Droit international général

Yesterday, the Regional Court of Munich (Landgericht München I) held a highly interesting oral hearing in a dispute brought by GEMA, a German collecting society representing composers, and Suno, a generative music AI company based in Cambridge, MA. The hearing was noteworthy, first, because it gave the public an opportunity to listen to numerous international hits, from Alphaville’s Forever Young to Lou Bega’s Mambo No. 5 (and their alleged copies created by Suno) in a courtroom; and secondly, because the dispute raises some interesting questions of private international law.

After GEMA had already scored a famous victory against OpenAI in November 2025, when the same chamber of the Munich Court had held that the company had been violating the copyrights of several artists and composers by reproducing their song texts, the present proceedings differed not just in scope (focusing on the musical arrangement rather than texts) but also in its international dimension. For the first time, the claimant explicitly included the use of the protected works for training that had happened (according to both parties) exclusively in the US.

As far as those claims are concerned, the main obstacle to overcome for the claimant is the German court’s jurisdiction. As Germany has no (codified) law on international jurisdiction over non-EU defendants, international jurisdiction is established by extending the rules on local jurisdiction (venue) to international jurisdiction (so-called ‘double funtionality’; see Lutzi/Wilke, in Lutzi/Piovesani/Zgrabljic Rotar (eds), Jurisdiction over Non-EU Defendants (Hart 2024), 111 et seq). In the present case, this appears to provide an opportunity for the claimant to rely on a little-known norm of the German Verwertungsgesellschaftsgesetz (VGG; own translation and emphasis):

§ 131 Exclusive Jurisdiction

(1) For legal disputes concerning claims by a collecting society for infringement of a right of use or right of consent administered by it, the court of the district in which the infringing act was committed or in which the infringer has their general place of jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction. (…)

(2) If, pursuant to paragraph 1, sentence 1, different courts have jurisdiction for multiple legal disputes against the same infringer, the collecting society may bring all claims before any one of these courts.

While the provision is clearly aimed at allocating local jurisdiction within Germany, nothing in its wording seems to exclude an international understanding, similar to other norms on local jurisdiction. While this would create a clearly exorbitant forum actoris for German collecting societies in cases falling under paragraph 2, this might be justified by the peculiar nature of collecting societies, which are heavily regulated in German law and are required, for instance, to enter into licensing agreements under ‘appropriate’ conditions (§ 34 VGG). Indeed, the Munich court appeared rather amenable to the proposition of applying § 131 VGG internationally.

In the present case, this would raise further interesting questions.

For once, does paragraph 1, according to which the courts of the place of infringing and the courts of the defendant’s seat are competent, lead to ‘different courts’ being competent in the sense of paragraph 2? Traditionally, the provision was supposed to solve the problem of traveling showmen performing committing similar infringements in numerous places. As far as the training of AI is concerned, there might only be a single place of infringement, though. Then again, paragraph 2 only requires multiple competent courts for proceedings ‘against the same infringer’, which should allow other infringements, such as the streaming of allegedly copyright-violating output in Germany to be taken into account.

Assuming that the court would not consider this sufficient to trigger the forum actoris of paragraph 2, it would need to answer another question, namely if paragraph 1 as a rule of exclusive jurisdiction would also prevent the claimant from (subsidiarily) relying on § 23 of the Civil Procedure Code (ZPO), which creates jurisdiction at the location of the defendant’s property. In other contexts, authors have argued that provisions of exclusive local jurisdiction should not be understood as provisions of exclusive international jurisdiction so as not to render the recognition and enforcement of decisions from other fora impossible.

If the Munich court accepted its international jurisdiction on either of those bases, the applicable law would, of course, still be US copyright law (including its relatively far-reaching exceptions for ‘fair use’, which the defendants argue should apply here) pursuant to Article 8 Rome II. Thus, if the decision – which has been scheduled for 12 June – includes a positive decision on international jurisdiction regarding the US-based training, it might not yet include a decision on the substance in this regard, but could instead include an order for expert evidence on foreign law (§ 293 ZPO).

The claimants would understandably still consider this as a win, though, as it would provide a basis for future claims by German collecting societies against AI companies. In this sense, it would fit neatly into what Linda Kuschel and Darius Rostam have described, in reaction to the previous decision against OpenAI, as ‘the current popular narrative of a tightly regulating EU that protects rightsholders and a US that favors AI-friendly market solutions.’ While the Munich judges said rather little about their own preferred interpretation of the law at yesterday’s hearing, especially with regard to international jurisdiction, they also made no effort to dispel this narrative.

On 12 January 2026, the European Law Institute (ELI)’s Report on Enhancing Child Protection: Private International Law on Filiation and the European Commission’s Proposal COM/2022/695 final has been formally approved by ELI Fellows. The Report was prepared by a team consisting of Claire Fenton-Glynn, Cristina Gonzales Beilfuss, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Martina Melcher, Sharon Shakargy, Patrick Wautelet and […]

In March 2026, the European Association of Private International Law had the distinct honour of joining as an observer, for the first time, the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). The invitation to participate in the HCCH’s principal governing body was a recognition of EAPIL’s […]

This case note is kindly provided by Dr. Samuel Vuattoux-Bock, LL.M. (Kiel), Freiburg University (Germany)

 

On February 24, 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice ruled on the Kingdom of Morocco’s claim against the German news portal “Zeit Online” (Case no. VI ZR 415/23). In 2021, the journal alleged that Morocco had spied on several lawyers, journalists, and high-ranking politicians, including French President Emmanuel Macron, using the surveillance software “Pegasus”. Morocco denied the allegations and sued the publication for damages, claiming an infringement of its general right of personality. The Federal Court of Justice of Germany, the highest court for civil and criminal matters, rejected Morocco’s claim, arguing that states do not have such a right. This decision is interesting because it lies at the intersection of private international law, national tort law, and public international law. The following article aims to present the main points of this decision in terms of both its international and substantive aspects.

I. Aspects of Private International Law: A too Easy Gateway into German Law?

First, the court had to determine if it was competent and which law should apply to this claim (Nos. 7 et seq.). Despite the claimant’s status as a Third State, the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (EU 1215/2012) was unproblematic here. Morocco’s claim was not made “in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii)” (Art. 1(1) Brussels Ibis), and the defendant is based in a European Union Member State (Hamburg, Germany).

However, the determination of the applicable law revealed some hesitation on the part of the Court (Nos. 11 et seq.). Surprisingly, the Court did not decide whether the Rome II Regulation or German autonomous private international law should apply to the case (no. 13). Although the court considered the possible application of the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II (“non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.”), the Court did not address whether an infringement of a legal person’s reputation falls under this exception (nos. 15 and 16). However, infringements of rights relating to personality through the media clearly fall under the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II. The debate about applying this exception to legal persons is actually caused by the application of the Rome II Regulation to claims related to unfair competition (Art. 6(1) and (2) Rome II), not by their mere quality as legal persons (see CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, mn. 38). However, the present case is not related to business matters or competition claims; therefore, the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II should clearly apply.

Therefore, German private international law should apply, which the Court also examined (nos. 18 et seq.). The Court found that the parties had made an implied choice-of-law agreement for German law (no. 19). The Court ruled that, throughout the entire procedure, the parties’ exclusive reference to substantive German law satisfied the conditions of such an agreement under Art. 14(1)(a) Rome II (no. 17) and Art. 42 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB). This decision, if it can be understood, left some kind of an aftertaste of insecurity of the Court, as it appeared to be the simplest way to reach German law. Art. 40 EGBGB, relating to the applicable law for torts, allows the claimant to choose between the place where the harm arose (Erfolgsort) and the place where the event which gave rise to the harm occurred (Handlungsort). The eventual question of the claimant’s (Morocco) choice for determining where the harm occurred would have led to the well-known difficult question of the localization of such an infringement through the Internet and the possible application of Moroccan law. In such a case, the Court would also have had to consider the application of Art. 40(3)(2) EGBGB, which states that this law is inapplicable if the claimant’s purpose is not actually to seek compensation (e.g. to exert pressure on the defendant). The Court did not address these issues and concluded that German law applies.

II. Aspects of Substantive Law: A Panorama of Public International Law for the Benefit of Private Law

German tort law is based on a restrictive approach. The central norm, Sect. 823(1) of the Civil Code (BGB), lists the legally protected rights: Life, Body, Health, Freedom, Property and “other right”. This last category allows for the protection of interests comparable to those listed, such as the right to one’s personality, or the protection of victims from certain types of professional pure economic loss. Schematically, damages can only be granted for other interests if the tortfeasor infringed upon a protective law (Sect. 823(2) BGB) or if the harmful act is immoral (Sect. 826 BGB), which conditions are stricter.

Therefore, the claimant first tried to obtain damages based on the general case law regarding the infringement of personality rights under Sect. 823(1) BGB, and second, based on the infringement of criminal laws as protective laws under Sect. 823(2) BGB. However, the claims based on criminal legislation (Sect. 90a, 90b, 185 et seq., 102 to 104a of the Criminal Code, StGB) failed because foreign states are not subject to these norms (nos. 62 et seq.).

Therefore, the debate focused on Sect. 823(1) BGB and, logically, if such a right of personality also exists for states. After establishing that domestic law does not grant states such a right according to settled case-law (nos. 21 et seq.), the Court considered whether such a right exists as a general principle of public international law (nos. 23 et seq). In doing so, the Court examined an extensive body of case law (nos. 28 et seq.) from international courts and arbitral tribunals, the European Court of Humans Rights, diverse international and regional organizations (e.g. the Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE…) and national courts (USA, England, Scotland, France and Germany). The Court concluded that a protection of an alleged right of personality for states against private individuals does not exist. Most of the relevant decisions involve cases concerning diplomats or claims from state to state. In fact, the Court noted that many organizations encourage states to refrain from suing journalists regarding questions of the state’s reputation to guarantee freedom of speech and press freedom (cf. no. 54). Although the Court does not explicitly refer to it, the idea of extracontractual liability that does not “open the floodgates” of liability, as well as the weighing of interests, are typical to German tort law. The interest of a foreign state in protecting its honor against statements by private individuals is neither necessary nor worthy of protection under civil law.

III. Final remarks

By ruling that foreign states do not have a right of personality that can be enforced against private individuals, the German Federal Court aligned itself with the decision of the French Cour de Cassation. The highest French court for civil and commercial matters also decided on the very same case in 2024, i.e. a claim of the Kingdom of Morrocco against a French journal regarding the very same accusations. In this case too, the French Cour de cassation – without spending a word on the aspects of private international law – decided that “a foreign state is not entitled to bring a public defamation action against an individual” (no. 12). These decisions are certainly welcome, as they reinforce the independence of the press against foreign attempts to influence press freedom in Europe, especially in these troubled times.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

C. Budzikiewicz/H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2025: Im Windschatten der Weltpolitik [German]

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2025 until December 2025. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. The authors discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

 

P. Stenko: Employer’s Liability Towards Subcontractors in International Construction Disputes: Direct Claims of the Subcontractor Against the Employer in European Civil Procedure Law and the New Interpretation of the Term “Matters Relating To a Contract” [German]

This paper examines international jurisdiction for direct claims of subcontractors against employers (clients) in international construction disputes under the Brussels I Recast Regulation. In several European legal systems, subcontractors are granted a statutory direct claim for payment of remuneration against the employer, in addition to their claim against the general contractor. Central to the analysis is whether such direct claims may be qualified as “matters relating to a contract” within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, even though there is no direct contractual relationship between the subcontractor and the employer. Traditionally, the CJEU required an “obligation freely assumed” for the application of the contractual jurisdiction under Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast Regulation. However, recent CJEU case law has relaxed this requirement: statutory claims arising in the context of a contractual relationship may also be treated as “matters relating to a contract” even if there is no direct contractual relationship between the parties. As a result of this change, the subcontractor’s claims against the employers may be qualified as “relating to a contract” and the subcontractor may sue at the contractual place of performance (Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast Regulation).

 

C. Wendland: The Jurisdiction of Member State Courts under the EU Maintenance Regulation in Cases Involving Third Countries [German]

While there have been repeated calls to extend the scope of the EuGVVO to third countries, the universal application of jurisdiction rules has been a reality in international maintenance law since the adoption of the EU Maintenance Regulation. The exhaustive nature of the jurisdiction rules in the Regulation was the focus of the ECJ’s ruling in the case Amozov, which is discussed here. While the court’s decision is hardly surprising, it nevertheless provides an opportunity to consider the challenges and opportunities of a conclusive jurisdiction system at the EU level.

 

S. Mock: Eligibility of US funds to apply for special court ordered audits under German corporate law [German]

The so-called Diesel-scandal has sparked interest, particularly among Volkswagen AG shareholders, in a comprehensive investigation into the responsibility for this scandal. Since the resolution of the annual meeting failed to achieve the required majority, several US shareholders applied for a court order for a special audit. Following several court decisions, including two successful constitutional complaints, the Court of Appeal Celle, in its decision of 27 November 2024, denied the US shareholders the capacity to participate in the proceedings, arguing that they were funds whose legal capacity was unclear. This article critically examines this decision and demonstrates that US funds are also eligible to participate proceedings in German courts.

 

J. Adolphsen: ECJ answers questions of jurisdiction of courts of the member states in patent infringement cases when patent infringers defend themselves with the argument the patent is not valid [German]

The judgment is the subsequent decision following a ruling from 2006. At that time, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) first addressed the question of the jurisdiction of courts of the member states in patent infringement cases when defending with the argument that the patent is not valid. It was established that any assessment of the validity of the patent is exclusively reserved for the courts of the granting state. Other questions remained unanswered. These are now answered by the present judgment. The infringement court may, but is not required to, stay its proceedings. It can also assume the validity of the patent and decide the infringement dispute accordingly. At the same time, the ECJ rejects the question of whether Article 24 Nr. 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation also applies when a third country has granted the patent. In this case, the ECJ denies a reflexive effect of Article 24 Nr. 4 Brussels Ia Regulation and allows the infringement court to also examine the validity of the patent for the purpose of deciding the infringement dispute with inter partes effect. As a result, the judgment strengthens the possibilities for patent holders to take action against infringers at the defendant’s court, especially when multiple national patents are involved across different member states.

 

H. Roth: Possible Legal Remedies for Debtors in the Enforcement of Provisionally Enforceable EU Titles in Germany (Art. 39 Brussels I Regulation (recast)) [German]

In principle, the debtor is required to utilize the legal remedies against the provisional enforcement of a judgment that are available in the member state of origin, in this case before the Italian appellate court (Art. 283 of the Italian Codice di procedura civile [CPC]). Applications for enforcement protection by the debtor may only be submitted to German courts or enforcement authorities insofar as European law permits. This is the case, for example, under Article 44 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) in conjunction with Section 1115 (6) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Article 44 (2) of the Brussels Regulation (recast) in conjunction with Section 1116 ZPO. If the conditions outlined in these provisions are not met, European law prohibits the debtor from seeking a suspension of enforcement based solely on German procedural law (e.g., by analogy to Sections 719 or 707 ZPO). The exhaustive regulation in Article 44 (1) and (2) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) excludes additional legal protection under national law.

 

J. F. Hoffmann: Cross-border payment to the debtor after the opening of insolvency proceedings – continuation of the ECJ‘s restrictive rulings on Art. 31 EIR [German]

In its unambiguous scope of application, Art. 31 (1) of the European Insolvency Regulation protects a third-party debtor who has honoured his obligation to the benefit of the debtor in good faith after insolvency proceedings have been opened. The third-party debtor is protected from having to perform to the insolvency administrator for a second time. The ECJ had to decide whether the third-party debtor should also be protected if not only he had made his payment to the debtor after the opening of the proceedings, but also if the debtor had provided counter-performance belonging to the estate after the opening of the proceedings. A need for protection may also be apparent in this case, as the third-party debtor faces comparable economic losses. To achieve this, Art. 31 (1) EIR would need to recognise also the debtor’s counter-performance as being effective vis-à-vis the insolvency estate. However, national legal systems often do not grant any legal protection concerning asset dispositions made by the debtor after the opening of insolvency proceedings. The ECJ now continues its restrictive interpretation of Art. 31 (1) EIR, likely because the provision’s underlying regulatory purpose remains highly controversial.

 

K. Duden: From the principle of recognition in EU primary law to the replication of status: a doctrine decades in the making [German]

Since Grunkin-Paul, the principle of recognition based on primary EU law has – through the jurisprudence of the ECJ – gained increasing importance in international family law. The Cupriak-Trojan decision marks a milestone in this respect: the Court demands the comprehensive recognition of marriages concluded between Union citizens abroad. Not only characteristics of one’s individual status but also status relationships – at least between Union citizens – must be recognized as effective across borders. This makes the free movement of status the law in force for Union citizens. Although some open questions remain, Cupriak-Trojan, coupled with the previous Mirin decision, expands the jurisprudence on the recognition principle in a way that allows it to be consolidated into an independent doctrine of private international law. To describe this doctrine, I suggest the term “replication of status” (Statusnachvollzug), which distinguishes the replication of status from the recognition of judgments and from the referral method. Another differentiation is also necessary: between the replication of status as a doctrinal approach in conflict of laws and international civil procedural law on the one hand and the principle of recognition and the free movement of status as mandates of EU primary law on the other. While the latter currently provide their normative framework and basis, the replication of status could, in future legislation, be detached from this origin.

 

 

A. Schulz: Name and Gender: German Federal Court of Justice Ruling on a Name Change via UK Deed Poll [German]

A recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) addresses two key issues in Private International Law. First, the Court held that a name change effected through a British “deed poll” can be recognised as a change of birth name under German civil status law. In this respect, the Court clarified that it is irrelevant whether the change concerns a person’s “legal name” or their “conventional name”. However, the Court ultimately rejected the requested amendments in their entirety, as the requirements for recognizing the applicant’s new legal gender had not been fulfilled. In particular, the applicant had not completed the formal procedure as required by the applicable Gender Recognition Act 2004.

Written by Marc-Philippe Weller, Carolina Radke, and Marianna Dänner (all Heidelberg University)

On 2 March 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof; “BGH”) held an oral hearing in two proceedings concerning the civil liability of companies regarding climate change. The authors of this blog post attended the hearing as members of the audience.

The German NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) is suing the car manufacturers BMW and Mercedes Benz, requesting a legal order obliging both companies to refrain from placing combustion engine cars on the market beyond 2030. These two proceedings join the club of (strategic) climate change lawsuits in Germany. Crucially, they are the first of their kind based on tort law to reach the German Federal Court of Justice. Accordingly, the hearing was eagerly awaited by many. The decision, which will be rendered on 23 March 2026, will undoubtedly have an impact on future climate lawsuits.

While no issues of international jurisdiction or applicable law arose in the proceedings in question – as all Parties are seated in Germany –, the judgment of the BGH could further motivate foreign parties to bring claims against German companies, thereby giving rise to questions of international jurisdiction and the applicable law (see for more details Weller/Weiner, Corporate Climate Liability in Private International Law, in: Japanese Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 26 (2024), 2). In this context, one may refer to the deliberations of the Higher Regional Court (OLG) Hamm in Lliuya against RWE (OLG Hamm, 28. Mai 2025, 5 U 15/17).

1. Legal Framework

The climate goal of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz; GG) derived from its Art. 20a  was specified by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in line with the Paris Agreement, namely, to limit the rising global average temperature to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Combustion engine cars contribute to the global CO2 emissions and hence to the greenhouse gas effect and the global warming. Against this background, the question arises whether the constitutional climate goal can (additionally) be enforced through private lawsuits against companies, notwithstanding the fact – as emphasized in the present case – BMW and Mercedes are acting in accordance with the existing public regulatory framework in Germany.

In both proceedings, the claim of DUH relies on Section 1004(1) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BGB) in conjunction with Section 823(1) BGB.

Section 1004(1) BGB allows an owner of an absolute individual right (like property or health) to demand that a disturbing party (“Störer”) – i.e. the party interfering with the individual right – remove an interference or refrain from future interferences. Section 823(1) BGB provides claims for damages in the event of a violation of such a right.

DUH bases its claim – to prevent the manufacturers from placing combustion engine cars on the market from 2030 onwards – on an infringement of the so-called “General Right to Personality” (Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht), which is provided for by the German constitution (Art. 2(1) in connection with Art. 1(1) GG) and which is recognized as protected right within the meaning of Section 823(1) BGB and Section 1004(1) BGB. Hence, infringements of that personality right can be stopped via an injunction based on Section 1004(1) BGB.

In the proceedings against BMW and Mercedes-Benz, the claimants want to activate an intertemporal dimension of that “General Right to Personality” called “Right to greenhouse gas-related freedom” (Recht auf treibhausgasbezogene Freiheit). This approach would be new in private law. It builds upon the famous “Klimaurteil” (climate judgment) of the Bundesverfassungsgericht from 24 March 2021. In this judgment, the Constitutional Court established a new legal figure called “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung”. It extends the basic rights protection to a protection against infringements by the state in the future that are grounded in present state omissions or insufficient actions (in the sense of a right to intertemporal freedom). By analogy to this legal concept in public law, DUH argues that the legal figure “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung” should also apply in tort law to actions by private companies (such as BMW and Mercedes).

The claims of DUH were rejected in the previous instances (LG München I, 07 Feb 2023, 3 O 12581/21, OLG München, 12 Oct 2023, 32 U 936/23 for the claim against BMW and LG Stuttgart, 13 Sept 2022, 17 O 789/21, OLG Stuttgart, 08 Nov 2023, 12 U 170/22 for the claim against Mercedes).

2. Inside the courtroom: key legal arguments

In the oral hearing before the BGH, the arguments focused on two legal aspects:

(1) Does the legal figure of intertemporal protection of basic freedoms in the form of an “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung” apply also to private actors if – as is currently the case in Germany – the national CO2 budget has not yet been attributed among industrial sectors, the federal states, or even single actors? According to the Constitutional Court, the state has the obligation to concretize the remaining national budget (“Konkretisierungsauftrag”) by assigning CO2 budgets to the different actors. What does this mean for the duties of private actors if the state fails to comply with this obligation by not assigning specific reduction targets? May civil courts assign specific reduction targets?

According to the claimant (DUH), the intertemporal protection of basic freedoms subsidiarily applies to such private actors that considerably contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions. The less reduction measures were taken now, the more strenuous reduction measures would be needed in the future, which would interfere in the basic rights freedoms more severely. CO2 budgets for private actors such as the car manufacturers could in that case be measured by scientific data (such as attribution science), so even without state-allocated CO2 budgets.

In the opinion of the defendants (BMW and Mercedes), it would exceed the competences of the courts if they were to allocate individual CO2 residual budgets to companies in such climate lawsuits. The counsels for the defendants relied on the argument of separation of powers and the complexity of climate change requiring multi-level solutions. Climate change would be a topic too complex to be solved by courts and by private law – instead, a mixture of legal instruments and a balancing of interests by the democratic legislator was needed. Any private law based litigation, being bilaterally restricted to the involved parties, would be arbitrary and could not solve the climate challenge which was a problem of societal scale. Courts would put themselves at the place of the legislator or at least thwart the legislator’s concept or solution. The defendants’ counsels also argued with the margin of appreciation granted by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its 2021 decision.

The defendants also raised the argument that a CO2-budget for civil actors would be ineffective, as the climate reduction goals could only be achieved globally – as such, if in other states major emitters did not comply with their obligations, the national emitters had to make “extra” efforts to make up for the gaps. Besides, “national solo runs” would endanger international cooperation.

(2) Can private actors, such as BMW and Mercedes, be treated as “disturbing” within the meaning of Section 1004(1) BGB for contributing to the risk of future state climate protection measures? The BGH raised the question whether the manufacturers could be qualified as indirect disturber by action (“mittelbare Handlungsstörer”). This was argued to result from an evaluative tailoring of the manufacturers’ responsibility (“wertender Zuschnitt von Verantwortungsbereichen”). A main point in the arguments in that respect revolved around the question if a private actor can be a disturber within the meaning of Section 1004(1) BGB if it complies with all legal requirements and duties. This was at least an indicator against a disturbance triggering liability under Section 1004(1) BGB.

The defendants argued that Section 1004(1) BGB as a bilateral claim was per se not suitable for resolving issues like climate change, which is a problem concerning our society as a whole, not only two parties in a civil proceeding. Civil law could not provide for protection if the threat caused concerned a mass of persons, not only another party.

Furthermore, according to the defendants, the disturber and the affected party would coincide since everyone contributed to climate change. It therefore would remain unclear where a distinction was to be drawn between who qualifies as a disturber and who does not. Besides, there was neither a general duty of care (“Allgemeine Verkehrspflicht”) nor specific CO2-budgets that the defendants are currently violating. Where the contested conduct was currently lawful, it could not be prohibited under civil law through the mechanism of Section 1004(1) BGB.

The claimant’s counsel argued that formal concerns against emitters being disturbers in the legal sense had to remain unapplied, as otherwise private law in general could not provide legal protection in the field of climate change.

The defendants relied finally on the argument that private law based litigation such as the given proceedings were arbitrary for the reason that (1) it was “random” which emitter would be the target of such litigation and (2) that there could be no redress in a bilateral two party relationship as this would lead to the same emission being litigated in several proceedings (e.g. car manufacturers, car rental agencies and car drivers).

III. Assessment and outlook

The final decision of the German Federal Court of Justice will be rendered on 23 March 2026. The Court will implicitly decide whether combating climate change primarily falls within the responsibility of the legislator, or whether civil courts can also play a meaningful role in addressing this global challenge.

Registrations for the 2026 AAPrIL Conference, to be held on 16 and 17 Apriil 2026, are now open!

 

VENUE: Ashurst Lawyers

Level 8, 39 Martin Place

Sydney, New South Wales 2000

AUSTRALIA

 

PANELS AND SESSIONS:

• Jurisdiction
• Private International Law and Digitalisation
• Regional and International Cooperation
• Arbitration
• Applicable Law

 

Attendance at conference sessions can be used for CPD; you will need to check local requirements.

 

REGISTRATION FEES:

If you are coming for both days, please select Friday. 

Non-member 2 days: $160

Non-member 1 day: $90

AAPrIL member 2 days: $120

AAPrIL member 1 day: $70

Student: Free to attend the conference only

Conference dinner: $110 for dinner and a selection of drinks

 

REGISTRATION INCLUDES:

Access to all conference sessions

Morning tea and coffee, morning teas and lunches

Access to purchase a conference dinner ticket at an additional cost of $110

On January 15, 2026, the Court of Justice rendered its judgment in Wunner, C-77/24, addressing the application of the Rome II Regulation (864/2007) to the personal liability of company directors in the context of unlawful online gambling. The judgment clarifies the scope of the company law exception in Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome II Regulation […]

As already announced in another post, there will be a Webinar organized by the European Law Institute (ELI) on March 12 to present and discuss the Project Report of the ELI Project “Enhancing Child Protection: Private International Law on Filiation and the European Commission’s Proposal COM/2022/695 final”

The webinar description reads:

“On 12 January 2026, ELI Fellows formally approved its Enhancing Child Protection: Private International Law on Filiation and the European Commission’s Proposal COM/2022/695 final.

This Report, developed under the leadership of Dr Ilaria Pretelli and Prof Dr Susanne Gössl, examines the above proposal and its critical role in advancing fundamental rights within the EU. While preserving the Commission’s Proposal’s core vision and framework, this analysis recommends strategic refinements that strengthen alignment with the existing EU acquis, foster deeper European integration, and enhance the protection of children’s fundamental rights. In addition, it expands upon the Proposal’s initial emphasis on the EU Strategies for children’s rights and LGBTIQ+ equality by incorporating a comprehensive women’s rights perspective.

ELI is hosting a webinar introducing and exploring key aspects of the Report on 12 March 2026 from 12:30–14:00 CET.

Confirmed speakers include:

• Pietro Sirena (ELI Treasurer; Dean and Professor at Università Bocconi)
• Ilaria Pretelli (Co-Reporter; Senior Fellow, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law)
• Susanne Gössl (Co-Reporter; Professor, University of Bonn)
• Elina Pekkarinen (Ombudsperson for Children in Finland, Past Chair of European Network of Ombudspersons for Children (ENOC))
• Alina Tryfonidou (Assistant Professor of EU Law and Family Law, University of Cyprus)”

More information, esp. the possibility to register and possible updates, can be found on this website.

The second issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) for 2026 was published on 1 March. The following abstracts have been kindly provided by the editor of the journal. C. Budzikiewicz/H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2025: Im Windschatten der Weltpolitik (German) This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the […]

The following Call for Papers has been kindly shared with us by Christiane von Bary (University of Zurich):

Following the 20th Anniversary Conference in London (2025), we are pleased to announce that the Journal of Private International Law will be holding its 11th Conference at the University of Zurich from 1 to 3 April 2027.

We are now inviting the submission of paper proposals for the conference. Please submit an abstract if you would like to make a presentation at the conference and you are willing to produce a final paper that you will submit for publication in the Journal. Abstracts should be up to 500 words in length and should clearly state the name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s). Participants are also welcome to propose collective panels. If the proposal is for a panel, it should include the names and affiliations of all proposed participants.

Presentations can be on any subject matter that falls within the scope of the Journal and can be offered by people at any stage of their career, including postgraduate students and practitioners. Presentation at the conference will depend on whether your abstract is selected by the Editors of the Journal (Professor Jonathan Harris KC, King’s College, London and Professor Paul Beaumont FRSE, University of Stirling) and the conference organisers (Professors Tanja Domej and Christiane von Bary, University of Zurich). The subsequent article should be submitted to either of the editors of the Journal before the end of 2027. Publication in the Journal will be subject to the usual system of peer review.

The Conference will be held at the University of Zurich. There will be a mixture of plenary and parallel panel sessions. Speakers will not be expected to pay a conference fee but will be expected to pay for their own expenses in relation to their attendance at the conference in Zurich. Non-speakers will be expected to pay a conference fee. A conference dinner will be held on Friday (2 April 2027), at additional cost and with limited places. Details about registration, the conference dinner and options for accommodation will be made available on the conference webpage: https://t.uzh.ch/1WV.

Please send your proposal to the following e-mail address by Tuesday, 30 June 2026:

jpil2027@ius.uzh.ch

We look forward to receiving your proposals, and to welcoming you to Zurich in April 2027!

The following conference announcement was kindly shared with us by Johannes Ungerer (University of Oxford).

At the University of Oxford, a conference on “Assimilated law – the role and future of retained EU law in the UK” will be held on 13 and 14 April 2026. It is jointly organised by Professor Anne Davies and Dr Johannes Ungerer; it is funded by the Institute of European and Comparative Law as part of its 30th anniversary events.

The concept, category or chimaera of assimilated law emerged in the UK after Brexit: when becoming a Non-Member State, the UK chose to retain many EU laws in its domestic legal system, and this body of law has since been labelled ‘assimilated law’. There is an urgent need to explore and understand how assimilated law operates and might develop in future in the UK. Pressing questions concern how assimilated law is to be applied and interpreted and how it and the underlying EU laws might develop and diverge over time. Courts in the UK and on the Continent already had to deal with complex matters arising with regard to assimilated law, so there is a real need to distil and disseminate academic insights. In Lipton, the UK Supreme Court dealt with some initial questions, but they only addressed a small portion of the underlying issues.

The conference will bring together legal scholars and practitioners to establish a common understanding of the practices and challenges regarding assimilated law. The conference will be structured in two parts over the course of one and a half days: first, general questions about assimilated law will be debated, so that common themes, trends, and topics can be explored. Secondly, particularly tricky issues will be addressed which pertain to assimilated law in specific areas.

Further information, including the conference programme, is available here.

The 11th Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in Zurich from 1-3 April 2027. The conference organizers, Tanja Domej and Christiane von Bary, as well as the editors of the Journal, Jonathan Harris and Paul Beaumont, have provided the following call for papers inviting submissions of proposals for the conference. Following the […]

Johannes Kepler University Linz is currently advertising a tenure-track professorship in “European and International Civil Procedure Law”.

The full advertisement reads as follows:

The Institute of Civil Procedure Law at the JKU’s Faculty of Law is seeking to fill a tenure-track position for a person with a doctorate/Ph.D at the earliest possible date. The position is full-time and limited to a period of six years in accordance with the collective agreement for university employees and the Austrian Universities Act (Universitätsgesetz, UG).

The position is open to highly qualified junior researchers holding a doctorate/PhD in the field of European and International Civil Procedure Law and includes the option of concluding a qualification agreement which could result in a permanent position as Associate Professor (Section 99 (5) (6) of the Austrian Universities Act (Universitätsgesetz, UG)).

The candidate should have a record of excellent publications and relevant teaching experience and is expected to be willing and able to teach courses in German and English. The prospective applicant is expected to possess a sound knowledge of Austrian civil procedure law or be willing to familiarize themselves with Austrian civil procedure law in a timely manner. The applicant should have completed their doctoral or PhD studies no more than five years prior to the date of application.

Detailed information regarding the position, responsibilities, and requirements is available at: www.jku.at/tenuretrack. The job description contains information regarding the position and its requirements and strategic direction of research, the areas of priority, the type of research expected, the expected scope of contributions to teaching/education, the required degree of professional experience, the key qualifications and objectives to be met during the course of employment, key information regarding the existing research infrastructure, and other position-specific conditions.

The annual minimum salary under the collective agreement is EUR 70,200.20 gross. The annual minimum salary under the collective agreement may be raised to EUR 82,656.00 after the possible conclusion of a qualification agreement (as of 2026). A higher salary is a matter of negotiation.

For further information, please contact Univ. Prof. Dr. Thomas Garber, +43 732 2468 3671,
E-mail: thomas.garber(at)jku.at.

When assessing the candidates’ accomplishments, performance, and future potential, the JKU will take the candidates’ individual background and personal history into account by acknowledging that academic and professional success and accomplishments can happen at different stages in life (and can include periods of reduced employment, or career interruption on account of having to provide care, childcare, etc.). In this regard, qualifications are assessed and evaluated in terms of equal opportunity, taking life-course factors, such as academic age, into account.

The Johannes Kepler University wishes to increase the proportion of academic female faculty and, for this reason, especially welcomes and encourages applications by qualified women. If applicants are equally qualified, a woman will be given preference for this position. The university welcomes applications from qualified applicants with disabilities. These applications will be given special consideration.

Prospective applicants interested in the position are requested to electronically send a complete application to the Rector of the Johannes Kepler University by no later than March 18, 2026, observing the three-week application deadline. Please submit the application electronically, in German/English, at: https://forms.jku.at/pm/tenuretrack, opens an external URL in a new window.

Please enclose the following documents with your application: A letter of application (addressing in particular your reasons for applying and suitability for the position), a current curriculum vitae, a list of publications (including a ranking of the three publications you consider to be the most important), a description of prior activities in education and lecturing, including any student evaluations, a description of research projects, studies, and collaboration efforts, a description of prior professional practices and activities related in content to the activities in research and teaching, an outline of prospective projects and objectives in the field of research and teaching.

More information is available here.

A collection of essays under the titled Who’s Afraid of Punitive Damages? has recently been published by Mohr Siebeck, edited by Tobias Lutzi (University of Augsburg). The book can be freely accessed here. It is the first of two volumes resulting from the Project Zeitenwende beim Strafschadensersatz? / A Turning Point for Punitive Damages?, aimed […]

The Law Quarterly Review has published an interesting article by Ardavan Arzandeh (Associate Professor, National University of Singapore) on Validation Principle and the Choice-of-Law Question. The article discusses the elements of the validation principle, its application in cases such as Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 to choice-of-law […]

The third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 18-20 June 2026. The conference will present current developments in Private International Law. The program is available on the conference’s website (see here). Early bird registration closes in two weeks, on 15 March 2026. You […]

Miguel Checa Martínez (Kinship Law) has kindly shared the following summary of his latest publication on ‘Instituciones de estate planning y Derecho internacional privado patrimonial’ with us.

 

This monograph constitutes the first systematic treatment in Spain of international estate planning from the perspective of patrimonial private international law. Conceived for practitioners advising globally mobile families and cross-border wealth structures, the work offers a rigorous comparative analysis—particularly attentive to Anglo-American legal systems—of the legal instruments available to preserve, structure, and transfer family wealth efficiently across generations.

The study opens with an examination of the classical connecting factors that determine personal status in private international law—nationality, habitual residence, and domicile—and explores their practical implications in cross-border planning. It proceeds to address the preventive protection of vulnerable adults through enduring powers of attorney and related mechanisms, as well as the safeguarding of minors’ patrimonial interests.

A substantial portion of the book is devoted to matrimonial property regimes and their distinction from the financial consequences of divorce. Through comparative analysis, with particular emphasis on English and U.S. law, the author examines the interaction between these categories and the preventive structuring tools available to spouses, including marital agreements and prenuptial arrangements, as key instruments of wealth preservation.

At its core, the monograph provides an in-depth study of succession planning techniques. It distinguishes between lifetime planning devices—such as inter vivos gifts and trusts—and testamentary dispositions, including functional equivalents to wills (will-like devices). Special attention is given to the conflict-of-laws solutions offered by Regulation (EU) 650/2012 on international successions, particularly the role of the professio iuris and its potential to coordinate universal and territorially limited wills within a coherent cross-border strategy.

The final chapter addresses estate administration, focusing on the anticipatory design of executorial structures within the will, the appointment and confirmation of executors under Anglo-American probate procedures, and their capacity to act in respect of assets located in Spain.

Overall, the work offers a comprehensive and technically sophisticated framework for international estate planning, positioning patrimonial private international law as a central discipline for the structuring of global family wealth.

More information is available on the publisher’s website.

The first issue of the Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly for 2026 was recently published last month. It contains the following works on private international law:

Bulat Karimov, “Arrest of Associated Ships from a Common Law Perspective”

The Arrest Conventions 1952 and 1999 provide for the arrest of ships owned by the person who would be liable for the claim in personam. The widespread use of one-ship companies has effectively circumvented these provisions. It has allowed shipowners to limit or avoid their liability by distributing their fleet between one-ship companies. The only country that has introduced separate associated ship provisions is South Africa. Other countries do not follow this example and generally deal with one-ship companies through beneficial ownership and piercing the corporate veil. The article examines the law and practice of arresting associated ships in South Africa, the US , England, Singapore and Australia. Particular focus is paid to the impropriety criterion, which is part of piercing the corporate veil but is irrelevant to the South African approach. It is concluded that the primary function of impropriety is preventing overreaching, which means subversion of the idea of separate legal personality of a shipowning company. The “objective” and “reasonableness” approaches are suggested as a middle ground to the problem discussed.

 

Steven Gee, “Enforcement of Judgments against Wealth Structures: Receivers, Trusts, Insolvency Act 1986, S.243 and Mareva Injunctions”

This article considers remedies leading to compelling satisfaction of a judgment, from assets in a wealth structure used by a judgment debtor, or assets produced by them, or from persons who have received such assets. These include (1) enforcement by equitable execution, (2) enforcement disregarding “sham” or invalid trusts or through an undisclosed legal power, (3) the effect of the Model Form of Freezing Injunction, and (4) use of the Insolvency Act 1986, s.423 to unwind transactions prejudicing creditors, including when to attribute to others a debtor’s purpose to prejudice creditors. It considers the relevance of a person having legal or de facto control of assets to the availability of these remedies.

Adrian Briggs, “The Death of Henry v Geoprosco“

Michal Hain, “Is a Foreign Judgment a Debt?”

Joseph Khaw, “Going Cherry Picking”

Paul MacMahon, “Pre-emptive Challenges to Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards”

 

 

 

Written by Prof Dr João Costa-Neto, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Brasília
and Dr Pedro Pagano Payne, Academic Assistant, Faculty of Law, University of Brasília

 

In April 2025, the highest chamber (Corte Especial) of the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ), under Justice Maria Isabel Gallotti as rapporteur, ruled on ‘Recognition of a Foreign Judgment’ (HDE) no. 7.091/EX. The case concerned the recognition of a United States ruling changing the last name of a Brazilian national who had acquired US nationality. The Plaintiff sought recognition of (i) his US naturalisation and (ii) a ruling of the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, which changed his name from ‘Ariosto Mateus de Menezes’ to ‘Matthew Windsor’.

The Court decided it had no competence to ratify the naturalisation. Granting US citizenship is a prerogative of the US Government. And loss of Brazilian nationality is ruled by a specific domestic administrative procedure, under the Brazilian Ministry of Justice. The Court concluded that, because of lack of competence, the documents presented did not satisfy the statutory requirements for recognition under the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure and the Court’s internal rules. By contrast, the Court granted recognition of the name-change judgment. It found that the formal requirements for recognition had been met: the decision was rendered by a competent authority, had become stable, and was properly documented and translated. The decisive issue, therefore, was whether recognition would violate Brazilian ordre public.

Justice Gallotti grounded her analysis in Article 7 of the Introductory Statute to the Norms of Brazilian Law (LINDB), a statute inspired by the German Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (EGBGB). LINDB provides that the law of the person’s domicile governs name and capacity. The applicant was domiciled in the United States. The name change was carried out under US law. The case did not fall within any area of exclusive Brazilian jurisdiction (Article 23 of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure).

The Attorney General’s Office (Ministério Público Federal) argued that Brazilian law does not permit total suppression of family names. The foreign judgment therefore offended public policy. The Court rejected this view.  It held that the mere fact that Brazilian legislation does not provide total suppression or change of surnames does not invalidate a foreign act. The prohibition is not a “nuclear” or foundational norm of the Brazilian legal order. There was no violation of ordre public, national sovereignty, or human dignity. Justice Gallotti stated: ‘The “ordre public clause” is intended to prevent the recognition of rights that contradict the fundamental principles of our legal order. In general, private international law doctrine considers, for example, that Western countries tend not to recognise more than one spouse, even when the husband is domiciled in a country governed by Islamic law. Polygamy (the marriage of a man to multiple women) is understood to violate the basic and core rules of national family law and succession law.’ Nothing of that nature was present in the case, said the Court. A foreign name change, even one involving the substitution of a surname, does not approach the level of structural incompatibility exemplified by polygamy.

The Court also placed the case in the context of recent domestic legal reform. Brazilian Law no. 14.382/2022 significantly facilitated changes of forenames in Brazil. A person may now change their first name extrajudicially (before a notary), without demonstrating a relevant reason. But such a change can only happen once in a lifetime and solely encompasses first names. Surname changes have also been made more flexible, but exclusively by allowing the recovery and inclusion of ancestral surnames. Brazilian law therefore no longer reflects a rigid immutability model, even if surnames remain harder to change than forenames. In HDE 7.091/EX, the Court considered it understandable and reasonable that the applicant adopted anglophone first and last names in the United States in order to avoid possible discrimination in the country of his new nationality. The change did not harm any relevant public or third-party interest.

 From a comparative perspective, the decision sits at an interesting point. In Common Law jurisdictions, name change is generally available with considerable freedom, often through unilateral instruments such as a deed poll, subject to modest administrative formalities. In Germany and Austria, by contrast, name changes are treated as exceptional and typically require an ‘important or relevant reason’ under public-law procedures. Christian von Bar’s comparative study Gemeineuropäisches Privatrecht der natürlichen Person (pp. 567–604) illustrates precisely the different models regarding name change. Some systems conceptualise the name primarily as an element of personal identity. Others see it as a structured institution embedded in family and public-order concerns. Brazil’s domestic law still reflects elements of the latter approach. Yet in recognition proceedings, Brazil’s highest Court with private law jurisdiction clearly opted for continuity of status formed at the domicile.

The decision is also consistent with a long Brazilian tradition of construing public policy narrowly in cross-border cases. As noted in a recent article, Brazilian law was frequently referenced in Ernst Rabel’s writings. For instance, Rabel noted how Brazilian Courts would recognise foreign divorces at a time when divorce was not yet permissible in Brazil. HDE 7.091/EX fits that pattern: foreign status effects may be recognised even when domestic law would not have produced the same result internally.

Ultimately, HDE 7.091/EX is a restrained and technically precise decision. It does not liberalise Brazilian internal surname law. It does not dissolve the state’s control over civil status. What it does is confirm that ordre public remains a high threshold in recognition proceedings of foreign rulings. In an era of increasing personal mobility and multi-layered identities, this approach reinforces a central intuition of private international law: the stability of personal status across borders is itself a value worthy of legal protection.