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The European Civil Justice Centre is pleased to announce a European Civil Procedure Seminar, which will take place on 25 and 26 June 2026 at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of KU Leuven.

The seminar is organised on the occasion of the publication of European Civil Procedure, edited by Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori, and published by de Gruyter in 2026. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the main developments shaping civil justice, including EU instruments on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, service of documents, taking of evidence, and collective redress.

The seminar will be held at KU Leuven, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Tiensestraat 41, Leuven, Facultaire Raadzaal. Participation is free. Registration for in-person attendance is available by email at anne-marie.cuypers@kuleuven.be. Registration to attend online is available via Eventbrite: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/online-european-civil-procedure-seminar-tickets-1991345046640

The seminar will bring together a number of the book’s authors to reflect on and discuss various topics within the field of European civil procedure.

Programme

Thursday 25 June 2026

12.45
Welcome
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

13.00
Innovations in EU Civil Procedure: Novel Concepts, Regulatory Mechanisms and Technology
Anna Nylund [online]

13.40
Mariana after Magnitsky: How Global Sanctions and Litigation Funding Politicize Private International Law
Eduardo Silva de Freitas

14.20
Three to Tango: Lawyers Ethics in Collective Litigation with Third Party Funding
Jos Hoevenaars

15.00
Coffee break

15.30
“No Mini-Trials at the Jurisdictional Stage”: Brussels Ia and Engagement with the Merits
Geert Van Calster

16.10
CJEU Case Law on Delineating the Scope of Application Between the Insolvency and Brussels Ibis Regulations: Challenges of Uniform Interpretation
Vesna Lazic

17.00
Taking of Evidence: Cross-Border Aspects and EU Influence
Wannes Vandenbussche and Jachin Van Doninck

17.40
End of day one

 

Friday 26 June 2026

9.00
Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication
Willem Visser

9.40
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Enforcement
Patrick Gielen

10.20
The Revision of the ADR Directive 2013/11 and the Amendments in the ADR Directive 2025/2647: The use of Evidence
Emma van Gelder

11.00
Coffee break

11.20
EU law and National Civil Procedure: A Slightly Larger Area Than It First Appears.
Bart Krans

12.00
Elusive DigitalJustice@2030: Can the Promise Be Fulfilled?
Alan Uzelac [online]

12.30
Closing
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

End of day two

For further information, please contact kramer@law.eur.nl and stefaan.voet@kuleuven.be.

 

The second book in the European Association of Private International Law series is out. Edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), the volume, published by Edward Elgar, builds on the presentations delivered at the 2024 EAPIL Winter School, held in Como in February […]

A recent article in the latest issue of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law revisits a feature of Indian private international law that often sits in the background of transactional and disputes practice but can decisively shape outcomes: the continued presence of révision au fond in India’s law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ).

For practitioners, the issue is not merely doctrinal. It concerns the enforceability of outcomes and, therefore, how disputes should be structured at the drafting stage.

Under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, Indian courts are formally empowered to refuse enforcement where a foreign judgment is not “on the merits.” Read literally, this suggests a willingness to reassess the correctness of the decision. In most jurisdictions today, that approach has been abandoned. Refusal of enforcement is typically confined to procedural defects: jurisdiction, fraud, natural justice, or public policy, not the substance of the decision.

In practice, Indian courts have taken a far more restrained approach. They do not reopen the correctness of the foreign judgment. Instead, they ask whether the decision reflects a genuine adjudication: was there evidence, was there a real opportunity to be heard, and is the decision reasoned? In effect, what appears to be révision au fond operates as a proxy for natural justice.

The difficulty lies in how this framework is perceived externally. Courts in jurisdictions that condition enforcement on reciprocity or substantially similar standards, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and, increasingly, China, do not necessarily engage with the nuances of Indian case law. The statutory text continues to signal that India permits merits review. That signal alone may be sufficient to deny enforcement of Indian judgments abroad.

This gap between doctrine and practice creates a set of risks that practitioners should factor into both litigation strategy and transactional drafting.

First, forum selection cannot be approached in isolation from enforcement.
Where assets are likely to be located outside India, the portability of an Indian judgment becomes a central concern. If enforcement is anticipated in reciprocity-based jurisdictions, the choice of an Indian court may introduce avoidable uncertainty.

Second, arbitration retains a structural advantage in this context.
India’s alignment with the New York Convention and the prohibition on merits review in the enforcement of arbitral awards offers a level of predictability that litigation currently does not. Where enforcement abroad is critical, arbitration may continue to be the safer route.

Third, dispute resolution clauses should be drafted with enforcement geography in mind.
This may involve:

• Selecting a forum whose judgments are more readily enforceable in the jurisdictions where assets are located
• Considering hybrid approaches, such as arbitration with carefully chosen seats
• Avoiding assumptions that a favourable judgment in one jurisdiction will translate into effective recovery elsewhere

Fourth, expectations around default and summary judgments should be managed carefully.
Indian courts place emphasis on whether the judgment reflects a substantive evaluation of the dispute. Orders that appear purely formal or insufficiently reasoned may face resistance in India, and this in turn feeds into how Indian judgments are assessed abroad.

The broader point is that India’s REFJ framework is not out of step in practice, but it appears to be so in form. Until that dissonance is addressed, whether through legislative clarification or greater international alignment, the enforceability of Indian judgments will continue to depend as much on perception as on doctrine. The article is available open-access here.

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this one is entirely AI free.

 

Anyone with an interest in SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation – SLAPP) suits will of course be aware of the battle raging between Greenpeace and Energy Transfer. The former is an environmental and sustainability NGO of established pedigree. The latter the developer of the Dakota Access Pipeline  against which Greenpeace protests vigorously, supported ia by indigenous groups.

The procedural history particularly on the US side of the pond is excellently summarised by Hannah Buxbaum here. In short, Energy Transfer sued for defamation, tortious interference with business, and conspiracy under state law and won a considerable damages award in front of a jury, later effectively halved by the bench to a still massive USD 345 million. Greenpeace are seeking a retrial of that claim.

Meanwhile, Greenpeace itself sued in The Netherlands, alleging tortious liability on the basis of a range of public statements by and /or on behalf of Energy Transfer.

In these interlocutory debates, Energy Transfer argue that the Dutch courts lack jurisdiction, and subsidiarily, that they ought to apply lis pendens or, should the Dutch courts find that the retrial application in the US  bars res judicata, should stay the Dutch claim until the US case is final.

The background includes the EU’s anti-SLAPP Directive 2024/1069, summarised by Aberdeen’s Justin Borg Barthet here. Greenpeace argue the EU’s anti-SLAPP Directive may already be applied to the claim, despite the Directive’s implementation period not having been passed. It argues the Dutch abuse of process provisions, predating the Directive, already meet with the Directive’s requirements, and that consequently the Dutch rules may be applied with the specific provisions of the Directive in mind (CJEU Marleasing and CJEU Inter-Environnement on steroids, as it were: in Marleasing, the Court held that courts in the EU must apply national law as much as possible in line with EU Directives (which, unlike Regulations, lack direct applicability) and in inter-Environnement it expanded on what that means for national law prior to the Directive having been transposed into national law).

Application of the Directive not only would pre-signal unenforceability of the US findings per A16. It would also solidify jurisdiction of the Dutch courts: A17 reads

Jurisdiction for actions related to third-country proceedings

1.   Member States shall ensure that, where abusive court proceedings against public participation have been brought by a claimant domiciled outside the Union in a court or tribunal of a third-country against a natural or legal person domiciled in a Member State, that person may seek, in the courts or tribunals of the place where that person is domiciled, compensation for the damage and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the court or tribunal of the third-country.

2.   Member States may limit the exercise of jurisdiction under paragraph 1 while proceedings are still pending in the third-country.

Meanwhile, a Dakota District court has denied an anti-suit injunction sought by Energy Transfer, yet the Dakota Supreme Court issued one (the Dutch court referred to the former but not to the latter finding): for all details on these, see Hannah’s post.

In Stichting Greenpeace Council v Energy Transfer LP et al ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:5461 the first instance court at Amsterdam has now held last Tuesday that it does have jurisdiction.

[4.4] ff the court finds that the anti-SLAPP Directive does not apply, Marleasing fashion, and cannot be used to apply the Dutch abuse of process rules in a way which would grant forum actoris (jurisdiction on the basis of the claimant’s domicile). The court rebukes the Dutch Government’s views expressed in its draft Act for transposition of the anti-SLAPP Directive as being optimistic.

However it then holds the residual private international law rules do already grant jurisdiction to the Dutch courts as the locus damni. [4.14] it refers to the clear Dutch parliamentary intention to apply Dutch CPR – Civil Procedure Rules in line with CJEU authority on the Brussels Ia Regulation in cases where, such as here, BIa does not apply.

[4.16] it emphasises that the defendant’s arguments on the actual relationship between parties must be taken into account yet that jurisdictional issues must not lead to a mini-trial, instead must be judged prima facie, to ‘good arguable case’ standard as it were.

[4.17] with reference to Universal Music, the court reiterates that the mere presence of a bank account does not suffice to establish jurisdiction (reference to CJEU Universal Music and Kolassa):  additional elements are required, and in the case of infringement of personality rights such as a libel claim, the court of the centre of the claimant’s interest may have jurisdiction (reference to CJEU eDate and Bolagsupplysningen).

[4.18] Greenpeace qualifies the damage as (i) financial loss, (ii) loss resulting from the deliberate obstruction of GPI in the pursuit of its charitable objectives, and (iii) damage to reputation. The court holds that Greenpeace does to prima facie standard show that its has led financial damage in The Netherlands as a result of this specific litigation and the corresponding legal costs (Energy Transfer had argued that the intense financial streams between Greenpeace and its US entities on a rolling basis, make it impossible to establish financial damage in The Netherlands).

[4.20] ff the court then also finds the presence of additional elements locating the damage in The Netherlands: [4.22] it accepts Greenpeace’s arguments that it had to dedicate significant manpower at ats Dutch international headquarters to deal with the US case, leading to those staff members not being available for other duties.

[4.24] the court holds that having established locus damni jurisdiction viz the US proceedings, it need not hold on the centre of interest jurisdictional gateway as a result of these proceedings, however it does hold on that gateway viz the alleged reputational damage resulting from Energy Transfer’s statements on the internet. [4.30] it holds that Greenpeace’s centre of interest is in The Netherlands, despite its global activities (the court refers ia to the absurd implication of Energy Transfer’s arguments on Greenpeace’s activities being global: for that would mean that globally active outfits can never have a COI).

[4.31] it dismisses Energy Transfer’s appeal to CJEU Shevill as being entirely behind the curve, given the later eDate and Bolagsupplysningen case-law, and [4.34] it rejects Energy Transfer’s argument per CJEU Marinari, that The Netherlands are merely a place of indirect damage: the damage manifests itself directly in The Netherlands.

[4.36] the appeal to lis pendens and /or res judicata is summarily dismissed: the claims are held to be entirely different claims even if they take place between the same parties.

[4.41] Permission to appeal is denied (it will be resurrected once the court finds on the merits, for which the parties are given a short additional period to file their submissions).

Of much note and just in time for my SLAPP slot at Monash University’s Prato Campus, in the climate litigation unit of my excellent colleague Joanna Kyriakakis.

Geert.

 

This post is written by Dr. Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM(LSE) PhD(Navarra), Associate Professor School of Law KIMEP

Introduction

In May 2026, the Court of First Instance of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) recognised and enforced a Swiss ICC arbitral award rendered in favour of Naftogaz against Gazprom. The award arose out of the disputes between the parties concerning the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine after the start of the war.

The decision was followed by public comments from Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice. According to press reports, the Minister stated that the award would not be enforced in Kazakhstan because neither Gazprom nor Naftogaz were participants in the AIFC and because the dispute had no connection to the Centre. He further suggested that the AIFC should not become a “transit platform” for the enforcement of foreign decisions unrelated to its activities.

The controversy raises an interesting private international law question that extends well beyond the particular dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz. Can the AIFC Court function as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and their subsequent enforcement in Kazakhstan, i.e. outside the AIFC?

The Jurisdictional Problem

The AIFC occupies a unique constitutional position. Established in 2018, it operates under a separate common-law framework within Kazakhstan and possesses its own court system staffed by international judges. Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute on the AIFC expressly provides that the AIFC Court is not part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The difficulty is that the Constitutional Statute does not expressly address whether the AIFC Court may recognise foreign arbitral awards that have no connection to the Centre.

The Court relied principally on Article 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations, which provides that: “An arbitral award, irrespective of the State or jurisdiction in which it was made, shall be recognised as binding within the AIFC.” The Court also relied on Article 40(3) of the AIFC Court Regulations, which refers to the enforcement of “other judgments and arbitration awards”.

Whether these provisions actually confer jurisdiction to recognise foreign arbitral awards remains debatable. The AIFC Constitutional Statute itself is largely silent on the matter. The dispute therefore raises a classic question of institutional competence: can jurisdiction be inferred from subordinate regulations where the constitutional instrument neither expressly grants nor expressly excludes it?

The New York Convention Argument

One possible justification for the Court’s approach lies in Kazakhstan’s obligations under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.

The AIFC is located within the territory of Kazakhstan. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties bind the entire territory of a state unless a contrary intention appears. Nothing in Kazakhstan’s ratification of the New York Convention suggests that the Convention does not apply within the territory of the AIFC.

Article III of the Convention requires contracting states to recognise foreign arbitral awards. However, the Convention itself does not allocate jurisdiction among domestic courts. It does not specify whether recognition must be sought before an ordinary state court, a specialised commercial court or a court located within a financial centre. It may therefore be argued that once Kazakhstan created the AIFC Court and granted it powers relating to arbitration, the Court became one of the institutions through which Kazakhstan fulfils its Convention obligations.

The contrary argument is equally plausible. Kazakhstan may comply fully with the Convention while reserving recognition proceedings to its ordinary courts. The Convention requires recognition; it does not dictate which court must provide it.

An Exequatur of an Exequatur?

The dispute also raises a more traditional private international law concern.

If a Swiss arbitral award is recognised by the AIFC Court and the resulting AIFC judgment is then enforced elsewhere in Kazakhstan, one might ask whether this effectively amounts to an “exequatur of an exequatur”. Scholars have long expressed reservations about attempts to circulate recognition judgments relating to arbitral awards. Such practices may circumvent the grounds for refusal contained in Article V of the New York Convention by converting an arbitral award into a court judgment before seeking enforcement elsewhere.

Whether that objection applies here depends in part on how one characterises the relationship between the AIFC and Kazakhstan. Although the AIFC forms part of Kazakhstan’s territory, it possesses a distinct legal system and separate courts. Therefore it is, properly speaking “another jurisdiction”, if not another state.

Lessons from Dubai and Abu Dhabi

The most illuminating comparison comes from the Gulf financial centres, which the AIFC openly tries to emulate.

The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts have long been associated with the concept of a conduit jurisdiction. Under the DIFC framework, parties have sought recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards before the DIFC Courts even where neither the parties nor the dispute had any connection to the DIFC. Once recognised, the resulting DIFC judgment could potentially be enforced through the ordinary Dubai courts.

The leading authorities include X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2 and Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd v Meydan Group LLC. In both cases, the DIFC Courts adopted a broad understanding of their recognition jurisdiction.

The Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) followed a different path. Following legislative reforms in 2020, it became clear that the ADGM Courts could not be used as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Abu Dhabi thus deliberately rejected a model that Dubai had largely embraced.

The AIFC now appears to stand somewhere between these two approaches. Unlike the DIFC legislation, the AIFC framework contains no clear statement granting recognition jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards irrespective of any connection to the Centre. Unlike the ADGM legislation, however, it contains no express prohibition.

Conclusions

The Minister’s remarks announcing that the AIFC Court judgement would not be enforced in Kazakhstan may be understood as reflecting a legitimate policy concern: whether an international financial-centre court should be used to bypass ordinary domestic recognition procedures. Yet, they also concern a matter that is arguably for the courts themselves to determine. The Constitutional Statute repeatedly emphasises the independence of the AIFC Court and grants it exclusive authority to interpret AIFC law.

The broader issue therefore concerns institutional design rather than merely arbitration enforcement. If Kazakhstan does not wish the AIFC Court to function as a conduit jurisdiction, the appropriate solution may be legislative clarification. Conversely, if the AIFC is intended to replicate aspects of the DIFC model, greater certainty regarding its recognition jurisdiction would be desirable.

The CJEU judgment in TQ v Mr Green Limited (C‑198/24) follows an approach that the Court accustomed us to in relation to European uniform procedures requests for a preliminary ruling. In this area, over the years, the Court methodically adopted an autonomous and strict interpretation of the requirements that must be fulfilled for the creditor […]

On 16 June 2026, Stockholm University will host a release seminar for Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 72: ThePoliticisation of Private International Law. As previously reported on the blog, Stockholm University hosted a Nordic conference last June on the politicisation of private international law. The conference presentations, together with several additional contributions, have now been […]

This post, which is cross posted on EU Law Live, was contributed by Dr Johannes Ungerer, who is a Senior Research Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, a Deputy Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law, and an Associate Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford. The CJEU’s judgment in Crédit […]

On May 19, the CJEU (Grand Chamber, judge F. Biltgen as rapporteur), made public its judgment in case C-350/24, Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank SA, upon referral by the French Cour de Cassation. The importance of the decision for PIL cannot be ignored, thus this post reproducing the main points of the reasoning of […]

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been enacted by every U.S. state, discourages forum shopping in child custody disputes by assigning subject-matter jurisdiction to the court located in the “home state” of the child. In Allen v. Allen, decided on April 21, 2026, the Montana Supreme Court had to determine whether the child’s “home state” was Montana or the Netherlands. This case shines an important spotlight on the importance of timing in international child custody disputes. The left-behind parent’s likelihood of success is strongly correlated with how quickly her or she acts to vindicate their legal rights.

Facts

Jonathan Edward Allen (Father) and Petronella Gerline (Van Oosterom) Allen (Mother) were married in Colorado in 2009. Father is a United States citizen. Mother is a dual citizen of the United States and the Netherlands. Their child (R.A.A.) was born in 2015. In 2020, the family moved from Colorado to Montana.

In August 2023, after Father and Mother began having marital difficulties, Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands. In February 2024, Mother filed a petition for divorce and custody with the District Court of Central Netherlands (Netherlands District Court).

In January 2025, Father filed a petition with the District Court of The Hague seeking the return of R.A.A. pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This petition was denied. Although the court held that R.A.A. had been wrongfully removed from the United States, the court reasoned that the one-year automatic return period had passed and that R.A.A. had become settled in her new environment in the Netherlands. This decision was affirmed on appeal.

In September 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody and Petition for Permanent Parenting Plan in Montana state court. That court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it held that it lacked the power to adjudicate the dispute because Montana was no longer the “home state” of R.A.A. Father, acting pro se, appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) assigns exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to courts located in the child’s “home state” when it comes to matters relating to child custody. The “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” The UCCJEA specifically provides that courts “shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States” for purposes of resolving these disputes.

On the facts presented in Allen v. Allen, the Montana Supreme Court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Father’s emergency motion. Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands in August 2023. Six months later—in February 2024—R.A.A.’s home state shifted to the Netherlands. The Dutch courts—not the Montana courts—now had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes involving R.A.A. Father did not file his motion in Montana until September 2025, which was nineteen months too late.

Conclusion

If Father had filed his suit in Montana before February 2024, he could have shown that Montana was R.A.A.’s “home state” because she had not yet resided in the Netherlands for six months. The suit was, however, not filed until September 2025.

If Father had filed suit in the Netherlands before August 2024, he could have argued that R.A.A. should be returned to the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction because R.A.A. had not yet resided in the Netherlands for a year. The suit was, however, not filed until January 2025.

The takeaway of Allen v. Allen is the need for speed in international child custody cases. The timelines baked into the relevant laws and treaties mandate that the left-behind parent move quickly to assert their rights. If they are slow off the mark, they be forced to litigate in foreign courts under less favorable legal rules.

This post was contributed by Denise Wiedemann, a Professor for Private Law with Focus on Family and Succession Law at the University of Kiel. This is the fourth contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. The circumstances and background of case C-198/24 have already been described by Daryna Shykeriava, Emilia Sandri and Carlos Santaló […]

This post was contributed by Carlos Santalo Goris, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Luxembourg and the author of The Application of the European Account Preservation Order in Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. A Comparative-Empirical Analysis (Nomos, 2025). This is the third contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. The main prerequisite to […]

This post was written by Emilia Sandri, who is a doctoral candidate at the University of Antwerp. This is the second contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green LTD. On 21 May 2026, the ECJ delivered its ruling in Mr Green, providing the first authoritative guidance on the conditions for issuing a preservation order […]

This post was contributed by Daryna Shykeriava, who is a PhD researcher at Mykolas Romeris University (Vilnius, Lithuania). It is the first contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. On 21 May 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – CJEU) rendered the judgment in the case C-198/24 (TQ v […]

On 21 May 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union rendered its judgment in case C-198/24 TQ v Mr Green Limited on the interpretation of Article 7(1) of the Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 on the conditions for the issuance of European Account Preservation Orders. In the coming days, the EAPIL blog will hold […]

On Tuesday, June 2, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).

Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) will speak, in English, about the topic

“The Problem with Legal Certainty in Private International Law”

Legal certainty is often considered foundational in private international law.  It is used as justification for some of our connecting factors, and their application in time, as well as for our standards on recognition of foreign authentic instruments and judgments. However, if understood in a positivistic and precise manner, legal certainty can impede or complicate legal changes. The paper investigates where legal certainty has undesired consequences, especially in a context of righting past wrongs.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

This month begins with the publication, on Thursday 4, of Advocate General Norkus’s opinion in the Grand Chamber case C-41/25, Orsay, on the interpretation of Regulation 2015/848, on insolvency proceedings. The dispute pending before the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) concern avoidance proceedings brought in Germany by a German insolvency practitioner against the Treasury of the Republic of […]

As part of the DFG- and AHRC-funded Fashion’s PLACE project, a workshop on Private International Law, Sustainability and Fashion will be hosted at the Geneva Graduate Institute on 18 June 2026, from 11:00 to 13:00 CEST. The event will bring together perspectives from law, sustainability and the fashion industry, with short presentations and space for […]

The Centre for Private Governance of the Faculty of Law of the University of Copenhagen and UNIDROIT Nordic Law Centre will host a conference on Direct claims, forum and choice of law on 11-12 June 2026 in Copenhagen. Direct claims have for long been recognised in Nordic law and also in other jurisdictions. The concept […]

From 8 to 10 June 2026, the Faculty of Law at Stockholm University will host a conference entitled Cross-border Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Africa. The conference brings together leading scholars and practitioners to explore the challenges and opportunities of cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights (IP) in Africa, focusing on regional frameworks, private […]