EAPIL blog

As noted earlier on this blog, on 5 March 2021, from 5 to 6.30 p.m. (CET), the European Association of Private International Law will host its third (Virtual) Seminar, devoted to the digitalization aspects of the revised Service of process and Taking of evidence Regulations.

Those wishing to attend have time until 3 March 2021 at noon to register. The registration form is available here.

Registered participants will receive the details to join the Seminar by e-mail the day before the Seminar (please note the e-mails with these details occasionally end up in the spam folder).

For more information, please write an e-mail to Apostolos Anthimos at apostolos.anthimos@gmail.com.

To the best of my knowledge, March 2021 will be another quiet month at the Court (for private international law issues). In fact, there is only one event to be reported, namely the judgment in case C-307/19, Obala i lučice, by the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Bay Larsen, Safjan, Jääskinen, and Toader as reporting judge), which will be published on Thursday 25th.

Readers of this blog may remember that the main proceedings concern a dispute to recover the principal amount of HRK 84 (some 11 Euros) owed as payment for a daily parking ticket for a car parked on the public highway in Zadar (Croatia) on 30 June 2012. The national court – the Visoki trgovački sud Republike Hrvatske (Commercial Court of Appeal, Croatia)- referred nine questions to the Court in Luxembourg, on the interpretation of a number of provisions of several regulations. AG Bobek’s opinion was delivered on 26 November 2020.

A similar trend is announced for April. Therefore, while waiting for the opinions and decisions of the many pending cases directly related to private international law, I would suggest to have a look at nearby fields. A proposal: case C-919/19, Generálna prokuratura Slovenskej republiky, on the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters. The CJEU has been asked to interpret Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended. The questions are:

Is Article 4(1)(a) of the Framework Decision to be interpreted to the effect that the criteria set out therein are satisfied only when the sentenced person has, in the Member State of his nationality, such family, social, professional or other links that it is possible to reasonably assume from those links that enforcement in that State of the sentence may facilitate his social rehabilitation, and as therefore precluding national legislation such as Paragraph 4(1)(a) of Zákon č. 549/2011 Z.z. [Law No 549/2011] (in the version in force until 31 December 2019) which, in such cases, enables a judgment to be recognised and enforced in the event of merely formally recorded habitual residence in the executing State, regardless of whether the sentenced person has concrete links in that State which could enhance his social rehabilitation?

If that question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 4(2) of the Framework Decision to be interpreted to the effect that the competent authority of the issuing State is required also in the situation provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of the Framework Decision to satisfy itself, even before forwarding the judgment and certificate, that enforcement of the sentence by the executing State would serve the purpose of facilitating the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person and is, furthermore, required to provide the information gathered for that purpose in section (d), point 4, of the certificate specifically, where the sentenced person claims in the statement of his opinion provided for in Article 6(3) of the Framework Decision that he has concrete family, social or professional links in the issuing State?

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, must Article 9(1)(b) of the Framework Decision be interpreted to the effect that where, in the situation set out in Article 4(1)(a) of the Framework Decision, despite the consultation under Article 4(1)(3) of that Decision and any provision of other necessary information, it is not proven that there are such family, social or professional links from which it could reasonably be assumed that the enforcement in the executing State of the sentence may facilitate the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person, there is still a ground for refusing to recognise and enforce the judgment?

An opinion, again by AG Bobek, is expected mid-April.

The Journal for European, Private International and Comparative Law (Zeitschrift für Europarecht, Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung – ZfRV) just released its latest issue. It includes two interesting articles.

The first, published in English and authored by Leszek Bosek and Grzegorz Żmij, is titled “On the CETA’s compatibility with European Union law in light of Opinion No 1/17 of the Court of Justice of 30 April 2019” (ZfRV 2020, p. 248). The summary reads:

The CJEU’s opinion No 1/17 regarding the CETA’s compatibility with European Union law is an important document demonstrating the evolution of the Court’s position when faced with the challenges of the world’s economic globalisation and the effect of various factors related to it on its case law. In our view, the Court of Justice has not sufficiently explained why it has departed from the principal determinations laid down in its Opinions Nos 2/13 and 1/09 and the Court’s judgement in the Achmea case, which were demonstrably in accordance with the line of the Court’s case law consistently defined by its subsequent judgements to date, demarcating in a clear way the fundamental constitutional principles of EU legal and judicial order. In particular, it is hard to accept as satisfactory its contention that the CETA tribunals will not apply or interpret the EU’s or Member States’ law, requiring a uniform interpretation in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 267 of the TFEU, which does not agree with observations from the international investment arbitration practice. The solutions adopted in the CETA seem to be pragmatic, but may raise doubts from the point of view of Article 19 of the TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the corresponding guarantees in the constitutions of Member States. Those issues have not been sufficiently tackled by the Court of Justice.

The second article, published in German by Caroline Kohlhaupt, deals with the change of the Consumer Rights Directive’s substantive scope of application through the Omnibus Directive (“Die Änderung des sachlichen Anwendungsbereichs der Verbraucherrechte-RL 2011/83/EU durch die Omnibus-RL (EU) 2019/2161”, ZfRV 2020, p. 276). The summary reads:

The Directive (EU) 2019/2161 brings various amendments to the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU. When it comes to the material scope of Directive 2011/83/EU, especially the following clarification is substantial: The Directive shall – in principle – also apply where the trader supplies or undertakes to supply digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium or a digital service to the consumer and the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader.

The post below was written by Serena Forlati, Professor of International Law at the University of Ferrara. It follows a post by Andrew Dickinson which opened an on-line symposium devoted to the fate of the 1968 Brussels Convention. One more contribution will be published on this blog in the coming days.

The symposium follows a lively exchange prompted by a post by Matthias Lehmann (Brexit and the Brussels Convention: It’s All Over Now, Baby Blue?), which attracted comments by Eduardo Álvarez-Armas, Apostolos Anthimos, Gilles Cuniberti, Burkhard Hess, Costanza Honorati, Alex Layton, François Mailhé and Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti.

Readers are encouraged to share their comments to the contributions. Those wishing to submit a full contribution to the on-line symposium are invited to get in touch with Pietro Franzina at pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

Matthias Lehmann’s post on the possibility to ‘revive’ the Brussels Convention in the relationship between the United Kingdom and EU Member States, and the discussion it triggered, raise a number of interesting issues of both private and public international law.

I intend to offer a few reflections from the latter perspective, and more specifically from the standpoint of the international law of treaties. While termination of the Brussels Convention is regulated by customary international law (see Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969), I will refer to the rules enshrined in the Vienna Convention since the grounds of termination it sets forth largely codify custom (see notably the ICJ Judgment in Gabčíkovo/Nagymaros, paras 46, 99-100, and here also for further references).

Whether the Brexit could revive the Brussels Convention in the relations between the United Kingdom and the EU Member States was already discussed in this blog (see here and here). I tend to rule out such possibility, for the reasons set out by Andrew Dickinson and Burkhard Hess. The picture would however be clearer if one could argue that, before Brexit, the Brussels Convention was no longer applicable as regards Aruba and relevant French overseas territories – as the revival of a treaty that was already completely terminated (cf Article 59 VCLT) would be difficult to conceive. An aspect worth raising in this regard (and I thank Pietro Franzina for pointing it out to me) concerns the impact of the Lugano Convention 2007 on the applicability of the Brussels Convention to such territories. Notably Article 69(7) of the 2007 Lugano Convention stipulates:

Insofar as the relations between the Member States of the European Community and the non-European territories referred to in Article 70(1)(b) are concerned, this Convention shall replace the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968 … as of the date of the entry into force of this Convention with respect to these territories in accordance with Article 73(2).

In discussing this text, the Pocar Explanatory Report (para. 186) characterized the continuing applicability of the Brussels Convention to non-European territories as a ‘problem’ which the 2007 Convention ‘supplied an opportunity to resolve’, thus indicating that a complete termination of the Brussels Convention would be advisable. Still, Article 69(7) did not automatically achieve this result: the Lugano Convention could actually replace of the older instrument only upon completion of the simplified accession procedure under Article 70(1)(b) on behalf of those non-European territories ‘that are part of the territory of [a] Member State or for whose external relations [a] Member State is responsible’. This does not seem to be the case.

More specifically, the French Parliament has authorized the accession to the Lugano Convention on behalf of overseas territories to which the Brussels Convention applies through law No. 2019-983 of 26 September 2019 (see here, and here for the explanatory report); however, apparently the French Government did not follow suit, as no notification of accession is mentioned to date in the repository of the Swiss Government, as depositary of the Lugano Convention; nor is there any record of similar steps being taken by the Netherlands on behalf of Aruba (see here). Article 69(7) of the Lugano Convention and the implementing practice would thus seem to offer no conclusive indication ruling out a revival of the Brussels Convention.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Brussels Convention still regulates the relationship between the UK and the EU, and should the EU challenge the United Kingdom’s claim that it does not apply in its regard, which options would the United Kingdom have under the international law of treaties to terminate a treaty relationship that it deems no longer to meet its interests? None of the grounds of termination discussed in the previous posts would seem to be fully adequate for the purpose.

Firstly, as regards termination on grounds of breach, Matthias Lehmann rightly questions whether the repeal of implementing legislation would as such qualify as a ‘material breach’ of the Brussels Convention. Although this is not straightforward, the repeal, taken together with the notification to the European Council of 29 January 2021, could amount to a ‘repudiation’ of the treaty (see Article 60, para 3(a) VCLT); this notion is understood as ‘encompass[ing] all means by which a party intends to relieve itself from its obligations under a treaty’  (cf here B. Simma, C. Tams, ‘Article 60’, para 16), and this is clearly the intention of the United Kingdom. However, under the rule reflected in Article 60(2)(a) VCLT the United Kingdom’s non-performance could be invoked as a ground for termination only by all the other Parties to the Brussels Convention acting together – most likely through the EU Institutions, in light of the EU’s acquired exclusive external competence in the issue. Should such a consensus exist, it would be much more practical to express it right away – even if only implicitly by accepting the UK’s request to accede to the Lugano Convention, in line with the approach of the other contracting Parties to the latter instrument (see here and here). The possibility for ‘specially affected States’ to individually suspend the Brussels Convention (Article 60(2)(b) VCLT) would seem to raise further difficulties also in light of the EU’s exclusive competence in the matter.

Whether the United Kingdom could invoke a fundamental change of circumstances is also doubtful in my view. I agree that the ‘subjective’ requirement set forth by Article 62 VCLT is met in this case, since membership in the European Union was ‘an essential basis of the consent’ of the United Kingdom to be bound by the Brussels Convention.  However, as Matthias Lehmann notes in his reply of 17 February 2021, it is by no means certain that a renewed application of that instrument would ‘radically […] transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty’ (Article 62(1)(b) VCLT).

The United Kingdom may be on safer ground in invoking Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, whose paragraph 1 stipulates: ‘A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty’. Arguably the presumption against withdrawal enshrined in Article 56 can be rebutted in the case of the Brussels Convention (and of the 1978 Luxembourg Convention) by relying on either the intention of the parties or the nature of the treaty in question.

The scope of these exceptions is admittedly ambiguous, and the burden of proving that the situation falls under their scope would fall upon the United Kingdom (see here  T. Giegerich on Article 56, p. 1048, margin note 24). Notably the exception linked to the ‘nature’ of a treaty was the object of much controversy during the negotiations. According to the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur Waldock, the category would include ‘commercial and trading’ treaties, that seem much closer to the Brussels Convention than the examples of treaties which in his view ‘shall continue in force indefinitely’, listing treaties establishing boundaries and territorial regimes, treaties of peace, treaties concerning the final settlement of international disputes and multilateral treaties codifying general international law (see under Article 17 in his Second Report on the Law of Treaties, p. 64; on practice subsequent to the adoption of the Vienna Convention see however T. Christakis’ comment to Article 56, para 59).

A further indication as to the possibility to withdraw unilaterally from the Brussels Convention could come from ‘the intention of the parties’, under Article 56(1)(a) VCLT. The silence of the Brussels Convention could arguably be read in light of its nature as an instrument of EC Law, that others have highlighted in this discussion; this would militate in favour of a possibility for the United Kingdom to withdraw unilaterally once its membership in the EU has ceased, without necessarily meeting the requirements for termination in light of a fundamental change of circumstances. Nonetheless, a clear stance by the EU in this respect would be welcome in the interest legal certainty and of the stability of future relations.

French Private International Law (“PIL”) has never been codified despite various proposals of codification in the last century (see for instance here and here). The growing European acquis of PIL and the idea of an European Code of PIL (see for instance here and more recently within the EAPIL here), as well as the numerous codifications in the field within EU Member States have probably contributed to a re-launch of the reflection, in particular among French governement officials.

An expert group has be appointed two years ago under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Ancel (former President of the first Chamber of the French Court of Cassation) to draft a project of French PIL Act.

Against this backdrop, Ludovic Pailler (University of Lyon 3) organises a webinar (in French) titled “Codification of French Private International Law in the European context” (La codification du droit international privé français à l’heure européenne).

It will take place on 18 March 2020, 2 to 5 PM (CET).

The speakers are Jean-François de Montgolfier (Director of the Civil Affairs of the French Ministry for Justice), Marc Cagniart (Notary, SCP Castiglione, Paris), Alain Devers (University of Lyon 3 & Lawyer at the Lyon Bar) and Emmanuel Putman (University of Aix-Marseille).

The program is available here.

Those wishing to attend the webinar may write an e-mail to marie.brossard@univ-lyon3.fr.

Tamás Szabados (Eötvös Loránd University) published Constitutional identity and judicial cooperation in civil matters in the European Union – An ace up the sleeve?, in the Common Market Law Review (vol. 58, February 2021).

The paper discusses the constitutional identity-based arguments in the field of private international law.

He has kindly provided us with an extended abstract :

Constitutional identity has become a fashionable concept that is used by politicians and courts alike. But how does constitutional identity affect private international law?

The use of constitutional identity-based arguments has been primarily examined in the context of EU and domestic constitutional law. Constitutional law discourse has mainly centred around the interpretation of Article 4(2) of the TEU. However, less attention has been devoted to the role and impact of arguments related to constitutional identity on the development of EU private international law. This is notwithstanding the fact that constitutional identity seems to shape the application and creation of private international law rules.

Constitutional identity has a twofold effect on private international law. First, peculiar constitutional norms and values belonging to constitutional identity can be safeguarded through the public policy exception. This opens the door for courts to disregard the otherwise applicable foreign law or to reject the recognition of a foreign situation on the ground that it violates the constitutional identity of the forum state.

Second, arguments based on constitutional identity may be relied on to stay outside the enactment of new private international legislation by the EU. In particular, due to the unanimity requirement laid down by Article 81(3) TFEU, Member States have a strong bargaining power in the area of international family law. This can be well illustrated by the recent adoption of Matrimonial Property Regulation and the Regulation on the Property Regimes of Registered Partners where the opposition of some Member States led to the enactment of these regulations in enhanced cooperation procedure. Staying outside from the adoption of these regulations has been motivated by protecting the domestic concept of family as part of national or constitutional identity. In this way, constitutional identity undoubtedly contributes to the fragmentation of EU private international law.

Nevertheless, constitutional identity can be rarely used as a trump by the Member States in the area of the judicial cooperation in civil matters. There are at least two limits concerning the application of the autonomous private international law rules of the Member States. First, as long as an international legal dispute demonstrates some connection to EU law, Member States must respect the fundamental principles of EU law, in particular the principles of free movement and non-discrimination. Second, even if no such connection exists, the limits stemming from international conventions, such as the ECHR, cannot be ignored.     

The details of the article are available through the journal website here.

In a judgement dated 18 November 2020, the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) ruled that the obligation to apply choice of law rules equally applies in interim proceedings. In contrast, the court had ruled in 1996 that French courts did not have the power to apply choice of law rules in interim proceedings.

Background

The case was concerned with a traffic accident which had occurred in Italy. A car driven by a French woman had run over a professional Australian cyclist living in Monte Carlo (which one is anyone’s guess). The victim initiated interim proceedings in France against the driver and her insurer seeking the appointment of a judicial expert and a provisional payment order.

Various provisions of the French Code of Civil Procedure grant French courts the power to issue provisional payment orders (référé provision) where a claim cannot be “seriously disputed”. Such orders may be granted in interim proceedings for up to 100% of the claim. They are not final, and in theory the defendant may always reopen the issue in the proceedings on the merits. In practice, defendants often do not bother and provisional payment orders are never challenged.

The issue in this case was whether the French court had the power, and indeed the duty, to apply French choice of law rules and, as the case may be, assess whether the claim was undisputable be reference to the law governing the substantive rights.

Applicable Law

The case was clearly concerned with a tort claim. In many Member states, the Rome II Regulation would have applied, but France is a party to the 1971 Hague Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents. Pursuant to Article 28 of the Rome II Regulation, the Regulation does not affect the application of the 1971 Convention because it also applies in third states (Switzerland, Morocco, Ukraine, etc…).

The Hague Convention is of universal application, and it thus applied in French courts irrespective of the fact that the accident occurred in a third state, and designated the law of a third state. The choice of law rules of the Convention are pretty complex, and include a number of exceptions to the application of the law of the place of the accident, in particular where the car was matriculated, and the victim was outside the vehicle and resided, in the same country (art. 4), but that was not the case here. So Italian law likely applied as the law of the place of the accident (Article 3).

However, maybe because it had limited knowledge of private international law or, more likely, because it had no intention of applying Italian law, the court of appeal of Aix en Provence applied the Rome II Regulation and found that the exception clause in Article 4(3) allowed for the conclusion that French law was manifestely more connected to the tort.

The Cour de cassation did not even bother to comment on the application of the exception clause. It set aside the judgment of the court of appeal on the ground that it had applied the wrong choice of law rule, as it had failed to apply the Hague Convention.

Most importantly, it held that the court of appeal had the duty to apply the Hague Convention to determine the applicable law, “even in interim proceedings” (“même statuant en référé“).

Substance and Procedure

Although the judgment of the Cour de cassation is concise, its meaning is clear.

It is not that foreign law might be applied to procedure or to determine which provisional measures might be available. This is governed by the law of the forum. So, the availability of the two provisional measures sought by the  victim was entirely governed by French law, and so were the requirements for granting them. French law provided that provisional payment orders could only be granted if the claim could not seriously be disputed.

Many provisional measures, however, aim at protecting and anticipating substantive rights. Freezing orders protect the payment of a claim. Under French law, a provisional payment order anticipates the payment of a claim. The issue was whether the existence of such claim should also be assessed in accordance with the law of the forum, or whether it should be assessed in accordance with the law governing the relevant claim. The Cour de cassation rightly holds that it should be in accordance with the law governing the relevant claim.

Assessment

The judgment is right. There is no acceptable alternative to the application of the law governing the claim. If the law of the forum is applied, the resulting measures will protect imaginery rights. Another possibility would be to rule that, as foreign law cannot be applied in interim proceedings, the application should be dismissed where the law of the forum does not apply. For protective measures at least, this would border denial of justice. But this was the outcome of the 1996 judgment of the Cour de cassation where it was held that French courts did not have the power to apply choice of law rules to determine whether the creditor seeking a freezing order had a good arguable case, and the application denied.

Of course, time is typically of the essence in interim proceedings. The establishment of foreign law may then raise difficulties. But the establishment of facts raises the same difficulties. For certain proctective measures such as freezing orders, the answer is to lower the standard of proof. It is possible to do the exact same for establishing foreign law. German courts have so held in several cases: only the likelihood of the content of foreign law should be established at that stage.

For other provisional measures, the standard of proof is high, if not higher. This is the case for establishing that a claim cannot be seriously disputed under French civil procedure. But such measures are not urgent, and it would not be a denial of justice to deny the remedy and to await for the outcome of the proceedings on the merits.

The author of this post is Cecilia Rizcallah. She is visiting Professor at the Université Saint-Louis-Bruxelles and at the Université libre de Bruxelles, Postdoctoral Researcher at the National Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.-FNRS) and re:constitution fellow. As announced in a previous post, Cecilia is the author of a monograph on the principle of mutual trust in EU Law, based on her doctoral thesis. She has kindly accepted to provide us with a presentation of this key-principle of EU law with a special focus on EU judicial cooperation in civil matters.

The Principle of Mutual Trust, an Essential and Transversal Principle of EU law  

The principle of mutual trust, whose fundamental importance is recognised by the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”), became a genuine “leitmotiv” of discourses on EU integration. This principle indeed underpins a large set of EU rules of primary and secondary law, in the fields of the internal market and the area of freedom, security and justice.

The principle of mutual trust appeared at an early stage of European integration, in the area of mutual recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications and in the field of free movement of goods. Being an attractive tool for integration by allowing the opening-up of the different national legal orders, it was subsequently called upon in the areas of European judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, as well as in the area of the common asylum policy. In spite of its success, this principle lacked conceptualization. The main objective of my research was to remedy this nebulous situation by providing a cross-cutting definition of the principle of mutual trust. It also analysed its role for EU integration as well as its relationship with EU founding values, which include the rule of law and human rights. The principle of mutual trust is indeed presented as being “based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU” (ECJ, Opinion 2/13, pt. 168). Yet, the EU currently faces a “crisis of values” resulting from the existence of serious violations of these values and, in particular, the rule of law and human rights, in an increasing number of Member States.

The in-depth study of the manifestations of the principle of mutual trust shows that it imposes to the Member States to presume – to a certain extent and in their direct horizontal relationships – the compatibility of different national “legal solutions”.  Indeed, the principle of mutual trust requires Member States – when it applies – to “trust” acts issued by other Member States, or legal practices or situations tolerated in their territory. This duty of trust prevents, as a matter of principle, the double control of these national legal solutions’ compliance with EU law. The principle of mutual trust has nevertheless no direct effect and has therefore to be implemented by primary or secondary law in order to be applicable. It constitutes one of the foundations of the principle of mutual recognition, which in turn imposes, more specifically, the recognition of a legal act issued by another Member State.

The Principle of Mutual Trust, a Foundation of the Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Field of Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters

In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, the principle of mutual trust opposes the revision of a judgment issued by a – issuing – Member State for which the recognition is sought in another – executing – Member State. It therefore countenances the principle of mutual recognition imposed by a number of instruments in civil and commercial matters, matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility and insolvency. A judgment deciding on the custody of a Franco-German couple’s child handed down in Berlin will thus be able to take effect almost without formalities in Paris, despite the specificities distinguishing German and French family law. The judgments issued by the Member States should be presumed as being “equivalent” and as complying with the requirements of Union law, particularly in terms of fundamental rights.

The Principle of Mutual Trust, at the Crossroads of the Imperatives of Unity, Diversity and Equality

As a matter of fact, the principle of mutual trust plays an essential role for EU integration. It indeed lies at the crossroads of three essential imperatives of the European construct: unity, diversity and equality between Member States. Despite the safeguarding of national substantive and procedural diversities, the borders between the Member States are fictitiously blurred so that – in broad terms – the legal solution of State A does not encounter any obstacles to penetrate the legal order of State B. The judgment issued by the authorities of a Member State A will indeed be able to take effect, without any formalities such as an exequatur, in the Member State B. In this way, the principle of mutual trust makes it possible to unify the national legal orders, which remain distinct and equal.

The Principle of Mutual Trust, a Source of Risk

Although it plays an essential role for EU integration, this principle generates important risks because of the lack of mutual control of legal solutions presumed to be compatible. It may indeed lead to the spread of unsatisfactory legal solutions – infringing EU law – within the European area without internal borders. These risks are of course amplified because of the existence of the “crisis of values”. The major challenges faced by the Union and the Member States in economic, security and migration matters have indeed revealed deep divisions as to the meaning of European integration and the values on which it is based. These divisions have gone so far as to lead to the existence of widespread and persistent failures which, in the opinion of the majority of observers, are causing a rule of law backsliding in a few Member States. This situation increases the likelihood that national legal solutions are incompatible with democratic values and the rule of law. A judgement issued by a judge who is no longer independent could indeed, by vertu of mutual trust, spread its effects in the other Member States.

The Principle of Mutual Trust Does not Impose “Blind” Trust

Exceptions have nevertheless been recognized to the principle of mutual trust in order to limit the risks of violation of EU founding values it entails. These exceptions must however be construed narrowly according to the ECJ, because of the principle mutual trust. Indeed, according to the Court, it is only in “exceptional circumstances” that this principle may be set aside (ECJ, Opinion 2/13, pt. 191).

The ECJ, for example precluded, with regards to the Brussels II bis regulation, the review, by an executing authority, of a decision requiring the return of a child issued on the basis of Article 42 of this regulation. In the Zarraga case, it held that the authorities of the executing Member State were not entitled to verify whether the court which issued the judgment requiring the return of the child had respected the child’s right to be heard, as provided for by the Regulation, since the principle of mutual trust requires the national authorities to consider “that their respective national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent and effective protection of fundamental rights, recognised at European Union level, in particular, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights” (pt. 70). The Court of Justice justified this approach on the grounds that the regulation did not foresee any exceptions to this kind of decision and, also, that the child’s right to be heard is not absolute and that the national authorities are granted a margin of discretion regarding its application (pt. 66).

Exceptions to the principle of mutual trust have nevertheless been established, when more serious risks of violation of fundamental rights were at stake, in the context of the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which concerns the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and which establishes a general exception to mutual recognition based on public policy. This exception must however, still because of the principle of mutual trust, be construed narrowly. In the Krombach case, the Court of Justice nevertheless held that mutual recognition may be refused when the defendant has suffered “a manifest breach of his right to defend himself before the court of origin”. A similar conclusion was made in the Trade Agency case, where the Court of Justice stressed that the public policy clause could only be relied upon when the defendant’s right to a fair trial is “manifestly” breached, leading to the “impossibility of bringing an appropriate and effective appeal” against the judgement in the issuing state.

The study of all the exceptions surrounding the principle of mutual trust led to the conclusion that if not all violations of fundamental rights justify setting aside mutual trust, the ones threatening absolute fundamental rights (such as the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) or the essential content of other fundamental rights, in the sense of Article 52(1) of the Charter do. Indeed, only the most serious violations of fundamental freedoms seem to exclude the application of the principle of mutual trust.

This observation is based on the case-law in private international law (above) which refers to the concept of “manifest breach”, but also in the field of criminal cooperation and asylum where the Court found that a risk of infringement of Article 4 of the Charter prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatments excluded mutual trust.

Yet, if the integration aims pursued by the principle of mutual trust are legitimate, one can nevertheless wonder how to justify that this principle continues to apply even in presence of risks of “simple” infringements of fundamental freedoms, especially since this principle is supposed to be based on the respect of these rights by all the member states. The implementation of the principle of mutual trust can therefore in itself weaken its proper foundations.

The Principle of Mutual Trust, a Risk Analysis

 Observing the unsatisfactory character of the limitation scheme surrounding the principle of mutual trust, this research ended by proposing ways of improving its operation so that the founding values of the Union are better protected. More specifically, we call on those involved in mutual trust to transform the principle of mutual trust from a postulate into a method. In other words, we propose to move away from the postulate of trust in favour of a methodical application of trust.

This method, which is based on risk management tools notably developed by the Society for Risk Analysis, is divided into two phases.

The first is aimed at EU institutions that implement, in an abstract way, mutual trust in standards with a general scope: when they adopt an EU legislation implementing this principle, it seems desirable to us that they carry out a risk analysis and that they adapt the exceptions enshrined in this instrument accordingly. To this end, several steps are proposed, which differ according to the type of value exposed by the envisaged legislation, the type and seriousness of the damage incurred, and the possible vulnerability of the resources concerned. For example, when fundamental rights are threatened by the instrument underpinned by the principle of mutual trust – such as the best interest of the child in the framework of the Brussels II bis regulation – we consider that a margin of appreciation should be reserved to national authorities implementing the instrument on a case-by-case basis.

The second phase is aimed at the actors who actually implement these general instruments in specific cases (judges, administrations, etc.). Here too, guidelines that could guide these actors in this task are developed, always with a view to increasing the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals. The method deals in particular with the question of the adjustment of the burden of proof, an issue that is of particular importance in litigation, especially when it comes to protecting fundamental rights. In this sense, if the existence of risks of serious violations of fundamental rights is alleged and demonstrated prima facie, we recommend a shift of the burden of the proof so that it would be up to the authority that wants to take advantage of the principle of mutual trust to demonstrate the non-existence of this risk. This proposition is largely inspired by the adjustment of the burden of the proof in non-discriminatory law (see, for example, art. 10 of Directive 2000/78)

As a complement to this method, various “risk management tools” are also explored, making it possible to reduce those that threaten human rights in the context of the implementation of mutual trust. These tools include minimum harmonization, the strengthening of procedural guarantees surrounding the principle of mutual trust, the establishment of solidarity mechanisms between the Member States, …

Evidently, this method does not claim to solve all the difficulties arising from the principle of mutual trust. On the contrary: it aims at opening the discussion on the basis of a systematic identification of the risks induced by this principle, and to inspire the stakeholders with a few best practices.

On 5 March 2021, from 5 to 6.30 p.m. (CET), the European Association of Private International Law will host its third (Virtual) Seminar (see here and here for the previous events in the series). The Seminar will focus on the digitalization aspects of the revised Service of process and Taking of evidence Regulations.

The speakers will be Andreas Stein (European Commission), Elizabeth Zorilla (Hague Conference on Private International Law), Michael Stürner (University of Konstanz and Court of Appeal of Karlsruhe), Jos Uitdehaag (International Union of Judicial Officers) and Ted Folkman (attorney at law, Boston, and Letters Blogatory).

Gilles Cuniberti will introduce the Seminar, while Giesela Rühl will provide some concluding remarks.

Attendance is free, but those wishing to attend are required to register here by 3 March 2021 at noon.

Registered participants will receive the details to join the Seminar by e-mail the day before the Seminar.

For more information, please write an e-mail to Apostolos Anthimos at apostolos.anthimos@gmail.com.

The author of this post is Ségolène Normand, Postgraduate Student in Private Law at the University of Valenciennes.

Digital technology has been investing all areas of society and its potential seems unlimited. At the global level, public institutions are progressively transforming in favour of eGovernment which involves rethinking both organisation and process, so that public services can be delivered online, quickly and at a lower cost for individuals and businesses (see for instance here). States are also investing massively in the digitisation of their justice system and national courts have to adapt to this new paradigm, irrespective of the type of disputes – domestic or cross-border – they are dealing with. Digitalisation has no borders.

Against this backdrop, the use of new technologies can facilitate the resolution of cross-border disputes, as it helps justice being faster, more accessible and efficient. The distance between courts and litigants may be removed by online hearings and proceedings. Digitalisation also makes cross-border judicial cooperation easier, in particular through the dematerialisation of circulation of procedural documents between courts, legal professionals and litigants. This trend has recently been illustrated by the recast of the Taking of evidence and Service Regulations (announced here) within the European Union (“EU”) and is one of the axioms of the modernisation of the European judicial area in civil matters (see here).

A seminar on Digital technology in family matters organised by the Academy of European Law (ERA) on 27 January 2021 gives me the opportunity to focus on digital justice in cross-border dispute resolution. What are the main tendencies of digital justice for international families worldwide? Does digitalisation lead to different ways and results in the legal and judicial treatment of family matters, as in other fields of private law?

On the one hand, digitalisation can contribute to promoting family mobility and ease dispute resolution. For instance, the translation of judgements by artificial intelligence (AI) may simplify the recognition of families’ documents in the receiving States. On the other hand, family legal issues often involve vulnerable parties and, therefore, deserve a specific attention within the process of digitalisation of justice.

This ERA seminar gave interesting insights on digitalisation of family justice, that I propose to share with the readers of the blog. The seminar brought together practitioners (professors, judges, lawyers, mediators…) from different jurisdictions, in order to present their national, as well as international experiences on digitalisation of family justice (1), the use of e-Codex in European cross-border procedures (2) and finally on legal tech and AI in family matters (3). The report is limited to some aspects of their contributions, with a private international law perspective.

1. Digitalisation of Family Justice

Several speakers presented various national digital progress in family law.

First, Annette Kronborg (Southern University of Denmark) screened the “mandatory digital application” and the “recovery of maintenance obligation” in Denmark. Unlike other Members States, Denmark introduced early the digitalisation in the family justice system. In fact, the first policy paper on digitalisation was introduced in 2001. The establishment in 2014 of a “mandatory digital application” introduced a digital communication between citizens and public authorities through a software application. And since 2015, a new digital authority has been centralising maintenance debts. But, according to the speaker, it must be reformed to be more efficient.

Second, Bregje Dijksterhuis (Molengraaff Institute for Private Law) explained the online divorce proceeding in the Netherlands. Thanks to “Rechtwijzer”, spouses can divorce online. It is up to them to decide what type of measures for their divorce they want. The project is a success for the user; nevertheless, lawyers criticise the lack of information on spouse’s rights.

Third, Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University) presented the project of online marriages and divorces in Japan. Indeed, since the pandemic, Japan’s authorities plans to digitalise marriage and divorce as well as replace traditional administrative (paper) documents. Moreover, Japanese authorities envisage a legislative reform following the Resolution of European Parliament of 8 July 2020 on the international and domestic parental abduction of EU children in Japan. Since there is no possibility under Japanese law to obtain shared or joint custody, there is a significant number of unsolved parental child abduction cases where one of the parents is an EU national and the other is a Japanese national.

2. E-CODEX and Cross-border Proceedings

Joanna Guttzeit (Judge at the District Court Berlin & Liaison Judge of the International Hague Network of Judges and the EJN in Civil and Commercial Matters) focused on cross-border family procedures and online hearings.

In the EU, the general statutory duty to hear in-person the participants to the proceeding (especially children) for family courts can lead to the refusal of recognition for judgements in the field of parental responsibility in case of online hearings. This results from Article 23 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. Traditionally, families travelled to the courts to be heard. But with the advent of new technologies, family courts could proceed to online hearings if a family member is unable to travel. However, some EU Member States might refuse to recognise the judgment in such circumstances.

The pandemic speeds up online-hearing in many European countries, such as Spain, Poland and Germany. However, online hearing should be exceptional and never become the “normal rule”, in particular within proceedings implying children. The procedures have to guarantee the welfare of children. Some States, like Germany, are really strict on this point. This is the reason why the EU Members States should harmonise their procedures by following European guidelines.

Then, Cristina Gonzàlez Beilfuss (University of Barcelona) discussed digitalisation of cross-border judicial procedures.

Undeniably, the pandemic shows that digital development in Europe could be a real opportunity to improve cross-border judicial cooperation. This is why the European Commission promotes national reforms in the field. The use of new technologies is, according to the Commission, the more efficient way to encourage exchanges between competent authorities in the area of mutual legal assistance. A vast majority of participants during the seminar, thought this communication should be predominantly digital in the future, while a minority thought it should be exclusively digital.

Actually, the main issue is the assessment of the legal effect or admissibility of the electronically determined document and the applicable law. It should be governed by the law of the requesting State. Pr. Gonzàlez Beilfuss proposed to harmonise the diffusion methods of electronic documents between the courts of the EU Member States to have a more predicable cross-border proceeding for international families. Regarding the legal effect, it cannot be denied on the sole ground that it is an electronic means of obtaining a judgment.

To conclude this session, Xavier Thoreau (Council of the European Union) presented e-CODEX and the new EU initiatives for the digitalisation of justice systems (here and here).

E-CODEX is a project established by the European Commission, in order to facilitate secure exchanges of data between legal professionals and litigants in different EU Member States. It consists of a package of software components that enable the connectivity between national systems. In cross-border proceeding, e-CODEX allows to establish a bridge between national systems. For the Commission, e-CODEX is the reference for secure digital communication in cross-border legal proceedings.

More than half of the participants rarely or never received in the context of their legal practice requests in electronic format by e-CODEX. According to Xavier Thoreau, this is problematic and shows that EU ambition to use the e-CODEX system to support national digitalisation of cross-border as well as domestic justice may take a long time. This is also supported by the fact that the EU has only a “subsidiary jurisdiction” in domestic family procedure.

3. Legal Tech and Artificial Intelligence in Family Matters

Markus Hartung and Ulrike Meising (lawyers) presented with Alan Larking (Family Law Patners, Brighton) the potential of AI and legal tech in the lawyer’s work.

AI and legal tech are great tools to help lawyers. From now on, they have an unlimited access to the law. In particular, they have an easier access to the law of other Member States, which is useful in the presence of foreign components in legal disputes. Increasingly, online applications with algorithms rank the dispute resolution models. For example, some law firm websites provide clients with a form to fill in online and an algorithm proposes a legal solution. Digital cross-border dispute resolution is possible since online applications are capable to adapt to each family model. However, a lawyer should always control the solution introduced by the algorithm.

Finally, Bérénice Lemoine (Council of the European Union) concluded with some thoughts on legal tech in family matters. Yet, the development of digitalisation of family justice in Europe is still far from uniform. For instance, only 24% of EU Member States integrate the issuance of “multilingual standard forms” of the Regulation on Public Documents, whereas in 54% of Member States, the possibility does not exist. Indeed, European citizens are not required to provide an official translation of family documents. They can ask the authorities of the EU country that issued their document to provide a “multilingual standard form” to facilitate its recognition in the receiving State. In the same vein, in 15% of Members States, official court documents cannot be served electronically on citizens and businesses. And for a third of them, evidence submitted in digital format is not deemed admissible. According to Bérénice Lemoine, it is not only necessary to encourage Member States to use already available legal tech and quickly develop them, but also to start the digital Justice transformation in those States which are less advanced, with the aim of having a more efficient resolution cross-border family procedure. For that, the EU offers a financial support (see Tool 1 of COM/2020/710 final).

 

 

The post below was written by Andrew Dickinson, Fellow of St Catherine’s College and Professor of Law, University of Oxford. It is the the first contribution to an on-line symposium devoted to the fate of the 1968 Brussels Convention: further contributions will be published on this blog in the coming days.

The symposium follows a lively exchange prompted by a post by Matthias Lehmann (Brexit and the Brussels Convention: It’s All Over Now, Baby Blue?), which attracted comments by Eduardo Álvarez-Armas, Apostolos Anthimos, Gilles Cuniberti, Burkhard Hess, Costanza Honorati, Alex Layton, François Mailhé and Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti.

Readers are encouraged to share their comments to the contributions. Those wishing to submit a full contribution to the on-line symposium are invited to get in touch with Pietro Franzina at pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

In recent months, rumours have circulated in social media and the blogosphere that the Brussels Convention (*see below) is to launch a “Brexit revival tour” in the courts of its Contracting States. This appears, in part at least, to be an exercise in wishful thinking by supporters of closer judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters between the EU’s Member States on the one hand and their former partner, the UK, on the other.

More recently, the permanent representative of the UK Government, the operator of the UK venues, has written to the Secretary-General of the EU Council to deny their involvement in any revival. Although other members have hitherto remained silent, their longstanding representative, the European Commission, has already expressed its own opinion that there is no role for the Convention in the post-Brexit landscape. In its view, “EU rules on enforcement will not apply to judicial decisions where the original proceedings have been instituted after the end of the [Brexit] transition period”. In the preceding paragraph of its statement, the Commission makes clear that its reference to “EU rules on enforcement” includes the 1968 Brussels Convention, and that the Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the EU and UK should be read in that light.

This appears an opportune moment, as a longstanding afficionado of the Convention, to express my own view: that a comeback tour would as undesirable as it is improbable. Before summarising my reasons for reaching that conclusion, two important points are worth clarifying.

First, despite speculation to the contrary, the Convention has not been “terminated”. As Recital (23) and Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation make clear, the Convention still applies to the territories of the Member States that fall within Convention’s territorial scope while being excluded from the Regulation by Article 299 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU, Article 355 – see Recital (9) and Article 68 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation. Performances have continued, for example, in Aruba and New Caledonia.

The question which presents itself, therefore, is whether the arrangements put in place by the Convention no longer (from 1 January 2021) apply to relations between the UK, on the one hand, and the other Contracting States or whether the Convention applies with renewed vigour to those relationships now that the EU treaties and the Brussels Regulations no longer apply to the UK. That is a question of modification or suspension, not of termination.

Secondly, although Convention is a treaty, it is not one that is removed from the EU’s legal system: instead, it exists as a satellite and, like a moon orbiting a planet, is subject to the gravitational pull of EU law. Although formally concluded outside the framework of the original EEC/EC Treaty, the Convention is inexorably linked to that Treaty (and the treaties that replaced it):

• through Article 293 (ex-Article 220) of the EC Treaty (which inspired and justified the Convention);
• through its role in strengthening the legal protection of persons in the context of the common, later internal, market: as the Commission stated when it proposed the formation of the Convention between the EEC’s original members, “a true internal market between the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured” (Jenard Report, [1]);
• through the role of the European Court Justice in interpreting its provisions under the 1971 Protocol: from the outset, the ECJ has treated the Brussels Convention as an instrument within the province of EC law and not merely as a standalone international treaty falling to be interpreted according to the rules and principles of public international law: see eg Mund & Fester v Hatrex International Transport, [11]-[12].

If interpretation of the Brussels Convention does fall within the province of EU law, there is no need to treat questions concerning its modification or suspension differently. Indeed, as the question of the Brussels Convention’s status depends upon the interpretation and effect of the EU treaties and of the Brussels Regulations (see below), it is not difficult to see the matter as having its centre of gravity in European Union’s own (autonomous) legal order rather than in public international law (see Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [44]-[46]). Principles of customary international law, and of the Vienna Conventions insofar as they describe or establish those principles, accordingly, take on a subsidiary role as part of the set of general principles of EU law (Wightman, [70]-[71]).

With these points in mind, let me identify briefly the main reasons for opposing the renewed application of the Brussels Convention to govern jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters involving the UK and the other Contracting States from 1 January 2021 onwards:

1. As a matter of first impression, the argument in favour of the “Brexit revival tour” is not a promising one. It involves two linked propositions: (i) the Brussels Convention automatically springs back to occupy the legal domain formerly controlled by the Brussels Regulations, which themselves no longer apply to the UK following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU resulting in the cessation of the EU treaties (TEU, Article 50(3)); and (ii) it does so because the Brussels I Regulation (and Recast Brussels I Regulation) merely suspended the Convention’s operation as between the (then) Member States (subjection to the exceptions expressly set out) for the period in which the Regulations remained in force.
2. The first proposition seems counterintuitive: a convention expressly contemplated by the EC Treaty, concluded to achieve close co-operation in the field of civil justice between Member States and to facilitate the functioning of the common (internal) market supposedly acquires new vigour when one of the participating Member States chooses to remove itself from the EU on terms that bring an end to its participation in the internal market and that make no provision for continued co-operation in civil justice matters.
3. Although the Brussels Convention was, admittedly, concluded for an unlimited period (Article 67), this was done at a time when the EC Treaty did not (at least expressly) contemplate that a Member State might withdraw from the Community. As its Preamble emphasises, the parties to the Convention acted in their capacity as parties to the EC Treaty.
4. The Preamble to the 1978 Convention of the Accession of the UK, alongside Denmark and Ireland, to the Brussels Convention records that the three States had “in becoming members of the Community” undertaken to accede to the Brussels Convention (see Article 3(2) of the Accession Treaty). Article 39 of the 1978 Convention refers to the UK as a “new Member State”. This highlights the awkward nature of the proposition that the Convention should spring back on the occasion of the UK becoming a former Member State.
5. As to the second proposition, the Brussels I Regulation was also adopted at a time when the EC Treaty (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) did not (at least expressly) contemplate that a Member State might withdraw. Its recitals refer to the progressive establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice to facilitate the internal market (Recital (1)), to the work done within the EU’s institutions to revise the Brussels Convention (Recital (5)), to the need to replace the Convention with a Community legal instrument (Recital (6)) and to the desire to ensure continuity between the Convention and the Regulation (Recital (19)). These matters, as well as the explicit reservation of the Convention’s application to overseas territories to which the Regulation did not apply (Recital (23)), point overwhelmingly to a movement in one direction only, with the Regulation permanently overriding the Convention within the Regulation’s sphere of operation.
6. Although the language of Article 68 of the Brussels I Regulation (in the English language version: “supercede”, “replaces”; in the French, “remplace”; in the German, “tritt … an die Stelle”, “ersetzt”) is not unambiguous, a contextual and teleological interpretation of this provision strongly favours the conclusion that the intention of the EU and of its Member States was that the Regulation would permanently replace the Convention in relations between the Member States (rather than suspending its operation for the period in which the Regulation remained in force).
7. Admittedly, if one reaches that conclusion, it rather begs the question why (if Article 68 of the Regulation adopted in 2000 had overridden the Convention once and for all), the legislator considered it necessary to carry that provision forward into Article 68 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation. This can, however, be explained as a sensible measure to account for the relationship of the three instruments and the need for continuity from the original Convention, via the original Regulation to the recast Regulation (see Recitals (7)-(9) and (34) of the recast Regulation). (In any event, for reasons of legal certainty, the relationship between the Convention and the original Brussels I Regulation should be determined without reference to the later, recast Regulation.)
8. Understandably, the thirteen Member States who joined the EU after the enactment of the Brussels I Regulation were not required in their accession treaties to join the Brussels Convention. A reading of Article 68 of the Regulation that merely suspended the Convention in relations between the UK and the other Contracting States would produce an arbitrary and unsatisfactory schism between “old” and “new” Member States. It would also undermine the exclusive external competence of the EC/EU in this field generated by the adoption of the Regulation.
9. Although its supporters still rightly endorse its virtues, the Brussels Convention is, uncontroversially, “old technology”. Recital (5) of the original Brussels I Regulation accepted the need to update it, and the EU’s approach to questions of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments evolved further with the recast Regulation.
10. At a time when parties to the Lugano Convention are pressing for an update to bring it into line with the recast Regulation and a review of the Regulation lies in the not too distant future, it offends common sense to suggest that the EU’s acquis should be interpreted in a way that produces the result that fourteen of the EU’s Member States and its one former Member State are required to re-establish close (but outdated) treaty relations in the field of civil justice, while the others must deal with the UK on the basis of national law rules alone.
11. The UK and the Commission are right to reject the revival of the Brussels Convention. It is best for all of us that we live with our warm memories of its back catalogue, and use them to press for closer civil justice cooperation in the future between the legal systems of the UK and the EU. The 2007 Lugano Convention is the right place to start.

 

(*) The Brussels Convention (or to use the full title Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters), initially formed in 1968, and reformed on a number of occasions since (most recently in 1998, has 15 members (“Contracting States”) being the first fifteen Member States of the European Communities. Member States joining the European Union after 1998 (13 in total) are not members of the Convention.

As announced earlier on this blog, the Private International Law Interest Group of the Italian Society of International Law and EU Law organises a series of webinar titled Private International Law in Europe: Current Developments in Jurisprudence.

The webinar scheduled to take place on 19 February 2021 on State Immunity and Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters in Recent Court of Justice Rulings, with Alexander Layton and Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe has been rescheduled. It will take place on 1 March 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET).

To attend the webinar, please write an e-mail to sidigdipp@gmail.com.

The first issue of the Journal du droit international for 2021 has just been released. It contains two articles and several case notes relating to private international law. Both articles deal with the topical issue of corporate social responsibility.

In the first article, Bernard Teyssié (University of Paris II – Panthéon-Assas) discusses the legal scope of the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises (“Les principes directeurs de l’OCDE à l’intention des entreprises multinationales”)

The English abstract reads:

The OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises carry rules of conduct which, on a literal reading, are not binding. The recommendations made are designed to identify, prevent, exclude or, at least, mitigate the negative impacts generated by the activity of multinational enterprises or their suppliers and subcontractors in the social and corporate social responsability area. However, the reach of these recommandations is increased by the obligation imposed on any State, which has acceded to the Guidelines, to establish a national Point of contact to deal with complaints alleging a breach of the laid down Principles. The role of these Points of contact in fact confers a binding effect upon the enacted rules, contrary to what it is officially declared.

In the second article, Catherine Kessedjian (University of Paris II – Panthéon-Assas) analyses the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration drawn up under the auspices of the Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) (“The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration ou comment l’arbitrage et la médiation peuvent renforcer le respect des droits de l’homme par les entreprises“).

The English abstract reads:

Many recognize that access to justice is the Achilles’ heel of corporate respect for human rights. This is why, at the end of 2019, a group of jurists from various backgrounds proposed a set of arbitration rules specific to this area, which mixes public and private interests. The exercise was not easy. The purpose of the article that follows is to evaluate these rules in the light of the particularities of the subject matter and the concrete findings that have been made thanks to the procedures conducted before national courts in a few countries, some of which are still ongoing. Certain points are identified that could justify amendments to the rules when and if a revision is initiated. 

A full table of contents can be downloaded here.

Paul Lorenz Eichmüller (University of Vienna) has kindly provided the following post.

Austria is one of the few European countries that still retains the institution of fault divorce, which means that a court will have to examine the grounds for a separation. With an increasing number of States abolishing this type of divorce (England and Wales being one of the most recent examples), conflicts problems may arise due to the incompatibility between the different systems. This is well illustrated by a recent decision of the Austrian Supreme Court from 10 December 2020.

Facts

The parties of the underlying case were both Austrian citizens who got married in Austria and later moved to Belgium for professional reasons. Subsequently, they got divorced there under Belgian law in accordance with Article 8(a) of the Rome III Regulation. Belgium had abolished fault divorce in 2007. Thus, no statement on fault for the divorce was issued in the judgment.

After the divorce, the former wife moved back to Austria and brought an action for a supplementary pronouncement of fault in Austrian courts to improve her situation in subsequent maintenance proceedings under Austrian law. The former husband had in the meanwhile relocated to Guinea.

The Decision by the Austrian Supreme Court

After the court of first did not discuss the applicable law at all and the court of second instance ruled that pursuant to Article 8(c) of the Rome III Regulation, Austrian law was applicable to the issue of determining fault in a marriage, the Supreme Court of Austria decided that Austrian law was indeed applicable. According to the Supreme Court, the supplementary pronouncement of fault serves primarily for the purposes of maintenance, as it determines the amount of maintenance that a divorced spouse receives. As such, it is a preliminary question for the maintenance claim and hence governed by the maintenance statute, rather than the divorce statute. This would also be in line with the Rome III Regulation, which excludes matters of maintenance from its sphere of application in Article 1(2)(g). The Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, which determines the maintenance statute in Austria (Article 15 of the Maintenance Regulation), stipulates in Article 3 that the applicable law is the law at the habitual residence of the creditor, which in this case was Austria. However, in order to give the former husband the opportunity to argue for the possible application of a law with a closer connection according to Article 5 of the Hague Protocol, the court referred the dispute back to the court of first instance.

Assessment

The decision of the Supreme Court is overall not very convincing, leaving many open questions that have not been dealt with in the reasoning of the judgment.

First of all, the decision is insofar remarkable as it unnecessarily brought confusion to an issue that had previously been settled in well-established case law. Given the unclear qualification of fault in a divorce in private international law, a referral of the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling would have thus been preferrable, as the scope of application of the Rome III and Maintenance Regulations is concerned. The previous rulings of the Austrian Supreme Court had always determined the supplementary pronouncement of fault according to the divorce statute (RS0077266; approving also in literature: Nademleinsky, EF-Z 2019, p. 139).

Apart from this procedural issue, the Supreme Court surprisingly broke with precedent (1 Ob 340/58) stating that it is not a preliminary question for the award of maintenance whether there was fault, but rather a mere question of fact, whether the divorce judgment contains a pronouncement of fault. That approach is also followed in literature (Zankl/Mondel in Schwimann/Kodek, ABGB4 § 69 EheG Rz 1). But even if it is classified as a preliminary question in the exception of international cases (as supported by Nademleinsky, EF-Z 2019, p. 139), the law applicable to preliminary questions nevertheless has to be determined separately in accordance with the applicable rules of private international law. Therefore, this would in itself not provide any additional value for the scope of application of the abovementioned regulations or for the applicable law.

Now, what actually is the applicable law determining fault in a divorce? At a first glance, the argumentation of the Supreme Court seems plausible: As the pronouncement of fault after a finalised divorce only serves the purpose of creating a better position for the maintenance creditor, it might be regarded as an issue of the Maintenance Regulation. However, a question is not automatically within the scope of the Maintenance Regulation, solely because its main relevance lies in maintenance law. In a fault divorce, the question who bears fault for the end of the marriage falls without the shadow of a doubt under the divorce statute. Yet, in maintenance proceedings following a no-fault divorce the exact same question would be determined by another statute, just because the law applicable to the divorce under Art 8 Rome III does not know a fault divorce. It is not convincing that the classification should depend on the type of proceedings initiated, as this undermines the aim of the European private international law regulations, namely to uniformly determine the applicable law.

Additionally, the rules of the Hague Protocol are designed in such a way that they protect the creditor by referring to the law at the creditor’s habitual place of residence. This is appropriate given that the creditor has to make a living at that place. However, the question whether there was fault in ending the marriage is not at all connected to the place of the creditor’s habitual residence. It is much more closely connected to the marriage and its dissolution. Thus, it should be determined according to the divorce statute.

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Belgian law is thus relevant for fault in divorce in the present case. Does that, however, mean that the former wife necessarily receives a lower maintenance and the husband’s fault cannot be taken into account? Not necessarily. If there is no pronouncement of fault in the divorce judgment, the maintenance is determined according to equity (§ 69(3) EheG) rather than by a fixed percentage, as when there is a pronouncement of fault. Up to the present decision, this was also the case for any foreign judgment from a jurisdiction without fault divorce (RS0114475).

According to some opinions (Zankl/Mondel in Schwimann/Kodek ABGB4 § 69 EheG Rz 18; LGZ Wien 11.6.1984, 44 R 1049/84), the fault of a spouse can then be weighed in this equitable evaluation. Although the Supreme Court seems to disagree with this interpretation – for good reasons if both the divorce and the maintenance proceedings were held under Austrian law – this line of jurisprudence should not be followed in an international context, since a failure to consider fault would lead to a qualitative discrepancy of norms.

If the Supreme Court were to remain adamant in its position that the fault may in principle not be weighed in cases of § 69(3) EheG, the legal norms in the foreign divorce statute and the Austrian maintenance statute would be in qualitative discrepancy to each other, as the latter simply assumes that fault will be pronounced in the divorce judgment if there is any. Based on this assumption, it assigns lower maintenance to divorces where no fault is pronounced. However, this assessment does not have foreign judgments in mind where there is no possibility for a pronouncement of fault according to the divorce statute. While Austrian maintenance law requires the existence of this legal institute, its absence in many jurisdictions results in the connection of this question ending up nowhere. Hence, the incompatibility of the two legal systems has to be remedied by the means of adaptation.

While adaptation can be conducted both on the level of private international law (as Gitschthaler in Gitschthaler, IntFamR Art 11 HUP Rz 2 seems to suggest) and on the level of substantive law, the choice between the two should depend on which one is the less invasive.

As maintenance after divorces without the pronouncement of fault is under Austrian law determined on the basis of equity anyway, the adaptation on a substantive level – by allowing the weighing of fault – is relatively non-invasive compared to applying a different statute altogether. The application of Austrian law on the determination of fault can therefore not be considered the preferred option.

Thus, the Supreme Court should have dismissed the action for a supplementary pronouncement of fault, so that the maintenance court could weigh the fault in its equitable evaluation – if not by default, then at least by the means of adaptation. Also from a point of procedural economy, this would be a desirable outcome, as the additional supplementary proceedings could be avoided.

Irit Mevorach (Professor of International Commercial Law at the University of Nottingham and Co-Director of the University of Nottingham Commercial Law Centre) has wriiten an interesting article on Overlapping International Instruments for Enforcement of Insolvency Judgments: Undermining or Strengthening Universalism?. that has been just published in the European Business Organization Law Review.

The abstract reads as follows:

In recent years modified universalism has emerged as the normative framework for governing international insolvency. Yet, divergences from the norm, specifically regarding the enforcement of insolvency judgments, have also been apparent when the main global instrument for cross-border insolvency has been interpreted too narrowly as not providing the grounds for enforcing judgments emanating from main insolvency proceedings. This drawback cannot be overcome using general private international law instruments as they exclude insolvency from their scope. Thus, a new instrument—a model law on insolvency judgments—has been developed. The article analyses the model law on insolvency judgments against the backdrop of the existing cross-border insolvency regime. Specifically, the article asks whether overlaps and inconsistencies between the international instruments can undermine universalism. The finding is mixed. It is shown that the model law on insolvency judgments does add vigour to the cross-border insolvency system where the requirement to enforce and the way to seek enforcement of insolvency judgments is explicit and clear. The instrument should, therefore, be adopted widely. At the same time, ambiguities concerning refusal grounds based on proper jurisdiction and inconsistencies with the wider regime could undermine the system. Consequently, the article considers different ways of implementing the model law and using it in future cases, with the aim of maximizing its potential, including in view of further developments concerning enterprise groups and choice of law.

On 5 February 2021, the Universities of Amsterdam, Maastricht and Tilburg, in collaboration with the Open University, organized an online seminar on The Netherlands, a forum conveniens for collective redress?

A group of experts in the field addressed both procedural and private international law aspects of collective actions under the Dutch and European frameworks. The first panel of the seminar discussed whether the current private international law instruments need specific rules on collective actions and settlements. Burkhard Hess and Alexia Pato drafted some preliminary statements that sparked interesting discussions. The questions related to standing to sue under the Directive on representative actions (2020/1828), which where discussed in the third panel of the day, will also be published on the EAPIL blog. Finally, a brief account of the whole seminar will be published in the Dutch journal on PIL, NIPR.

 

Panel 1. Statement: The instruments of European private international law (Brussels I, Rome II) are in need of specific rules for collective action and collective settlements. 

AP: The proposed statement for the present panel is that EU instruments on Private International Law need specific rules on collective redress. I believe that this statement is true as far as the Brussels I bis Regulation is concerned.

BH:  First, I would like to thank the organizers of this webinar for the thorough preparation of today’s event. The explanation of the Dutch case law and the small films on the structural issues of jurisdiction, pendency and applicable law are very much appealing. I assume that the audience expects this panel to be a little bit controversial. In this respect, I would like to state that I am less optimistic regarding the enactment of a specific EU instrument on cross-border collective redress. However, we will come back to this issue in the course of our common reflections.

1. AP: Let us start with Article 4 of Regulation Brussels I bis, the general head for international jurisdiction. One might question whether litigation in the defendant’s domicile should be promoted in all cases. In that sense, it is interesting to note that the Directive on representative actions implements the mutual recognition of representative entities’ standing to sue, so that access to courts of other Member States is facilitated. Coupled with the fact that the Directive leaves Private International Law questions to the Regulations already in force, one cannot help but conclude that litigation in the domicile of the defendant should remain the general rule, according to the European legislator. Nevertheless, that forum might not be always accessible, especially where small-value claims are involved. In consumer law cases, for example, consumer associations have tried to use the alternative forum of Article 7(2) of Regulation Brussels I bis, which opens a forum on the market they are active in. This could be a mere strategic move or the evidence that cross-border litigation is uneasy. Either way, I believe that this question should be further examined.

BH: The basic principle of the Brussels I bis Regime is actor sequitur forum rei. It corresponds to the basic idea that a party should primarily defend against the lawsuit brought against her or him at home. There might be a home advantage, especially when a large enterprise is facing a high value lawsuit and the compensation sought may impact on employment. However, as collective redress usually empowers the plaintiff(s), at first sight there is no (compelling) need to further privilege collective redress with regard to jurisdiction. Article 79(2) GDPR is an example where the EU lawmaker enlarged the grounds of jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiffs. However, I have the impression that this provision shall strengthen the extraterritorial application of EU data protection law vis à vis third state defendants.

2. AP: Second, even though the Dutch case law on collective actions involving environmental harms recalls that the mandatory nature of Article 4 of Regulation Brussels I bis must be respected, this idea has been challenged before the English courts. In particular, in Vedanta, the UK Supreme Court seemed to admit that an exception to Article 4 of Regulation Brussels I bis is conceivable, when “the claimant has no genuine intention to seek a remedy against the anchor defendant”. Additionally, cases such as Trafigura and Petrobras pose the question whether party autonomy could supplant the application of Article 4 of Regulation Brussels I bis.

BH: This issue seems to me to be more related to Article 8(1) of Regulation Brussels I bis. This provision was generously interpreted when the CJEU in case C-352/13, CDC, permitted actions against co-defendants to move on. In this case, the plaintiff and the anchor defendant had settled the case even before the lawsuits against the co-defendants had been served. However, the CJEU held that a control of abuse might be possible in the realm of Article 8(1) of Regulation Brussels I bis.

3. AP: In cases such as Milieudefensie v. Shell, the Dutch courts had to assess whether jurisdiction could be asserted over the foreign subsidiary of a Dutch mother company, based on Article 7 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, which corresponds to Article 8(1) of Regulation Brussels I bis at the EU level. This kind of scenario obliges us to determine whether jurisdiction should be exercised when the dispute involves foreign plaintiffs, a foreign co-defendant, a foreign harm, and the application of a foreign law. The tension between access to justice and the private international law principles, according to which jurisdiction is allocated where some relevant connecting factors link the court to the dispute is particularly visible in those kinds of cases. Having a look at the case law of other jurisdictions, such as the US, one observes that the tendency is to restrict the assertion of jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases. In all cases, a redefinition of our policy objectives (e.g. avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments, provide access to justice, etc.) might be necessary in order to better frame what the general rule on the attraction of co-defendants and its exception should be.

BH: Objectively, jurisdiction over co-defendants may amount to an exorbitant head of jurisdiction when the relationship between the main defendant and the co-defendant appears to be superficial and loose. However, when it comes to tortious behaviour, the decision-making in the board of a mother company related to the foreign subsidiary may amount to tortious conduct. Yet, these are facts easy to assert but very difficult to prove. In the context of Article 7(2) of Regulation Brussels I bis, the CJEU has been very reluctant with regard to co-perpetrators (cf. case C-228/11, Melzer).

4. AP: As regards the WCAM procedure, asserting international jurisdiction to declare collective settlement agreements binding has been controversial as well. In Shell and Converium, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal considered that the victims located in the Netherlands were the defendants and declared that it had jurisdiction according to Article 4 of Regulation Brussels I bis. Victims domiciled in other EU Member States were included within the collective settlement thanks to Article 8(1) of Regulation Brussels I bis. This means that the presence of one shareholder in the Netherlands allocates jurisdiction to Dutch courts. Of course, this has to be mitigated by the fact that both petitioners freely chose to submit to the jurisdictional power of those courts. However, would that situation be sustainable if all Member States had a WCAM mechanism and hence, the ability to declare EU-wide settlements binding? Put differently, the question is whether Private International Laws rules on jurisdiction should adapt (and if so, how?) or remain unchanged.

BH: The problem related to WCAM relates to the applicability of the Brussels I bis Regulation: Does the “homologation” of an out of court settlement really amount to a dispute litigated in courts? (here, I would like to add that the same concerns relate to schemes of arrangement). Just to put it differently: Are non-contentious proceedings in the material scope of the jurisdictional regime of Brussels I bis? The difficulties start with the determination of the role of the parties: who is the plaintiff, who is the defendant? To my opinion, jurisdiction in these cases should be based on articles 25 or 26 in case one agrees that the Brussels I bis Regulation applies to this constellation.

5. AP: As regards the application of the special and protective fora of Regulation Brussels I bis, it is commonly acknowledged that collective redress actions, which protect a general interest, such as the environment or the market as a whole, may be brought in the place where the damage occurred, as case C-167/00, Henkel, shows. When the collective redress action bundles many individual claims, the centralisation of those claims in a place other than the defendant’s domicile is trickier. As the CJEU ruled in C- 498/16, Schrems, multiple claims cannot be bundled in the forum of one consumer’s habitual residence (section IV of the Regulation Brussels Ibis). Even though such a result is bad news for access to justice, I believe that the current text of the Regulation would not have allowed the CJEU to come up with another solution. The centralisation of claims at the place where the damage occurred is difficult as well, as Article 7(2) of the Regulation Brussels I bis allocates not only international but also territorial jurisdiction, and the place of the damage will hardly ever be exactly the same for all victims. In the case C-709/19, VEB, the AG seems to open the door to the centralisation of claims for victims who are located within the same Member State. He says (I quote) ‘the problems of territorial fragmentation arising from a strict application of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis could be solved by arguments in support of a specialised court in a particular local jurisdiction’. However, I doubt that Article 7(2) of Regulation Brussels I bis actually allows domestic procedural law to modify the venue designated by the Regulation.

BH.: As far as consumer claims are concerned, Articles 16 and 17 of Regulation Brussels I bis only apply to contractual claims – but this may be the case when private shareholders sue the company. In his Opinion on case C-498/16 AG Bobek clearly and correctly stated that the introduction of a new head of jurisdiction for consumer collective claims is a matter for the EU lawmaker, the argument has been taken up by AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona in case C-709/19, VEB.

According to the case law of the CJEU as it stands today, the application of Article 7(2) requires more than a pure pecuniary loss to fix the locus damni. In this regard, the Opinion in case C-709/19, VEB, clearly (and correctly) indicate that neither the location of an investment account, nor the status as consumers of some of the investors establish a sufficient connection with the Netherlands. In the case of a declaratory action, followed by (individual) actions for damages, the place of the damage is difficult to assess when there is no clear indication of the place of the damage in the first phase of the proceedings.

On the other hand, I do not see a problem in setting up a specialised court in a Member State having particular jurisdiction for a specific type of claims. In case C-400/13, Huber and Sander, the CJEU has already decided that the concentration of venue in one court by the MS is not excluded by the specific heads of jurisdiction of the Maintenance Regulation which equally address both: international jurisdiction and venue. A good example could be follow-on actions related to cartel law violations; let’s see what is decided in the pending case C-30/20, Volvo.

6. AP: My last point concerns parallel litigation. The emergence of multiple proceedings in several states may give rise to potential ‘overlaps’ between actions. Those overlaps represent a waste of judicial resources and may generate inconsistent judgments, as well as overcompensation. At the same time, we have to accept that parallel litigation is a by-product of our jurisdictional system, which provides for alternative fora. To some degree, parallel litigation will therefore take place. Within the Brussels regime, the lis pendens rule of Article 29 of the Regulation Brussels Ibis should hardly ever apply in collective redress cases as the formal (or even material) identity of parties in parallel proceedings will usually not be met. As for Article 30 of the Regulation, on related actions, this provision could theoretically apply to parallel proceedings in collective actions. However, potential delays in the resolution of the dispute and possible disparities between the claims will more often than not militate against the stay of proceedings. Both the Steinhoff and Libor cases illustrate the difficulties that parallel ligation generates.

In all cases, a clear-cut rule on stay of proceedings does not seem to be an option, as collective redress mechanisms vary from state to state. As regards the difficulty to determine which court is seised first, one could imagine implementing a communication channel between courts in the manner of Article 29(2) of Regulation Brussels I bis or setting up an EU-wide register of collective redress actions, as the Commission’s Recommendations of 2013 suggest. These proposals are no panacea, but they might nevertheless bring more clarity to this complex legal landscape.

BH: As long as collective actions are based on opt in, the problems of pendency and relatedness are manageable. The moment, a person opts in a collective lawsuit should be the moment of pendency for this person as he or she becomes by registration a party to the (collective) proceedings. I am happy to see that the new Directive on Collective Redress for Consumers is based on the basic idea that in cross-border settings only opt in is possible, see Article 9(3) of Directive (EU) 2020/1828. However, the Directive addresses problems of cross-border litigation rather randomly and Article 3(7) provides for a strange definition of a cross-border representative action, whereby a cross-border situation is present ‘where a qualified entity in another EU Member State brings an action in another EU Member State than that in which the qualified entity was designated.’ This definition is not in line with the concept of the Brussels regime and demonstrates that the Directive primarily provides for the mutual (but limited) recognition of the standing of qualified entities in the courts of other EU Member States. I addressed these issues in my book on Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht (2nd ed., 2021) ch. 11, at paras 11.78 -11.87.

However, the Directive only intends to achieve procedural minimum harmonisation. Consequently, Member States may go further and expand collective redress mechanisms based on opt out also to cross-border settings. In these constellations only Article 30 of Regulation Brussels I bis applies to parallel proceedings. As Alexia has explained, this provision is based on judicial discretion and, therefore, is not suited to effectively coordinate overlapping opt out proceedings pending in several EU Member States. An additional weakness is that this provision only permits the first proceedings to move forward – this might not be an optimal solution in the case of competing, overlapping collective actions.

When it comes to the certification of the class, Article 32 of the Brussels I bis Regulation is difficult to apply. This is well explained in the video of Ianika Tzankova. To my opinion, the decisive moment should be either the filing of the lawsuit or the filing of the application to permit the collective case to proceed. This flexibility corresponds to the aims of Article 32 of Regulation Brussels I bis.

7. AP: To conclude, the application of Private International rules on jurisdiction to collective redress cases is uneasy and forces us to reconsider what kind of policy objectives should be promoted. On the one hand, we could encourage litigation at the defendant’s domicile, which would limit parallel litigation to a certain extent. However, we would probably have to think about creating extra-incentives for representative entities to be able to reach that forum. We would also have to think about potential exceptions to the application of this general rule in light of the case-law involving environmental matters. On the other hand, if a closer forum is to be offered and promoted, access to justice would be fostered, but parallel litigation would probably increase, and more coordination measures would be required. In all cases, recent mass harm situations have stretched the interpretative limits of the Brussels I bis provisions and we have been forced to create extravagant interpretations, so that the system could hold. I believe that now is a good time for a change and I support the enactment of a truly appropriate regulatory regime for cross-border collective redress.

BH: Should the EU lawmaker intervene? To my opinion, this would be a considerable political challenge, as there is currently a clear competition among Member States either to promote their judicial systems to attract collective litigation (as in the Netherlands) or to protect their industries from collective redress (as it is still the case in Germany). Against this background, the chances of a binding EU instrument on the coordination of the different cross-border collective redress instruments in the EU Member States appear to be limited. Member States might strongly oppose to such a zealous project. They already did it when the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation was negotiated.

When enacting Directive 2020/1828, the EU lawmaker intentionally avoided to set a clear framework for the different instruments on collective litigation in the Member States (cf. Article 1(2)). The Directive only requires that Member States provide for an instrument of collective redress corresponding to the main features of the Directive. However, it is worth noting that most of the mandatory provisions of the Directive apply to cross-border settings and require an opting in. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the CJEU will interpret the Regulation Brussels I bis and the Directive in a systematic way. This might finally entail that only opt in instruments will be included into the Brussels regime.

The post below was provided by Catherine Shen, Project Manager at the Asian Business Law Institute.

Readers of the EAPIL blog are well aware that in Europe, harmonisation in the field of private international law has been enormously successful with efforts encompassing both the civil and commercial, as well as family, spheres. In relation to foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters, the Brussels I bis Regulation is a double convention comprising of rules on both jurisdiction and foreign judgments. Apart from harmonising the rules under which a court in one European Union (“EU”) Member State would assume jurisdiction, it enables the free circulation of judgments from one EU Member State within the EU.

In Asia, however, harmonisation efforts in this field have been relatively lacking. That was until recently. The Asian Business Law Institute (“ABLI”), set up in 2016 with the aim of promoting the convergence of business laws in Asia, identified among its first batch of projects an undertaking to advance the convergence of foreign judgments recognition and enforcement rules in Asia (“Foreign Judgments Project”).

ABLI released its first publication, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (“Judgments Compendium”) in the beginning of 2018. This compendium contains 15 short and concise country reports which provide lawyers and businesses with an overview of how foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters are recognised in different jurisdictions in Asia and the requirements which would need to be met for a foreign judgment to be enforced in those jurisdictions. The jurisdictions studied are all ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN (i.e., Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and their major trading partners, including Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea.

In fact, the Judgments Compendium marks the first time when the rules of several ASEAN member states on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are made available in the English language. Its release concluded the first phase of ABLI’s Foreign Judgments Project and set the stage for the second phase where both the similarities and the differences of the rules of these 15 jurisdictions are distilled to formulate a set of common principles.

That set of principles has now been released under the title of Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (“Asian Principles”). This ambitious piece of work is a sequel to the Judgments Compendium and includes a total of 13 principles that among other things, cover the rules on international (or “indirect”) jurisdiction, reciprocity, the enforcement of non-monetary judgments, public policy, due process and inconsistent judgments. Each principle is accompanied by a commentary which fleshes out how the various countries apply that principle and also includes a way forward section, where applicable, to suggest the desired directions of law development.

A detailed write-up on the Asian Principles and the Foreign Judgments Project in general can be found at Adeline Chong, “Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia” (2020) 16 Journal of Private International Law 31-68. Associate Professor Chong is the general editor of both the Judgments Compendium and the Asian Principles.

ABLI is delighted to offer all members of EAPIL and all readers of this blog an exclusive discount to purchase both the Judgments Compendium and the Asian Principles. Interested members and readers can enjoy 10% off by following the steps listed at the end of this post.

Both the Judgments Compendium and the Asian Principles are available in PDF softcopies. Three hardcopies remain in stock for the Judgments Compendium. Please contact Catherine Shen, Project Manager of ABLI, for any query at catherine_shen@abli.asia.

How to enjoy your 10% discount as an EAPIL member or EAPIL blog reader (offer ends on 1 March 2021): (1) Go to https://payhip.com/b/e0md (for Judgments Compendium) or https://payhip.com/b/hACJ (for Asian Principles); (2) Click on the purple icon “buy now”; (3) After entering your name and email address, click on “Have a coupon code? Add coupon“ (right below the data protection terms) and enter promo code “EAPIL”, and then proceed to check out; (4) Once payment is processed by PayPal, an email will be sent to your indicated address for you to download the purchased copy instantly.

Please contact Catherine Shen if you wish to pay by credit card instead of PayPal.

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Supreme Site Services v. Shape (Case C‑186/19) did not only raise the issue of the impact of the immunity of enforcement of international organisations on the definition of civil and commercial matters in the meaning of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The main question asked to the CJEU was that of the jurisdiction to lift cross-border provisional attachments under the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Background

The case was concerned with a dispute relating to the supply of fuel by a group of private companies to the headquarters of NATO in Europe (the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE), for the purpose of a mission in Afghanistan. SHAPE is established in Belgium, but it has a regional headquarter in the Netherlands, the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (‘JFCB’). In order to guarantee the payment of all the costs related to the supply contracts, JFCB and the private companies signed an escrow agreement, whereby funds were deposited in a bank in Brussels.

After a dispute arose between the parties, the private companies sued JFCB and SHAPE on the merits in a Dutch court in 2015.

In 2016, the plaintiffs applied ex parte to the same Dutch court for an authorisation to carry out a provisional attachment on the monies held by the bank in Brussels. The application was granted and, two days later, was carried out in Brussels by a Belgian enforcement officer (huissier de justice) on the basis of a certificate issued on the ground of Art 53 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. In other words, the Dutch order was directly enforced under the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Jurisdiction to Issue a Cross-Border Attachment

After SHAPE was notified, it challenged the order before the court of origin. Interestingly enough, it does not seem that JFCB was notified, and that it was a party to the interim proceedings. The debate essentially revolved around the immunities of NATO, but there was also an issue of jurisdiction. On which ground could a Dutch court authorise the attachment of monies in Belgium? When the Dutch court of appeal considered the issue, it referred to Article 35 of the Regulation. Is that because, in the absence of JFCB, it considered that it did not have jurisdiction on the merits? If so, its jurisdiction should have been restricted to Dutch territory (see Recital 33 of the Preamble to the Regulation).

Enforcement in Belgium

In addition to the jurisdictional issue, there was an obstacle for enforcing the Dutch order in Belgium. It had been issued ex parte. It was therefore not a decision in the meaning of Article 2 of the Regulation, and it could not benefit from the enforcement regime of the Regulation.

But after the abolition of exequatur, the enforcement of foreign judgments is only to be challenged ex post for grounds listed in Art 45. Violation of the scope of Art 35 is not one of them. Issuance of protective measures ex parte is not either. Was there a remedy for SHAPE in Belgium? Maybe Adrian Briggs is right when he writes that Art 45 should not be read literally, and that other grounds for opposing enforcement should be admissible.

It must be underscored that ex parte provisional measures may not benefit from the Brussels regime, but the Brussels I bis Regulation expressly recognises that national law might allow their enforcement. In this case, after Dutch courts lifted the authorisation on the ground that NATO benefited from an immunity, SHAPE sought a declaration of enforceability of the Dutch judgment on the ground of a 1925 bilateral treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands (that the Brussels instruments have replaced, but not terminated – rings a bell?), because the argument of SHAPE was that its immunity excluded the application of the entire regulation (the argument was rightly rejected by the CJEU).

Jurisdiction to Lift the Provisional Attachment

SHAPE applied to the Dutch court, and the Dutch court of appeal set aside the authorisation and lifted the attachment on the ground of the immunity of SHAPE. The creditors appealed, and, although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised, the Dutch supreme court wondered whether Belgian courts had exclusive jurisdiction to lift an attachment over assets situated in Belgium on the grounds of Article 24(5) (“enforcement of decisions”), and thus referred the case to the CJEU.

The question was framed narrowly, and the CJEU only answered that Article 24(5) did not apply, because the proceedings did “not concern per se the enforcement of judgements in the meaning of Article 24(5)”. The court had just insisted that the provision applies to “proceedings relating to recourse to force, constraint or distrain on movable or immovable property”, so it seems that it considered that an application to lift a provisional attachment could not be considered to relate to use of force.

One must also say that Article 24(5) applies to the enforcement “of decisions”, and that it is unclear which decision would have been enforced in this case, since the proceedings on the merits were pending.

Most unfortunately, the CJEU only answered the question as it had been framed and did not elaborate on the court which would have jurisdiction under the Regulation.

It is submitted that, for a number of reasons, it should be the court which issued the order in the first place. A first reason is that the process of lifting a provisional attachment requires to reconsider and, as the case may, set aside, a judicial order. Under the Regulation, it is hard to see how any other court than the court of origin could be entitled to do so. Another reason is that the court of origin will apply the same rules to decide whether the decision was rightly granted.

The University of Silesia in Katowice hosted in 2019 a conference on the the Application of the Succession Regulation in the EU Member States.

The papers presented at the conference have recently been published, under the editorship of Maciej Szpunar, in Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego, a periodical specifically devoted to private international law.Below are the abstracts of (and the links to) the various contributions.

After the conference GEDIP held its meeting in Katowice and celebrated honorary doctorate awarded to Professor Paul Lagarde. The report from the conference is available here and from GEDIP’s meeting here.

Maciej Szpunar, Foreword

The current volume of “Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego” — the leading Polish periodical in the field of private international law — is primarily devoted to the Regulation No 650/2012 of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (“the Succession Regulation”).

Paul Lagarde, La réserve héréditaire dans le règlement 650/2012 sur les successions

The article addresses the issues relating to the protection of forced heirs in international context with a particular focus on the provisions of the EU Succession Regulation pertaining thereto. It contrasts common law tradition with the solutions adopted in French law, whereby certain relatives are entitled to the hereditary reserve (la réserve héréditaire). The author discusses selected examples taken from a body of French case-law dealing with the issue in question. Amongst the cases touched upon by the author are those concerning the successions of Johnny Hallyday and Maurice Jarre, which were two cases widely discussed in the recent French jurisprudence.

Jürgen Basedow, “Member States” and “Third States” in the Succession Regulation

The author advocates a flexible approach with respect to the interpretation of the term “Member State” as employed in the Succession Regulation, allowing the differentiation between “participating” and “non-participating” States. It does not mean that the term “Member State” should always be interpreted in a wide sense including the three non-participating States: Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Whether a wide or a narrow interpretation is appropriate depends on the context and the purpose of the single provision. Most provisions contained in the chapter on jurisdiction refer to participating Member States only. But some articles such as the Article 13 of the Regulation, provide a counter-example. A uniform interpretation of the concept of Member State in all provisions of the Succession Regulation seems far too sweeping. It reminds of Begriffsjurisprudenz and does not take account of the purpose of the single provisions. In particular, it disregards the need for the cross-border protection of individual rights in a Union with open frontiers.

Christian Kohler, Application of the Succession Regulation by German courts — Selected Issues

The article concerns the notion of “court” in the Succession Regulation. This notion is used in the Brussels I and Brussels Ia Regulations, where it does not necessarily have the same scope. The author attempts to interpret the concept in the light of the recitals to the Succession Regulation (in particular Recital 20) and of the case law of the Court of Justice. The very general description of the concept contained in Article 3(2) of the Regulation might potentially embrace other authorities and legal professionals, where they exercise judicial functions by way of delegation of power from the court. In the author’s view, the European Court, especially in Oberle and WB v Notariusz Przemysława Bac correctly navigated its way through the Succession Regulation and ruled in a way which is both coherent as regards the operation of the Regulation and consistent with the intentions of the legislator. The above judgments are analysed also with regard to Poland’s omission to notify notaries as “courts” under Article 79 of the Succession Regulation. The European Court found that the criteria for determining whether an authority or a legal professional, in particular a notary public, constitutes a “court” are determined by Article 3(2) and not by Article 79. Consequently, Poland’s omission to notify was not conclusive, but was in any event correct in substance. The author expresses the opinion that the judgment is accurate on this point.

Michael Wilderspin, The Notion of “Court” under the Succession Regulation

The article concerns the notion of “court” in the Succession Regulation. This notion is used in the Brussels I and Brussels Ia Regulations, where it does not necessarily have the same scope. The author attempts to interpret the concept in the light of the recitals to the Succession Regulation (in particular Recital 20) and of the case law of the Court of Justice. The very general description of the concept contained in Article 3(2) of the Regulation might potentially embrace other authorities and legal professionals, where they exercise judicial functions by way of delegation of power from the court. In the author’s view, the European Court, especially in Oberle and WB v Notariusz Przemysława Bac correctly navigated its way through the Succession Regulation and ruled in a way which is both coherent as regards the operation of the Regulation and consistent with the intentions of the legislator. The above judgments are analysed also with regard to Poland’s omission to notify notaries as “courts” under Article 79 of the Succession Regulation. The European Court found that the criteria for determining whether an authority or a legal professional, in particular a notary public, constitutes a “court” are determined by Article 3(2) and not by Article 79. Consequently, Poland’s omission to notify was not conclusive, but was in any event correct in substance. The author expresses the opinion that the judgment is accurate on this point.

Stefania Bariatti, The Capacity and the Quality of Heir. Possible Interaction with Preliminary Questions

The article contains an overview of the rules relating to the scope of application of the EU private international law regulations. It addresses the treatment of the relevant preliminary questions, with special reference to the Succession Regulation. The issues are discussed in three steps. The first is connected with the way of interpreting the notions and concepts, such as marriage, adoption, legal capacity etc., where such matters as personal status, legal capacity or family relationship may come to the foreground as a preliminary question. The second is dealing with the law applicable to the preliminary question. The author compares pros and cons of the “independent reference” (lex fori) and the “dependent reference” (lex causae) solutions, considering the latter as less effective, producing more negative consequences. The third step embraces questions relating to the jurisdiction with respect to preliminary question.

Andrea Bonomi, The Regulation on Matrimonial Property and Its Operation in Succession Cases — Its Interaction with the Succession Regulation and Its Impact on Non-participating Member States

The Regulations on Matrimonial Property (No 2016/1103) and on the Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships (No 2016/1104) are new important pieces in the “puzzle” of European private international law. This article particularly focuses on the relationship between the Matrimonial Property Regulations and the Succession Regulation, two instruments which will often be applied in parallel because of the close connection between the two areas they govern. The author examines in particular the scope of those instruments as well as their interaction with respect to jurisdiction and applicable law. At the same time, an attempt is also made to assess the position of Poland and of those other Member States that are bound by the Succession Regulation, but not by the Matrimonial Property Regulation.

Piotr Rylski, The Influence of Bilateral Treaties with Third States on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Decisions in Matters on Succession — Polish Perspective

The aim of the study is to discuss the impact of bilateral international treaties concluded by EU Member States with third countries on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in matters of succession from Polish perspective. The author discusses the main problems in the interpretation of Article 75 of Regulation 650/2012 and the possible conflict of this solution with the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The article indicates also practical problems related to the collision of bilateral treaties and Regulation No 650/2012 regarding, for example, the possibility of concluding choice-of-court agreements, recognition of foreign judgments in matters of succession and the possibility of issuing the European Certificates of Succession.

Krzysztof Pacuła, The Principle of a Single Estate and Its Role in Delimiting the Applicable Laws

This paper argues that the principle of unity of succession is one of the key concepts of the Succession Regulation. By operation of this principle on the jurisdictional level, the Regulation tends to favor a perspective of a single Member State when it comes to all issues related to succession. The principle of unity of succession does not of course eliminate the need to proceed to the characterization and to delimitate the scopes of conflict of laws rules at stake. However, this principle — aiming to promote a unitary vision of a single estate in all the Member States bound by the Regulation — sets a tone for some interpretative techniques that tend to favor succession-related characterization of the issues having some importance in the context of succession with cross-border implications. According to the Author, effet utile-driven characterization, on the one hand, and succession-friendly characterization of the issues falling within ‘gray areas’ created by the operation of Article 1(2) of the Succession Regulation, on the other hand, are among them.

Maksymilian Pazdan, Maciej Zachariasiewicz, Highlights and Pitfalls of the EU Succession Regulation

The EU Succession Regulation constitutes a remarkable achievement of unification of conflict of law rules at the European level. It has importantly changed the landscape for all those interested in succession law, in particular, the notaries and the estate planning practitioners. The present article takes up a number of selected issues that arise under the Regulation. The paper first identifies certain general difficulties that result either from the complex nature of the matters addressed or from a somewhat ambiguous wording of the rules adopted by the EU legislator. The attention is devoted to the exceptions to the principle of the unity of legis successionis, the dispositions upon death, and the intertemporal questions resulting from the change of the conflict of laws rules in the Member States which occurred on 17th August 2015 when the Regulation started to be applied. The paper then moves to some of the more specific issues arising under the Regulation. To that effect, it first looks at the Polish Act of 2018 governing the ”succession administration” of the enterprise, which forms part of the estate. The argument is made that the rules contained in the 2018 Act should be applied by virtue of Article 30 of the Succession Regulation because they constitute “special rules” in the meaning of this provision. Second, the notion of a “court” under Article 3(2) of the Regulation is discussed in light of the recent judgment of the CJEU in case C-658/17 WB, where the European Court found that a Polish notary issuing the deed of certification of succession is not a “court” for purposes of Article 3(2). The paper provides a critical account of the Court’s decision.

Brexit has dealt a major blow to judicial cooperation in Europe. With the end of the transition period, the Brussels I bis Regulation became inapplicable in the relation between the UK and the EU. Some authors, however, took the view that the Regulation’s predecessor, the Brussels Convention of 1968, would continue to apply (see e.g. here and here). The main argument was that the Brussels Convention is an international treaty and not an instrument of EU law. Moreover, and contrary to the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, the Brussels Convention had not been fully replaced by a regulation and continued to apply with regard to some overseas territories.

This debate seems now to come to a close. On 29 January 2021, the British government informed the European Council of its view that the Convention has ceased to apply to the UK and Gibraltar with the expiry of the transition period on 1 January 2021. The unofficial document was posted on Twitter by Steven (“Steve”) Peers from the University of Essex (thanks to Felix Krysa for sharing the tweet with me). It reads in relevant part:

The Government of the United Kingdom hereby notifies the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union that it considers that the Brussels Convention 1968 and the 1971 Protocol, including subsequent amendments and accessions, ceased to apply to the United Kingdom and Gibraltar from 1 January 2021, as a consequence of the United Kingdom ceasing to be a Member State of the European Union and of the end of the Transition Period.

Does this finally close the argument? Not for sure. The communication merely reflects an opinion by the British government, which as such is of no legal consequence. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enumerates the cases in which an international convention is terminated. A unilateral denunciation is not among them. Absent an impossibility of performance, a fundamental change of circumstances or a breach by one party, an agreement by the parties is required to suspend the operation of a treaty.

Since the Brussels Convention bound the UK to no less than 14 EU Member States, it may take some time and effort to reach agreement that the Brussels Convention is all over. The mere information of the European Council by the British government is certainly not sufficient. Of course, the EU and the UK could also enter into a new treaty. The British government has lodged an application to join the Lugano Convention, but it is still awaiting an answer from the EU.