, Israel, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uruguay.

So far, none of the above States has ratified the Convention. According to Article 28, two ratifications are needed for the Convention to enter into force.

In July 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Council decision on the accession to the Convention by the European Union. In December 2021, the Council forwarded the draft Council decision to the European Parliament, the consent of which is a precondition for the adoption of the decision pursuant to Article 218 of the TFEU.