Flux des sites DIP

On 20 March 2026 the Supreme Administrative Court in Poland handed down the decision following Cupriak-Trojan case (C-713/23, commented on this blog within an on-line symposium here, here, here, here, here and here; and additionally here; Opinion of the AG de la Tour in this case was also commented on the blog – here). Facts […]

The Court of Justice will resume its work on Monday 13th, after the Easter break.  On Thursday 16th, it will deliver its judgment in joined cases C-672/23, Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain e.a. and C-673/23, Smurfit Kappa Europe e.a. A hearing had taken place on January 2025; Advocate general J. Kokott’s […]

The Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), in collaboration with the Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) and the Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT), has launched a call for abstracts for the international conference SLAPP, Activism and Human Rights: Legal and Social Challenges in the Defense of the Environment, to be […]

This post was written by Birgit van Houtert and Marco Pasqua, co-Chairs of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions, as report of the Working Group’s third meeting. This post follows up on the report (Part I). The third meeting of the Working Group continued with an in-depth discussion structured around a case study, […]

This post was written by Birgit van Houtert and Marco Pasqua, co-Chairs of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. It is the first part of a report on the Working Group’s third meeting. This post continues with the report (Part II). On 19 March 2026, the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions […]

The following call was kindly shared with us by the editors of TDM.

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) special issue on “Project Finance in International Arbitration” This Special Issue will be edited by Seabron Adamson and Tiago Duarte-Silva, both of Charles River Associates.

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2118

 

Background

Project finance is used in many of the world’s largest energy, mining, infrastructure, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure projects. Many of the most complex commercial and investor-State arbitrations involve project financed businesses. However, the financial logic of special-purpose vehicle (SPV) structures, lender controls, cashflow waterfalls, and project financeability remains under-examined in arbitration writing. This special issue invites contributions on how project finance shapes jurisdiction, liability, causation, valuation, and remedies across both commercial and treaty disputes.

The sectors in which project finance is predominantly used — energy, mining, infrastructure, and telecommunications — are also the sectors that generate the greatest volume of international arbitration disputes. According to 2024 statistics, energy and construction matters collectively account for a substantial majority of ICC commercial arbitration cases, while energy and mining-related disputes represent nearly half of all ICSID cases. Project finance structures are therefore routinely at the heart of some of the most complex and high-value arbitrations in the world.

Despite this convergence, the specific financial mechanics of project finance remain under-explored in the international arbitration literature. The structural features of project-financed transactions (the SPV architecture, cashflow waterfalls, lender step-in rights, covenant frameworks, and heavily negotiated risk allocations) create a distinct legal and economic context that shapes how disputes arise, how liability is assessed, and how damages are quantified. Even modest disruptions to revenues or operations can trigger cascading contractual consequences that may wipe out equity value entirely, even when the underlying asset continues to function. Quantifying the full extent of such losses increasingly requires a sophisticated understanding of project finance mechanics by arbitration tribunals and practitioners.

Disputes in project-financed transactions frequently arise from governmental actions that may impair project economics or bankability (including permit delays, regulatory changes, and expropriation), counterparty failures (whether by offtakers, EPC or O&M contractors, or co-investors), or unforeseen operational disruptions. In the investor-State context, the interplay between treaty protections and the rights of lenders raises fundamental questions about who has standing to claim, what losses are recoverable, and how reparations should be structured. In commercial arbitration, multi-party, multi-contract disputes are common, involving intricate questions of risk allocation under construction contracts, power purchase agreements (PPAs), concession agreements, and financing documentation.

This special issue seeks to bring together leading practitioners, academics, and experts to examine the intersection of project finance and international arbitration in depth. Contributions from practitioners with experience in the field (whether as counsel, arbitrators, damages experts, or other specialists) are particularly welcome.

Topics

We invite submissions addressing one or more of the following topics, or any other relevant issues at the intersection of project finance and international arbitration:

Project Finance Structure and Arbitration

• The SPV structure and its implications for jurisdiction, standing, and enforcement in arbitration
• Lender rights in arbitration: step-in rights, direct agreements, and the role of lenders as parties or third parties to disputes
• Multi-party arbitration in project finance: aligning disputes across the contractual matrix (EPC, O&M, offtake, financing)
• Confidentiality and disclosure of financing documents in arbitral proceedings
• Arbitration clauses in project finance agreements: drafting considerations, potentially problematic clauses, and interaction between dispute resolution tiers
• The impact of political risk insurance
• Corruption and cronyism in project development

Investor-State Disputes Involving Project Finance

• Bankability and the fair and equitable treatment standard: when do regulatory changes cross the line?
• Stabilization clauses in concession agreements and their interaction with treaty protections
• Standing, nationality and attribution issues in investor-State claims involving SPVs, HoldCos, lending and sponsor syndicates and lender-controlled structures
• Force majeure, necessity, and hardship in project-financed infrastructure and energy disputes
• Government actions affecting project bankability: permit delays, regulatory creep, and currency restrictions
• The role of export credit agencies (ECAs), political risk insurers and multilateral development banks (MDBs) in shaping dispute outcomes
• Managing the risk of conflicting decisions across arbitral and judicial disputes involving separate claimants
• Political risk in project development and operation

Damages and Financial Analysis

• Quantifying losses in project-financed disputes: the role of the cashflow waterfall and financial model
• The “binary” nature of project finance equity losses: implications for damages methodology
• DCF and comparables-based valuation in early-stage, construction-phase, and operational project finance disputes
• Financeability as a damages issue: was the project realistically bankable, and how should that be assessed?
• Mitigation obligations and lender enforcement tools (waivers, cure periods, restructuring) in the damages analysis
• Loss of chance and causation in complex, multi-causal project finance disputes
• The impact of liability limits in project contracts

Sector-Specific Issues

• Renewable energy project finance disputes: PPAs, curtailment, and the energy transition
• Mining and natural resources: concession agreements, offtake disputes, and royalty financing in arbitration
• Infrastructure projects: PPP structures, availability-based payments, and government termination rights
• Oil and Gas project finance: production sharing agreements, joint operating agreements, and contractor disputes
• Digital infrastructure and data centres: emerging project finance disputes in a rapidly growing sector
• Disputes involving Islamic finance structures used in project financing

Procedural and Practical Considerations

• Interim measures and the protection of project assets and revenues pending arbitral proceedings
• Expert evidence in project finance disputes: financial modelling, engineering, and sector expertise
• Enforcement of project finance arbitral awards against States and SPVs
• Third-party funding in project finance arbitrations
• Insolvency, restructuring, and arbitration: managing distressed project finance disputes
• Dispute avoidance and management clauses in project finance documentation

Submissions

We invite all those with an interest in the subject to contribute articles or notes on one of the above topics or any other relevant issue. Proposals for papers (150–200 words) should be submitted to the editors by June 30th publication is expected final quarter 2026/first quarter 2027.

Please address all questions and proposals to the editors at sadamson@crai.com and tduarte@crai.com and CC info@transnational-dispute-management.com when submitting your materials.

Articles accepted for publication before this deadline will also go through TDM’s on-line advance publication process, allowing your work to reach its target audience as soon as the paper completes peer review and the editing process.

Guest Editors Seabron Adamson
Charles River Associates
View profile

* sadamson@crai.com Tiago Duarte-Silva
Charles River Associates
View profile

* tduarte@crai.com Submission Guidelines

The minimum word count for articles is 5,000 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, appendices, tables, summary etc.). Articles must include a short summary of the key points addressed and any conclusions drawn (150–200 words).

The layout of the articles should conform to TDM’s submission guidelines, available at: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/contribute.asp (more information available upon request).

For citations, please follow OSCOLA (4th Edition): www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/publications/oscola

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2118

Bilkent University Faculty of Law is pleased to invite you to an upcoming conference titled “Private International Law and Sustainable Development.”

We are honored to host a panel of world-renowned experts to discuss the evolving role of Private International Law in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Date: 13th April 2026, Monday
Time: 13:30 – 15:30
Venue: FFB 2

Moderator: Prof. Dr. Bilgin Tiryakio?lu

Distinguished Speakers:
Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels (Max Planck Institute) – The Place of Private International Law in Sustainable Development
Prof. Dr. Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh) – Sustainable Consumption and Production (SDG 12): Circularity in Fashion
Prof. Van Loon Hans (Former Secretary General of the HCCH) – The Role of the Judge in Climate Cases (SDG 13)
Assoc. Prof. Dr.Gulum Özçelik (Bilkent University) – Recognition of Personal Status Acquired Abroad (SDGs 5, 10, 16)

The conference will be live-streamed on our official YouTube channel: @bilkentuniversitesihukuk.

The event will be held in English.
All interested participants are welcome.

Students who attend the event will be awarded GE 250/251 points.

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Stichting Offlimits v X.AI llc,. X Corp, X Internet Unlimited Company ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:310, in which the courts at Amsterdam issued an injunction yesterday, echoes some of the themes of SEOK v Hammy Media. Of relevance to the blog of course are the jurisdictional issues.

X.AI is domiciled at Palo Alto, X Corp at Texas, and X Internet Unlimited Company ‘XIUC’ at Dublin.

[4.1] The Stichting’s claim serves two purposes, namely 1) to ensure that Grok and X no longer offer functionality that allows for the generation and  distribution of images depicting naked, existing individuals without their consent (‘non-consensual nude images’), and 2) to ensure that it is no longer possible to use Grok and X to generate and distribute child sexual abuse material ‘CSAM’.

The Stichting’s claim has a dual cause of action: the GDPR viz image generation of existing people; and tort (under Dutch law) viz CSAM (because it may also involve non-existing individuals. This has an impact on jurisdiction.

The court applies a textbook approach to jurisdiction [4.4] ff. It first assesses jurisdiction against XIUC (‘processor’ within the meaning of the GDPR): for the claim viz non-consensual nude images The Netherlands per A79(2) GDPR [as I detail here]:

Proceedings against a controller or a processor shall be brought before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment. Alternatively, such proceedings may be brought before the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.

The Netherlands is Off Limits’ habitual residence. Territorial jurisdiction is determined by Dutch civil procedure rules – CPR and rests with the courts at Amsterdam.

For the claim viz CSAM also The Netherlands, as locus damni per A7(2) Brussels Ia.

[4.7] the court accepts jurisdiction viz the US entities on the basis of the joinder and anchor defendant rules in Dutch CPR (A8 Brussels Ia does not apply to non-EU domiciled defendants); the claims are clearly related to the Dutch claims.

[4.8] Applicable law is determined as the GDPR for the non consensual images claim and Dutch law as lex voluntatis per A14 Rome II.

Privacy lawyers will be interested to read the remainder of the judgment with the court being unimpressed with X’s argument that GROK has been fixed to avoid generation of both types of images. Claimant produced stills showing the exact opposite.

In an echo of  the right to be forgotten, the court then limits its injunction (a ban on offering GROK with the relevant functionality) viz the US entities re the non-consensual images, to offering the functionality to individuals domiciled in The Netherlands (because the US entities do not themselves offer services in The Netherlands). That limitation is not extended to XIUC: here the court orders XIUC to simply block the offer on X, of GROK with the relevant functionality.

Conclusion: the court in essence

[5.1.] prohibits X.AI from generating and/or distributing sexual imagery insofar as this involves the use of functionality whereby persons are partially or fully undressed without having given their express consent, insofar as this concerns persons domiciled in the Netherlands;

[5.2.] prohibits X.AI from producing, distributing, offering, publicly displaying and/or possessing sexual imagery in the Netherlands insofar as this involves the use of functionality whereby imagery is generated that qualifies as child pornography under Dutch law;

[5.3.] orders X.AI to confirm in writing to Offlimits that and how it has complied with the prohibitions under 5.1. and 5.2.;

[5.4.] orders X. AI to pay Offlimits a penalty of €100,000.00 for every day or part thereof that it fails to comply with (one of) the prohibitions under 5.1. or 5.2., or with the order under 5.3., until a maximum of €10,000,000.00 has been reached,

[5.5.] prohibits X from offering the functionality of Grok as part of the X platform for as long as Grok acts in breach of the prohibition under 5.1.;

[5.6.] orders X to confirm in writing to Offlimits that and how it has complied with the requirement under 5.4.;

[5.7.] orders X to pay Offlimits a penalty of €100,000.00 for every day or part thereof that it fails to comply with the prohibition in 5.5. or the requirement set out in 5.6. is met, up to a maximum of €10,000,000.00,

[5.8.] prohibits XIUC from offering the functionality of Grok as part of the X platform for as long as Grok acts in breach of the prohibitions set out in 5.1. and 5.2.;

[5.9.] orders XIUC to confirm in writing to Offlimits that and how it has complied with the prohibition under 5.6.;

[5.10.] orders XIUC to pay Offlimits a penalty of €100,000.00 for every day or part thereof that it fails to comply with the prohibition under 5.8. or the order under 5.9., up to a maximum of €10,000,000.00

Geert.

 

 

The Governing Bodies of the European Association of Private International Law are about to be renewed. As announced a few weeks ago, elections will be held for both the Board of Administration and the Scientific Council of the Association in accordance with the EAPIL Statutes in the run up to the the next EAPIL Conference, […]

The following announcement was shared with us by the conference organizers, Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia), Adrian Rycerski (SWPS University in Poznan, Poland).

Please save the date: 19 November 2026

We are pleased to invite you to an international scientific conference devoted to modern problems of Private International Law, with particular attention to the impact of new technologies.

We hope the event will provide an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views, experiences, and in-depth discussion.

The conference will be held online and will bring together students, PhD candidates, and experienced experts.

The organizers plan a post-conference publication.

We welcome abstracts addressing any aspect of Private International Law, especially those focusing on modern issues and emerging challenges.

Abstracts (in English, max. 1500 characters) should be submitted to:
Aleksandrs.Fillers@rgsl.edu.lv and arycerski@swps.edu.pl

Submission deadline: 31 May 2026

Notification of acceptance: by 30 June 2026

Participation in the conference is free of charge.

We look forward to your contributions!

Aleksandrs Fillers, PhD
Associate Professor at Riga Graduate School of Law

Adrian Rycerski, PhD
Assistant Professor at SWPS University in Poznan

The University of Udine, together with its partners, has announced two exciting opportunities for students, researchers and practitioners interested in European consumer and market law, with a particular focus on sustainability and the circular economy.

The first call invites participants to register for the Summer School “Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy” to be held at the University of Udine, from 8 to 17 July 2026. This programme offers a unique chance to engage with leading scholars and experts, explore the evolving legal framework surrounding sustainable markets and deepen understanding of how EU law is adapting to support the transition toward a circular economy. The Summer School promises an interdisciplinary and international learning environment, making it especially valuable for those looking to expand both their academic knowledge and professional networks. The organisers have provided the Call for applications – Udine Summer School 2026 and the Brochure – Udine Summer School 2026.

In parallel, a second call has been launched for abstracts for the Workshop “Judicial Protection and Enforcement of ‘Green’ Rights in the EU”. This workshop aims to bring together researchers and practitioners to discuss critical issues related to environmental rights enforcement, judicial protection mechanisms and the role of courts in advancing the EU’s green transition. Contributors are encouraged to submit abstracts that engage with current challenges and emerging developments in this rapidly evolving field. The workshop will be held at the University of Udine, on 14 July 2026. The organisers have provided the Call for Abstracts – Workshop Udine Summer School 2026.

Registration is now open for the Summer School, and interested participants are encouraged to apply promptly. At the same time, those wishing to present at the workshop can submit their abstracts for consideration.

Both initiatives reflect a growing commitment within the European academic and legal community to address sustainability challenges through legal innovation and collaboration. For more information on the programmes, application procedures and deadlines, please visit the official project website.

Activities are co-funded by the EU Erasmus+ Programme.

This post was written by Lorène Anthonioz, who is PhD candidate in Private International Law at the University of Geneva and a Research and Teaching Assistant in Private International Law at UniDistance. With effect from 1 January 2026, Switzerland amended its declaration under the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and […]

Introduction

Hilton v Guyot, is the most influential case in the United States—and perhaps globally—on the use of comity as a basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments. In that case, Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court defined comity as follows:

“No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent of which the law of one nation… shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon… the “comity of nations”…”

Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on one hand, nor a mere courtesy and goodwill, on the other; it is the recognition which one allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial act of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under protection of its laws…”

By contrast, under English common law, the dominant basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments is the theory of obligation. Blackburn, J in the English case of Schibsy v Westenholz  stated that the true principle is that,

“…the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant, imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum for which the judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to enforce…”

And further on in his judgment, Blackburn J. makes it plain that the doctrine of “comity” is incorrect. Thus, no question of reciprocity could arise in an action brought upon a foreign judgment.”

The theory of obligation is applied in many Commonwealth and Anglophone African countries. Interestingly, an emerging but underexplored trend is the growing consideration—and in some instances, application—of the principle of comity by courts in these jurisdictions, with several African judges expressly citing Hilton v Guyot.

This blog highlights selected cases illustrating this development, focusing on Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, and Nigeria. The discussion is limited to the common law framework and does not address statutory regimes or international conventions.

 

Liberia

Liberia is a former colony of the United States located in West Africa. In  Turner v Burnette, the Liberian Supreme Court firmly established the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, drawing particular support from Hilton v Guyot. The Court further explained—by reference to another U.S. authority—that:

“The application of comity does not rise [sic] to the effect of establishing an imperative rule of law; it has the power to persuade but not command. Comity being voluntary, and not obligatory, rests in the discretion of the tribunal of the forum and is governed by certain more or widely recognized rules.” Generally, greater force and dignity will be given to judgments of foreign courts when parties have had their day in a court of competent jurisdiction, after due service of process or after an entry of appearance, and have had a full and impartial hearing upon the merits of their case; unless it can be shown that the proceedings were tainted with fraud.”

Andrew Moran and Anthony Kennedy, conclude on the basis of the above Liberian Supreme Court decision that, “It seems, therefore, that any foreign judgment may be enforceable in Liberia at common law as a matter of comity between nations. The procedure appears to be that a suit commenced on the foreign judgment, in the same way as an action is commenced at common law in other jurisdictions.”

Kenya

Kenya is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Kenyan courts apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law.

In ABSA Bank Uganda Limited (Formerly Known as Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited) v Uchumi Supermarkets PLC, the Kenyan High Court held at paragraph 5 that,

In the absence of a reciprocal enforcement arrangement, a foreign judgment was enforceable in Kenya as a claim in common law. Where a foreign court of competent jurisdiction had adjudicated a certain sum to be due to another, a legal obligation arose to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment could be maintained. In deciding whether a foreign court was one of competent jurisdiction, the courts would apply not the law of the foreign court itself but English rules of private international law. The competence of the foreign court was the competence of the court in an international sense, that was, its territorial competence over the subject matter and the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense was not material.”

However, in a more recent case, the Kenyan Supreme Court, relying on Hilton v Guyot, applied the principle of comity in determining whether to recognise and enforce a locus inspection order from Scotland (see Anam Abdul Majid and Chukwuma Okoli). After quoting the key passage from Hilton v Guyot with approval, the Court stated at paragraph 60 that:

“This approach prioritizes citizen protection while taking into account the legitimate interests of foreign claimants. This approach is consistent with the adaptability of international comity as a principle of informed prioritizing national interests rather than absolute obligation, as well as the practical differences between the international and national contexts.”

Uganda

Uganda is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Ugandan judges apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law. More recently, Ugandan courts have justified the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by reference to the theories of obligation, comity, and reciprocity. In the very recent case of Brianna v Mugisha, Justice Nagawa, after a careful consideration of Ugandan case law authorities and Hilton v Guyot, stated that:

 

“5.4 However, I have observed that despite the absence of a statutory
reciprocal arrangement, Ugandan courts have recognized and
enforced foreign judgments under the common law principles of
obligation, reciprocity, and comity.

5.5. These doctrines provide a legal foundation for cross-border judicial
cooperation, particularly in the absence of a formal treaty or statutory
framework, such as in the case of Uganda and the United States.

 

5.6. The doctrine of comity is based on mutual respect between sovereign
states. It allows a court to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment
not as a matter of strict legal obligation, but out of respect to the
foreign court’s authority and fairness in its proceedings. Courts apply
comity where: the foreign court had competent jurisdiction over the matter and the parties, the proceedings were conducted fairly, with
due process observed and enforcing the judgment would not be
contrary to public policy in the recognizing jurisdiction.

 

5.7. The obligation theory treats a valid foreign judgment as creating a legal
duty on the judgment debtor to comply, similar to a contractual
obligation. This approach holds that once a court of competent
jurisdiction has determined a party’s liability, that decision should be
respected and enforced in other jurisdictions unless there is a
compelling reason not to do so, such as: Fraud in obtaining the
judgment, Violation of natural justice, or a fundamental defect in
jurisdiction.

 

5.8. Under reciprocity, a foreign judgment will only be enforced if courts in
the originating country would likewise enforce judgments from the
enforcing country. This principle ensures mutual legal cooperation
between jurisdictions.”

It must, however, be noted that the acceptance of reciprocity as a basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law marks a significant departure from the position in other Anglophone and Commonwealth African countries, as well as Commonwealth jurisdictions more broadly.

Tanzania

In Tanzania, a significant number of recent cases have used foreign judgments to preclude new actions on grounds of res judicata, obligation, and comity (Exim Bank (COMORES) SA vs Costa Sari;  Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited & Another vs Independent Power Tanzania Limited & Others)

South Africa

South Africa, located in Southern Africa and formerly colonised by both Britain and the Netherlands, is a mixed legal system drawing from Roman Dutch law and the common law. The theory of obligation remains the dominant basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jones v Krok, where the Court endorsed the English authority of  Nouvion v Freeman as support for applying the obligation theory in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments

However, in Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick,, the Constitutional Court referred to the principle of comity to justify the development of the common law framework for recognising and enforcing judgments from international courts, signalling a limited but notable openness to comity based reasoning.

Nigeria  

Nigeria is a former colony of the United Kingdom and is located in West Africa. Under the common law regime, it applies the theory of obligation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Alfred C Toepfer Inc v Edokpolor).

However, some Nigerian judges at the Supreme Court have proposed comity, jurisdictional reciprocity, and the facilitation of international trade and commerce as additional bases for enforcing foreign judgments (Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v Ghassan Halaoui (2009) 10 NWLR 309, 338–39 (Oguntade JSC)), but there has been no reported case where these proposals have been implemented in practice.

 

Conclusion

The purpose of this post is to highlight how selected Commonwealth and Anglophone African courts have received and applied the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the common law, particularly as articulated in Hilton v Guyot.

At present, Liberia is the only jurisdiction that fully applies the principle of comity as advanced in Hilton v Guyot, arguably influenced by its historical ties to the United States.

Kenya applies the doctrine of obligation alongside the principle of comity, while Uganda adopts a similar approach and has recently gone further by recognising reciprocity as an additional basis for enforcement.

South Africa primarily follows the doctrine of obligation, although a few cases have considered comity in the context of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, albeit without concrete application.

In Nigeria, courts continue to rely principally on the doctrine of obligation at common law. Although some Supreme Court justices have proposed comity as a possible basis for enforcement, this has not been implemented in practice.

Overall, the doctrine of obligation remains the dominant common law basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments across Anglophone and Commonwealth Africa. Nonetheless, the principle of comity, as developed in Hilton v Guyot, continues to play an important role in shaping the jurisprudence of a limited number of African jurisdictions.

 

 

The author of this post is Lino Bernard, post-doctoral researcher at the University of Mainz, Germany. He developed the following thoughts in the course of his PhD thesis on parallel proceedings and jurisdiction agreements and has recently published a note on the preliminary reference of the German Federal Supreme Court in EuZW (European Journal of […]

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH in The Hague, for the period from September 2026 to February 2027!

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division.

Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Monday, 20 April 2026 at 18.00 (CEST). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

 

On 24 and 25 September 2026,the University of Edinburgh Law School and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law will host the second Private International Law Festival in Edinburgh on The End of Rule-Based International Order? – Implications for Private International Law. The Festival aims to make progress on the following questions: what impact do current geopolitical shifts have […]

A call for papers and panels has recently been issued by Michiel Poesen (University of Aberdeen) and Patricia Živković (University of Aberdeen), co-convenors of the Private International Law section of the Society of Legal Scholars 117th Annual Conference at University of East Anglia (UEA) in Norwich from 2 to 4 September 2026. The call is reproduced […]

INTRODUCTION

Following a significant hiatus, the public policy defense has re-emerged prominently in discussions surrounding the enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly in the context of a judgment issued by the Panama Maritime Court in 2024. The primary issue addressed by the Greek court was whether a foreign judgment could be recognized and enforced when the foreign court denied appellate proceedings due to the failure to post a security deposit that was both substantial and necessary for the appeal process.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The case involved a claim for damages between a company based in Hong Kong and another company registered in the Marshall Islands. This dispute was adjudicated under Panama’s maritime law, established by Law 8 of 1982 and updated by Law 55 of 2008, which governs maritime-related disputes through a specialized and efficient legal framework. The Panamanian maritime courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions, enabling prompt vessel arrests and maritime liens within both Panamanian territorial waters and the Panama Canal for claims related to damages, cargo issues, and collisions.

The Panamanian court ruled in favor of the claimant, mandating the defendant to either return the vessel or pay approximately 45 million USD, i.e., the valuation of the vessel along with associated legal costs, as ordered by the court.

Subsequently, the judgment creditor sought recognition and enforcement of the Panamanian judgment in Greece, as the vessel was docked within Greek territorial waters.

The opposing party contended that the ruling from the Panamanian Naval Court of First Instance contravened Greek public policy and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), primarily because the appellate process was effectively obstructed. According to Article 490 of Panama’s Maritime Courts and Disputes Law, the appellant was required to deposit a security of nearly 45 million USD (equivalent to the judgment amount and associated legal fees) within ten days to have its appeal considered.

The original text from Article 490 reads:

“Artículo 490. Para cursar la apelación se requerirá la consignación, ante la secretaría del Tribunal Marítimo de primera instancia, de una caución que garantice el pago del monto de la condena más las costas. Para determinar el monto de la caución se considerará la caución consignada para levantar el secuestro o el valor del bien secuestrado. Dicha caución será consignada dentro de los diez días siguientes a la notificación de la providencia que admita el recurso. Si el apelante no consigna la caución de que trata este artículo, el juez declarará desierto el recurso.”

In light of the above, the excessive requirement for a security deposit resulted in the judgment debtor’s appeal being dismissed, thereby forfeiting its right to be heard.

 

FINDINGS OF THE GREEK COURT.

The Greek court recognized that while imposing a financial guarantee as a prerequisite for appeal can have legitimate justifications, such as discouraging vexatious litigation and promoting judicial efficacy, the circumstances in this case revealed that the requirement was manifestly disproportionate and unduly burdensome. The court articulated the following concerns:

– The required guarantee matched the total amount of the initial judgment plus costs.

– There was no cap, no exceptions, and no discretion for reduction based on the specifics of the case.

– It effectively forced the appellant to comply with the first-instance judgment in full just to access the appeal process.

The court referenced Article 323(5) of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, which encompasses the public policy clause, confirming that the security requirement violated the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, limiting access to the court and undermining judicial protection directly contravened Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution.

Consequently, the obligation to deposit an amount of USD 44,397,715.97, which constitutes the awarded sum of the initial judgment (USD 41,248,107.88) plus legal costs (USD 3,149,608.09), was viewed as an untenable financial burden that contradicts the right to judicial protection.

More specifically, the imposition of a security deposit that equaled the judgment amount plus legal fees, with no statutory limits, exceptions, or discretionary reduction possibilities, violated public policy. This requirement substantially infringed upon the appellant’s right to access judicial remedies against an enforceable ruling.

Finally, the court noted that while Greek law allows for provisional enforceability of first-instance judgments under certain conditions, including the possibility of appeal suspension without a guarantee if there is a likelihood of success, such provisions were absent in Panamanian law.

The author of this post is Iina Tornberg, who is a project researcher at the University of Eastern Finland and a visiting researcher at the University of Helsinki. The judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 16 December 2025 addressed the protection of family life in a case involving the return […]

This blog note is kindly provided by Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi (Lecturer, School of Law, Royal Holloway, University of London; zubair.abbasi@rhul.ac.uk). It follows the author’s previous post on this topic, which was published earlier on this blog.

Introduction

In MA v WK [2025] EWFC 499, three women had undergone Islamic marriage (nikah) ceremonies in England. Each argued that subsequent registration of her marriage in Pakistan had converted it into a valid foreign marriage entitled to recognition in England and Wales. The Family Court rejected this argument because the lex loci celebrationis is fixed at the place and moment of the ceremony; no later act of registration in another jurisdiction can alter it.

The more important question is why the argument was made at all. Each applicant had already accepted that her ceremony was a non-marriage or non-qualifying ceremony (NQC) under English matrimonial law. Each had therefore been excluded, by the rule established in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 from the financial remedies that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would otherwise have provided. The argument from Pakistani registration was, in substance, a desperate attempt to find through private international law a route that domestic law had closed. It was always going to fail but the fact that it was attempted is itself instructive. When the law systematically denies recognition to a form of marriage that a significant part of the population regards as valid, litigants will look for whatever route remains open. MA v WK is a record of one such attempt, and it is unlikely to be the last as long as the existing legal framework remains unreformed.

The Facts

There were three female applicants, each of whom had celebrated a nikah-only in England and sought to rely on subsequent registration in Pakistan. The first, MA, had celebrated a nikah with WK in Oxfordshire on 1 April 2013. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate recording both the marriage date and entry date as 1 April 2013, with an issue date of 26 August 2024. The second, TM, had celebrated a nikah with MM at a mosque in England on 19 January 1992. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate, but the entry date was 2 October 2025 — thirty-three years after the ceremony and after MM had already remarried in Pakistan in 2017. The third, AM, had celebrated a nikah with RK in England in 2005. No evidence of registration was produced.

Non-Qualifying Ceremonies and Private International Law

The formal validity of a marriage is governed by the lex loci celebrationis, as restated by Moylan LJ in Tousi v Gaydukova [2024] EWCA Civ 203. All three ceremonies took place in England; all three applicants accepted that none had complied with the Marriage Act 1949. Each was therefore a non-qualifying ceremony (NQC). The question was whether subsequent registration in Pakistan could convert them into valid foreign marriages capable of recognition in England and Wales. The court held that it could not: the lex loci is determined by the place of celebration, not by any later administrative act. There is no authority for the proposition that registration can substitute for, or supplement, the ceremony for the purposes of legal recognition.

The applicants advanced two arguments. First, that registration is the operative event for lex loci purposes, deriving from Sottomayor v De Barros (No 1) (1877) 3 PD 1, a principle elevating it to the “pinnacle” of matrimonial law [para 16]. That reading does not survive examination: in Sottomayor ceremony and registration happened simultaneously at an English register office, and their coincidence does not make registration the constitutive event. The three further authorities relied upon, Boughajdim v Hayoukane [2022] EWHC 2673; Entry Clearance Officer v Firdous [2018] HU/04562/2016 (Upper Tribunal); and Farah v Farah 16 Va. App. 329 (Va. Ct. App. 1993), each turned on where the ceremony, or its dominant elements, had taken place. None held that registration of an English ceremony abroad could shift the lex loci; they are authority for the opposite proposition.

The second argument assumed what it needed to prove. The principle in Berthiaume v Dastous (Quebec) [1929] UKPC 73, that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, operates in favour of a marriage validly formed at its place of celebration. It avails nothing where the ceremony was not valid there in the first place. A further difficulty lay in Pakistani law itself. On the expert evidence, accepted in Rana v Manan 2011] EWHC 2132 and applied here, registration under section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 is directory rather than mandatory: it is the nikah contract that creates the marriage. What Pakistani law had done in registering these marriages was not to create new Pakistani marriages, but to record marriages that Pakistani law treated as having taken place in England.

On the presumption of marriage, the answer was straightforward. The presumption, as Evans LJ explained in Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath 1999] EWCA Civ 3008 at [31]–[32], fills evidential gaps; it does not operate where there is positive evidence of non-compliance with the statutory formalities. The circularity this produces is uncomfortable. A party who wishes to argue for recognition of her marriage must disclose to the court the circumstances of the ceremony; and once she has done so honestly, she will typically have foreclosed the only doctrine that might have assisted her.

Commentary

The judgment in this case is the latest in a sequence that has progressively narrowed the legal options available to parties in religious-only or a nikah-only marriages. Until Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122, the courts had available to them a range of tools: the “hallmarks of marriage” test from Gereis v Yagoub [1997] Fam Law 475; the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation from Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath1999] EWCA Civ 3008; and a generally flexible approach to the non-marriage category, which had been applied in reported cases almost exclusively to polygamous unions (A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6; Gandhi v Patel [2002] 1 FLR 603; Shagroon v Sharbatly [2012] EWCA Civ 1507; and El Gamal v Al-Maktoum [2011] EWHC B27.

The Court of Appeal’s introduction of the NQC category in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 changed the landscape. A court asked to classify a religious-only ceremony now asks a single, decisive question: did the ceremony comply, at least to some degree, with the statutory requirements? If the answer is no, the ceremony is outside the regulatory framework entirely, and neither the hallmarks test nor the presumption can operate to bring it back in. The present case is a private international law application of the same logic: the question is what happened at the ceremony, assessed as at the date of the ceremony, and later events, including registration abroad, are irrelevant.

The choice of jurisdiction made no difference to that conclusion. The applicants sought declarations of marital status under section 55(1) of the Family Law Act 1986, which enables a person to apply for a declaration that a marriage was at its inception valid, or that it subsisted on a particular date. That jurisdiction is declaratory, not constitutive: it identifies the status that the law recognises, it does not create one. The argument from foreign registration was in substance an invitation to the court to use the section 55 jurisdiction to confer a status that English law does not recognise. It was always going to fail, not because of any deficiency in the evidence or any technical point of procedure, but because the declaratory jurisdiction cannot be deployed as a means of circumventing the requirements that the Marriage Act 1949 imposes.

None of this is a criticism of the applicants, who were doing what people in their position typically do: looking for whatever route the law might offer. It is a comment on the law itself. The Attorney General had foreshadowed a public policy objection under section 58(1) of the 1986 Act had the court found in the applicants’ favour, an indication that the state’s interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage framework is regarded as sufficiently strong to resist even a successful argument from foreign registration [para 30]. That the argument failed means the public policy point did not arise, but its potential invocation confirms that the current framework is not one the courts are inclined to look for ways around.

Conclusion

The decision in MA v WK is easy to justify on the law as it stands. The lex loci celebrationis is not a rule that administrative convenience in another jurisdiction can displace, and the section 55 jurisdiction does not exist to remedy the deficiencies of the Marriage Act 1949. But the case is a reminder that when domestic law closes every available door, litigants will look elsewhere.

The failure in this case is not one of private international law. The Marriage Act 1949, built on foundations laid by Lord Hardwicke’s Clandestine Marriages Act 1753, which transformed the private marriage contract into a public act requiring the sanction of the church-state — was not designed with cultural and religious diversity in mind. The Government has committed to reform. But the proposed changes are prospective. They will not assist the three women in this case, nor the many others in the same position. Until Parliament addresses that gap, family courts will continue to turn away women whose marriages are real to everyone except the law.