EAPIL blog

Holidays are over, it is time for all the services of the Court to resume full activity.

As regards private international law, September 2020 will start with the delivery, on Thursday 3, of the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Safjan, Bay Larsen, Toader, Jääskinen) judgment in C-186/19, Supreme Site Services e.a.: a request for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands on the
interpretation of Article 1(1), and Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The request was made in the course of an application brought by an international organisation for the adoption of interim measures to lift an interim garnishee order levied on an escrow account by his opponent. In support of its action, the organisation had relied on immunity from execution under international law. The referring court’s doubts on Article 1(1) of Brussels I bis stem from that fact.

AG Oe’s Opinion was delivered on 2 April 2020 (see here). He was asked to address only the questions on Article 1(1) of the Regulation.

On the same day, an order is expected in C-98/20, mBank, on Article 17(1)(c) and Article 18(2) of the same Brussels I bis Regulation. The request was referred by the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 8 (Czech Republic), who had doubts about the relevant date of domicile for the consumer section to apply.

On Thursday 10, AG Oe will deliver his Opinion on C-59/19,Wikingerhof. The request, from the Bundesgerichtshof, addresses the divide between Article 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The question reads:

‘Is Article 7(2) … to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?’

It actually looks as a follow up to Brogsitter (C-548/12), except that this time the Grand Chamber will decide (Lenaerts, Silva de Lapuerta, Bonichot, Arabadjiev, Prechal, Safjan, Rodin, Xuereb, Rossi, von Danwitz, Toader, Šváby, Jürimäe, Lycourgos, Piçarra), and an AG’s Opinion has been deemed necessary.

On the same day, a hearing will take place on case C-709/19, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters: again a preliminary reference from the Netherlands, this time in relation to Article 7(2) of Brussels I bis, going to the core of the ‘holistic approach’. The Dutch referred four (de facto, five) questions to the CJEU:

‘1.   (a)   Should Article 7(2) … be interpreted as meaning that the direct occurrence of purely financial damage to an investment account in the Netherlands or to an investment account of a bank and/or investment firm established in the Netherlands, damage which is the result of investment decisions influenced by globally distributed but incorrect, incomplete and misleading information from an international listed company, constitutes a sufficient connecting factor for the international jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts by virtue of the location of the occurrence of the damage (‘Erfolgsort’)?

(b)   If not, are additional circumstances required to justify the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts and what are those circumstances? Are the additional circumstances referred to [in point 4.2.2. of the request for a preliminary ruling] sufficient to found the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts?

2. Would the answer to Question 1 be different in the case of a claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW (Burgerlijk Wetboek: Netherlands Civil Code) by an association the purpose of which is to defend, in its own right, the collective interests of investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, which means, among other things, that neither the places of domicile of the aforementioned investors, nor the special circumstances of individual purchase transactions or of individual decisions not to sell shares which were already held, have been established?
3. If courts in the Netherlands have jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation to hear the claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW, do those courts then, on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, also have international and internal territorial jurisdiction to hear all subsequent individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1?
4. If courts in the Netherlands as referred to in Question 3 above have international, but not internal, territorial jurisdiction to hear all individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, will the internal territorial jurisdiction be determined on the basis of the place of domicile of the misled investor, the place of establishment of the bank in which that investor holds his or her personal bank account or the place of establishment of the bank in which the investment account is held, or on the basis of some other connecting factor?’

In the light of the facts of the case (summary here), some of them might be declared inadmissible, though. The reference has been assigned to the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Safjan, Bay Larsen, Toader, Jääskinen), with Judge Safjan as reporting judge. Mr. Campos Sánchez-Bordona is the designated AG.

One week later the 1st Chamber will read the judgments in C-540/19, Landkreis Harburg (Subrogation d’un organisme public au créancier d’aliments), on the Maintenance Regulation. AG Sánchez-Bordona’s Opinion was published on 18 June 2020 (see here). The question referred reads

‘Can a public body which has provided a maintenance creditor with social assistance benefits in accordance with provisions of public law invoke the place of jurisdiction at the place of habitual residence of the maintenance creditor under Article 3(b) of the European Maintenance Regulation  in the case where it asserts the maintenance creditor’s maintenance claim under civil law, transferred to it on the basis of the granting of social assistance by way of statutory subrogation, against the maintenance debtor by way of recourse?’.

The judgment corresponds to the 3rd Chamber (Prechal, Lenaerts, Rossi, Biltgen, Wahl), with Ms. Rossi as reporting judge.

Albeit not directly on PIL issues: several hearings will take place in relation to the independence of the judiciary in Poland. AG Bobek will publish as well his Opinion on several cases regarding Romania, also connected to the independence of judges.

Recently, a (widely reported in the media) request for a PPU has been filed by the Rechtbank Amsterdam under Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA; thr underlying question is whether (all) Polish judges do still qualify as such for the purposes of the Framework Decision. If they don’t: should a similar conclusion apply to civil cooperation matters?

A Chinese divorce judgment delivered on 20 December 2013 by a court from Beijing was recognised by a French court in South Western France (Bergerac) in several decisions made in 2014 and 2016.

As will be explained below, the reason why the court had to rule twice on the issue is that each of its judgments was challenged before the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux and ended up before the French supreme court for civil and commercial matters (Cour de cassation).

Eventually, after the Cour de cassation set aside the second judgment of the Bordeaux Court of Appeal and sent back the parties before the Court of Appeal of Paris, the plaintiff gave up and never petitioned the Paris court. As a result, the first instance judgment now stands.

For years, the world has been following closely instances of enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments in the People’s Republic of China (China) and Chinese judgments abroad. This is because the default regime of judgments in China is based on reciprocity. A Chinese court will only enforce a foreign judgment if the state of origin enforced a Chinese judgment before. A more liberal regime applies to the recognition in China of judgments in family matters involving at least one Chinese national.

Bilateral Treaties

However, China has entered into bilateral treaties on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters, which provide for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, with 39 states, including quite a few European states (see the list here). France was one of the first to enter into such a bilateral treaty with China in 1987. The treaty applies not only to commercial matters, but also to family matters.

The main consequence of the existence of a bilateral treaty is that it fulfills (or replaces) the requirement of reciprocity. Chinesejusticeobserver has reported that there are several cases where Chinese courts have enforced French judgments in recent years, and it does not seem that the absence of prior enforcement of a Chinese judgements in France was an issue.

Parallel Divorce Proceedings

In the particular case, two spouses initiated parallel divorce proceedings in the contracting states. The wife, who was an English national, first sued in Beijing in December 2012. The husband, who was a French national, then initiated proceedings in Bergerac, France, in July 2013. The Beijing court delivered its judgment first and granted divorce in December 2013.

In the French proceedings, the lawyer for the wife first challenged the jurisdiction of the French court on the ground of lis pendens. Under the French common law of lis pendens, French courts may decline jurisdiction if they find that the foreign judgment is likely to be recognised in France. The French court applied the 1987 Bilateral Treaty with China and ruled that the Chinese judgment, once final, would be recognised. The court thus declined jurisdiction.

As will become clearer below, it is important to note that the wife had also made a subsidiary argument based on the res judicata of the Chinese judgment.

The husband appealed. Higher courts got involved. Not for the better.

Nationality Requirement in Bilateral Treaties?

Proceedings were first brought before the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux. In a judgment of 18 November 2014, the Court allowed the appeal and ruled that the French first instance court should have retained jurisdiction on the ground that the Chinese judgment did not fall within the scope of the bilateral treaty. This decision was wrong for two reasons.

The first was that the court held that the bilateral treaty only applied to disputes between Chinese and French nationals. In this case, the wife was an English national. As we shall see, the French Supreme Court would eventually rule that there is no such requirement in the relevant treaty, which applies irrespective of the nationality of the parties.

The second mistake was that the court did not care to examine whether the Chinese judgment could be recognised under the French common law of judgments. It simply concluded that the judgment could not be recognised outside of the scope of the treaty, and that no lis pendens exception could thus be raised.

The wife appealed to the Cour de cassation, arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to apply the bilateral treaty.

Useless Appeals

Most unfortunately, the Cour de cassation dismissed the appeal on disciplinary grounds. In a judgment of 25 May 2016, the Court held that the argument of the appeal that the bilateral treaty had been violated was a pretext, and that what the appelant was really criticising was that the lower court had failed to respond to the subsidiary res judicata argument of the wife, which could be directly addressed by a request directed to the lower court.

The judgment was difficult to interpret. Was it saying anything, even implicitly, on the conditions for applying the Bilateral treaty? Probably not, but when the case was sentback to lower courts, they understood it differently.

The case came back to the first instance court in Bergerac, which was understandably puzzled. It decided that the 2016 judgment of the Cour de cassation had two consequences: 1) French courts had jurisdiction, and 2) the Bilateral Treaty did not apply.

The Bergerac judge retained jurisdiction, but then declared the claim inadmissible. It applied the French common law of judgments and recognised the Chinese divorce judgment in France, ruling that the Chinese judgment was res judicata, and made the claim of the husband inadmissible. The Court of Appeal of Bordeaux confirmed the first instance ruling in a judgment of September 2016.

The husband appealed to the Cour de cassation and argued that the conditions for the recognition of judgments under the French common law of judgments had been wrongly applied.

Astonishingly, the Cour de cassation informed the parties that it intended to raise ex officio the issue of the applicability of the Bilateral Treaty and, after hearing them on that point, allowed the appeal on the ground that the lower courts had failed to apply the 1987 Bilateral Treaty. Two year after failing itself to respond to an argument related to the proper application of the Bilateral Treaty, the Cour de cassation disciplined the lower courts for misunderstanding that the argument that it had neglected was excellent.

The case was sent back to the Court of Appeal of Paris so that it would apply properly the Bilateral Treaty. But it seems that the husband was exhausted: he never initiated the proceedings before the Paris court.

This case was handled pathetically by the Cour de cassation, which has probably eventually exhausted financially the plaintiff who gave it up. What matters is that, eventually, the Cour de cassation made clear that 1) the 1987 Bilateral Treaty should be applied, and 2) the Chinese judgment was recognised.

More details on this case can be found here.

On 10 August 2020, the European Commission launched a public consultation on Regulation 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (“the EEO Regulation”).

The consultation is carried out in the framework of an ongoing evaluation of the EEO Regulation.

In this context, the European Commission “seeks opinions on how the Regulation is working, also with regard to the revised Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012). It also aims to collect practical experiences with the EEO Regulation, and attitudes towards its use in the future”.

The consultation is open until 20 November 2020 (midnight Brussels time) and can be found here.

As reported in this blog, the CJEU gave on 9 July 2020 its long-awaited judgment in VKI v Volkswagen (Case C-343/19). It ruled that the buyers of VW cars equipped with emissions test defeat devices can sue the manufacturer at the place where they had purchased the cars.

This result, which is broadly in line with the conclusions of the Advocate General, was hardly surprising. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain.

Where is the “Place of Purchase”?

The first and most urgent of these is what the CJEU means by the “place of purchase”. The Austrian court that submitted the reference for a preliminary ruling had identified three different places that could meet this description: (1) the place where the contract to purchase  the cars had been concluded, (2) the place where the purchase price had been paid, and (3) the place where the transfer or delivery of the vehicles had taken place (see para 10 of the judgment). In the dispute at hand, all three places happened to be located in the same district, but this will not be the case universally. In cases where they are different, which of these three places is the CJEU referring to?

What is the Role of the Place of Marketing?

The second question relates to the extent to which competent court will be foreseeable. The CJEU reasoned that the manufacturer must have anticipated that damage will occur at the place of purchase, as it knowingly contravened the statutory requirements imposed on it at this location (para 37). But this place of damage is foreseeable only on the assumption that VW will always market the vehicles in the country of purchase. That the place of acquisition and the place of marketing can differ is illustrated by Article 5(1)(b) Rome II Regulation.

Proximity of Tribunal or Protection of Tort Victims?

Third, one may harbour doubts about the CJEU’s argument that the tribunal at the place of purchase is best placed to carry out the assessment of damage (para 38). Proximity and the sound administration of justice would rather have suggested concentrating all cases in the court of the place of the manufacturer. The Court passed in silence over the main justification for locating jurisdiction over the tort in Austria; namely, the advantage to the tort victims in sparing them and their assignee the need to bring their claims in the home jurisdiction of the manufacturer, i.e. in Germany.

Purely Financial Loss or Not?

Fourth, it is unclear why the CJEU spent so much effort diffusing the referring court’s idea that the damage was “purely financial”. The Court of Justice was at great pains to make clear that the present case concerns material damage because the buyers received a vehicle with a defect (paras 32-35). Yet it did not draw any conclusions from this characterisation; in particular, it did not locate the damage at the place where the car had been used or registered. Instead, the Court abstracted from the vehicles and referred to the place of purchase, where the only loss incurred was…ehm…financial.

Parallel to Unfair Competition?

Fifth, it is a mystery why the CJEU – in holding that the damage occurred at the place of purchase for the purposes of Article 7 no 2 Brussels I bis Regulation – drew an analogy to the rules on unfair competition in Article 6(1) Rome II Regulation (para 39). The present case was not about unfair competition. Instead, the claimant brought a number of damages claims for defective vehicles.

Similarly, the situation was also quite different from the case of VKI v Amazon to which the Court of Justice referred. In that case, VKI had claimed in its own right when it applied for an injunction to restrain the use of unfair contract terms under the national law transposing Directive 2009/22/EC; whereas in the present case, it now brought a number of individual claims that had been assigned to it. It is true that the CJEU had ruled in VKI v Amazon that collective and individual claims must be treated under the same law. Yet this statement was made in the context of the validity of standard contract terms; it does not nearly have the same force with regard to damages claims. Even under the Court of Justice’s own standard in the new VW case, the latter will be judged under different laws and by different courts, depending on the country in which the vehicles were purchased.

An Alternative Proposal

The place of purchase that the CJEU identifies as the place where the damage occurred may be fortuitous, is subject to possible manipulation, and can hardly be determined in the case of e-commerce. It would have been more convincing to take into account other circumstances, such as the place of habitual residence of the purchasers, the place where they used the vehicle, and the place of marketing, as already suggested in this blog. Advocate General Sánchez Bordona had also suggested a combination of the place of purchase and the place of marketing. Only a holistic approach can properly balance the interests of the claimant and the defendant.

Trevor Hartley (London School of Economics) has published the 3rd edition of his textbook on International Commercial Litigation.

The book combines extensive texts presenting the topics discussed and extracts from cases and legislative materials (European regulations, international conventions, national acts). It is a mix of a textbook and a casebook.

As its title suggests, the focus of the book is on international civil procedure. It presents in depth issues of jurisdiction and foreign jugdments, but also freezing assets and the taking of evidence abroad. As its title does not suggest, the last part of the book also covers choice of law, and offers an in depth treatment of choice of law in contracts, torts and property.

The book is remarkable by the comparative stance that it takes on all the topics that the covers. It systematically presents the position in the EU, in England and in the U.S. It also sometimes includes cases and materials from other common law jurisdictions such as Canada.

Taking a fresh and modern approach to the subject, this fully revised and restructured textbook provides everything necessary to gain a good understanding of international commercial litigation. Adopting a comparative stance, it provides extensive coverage of US and Commonwealth law, in addition to the core areas of English and EU law. Extracts from key cases and legislative acts are designed to meet the practical requirements of litigators as well as explaining the ideas behind legal provisions. Significant updates include coverage of new case-law from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Of particular importance has been a set of judgments on jurisdiction in tort for pure financial loss, many of which have involved investment loss. New case law from the English courts, including the Supreme Court, and from the Supreme Court of the United States, is also covered.

Mark C. Weidemaier (University of North Carolina School Law) and G. Mitu Gulati (Duke Law School) have posted Unlawfully-Issued Sovereign Debt on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

In 2016, its economy in shambles and looking to defer payment on its debts, the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro proposed a multi-billion dollar debt swap to holders of bonds issued by the government’s crown jewel, state-owned oil company Petroleós de Venezuela S.A. (“PDVSA”). A new government now challenges that bond issuance, arguing it was unlawful under Venezuelan law. Bondholders counter that this does not matter—that PDVSA freed itself of any borrowing limits by agreeing to a choice-of-law clause designating New York law.

The dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds implicates a common problem. Sovereign nations borrow under constraints imposed by their own laws. Loans that violate these constraints may be deemed invalid. Does an international bond—i.e., one expressly made subject to the law of a different jurisdiction—protect investors against that risk? The answer depends on the text of the loan’s choice-of-law clause, as interpreted against the backdrop of the forum’s rules for resolving conflict of laws problems.

We show that the choice-of-law clauses in many international sovereign bonds—especially when issued under New York law—use language that may expose investors to greater risk. We document the frequent use of “carve outs” that could be interpreted to require the application of the sovereign’s local law to a wide range of issues. If interpreted in this way, these clauses materially reduce the protection ostensibly offered by an international bond. We explain why we think a narrower interpretation is more appropriate.

Rebecca Legendre (University of Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas) has just published a monograph on fundamental rights and private international Law based on her doctoral thesis: Droits fondamentaux et droit international privé – Réflexion en matière personnelle et familiale, Dalloz, 2020.

The author has provided the following abstract in English:

Fundamental rights put private international law to the test. First, the context in which private international law operates has evolved. Fundamental rights have created a better, closer, intertwining of the separate state legal orders and have achieved a higher protection for  the persons as they experience international mobility. If this evolution does not threaten, as such, the existence of private international law, it must be acknowledged that fundamental rights modify its analysis. Whereas the conflicts between legal orders are transformed into conflicts between values, the hierarchy of interests protected by private international law is replaced by a balancing of these interests. The solutions of private international law are thus disrupted by the enforcement of fundamental rights through litigation.  Proportionality is at the source of this disruption. Being a case by case technique of enforcement of fundamental rights, the influence of the proportionality test on private international is uneven. If the proportionality test is found to be overall indifferent to the methods of private international law, its main impact is on the solutions of PIL. The European courts are indeed prone to favour the continuity in the legal situations of the persons, over the defence of the internal cohesion of the state legal orders. As a consequence, private international law is invited to reach liberal solutions. The enforcement of fundamental rights through litigation must hence be clarified so as to maintain a measure of authority and predictability of the solutions of the rules of conflict of laws, international jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgements. It is, on the one hand,  by methodologically dissociating the enforcement of fundamental rights from the public policy exception and, on the other hand, through an amendment to the proportionality test, that the balance of private international may hopefully be restored.

More details are available here.

Franco Ferrari (New York University Law School) has posted A New Paradigm for International Uniform Substantive Law Conventions on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

This paper posits that a paradigm shift has taken place in respect of the way the relationship between private international law and international uniform law conventions is understood. The author shows that recent international uniform law conventions evidence that their drafters do not consider the relationship to be an antagonistic one, but rather one of symbiosis.

The paper was published in the Uniform Law Review.

Csongor István Nagy (University of Szeged), has posted on SSRN a paper titled The Reception of Collective Actions in Europe: Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation, also published on the Journal of Dispute Resolution.

The European collective action is probably one of the most exciting legal transplantation comparative law has seen. Collective litigation, which U.S. law did not inherit from common law but invented with the 1966 revision of class actions, has been among the most successful export products of American legal scholarship. Today in the European Union, seventeen out of twenty–eight Member States have adopted a special regime for collective actions. At the same time, collective actions are intrinsically linked to various extraneous components of the legal system; hence, their transplantation calls for a comprehensive adaptation. The need to rethink class actions has not only generated a heated debate in Europe about whether and how to introduce collective actions, but resulted in Europe’s making collective actions in its own image, producing something truly European: a model of collective actions à l’européenne. This Article presents the process of developing the European collective action and its outcome. It represents the first attempt to give a trans-systemic account of European collective actions and to elucidate them in light of the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the mindset of European jurisprudence. Further, this Article gives an analytical presentation of the emerging European collective action model and demonstrates how it was shaped by Europe’s legal thinking and societal attitudes.

Pravovedenie, an academic peer-reviewed legal journal published quarterly in Russia is calling for papers to be included in a special issue of the journal.

The special issue will be about Ensuring the Best Interests of the Child in International Family Procedures. Contributions should deal with the cooperation of States in ensuring the implementation of international legal instruments regulating relations to protect the best interests of the child, as well as in evaluating the necessary efforts to be made by States parties to international treaties to remove obstacles to the implementation of international treaties in the field of international family law.

Submissions are expected by 1 June 2021 at the latest, but the editors encourage interested authors to notify their intention to contribute to the special issue in advance.

A detailed description of the topic of the special issue, together with practical information on submissions, can be found here.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has delivered its ruling in the Novo Banco case (C‑253/19) on 16 July 2020.

The issue before the Court was the determination of the center of main interests (COMI) of individuals not exercising an independent business or professional activity under the Insolvency Regulation, and thus the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States to open insolvency proceedings against such individuals.

Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation provides that the COMI of such individuals is presumed to be at their place of habitual residence. The issue was more precisely how this presumption could be rebutted.

In this case, the individuals were English residents who were employed in Norfolk. Yet, they claimed that the centre of their main interests was not their habitual residence in the United Kingdom, but rather in Portugal, the Member State where the sole immovable asset which they own was located and where all the transactions and all the contracts leading to their insolvency were conducted and concluded. Furthermore, there was no connection between their place of habitual residence and the events that led to their insolvency, which occurred entirely in Portugal.

The Court ruled:

28 Although the location of the debtor’s assets is one of the objective criteria, ascertainable by third parties, to be taken into consideration when determining the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his or her interests on a regular basis, that presumption may be reversed only following an overall assessment of all the objective criteria. It follows that the fact that the only immovable property of an individual not exercising an independent business or professional activity is located outside the Member State of his or her habitual residence is not sufficient on its own to rebut that presumption.

29 In the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings also argue before the referring court that Portugal is not only the Member State where their only immovable property is located but also the Member State where all the transactions and all the contracts leading to their insolvency were conducted and concluded.

30 In that regard, although the cause of the insolvency is not, as such, a relevant factor for determining the centre of the main interests of an individual not exercising an independent business or professional activity, it nevertheless falls to the referring court to take into consideration all objective factors, ascertainable by third parties, which are connected with that person’s financial and economic situation. In a case such as the one in the main proceedings, as was observed in paragraph 24 above, that insolvency situation is located in the place where the applicants in the main proceedings conduct the administration of their economic interests on a regular basis or the majority of their revenue is earned and spent, or the place where the greater part of their assets is located.

31 In view of all of the foregoing factors, the answer to the question is that the first and fourth subparagraphs of Article 3(1) of Regulation 2015/848 must be interpreted as meaning that the presumption established in that provision for determining international jurisdiction for the purposes of opening insolvency proceedings, according to which the centre of the main interests of an individual not exercising an independent business or professional activity is his or her habitual residence, is not rebutted solely because the only immovable property of that person is located outside the Member State of habitual residence. 

On 16 July 2020, the Government of Portugal decided to start the process whereby Portugal will, in due course, become a party to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

Today, the Convention is internationally in force for 93 States. Once in force for Portugal, it will be binding on all the current members of the European Union, with the exception of Ireland and Malta.

The French Committee for private international law will hold a conference on the codification of private international law in the afternoon of 9 October 2020, in Paris.

The first speaker will be Geraldine Gazo, who practices in Monaco, and who will present the recent law on private international law adopted by Monaco in 2017.

The second speaker will be Justice Jean-Pierre Ancel, who is a former president of the first civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation, and now presides over a working group on the codification of French private international law.

The exact time and location are to be announced on the website of the Committee.

Woo-jung Jon is the author of Cross-border Transfer and Collateralisation of Receivables – A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Legal Systems, published by Hart Publishing.

Legal systems around the world vary widely in terms of how they deal with the transfer of and security interests in receivables. The aim of this book is to help international financiers and lawyers in relevant markets in their practice of international receivables financing. Substantively, this book analyses three types of receivables financing transactions, ie outright transfer, security transfer and security interests. This book covers comprehensive comparison and analysis of the laws on the transfer of and security interests in receivables of fifteen major jurisdictions, encompassing common law jurisdictions, Roman–Germanic jurisdictions and French–Napoleonic jurisdictions, as well as relevant EU Directives. To be more specific, this book compares and analyses the relevant legal systems of the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, Japan, France, Belgium, England, Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. Furthermore, in order to analyse those legal systems from the international perspective, this book compares relevant international conventions; it also proposes to establish an international registration system for the transfer of and security interests in receivables.

More information here.

Apostolos Anthimos has posted on SSRN a paper titled Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Field of Bilateral Conventions of Greece with Balkan States.

The purpose of this paper is to present the current legislative framework and the practice of Greek courts with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments falling under the scope of bilateral conventions signed with Balkan States. Prior to presenting individual conventions and related case-law, few brief remarks are given on the role of bilateral treaties in the Greek landscape. A special chapter is dedicated to the conditions for recognition and enforcement, cutting horizontally through all conventions included in the scope of this paper. The findings of the research suggest that, on a bilateral level, judgments from the Balkan States are generally recognized in Greece.

The number of transnational couples continuously increases within the European Union. At the same time, there are still large differences between the national rules on matrimonial property regimes and on the property consequences of registered partnerships. These disparities do not only affect the property relations among such couples themselves, but also – and even more – third parties contracting with transnational couples.

Some jurisdictions provide, for instance, that contracts between one spouse and a third party are not legally effective without the consent of the other spouse, especially in case of real estate transactions. One example of such a rule is the notorious Article 215(3) of the French Code Civil.

Third parties can be surprised by such limitations because they may not be aware that the law of another jurisdiction applies. In many cases, third parties may not even know at all that their business partner belongs to a couple with a transnational background. There is thus a strong need for third party protection not only on the national level, but also in private international law.

In the future, these conflict-of-laws problems must be solved on the basis of the new Council Regulations (EU) 1103/2016 and 1104/2016, which became applicable in their entirety on 29 January 2019. The scope of the Regulations explicitly includes third-party relations. However, the Regulations only provide fragmentary rules on third party protection. A new book analyses these provisions, identifies open questions and submits proposals how the gaps in the Regulations could be filled (Stephan Gräf, Drittbeziehungen und Drittschutz in den Europäischen Güterrechtsverordnungen, Mohr Siebeck 2019).

As the title indicates, the book is written in German. It starts with a comparative analysis of the differences between the national rules on matrimonial property regimes focussing on third party effects. In a subsequent chapter, the author outlines the conflict of law rules of the Regulations and points out that the applicable law can hardly be foreseen by third parties.

On this basis, Stephan Gräf analyses the core provision of third-party protection in both Regulations, namely their respective Article 28 (protection of the good faith of third parties). Although the provision appears to be quite detailed, it is in fact merely fragmentary and partially inconsistent. For example, it does not mention the exact subject of the required good faith of the third party (the applicable law, the particular matrimonial regime within the applicable law or the particular legal effect of the applicable law?). The provision also does not clarify that it is restricted to contractual transactions.

The Regulations furthermore contain provisions for the protection of third-party rights in case of a change of the applicable law with retroactive effect. The wording of the provisions, however, is extremely short. Many questions are left to the interpretation by the courts. Stephan Gräf analyses the scope and the legal consequences of these provisions. He shows, for instance, that they also apply when the applicable law changes only with effect for the future.

The book furthermore deals with the highly controversial coordination between international property law (lex rei sitae rule) on the one hand and the international matrimonial law on the other hand. This matter also affects third parties contracting with married persons. The author argues for the primacy of the lex rei sitae in so far as immovable property is concerned. On this point, he disagrees with the Kubicka decision of the European Court of Justice, which deals with the relationship between the EU Succession Regulation and the lex rei sitae rule.

Additionally, the book addresses the Regulations’ rules on jurisdiction (Articles 4 et seq.). It focuses on the question whether these rules apply in disputes between married persons and third parties. Despite its relevance this question has rarely been discussed so far. The Regulations lack explicit provisions on this matter. Relying on the ECJ’s approach on Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast: Article 29), Stephan Gräf argues that Articles 4 et seq. of the Regulations govern where matrimonial property law is the “heart of the action”. In disputes with third parties, this is rarely the case, as matrimonial property law typically only becomes relevant on the level of preliminary questions.

Overall, this new book provides valuable insights on the relation of Regulations on matrimonial property regimes and on the property consequences of registered partnerships with the rights and obligations of third parties. Interestingly, the author not only addresses the protection of spouses, but also that of third parties that do not know about the family relation. The Regulations are still young, and is to be expected that this book will influence their interpretation and application in practice.

On 13 May 2020, the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) issued an interesting decision on jurisdiction based on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation in case of online defamation (here).

The French Court implemented the Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan Case ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2017, but also asked for clarification on its scope of application to the CJEU (here).

Facts

A Czech company, Gtflix Tv, content producer and distributor, sued a film director and distributor, MX, domiciled in Hungary, before French court for unfair competition resulting from online defamation. The company accused MX of having used insulting language against itself and its website materiel on different online forums and websites. Therefore, the company asked for the removal and rectification of the defaming contents as well as for financial compensation. According to it, French jurisdiction should arise under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, since French viewers are the main audience. MX opposed a lack of international jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of Lyon followed the latter position and dismissed the demand. Gtflix Tv appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue at Stake

The legal issue submitted to the French Supreme Court was therefore to determine if any relevant connecting factors pursuant Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, as interpreted by the CJEU, could assert the French jurisdiction.

Legal Background

The application of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (corresponding to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation) regarding online defamation matters is not a new issue. In the eDate Case on online infringements of personality rights, the CJEU held that the victim has “the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all the damage caused, either before the courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that content is established or before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his interests is based”. In addition, the Court of justice also admitted that the victim could bring “his action before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible” but “only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the court seised”.

Then, this acquis was partially extended by the Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan Case to infringements related to online publication of incorrect information and failure to remove comments. On the one hand, the CJEU ruled, by analogy, that the victim could bring an action for rectification and removal of the contested comments and for compensation in respect of all the damage sustained “before the courts of the Member State in which its centre of interests is located”. On the other hand, the CJEU refused to distribute the jurisdiction between “the courts of each Member State in which the information published on the internet was accessible” to rule on rectification and removal of the comments. It is worth noting that the Court of Justice left out the claim for damages.

Response of the French Supreme Court and Preliminary Reference to the CJEU

In the present case, the French Supreme Court applied, by analogy, the Bolagsupplysningen acquis to the unfair competition claim, following publication on the Internet of defaming information against Gtflix TV and failure to remove comments. Since France is not the Member State in which the victim has its centre of the interests under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (the Czech Republic is), nor the Member State in which the defendant, MX, is domiciled pursuant Article 4, French courts have no competent jurisdiction to hear this part of the case. However, according to the French Supreme Court, the question of jurisdiction for financial compensation remains unclear (for other national judgements on this issue, see the post of Geert Van Calster on Gtflix Tv). Should the Bolagsupplysningen interpretation be extended to that additional issue and exclude the distribution of jurisdiction based on the different places where the information published on the Internet is accessible? Or, on the contrary, should the eDate alternative in favour of the fragmentation of jurisdiction remain applicable? Following the latter solution, French courts could indeed have a partial jurisdiction.

This is the question referred by the French Supreme Court to the CJEU.

As encouraged by the CJEU in its Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, the French Supreme Court sketched out a response. Considering the proper administration of justice, it took position in favour of an extension of the Bolagsupplysningen ruling. The competent jurisdiction for ruling on rectification and removal of online comments under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation should have an exclusive jurisdiction to rule on damages, because of the obvious connection between the two actions.

This solution would make online defamation claims much easier and more predictable. And it would contribute to adapt the European jurisdictional rules to the transnational digital area.

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan.

On 16 April 2019, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) ruled on the relevance of the Incoterm “FCA – Free Carrier (named place of delivery)” to the operation of Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation , corresponding to Article 7(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The Facts

An Italian company (Agusta) sued a French company (Team) before the Court of Frosinone seeking the termination of the sales agreement concluded between the two, on the ground that the goods supplied by the latter were defective. Team argued that the seised court lacked jurisdiction. It observed that the goods had been sold FCA (Free Carrier) the Paris International Airport, thereby contending that Paris ought to be regarded as the place of delivery agreed by the parties for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b), first indent, of the Brussels I Regulation (pursuant to the latter provision, jurisdiction over sales of goods lies with the courts for the place “where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered”).

The Relevance of Incoterms to Jurisdiction over Contractual Matters

Incoterms are standard commercial terms drawn up by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Under the FCA rule, the seller undertakes to deliver the goods, cleared for export, to the carrier or another person nominated by the buyer at the seller’s premises or at another named place. The seller bears all costs and risks of delivery, while the buyer undertakes to take care of the delivery of the goods to their final destination, bearing the costs and risks of the onward carriage.

The Italian Supreme Court recalled that in Electrosteel the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the seised court, in order to verify its jurisdiction under Article 5(1)(b), first indent, of Brussels I Regulation, must first ascertain whether the parties have agreed on a place of delivery in the contract. For this, account must be taken “of all the relevant terms and clauses … which are capable of clearly identifying that place, including terms and clauses which are generally recognised and applied through the usages of international trade or commerce, such as the Incoterms …”. According to the Corte di Cassazione, where an Incoterm is incorporated into a contract, and the issue arises of the relevance of that incorporation to the issue of jurisdiction, the seised court must assess whether the Incoterm in question is merely concerned with the allocation of the risks and costs related to the transaction, or whether the parties also meant it to identify – with sufficient clarity – the place of delivery of the goods.

The Judgment

The Corte di Cassazione concluded that by incorporating the Incoterm FCA into their contract, the parties failed to agree on a clear identification of the place of delivery of the goods for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Incoterm FCA, the Court argued, concerns nothing more than the allocation between the parties of the risks and costs related to the transaction.

Some Remarks

Regrettably, the Corte di Cassazione failed to state the reasons for the latter finding. The Court acknowledged that the key issue is whether the chosen Incoterm conveys an agreement of the parties as to the place of delivery of the goods, but did not provide an analysis of the Incoterm FCA, as used in the contract at issue, and did not explain why the naming of the International Airport of Paris could not be regarded as signifying an agreement to that effect (according to the ICC rules that accompany the Incoterms, when goods are sold FCA the seller ‘must deliver the goods to the carrier … nominated by the buyer at the named point, if any, at the named place …’).

Actually, all Incoterms concern the allocation of risks and costs between the parties. By providing for such allocation they perform, in fact, the key part of their job. On top of that, however, they may – as the Court of Justice acknowledged in Electrosteel – convey an agreement as regards the place of delivery. Whether this happens in a particular case depends on the analysis of the circumstances. The way in which the Corte di Cassazione engaged in this analysis is, methodologically, unconvincing. Arguably, one should examine the rules set out by the ICC itself to describe the Incoterm in question, and any other element as may help determine the intended meaning of the agreement (the negotiations between the parties etc.). The fact is that the Corte di Cassazione failed to indicate the circumstances which it considered to be relevant to the issue, and failed to elaborate on their assessment. It merely stated, in rather general terms, that the incorporation of the Incoterm FCA is not evidence, as such, of an agreement as to the place of delivery of the goods.

It’s a missed opportunity, for establishing a clear methodology, ideally one shared by domestic courts across the EU, would serve the needs of predictability and would foster the uniform application of the Brussels I regime.

Jorg Sladič is an associate professor of international and European law at the European faculty of law in Ljubljana (Slovenia). He was a member of the European Commission’s expert group on modernisation of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. This post is based on an article to be published shortly in the Revue des affaires européennes (L’obtention de preuves en matière civile et commerciale dans l’espace judiciaire européen : status quaestionis et la réforme envisagée, RAE 2020/1, pp. 191 – 212).

Taking of evidence abroad is hampered not only by foreign languages, distances etc. The scope of application ratione loci of a given law of civil procedure is limited by the principle of territoriality. Therefore the gathering of evidence in a pending civil proceedings before a forum is limited by the forum’s traditional inherent inability to perform judicial activities abroad. However, Europe is changing. Therefore an assessment of the principle of territoriality in the law of civil procedure is required.

1. Evidence Taking in Civil Procedure in Continental Europe as acta jure imperii

In the EU, judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters also covers international legal assistance – comprising traditionally the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents abroad and taking of evidence abroad. European rules on cross-border taking of evidence are to be found in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. The said regulation can be regarded as an update of existing traditional methods of international legal assistance and is heavily influenced by the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. Even the direct taking of evidence by the requiring forum goes back to influences of the 1970 Hague Convention.

Traditionally a forum from one EU Member State cannot take evidence in other EU Member States. Continental European States consider evidence gathering and taking as acta jure imperii. The Latin maxim judici fit probatio explains it all (see e.g. O. L. Knöffel, Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme durch Private, in R. Geimer, R. A. Schütze, T. Garber (eds.), Europäische und internationale Dimension des Rechts, Festschrift für Daphne-Ariane Simotta, Vienne, LexisNexis, 2012, p. 333 and 334; M. Virgós Soriano, F. J. Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho procesal civil internacional : litigación internacional, 2nd ed., Madrid, Thomson Reuters, 2007, p. 486; B. Audit, L. D’avout, Droit international privé, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2013, par 484). Evidence is taken by the judge (forum). However, in the common law world, evidence is taken by the parties before the judge and not by the judge. Gathering of evidence is rather a private matter left to the parties. However, in all Member States the Regulation is applied under the principle of national procedural autonomy.

This difference between evidence taking as a private matter between the parties or evidence taking as a performance of public authority by a forum is in short also a major part of the of the famous Justizkonflikt between the US and Germany.

Practical aspects of evidence taking abroad were assessed in the 2017 Luxembourg Study (see B. Hess, M. Requejo Isidro, F. Gascón Inchausti, P. Oberhammer, E. Storskrubb, G. Cuniberti, C. Kern, K. Weitz, X. Kramer, An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law, Report prepared by a Consortium of European universities led by the MPI Luxembourg for Procedural Law as commissioned by the European Commission, JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082, Strand 1, Mutual Trust and Free Circulation of Judgments, Brussels, Luxembourg, 2017, paras 240 – 263).

2. Principle of Territoriality of a Pending Civil Procedure

As judicial functions belong to performance of a public authority of a State, they are not supposed to be performed in an extraterritorial manner (the principle of territoriality of a pending civil procedure). Without going in the famous Lotus case law of the PCIJ the European version (Opinion of Advocate General JÄÄSKINEN, Lippens, C-170/11) of the rule reads as:

29. A court of a Member State can validly exercise its powers and make use of its ‘imperium’, that is to say, its power of enforcement, only within the limits of its geographical jurisdiction. Measures of inquiry are an exception to this rule in that they can be taken over the whole of national territory. Nevertheless, in view of the principle of territoriality in international law, which is linked to the principle of State sovereignty, the court cannot normally take action to enforce such measures in another Member State.

Fn. 44: However, a court ruling on a civil or commercial matter covered by Regulation No 1206/2001 cannot exercise public authority outside the territory of the Member State in which it is situated by carrying out substantive acts necessitating the use of State coercion such as using the State’s police force to bring a party resident in another Member State by force to appear before it.

It might also be added that the principle of territoriality prohibits in the continental legal thinking the recognition of foreign anti-suit injunctions, an issue that will become of importance if post Brexit negotiations do not produce a sufficient PIL framework between the EU and the UK.

According to the Belgian Court of Cassation, Belgian courts can condemn a third party residing in another EU Member State to produce documents in accordance with the Belgian lex fori and even apply the periodic monetary penalties (astreinte). The application of the regulation Nr 1206/200 is not mandatory (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 26 April 2018, case Banque de Luxembourg, n° C.16.0192.N). The Belgian Court of Cassation also ruled quite laconically that it results clearly from the judgment of the Court of Justice in Lippens (C-170/11) that a court of a Member State may condemn a party resident in another Member State to produce a documents before it in accordance with its lex fori and even apply sanctions for non production of documents (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 25 April 2013, aff. Fortis Luxembourg Vie, n° C.11.0103.F/1). However, as far as sanctioning witnesses residing abroad and having defaulted, the situation appears to be different. The Austrian Regional Court of Appeal in Linz dealt with the question of a regularly summoned German witness residing in Germany and not appearing before an Austrian forum (Oberlandesgericht Linz, 5 September 2013, case 3 R 145/13h, ECLI:AT:OLG0459:2013:RL0000147). The forum of first instance issued a heavy fine against the German witness. The appellate court ruled however that, due to the principle of territoriality of the pending civil proceedings, such a witness is not subject to jurisdiction of Austrian courts. An Austrian forum may summon him so that he can appear and testify, however, due to a non-existent duty to testify in another state, such a witness doesn’t have to comply with the summons. A foreign witness who fails to comply with the summons cannot to be sanctioned. Where the evidence is located abroad, an Austrian forum can order that this evidence be transferred to Austria as for example in the case of the summons of a witness – or may within the scope of Regulation No 1206/2001 proceed to the taking of evidence abroad, either through the requested court (Art. 10 and following of the regulation), or directly (art. 17 of the regulation). The regulation does not prevent the forum to summon a witness living abroad. However, means of constraint cannot be applied against such a witness residing abroad.

3. Methods of Taking of Evidence Abroad

It is generally recognised that evidence from abroad is to be gathered according to certain methods (A. Sengstschmid, Die europäische Beweisaufnahme, in P.G. Mayr (ed.), Handbuch des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, Vienna, Manz, 2017, par. 15.1; L. Fumagalli, La disciplina comunitaira dell’assunzione delle prove all’estero in materia civile e commerciale: il regolamento (CE) n. 1206/2001 in S. M. Carbone, M. Frigo, L. Fumagalli, Diritto processuale civile e commerciale comunitario, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, pp. 169 and 170):

1. the order of the forum before which the proceedings are pending ordering the parties to transfer themselves the evidence (or the means of evidence) which is located abroad to the forum State;
2. the active international legal assistance (the requesting court issues a letter rogatory which will be executed by the foreign requested forum according to the lex diligentiae, see Art. 10 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
3. the passive international legal assistance (the requesting court performs itself or through its agents directly the taking of evidence abroad according to its own lex fori. In principle, such an approach requires a prior consent of the requested foreign state. There is also the problem of coercive measures adopted by the requesting forum on the territory of the requested State. Such direct taking of evidence is allowed in the EU Under the conditions of Art. 17 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
4. videoconferencing or any other modern means of communication where the evidence remains abroad while the proceedings take place before the forum of origin (see Art. 10(4) of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
5. the taking of evidence is performed in cooperation or dialogue between the requesting forum and the requested forum (see Art. 10(3) and (4) and Art. 12 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001));
6. obtaining evidence through diplomatic officers or consular agents.

Neither obtaining evidence through diplomatic officers or consular agents nor the request of the forum before which the proceedings are pending ordering the parties to transfer themselves the evidence (or the means of evidence) which is located abroad to the forum State are regulated by the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001.

In this framework the Council Statement Nr. 54/01 of 4 July 2001 on Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 shall be mentioned. According to the Council of the EU “The scope of application of this Regulation shall not cover pre-trial discovery, including the so-called “fishing expeditions”.” (Statement, p. 16).

4. Effet utile of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 – Is it of American origin?

However, the effet utile of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 has lead the Court of Justice in cases Lippens (C-170/11) and ProRail (C-332/11) to construe that text as being optional and facultative.

It would appear that the US Supreme Court’s decision in case Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale et al. V. United States District Court for The Southern District of Iowa 82 U.S. 522 (1987), on the 1970 Hague Convention was a direct though not cited source of the European case-law. According to the US case law the “Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory’s territory”. “its purpose [is] to “facilitate” discovery and to “improve mutual judicial co-operation.”” “Although they are not mandatory, the Convention’s procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence, and “apply” in the sense that they are one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ”.

Documents having lead to the Lippens case, especially the opinion of Advocate General before the High Council of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, the Dutch Supreme Court) M. P. Vlas of 1st April 2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP3048 and the preliminary reference, judgement of the High Council of the Netherlands, 1st Chamber, 1st April 2011, case 10/02071, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP3048, show an in-depth assessment of the US Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale case.

The interpretation of facultative and facilitative nature of international instruments on taking of evidence abroad was extended by the CJEU to the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001. Such an interpretation is indeed not a forgone conclusion. If the rigour used to combat conflicts caused created between EU private international law (Brussels Ia Regulation) and national traditions in anti-suit injunctions (Turner, C-159/02, Allianz, C-185/07, Gazprom, C-536/13) and the forum non conveniens doctrine (Owusu, C-281/02) were to be extended also to the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001, then there there could be no space for facilitative nature of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 (C. Thole, Kein abschließender Charakter der Europäischen Beweisaufnahmeverordnung, IPrax, Nr. 3/2014, p. 255). Indeed, there are connecting points linking the Regulation on taking of evidence and the Brussels Ia regulation such as exclusion of arbitration (see on that issue B. Hess, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 2010, p. 465; M. Fartunova-Michel, JurisClasseur Europe Traité, fasc. 2800 : Obtention des preuves en matière civile et commerciale – Coopération entre les juridictions des États membres – Règlement (CE) n° 1206/2001 », update 27 May 2019, par. 20). However, the effet utile lead to a different conclusion.

Indeed, the CJEU ruled in Lippens:

according to recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001, the aim of the regulation is to make the taking of evidence in a cross-border context simple, effective and rapid. The taking, by a court of one Member State, of evidence in another Member State must not lead to the lengthening of national proceedings. […]. Thus, it is clear that, in certain circumstances, in particular if the party summoned as a witness is prepared to appear voluntarily, it may be simpler, more effective and quicker for the competent court to hear him in accordance with the provisions of its national law instead of using the means of taking evidence provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001. (paras. 29 and 31)

Finally, the interpretation according to which Regulation No 1206/2001 does not govern exhaustively the taking of cross-border evidence, but simply aims to facilitate it, allowing use of other instruments having the same aim, is supported by Article 21(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, which expressly authorises agreements or arrangements between Member States to further facilitate the taking of evidence, provided that they are compatible with the regulation. (par 33)

However, the facilitative nature of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 is limited by an exception of public powers of EU Member States (see e.g. C. Thole, op. cit., p. 257 ; G. Cuniberti, L’expertise judiciaire en droit judiciaire européen, Rev. crit. DIP, Nr. 3/2015, p. 535 ; M. Fartunova-Michel, op. cit., point 2 ; see in general law of international civil procedure S. Triva, M. Dika, Građansko parnično procesno pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2004, p. 57 ; A. Maganić, Pravna pomoć u građanskim stvarima između Republike Hrvatske i Republike Makedonije », Zbornik PFZ, 2/2011 p. 245).

Indeed, the CJEU has ruled in ProRail:

47. in so far as the expert designated by a court of a Member State must go to another Member State in order to carry out the investigation which has been entrusted to him, that might, in certain circumstances, affect the powers of the Member State in which it takes place, in particular where it is an investigation carried out in places connected to the exercise of such powers or in places to which access or other action is, under the law of the Member State in which the investigation is carried out, prohibited or restricted to certain persons.

48. In such circumstances, unless the court wishing to order cross-border expert investigation foregoes the taking of that evidence, and in the absence of an agreement or arrangement between Member States within the meaning of Article 21(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, the method of taking evidence laid down in Articles 1(1)(b) and 17 thereof is the only means to enable the court of a Member State to carry out an expert investigation directly in another Member State.

Such a ruling was then interpreted e.g. by the Belgian Court of Cassation as follows. A plea entirely based on the argument that the forum of a Member State which requires the act of investigation entrusted to an expert to be performed in the territory of another Member State is always required to request a prior authorization of the other Member State in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001, without distinguishing according to whether the taking of evidence may or may not have an influence on the powers of this other Member State or according to whether or not there is a convention or regulation within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 21 of Regulation 1206/2001, is not founded (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 7 November 2013, case C.10.0286.N/1)

5. Reform

The European Commission proposed a reform of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001. The EAPIL reported extensively on that. As a consequence an indepth assessment in the article was superseded by posterior legal development. Such direct taking of evidence is allowed in the EU under conditions of Art. 17 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001.

On 21 July 2020 the Unidroit Secretariat released a Note on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the COVID-19 health crisis.

As stated in the website of Unidroit, the Note is to be considered as work in progress, and the Secretariat welcomes any comments or suggestions.

The Note’s presentation reads:

In the context of the outbreak of COVID-19, UNIDROIT has prepared this note as a form of guidance as to how the Principles could help address the main contractual disruptions caused by the pandemic directly as well as by the measures adopted as a consequence thereof. The note analyses whether parties may invoke COVID-19 as an excuse for non-performance, and if so, based on which concepts and under what conditions. The analysis also covers the scenario, likely to be common in practice, where performance is still possible, but has become substantially more difficult and/or onerous under the circumstances.

The document aims to guide the reader through the process, leading her to ask appropriate questions and to consider the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. Naturally, solutions will vary according to the particular context of the pandemic in each jurisdiction and there is no one-size-fits-all approach. In particular, the document, considering the different ways the Principles have so far been used in practice, aims to: (i) help parties use the Principles when implementing and interpreting their existing contracts or when drafting new ones in the times of the pandemic and its aftermath; (ii) assist courts and arbitral tribunals or other adjudicating bodies in deciding disputes arising out of such contracts; and (iii) provide legislators with a tool to modernise their contract law regulations, wherever necessary, or possibly even to adopt special rules for the present emergency situation.

The open nature of the Principles furnishes the parties and interpreters with a much-needed flexibility in such an extreme context, constituting an efficient tool to offer a nuanced solution that can help preserve valuable contracts for the parties. Especially in mid-to-long term contracts, and in view of the – apparently – temporary nature of the impediment, mechanisms that allow for an adequate renegotiation and proportionate allocation of losses could ultimately help preserve the contract and maximise value for the jurisdiction(s) involved.

Arguably, the world of contracts has never suffered such an unforeseeable, global, and intense interference. Extraordinary situations require extraordinary solutions, and there is a global need to ensure the economic value enshrined in commercial exchanges is not destroyed. The Principles offer state-of-the-art, best-practice tools to deal with the problem; a set of rules that result from years of study and analysis, with the participation and consensus of the most prominent academics and practitioners in the field, from civil law and common law traditions.

— Many thanks to Carmen Tamara Ungureanu (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania) for drawing the editors’ attention to this development.