Droit international général

The ASADIP is pleased to share with you the Partnership entered into with the International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL) and the Center for the Study of Law, Economics and Policy (CEDEP) with a view to hold its annual event. The XV Conference of the Association: “A private international law to transform the world” will take place on October 27, 2022 in the city of Asunción, Paraguay during the General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, which will take place from October 23 to 28, 2022. The ASADIP invites you especially to be able to participate and meet again in this very special year. The opening of early registration for the General Congress is imminent. For the first time there will be simultaneous interpretation into Spanish during the Congress. The opportunity presented by this conjunction of activities and specialists of the highest level from all continents is unique. More information here. A call for papers is forthcoming.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 26 May 2022 at 3:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 10:00 pm (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is The impact of artificial intelligence on Private International Law and will be presented by Professor Wendolyne Nava, Professor Yaritza Pérez and Roberto Falcón (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84254265759?pwd=0r4SHVY24q8DByvWf236cKaQo1mPXF.1

Meeting ID: 842 5426 5759

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

This is the second of a series of posts on the French draft code of private international law of March 2022. The previous post in the series dealt with the issue of renvoi.

The draft code of private international law proposes to reform significantly the regime of choice of law rules before French courts. Unfortunately, the new provisions are silent on proof of foreign law.

Mandatory Application of Choice of law rules

Article 9, para. 1, of the draft code would establish an obligation for French courts to apply the applicable law. In other words, choice of law rules would become mandatory for courts.

Art. 9, para. 1: “L’application du droit internationalement désigné est impérative pour le juge.”

This would be a significant departure from the current regime. Since 1999, French courts have had the obligation to apply ex officio choice of law rules only in matters where the parties may not dispose of their rights (e.g. parenthood). In contrast, in matters where the parties may dispose of their rights (e.g. an international sale of goods), the application of choice of law rules was not mandatory for courts, unless one of the parties would raise their application.

The explanatory report makes clear that the drafters wanted to discard this regime and abandon the distinction based on whether the parties may dispose of their rights. It is explained that the goal is to make the law clearer and more coherent. The reference to coherence is likely a reference to the general principle that courts ought to apply applicable rules.

Readers might recall that the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) has initiated an evolution by ruling that it would consider certain EU choice of law rules mandatory (see the reports on this blog here and here). The precedent would obviously lose significance, as all choice of law rules would become mandatory.

Contrary Agreement of the Parties

However, the drafters propose to maintain the rule according to which the parties may agree to avoid the application of foreign law and apply French law instead in matters where they may dispose of their rights. The Cour de cassation has long ruled that such agreement could be reached implicitly by arguing the case under French law only.

In practice, such “agreement” was typically reached by parties (and counsels) unaware of the potential application of foreign law. This was more of a waiver mechanism. The drafters propose to strengthen the conditions for finding such agreement. Article 9, para. 2, provides that the agreement could either be express, or result from written pleadings which would be “concurring and non equivocal.” The explanatory report clarifies that, in this context, “non equivocal” would mean that it should be clear from the pleadings that the parties were aware that the case was international and that foreign law might apply. If the court is not satisfied that the parties were so aware, Article 9 para. 4 further provides that the court should raise the applicability of foreign law and, if necessary, apply it ex officio.

Finally, Article 9, para. 3, provides that such an agreement is valid in divorce cases if it is express. The rationale for this exception is to ensure compliance with Article 7 of the Rome III Regulation.

Art. 9:

(…)

Lorsque les parties ont la libre disposition de leurs droits, elles peuvent, par un accord procédural, soumettre leur litige au droit français. Cet accord est exprès ou résulte d’écritures concordantes et non-équivoques.

En matière de divorce, l’accord procédural doit être exprès.

Lorsque les parties s’abstiennent de s’expliquer sur le droit applicable, le juge les y invite et applique, au besoin d’office, la règle française de conflit de lois.

Proof of Foreign law

Most unfortunately, the draft code is silent on proof of foreign law in judicial proceedings. It includes one provision on proof of foreign law before judicial officers, which insists that the burden of proof lies with the party raising the applicability of foreign law.

One could think that the obligation in Article 9, para. 1, to apply the applicable law entails an obligation for the court to establish the content of foreign law. Whether or not this is true, it is unrealistic to expect that French courts would suddenly become able to conduct extensive research in foreign law. They do not, and thus likely will not in the future. The current judicial practice is to rely on litigants and the evidence that they can adduce. It is admissible for the parties to produce primary materials of foreign law (statutes, cases), or to produce opinions of private experts that they have hired (certificat de coutume).

A number of French scholars have argued that relying on private experts is highly unsatisfactory. The reason why is that such experts will never appear in court and be cross examined on their expert reports, for the simple reason that French courts do not hear anybody (parties, witnesses or experts) in civil and commercial cases. Experts have no serious incentive to faithfully report on the content of foreign law.

On the other hand, French courts routinely appoint judicial experts to report to the court on questions of fact. Such experts conduct investigations in the presence of the parties, hear them (and their private expert) and eventually write an independent expert report. The reason why French courts do not appoint judicial expert to establish the content of foreign law is unclear.

The future code would be a great opportunity to include a provision incentivising courts to appoint judicial experts for the purpose of ascertaining the content of foreign law.

Based on a tweet by the ‘enfant terrible of tech’, Elon Musk, Michael Douglas recently discussed ‘Conflict of Laws of Freedom of Speech on Elon Musk’s Twitter’ on this blog. In a new volume published by Mohr Siebeck, Anna Bizer adresses similar questions, from the point of view of German and European PIL. Starting from the observation that social media challenges the existing legal framework (even more so than the internet itself) by incentivizing the sharing of, and interaction with content, and thus perpetuating violations of personality rights, even where the original author of a post has already deleted it, the author focuses on three areas of law: contract law, tort law, and data protection.

As far as questions of contract law are concerned, Bizer rightly puts an emphasis on the fact that social media platforms often involve a triangle (or pyramid) of contractual relationships between the hosts and at least two users. Regarding the relationship between the host and individual users, she identifies the delineation between private and professional use (only one of which triggers the consumer rules in the Brussels Ia and Rome I Regulations) as the main problem and argues in favour of a much wider understanding of the consumer definition. Regarding the relationship between multiple users of the same service, she rightly acknowledges the potential of the platform contract to influence the applicable law via Art. 4(3) Rome I.

Concerning tort law, Bizer is generally critical of the existing legal framework under Art. 40–42 of the German EGBGB (infringements of personality rights being excluded from the Rome II Regulation). Instead of giving the claimant a choice between Handlungsort (place of acting) and Erfolgsort (place of damage), potentially leading to a mosaic of applicable laws, the applicable law should be determined by identifying the objective centre of the violation, with the intended readership of a given publication as the guiding criterion, which may be supplemented, if necessary, by the CJEU’s centre-of-interests criterion and the place of acting. Again, the author acknowledges that the contract for the social media platform might be taken into account via an escape clause (i.e. Art. 41 EGBGB).

In addition to questions of data protection, the author also addresses the role of the e-Commerce Directive’s country-of-origin rule and the ordre public in what is a well-argued, excellently researched book on a highly topical question.

The American Law Institute is currently drafting the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws. Lea Brilmayer (an eminent scholar of conflict of laws and a professor at Yale Law School) and Kim Roosevelt (the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) and a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School) recently engaged in a spirited debate about the current state of that project. Brilmayer and Daniel Listwa argued here that the current draft needs less theory and more blackletter rule. Roosevelt argued in response that the critics identify a problem that does not exist and propose a solution that would make things worse.

This exchange — the latest back-and-forth in a conversation between these interlocutors — is likely to prove illuminating to anyone curious about the status of the Restatement (Third) in the United States.

The Rovira i Virgili University (Tarragona), University of Barcelona and University of Lleida organise the First International Seminar on Rights In Rem in the European Union: General Aspects and International Jurisdiction.

The seminar seeks to define the concept of rights in rem in the framework of European private international law and comparative law, and to identify the problematic aspects arising from the characterisation of such a concept in terms of both the delimitation of the legal instruments applicable to this matter, and of its application in the Spanish legal system as the representative of a State in which several systems of law coexist. Moreover, in terms of jurisdiction, the Seminar will also address the problems of the delimitation of the rule of jurisdiction applicable under the Brussels I bis Regulation. The Seminar is divided into four panels dealing with three major topics:
· The approach to the concept of rights in rem in European comparative private law and European private international law
· Rights in rem in the Spanish legal system and the state’s internal conflict of laws
· Rights in rem and international jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation.

In addition to the invited speakers whose topics are indicated in the programme, the Seminar is open to those interested in presenting their short communications on the topic. Applications for submitting a communication proposal must include the following information: author’s personal information and academic position; topic selected; title of the paper and an abstract of between 300 and 500 words in length. Proposals for communications should be sent to: mireia.eizaguirre@urv.cat by 12 September 2022. More information is available in the call for communications.

You are welcome to take a look at and share the official seminar leaflet.

This Seminar is part of the activities within the project PID2020-112609GB-I0 Property Rights System over Tangible Goods in the Field of European Private International Law: Aspects of International Jurisdiction and Applicable Law, funded by the Spanish Government.

On 23 and 24 February 2023, the fourth German Conference for Young Scholars in Private International Law will be held in person at the Sigmund Freud University in Vienna.

The theme of the conference will be the following:
Deference to the foreign – empty phrase or guiding principle of private international law?

As part of any legal system, rules of private international law are determined by the principles of the respective national jurisdiction, but they also open up the national system to foreign rules.

This creates the challenge of reconciling foreign law and foreign values with the national legal system. At the conference, an exploration whether and to what extent deference to the foreign is a pervasive principle in private international law is looked for. In doing so, the methods of private international law as well as interdisciplinary approaches to the justification and implementation of said principle are expected to be investigated and dealt with.

Speakers are invited to give a presentation of approximately 20 minutes (in either German or English). The written contributions will later be published in a conference volume with Mohr Siebeck. The conference programme will also include smaller discussion rounds in which short presentations of approximately 5-10 minutes can be given. These contributions will not be published, and the organizing committee is looking forward to abstracts for such short presentations too.

The deadline for the submission of proposals is 12 September 2022. Proposals should be sent to ipr@sfu.ac.at.

For further information on the conference and the subsmission requirements, see here.

Stephan Madaus (Professor at Martin-Luther-University Halle Wittenberg) has made available on SSRN an interesting paper under the title The Cross-Border Effects of Restructurings. Principles for Improved Cross-Border Restructuring Laws. The paper explores latest developments in insolvency and restructuring procedures in several countries and their cross-border effects in order to inform policymakers on possible considerations to be made when modernizing existing restructuring legislation.

The abstract reads as follows:

The laws in many countries have added (preventive) restructuring options in recent years, sometimes as part of pandemic relief measures as in Germany or the United Kingdom. The cross-border effects of such options, especially when they take the shape of court decisions and proceedings, are rarely ever regulated specifically. Often the cross-border insolvency framework is assumed to apply where a Gibbs Rule or the availability of secondary proceedings threaten to frustrate the effort and limit the use of the new option to domestic cases.

The approach of this paper is to take a fresh doctrinal and conceptual look at the matter. By disassembling the functions and effects of insolvency and restructuring proceedings, it opens the path for a fresh look and a new differentiated conceptual design for cross-border restructuring frameworks based on the established principles and connecting factors of Private International Law.

First, a taxonomy is established in the paper. The term ‘restructuring’ is taken from the pure insolvency law context and explained as a general phenomenon in the management of any business at any time. This includes any cross-border effects of restructuring measures like workouts, which are secured either by general choice of law rules or, if a court is involved, by means of judgment recognition if available.

Second, the paper explains that the general principles of Private International Law have been modified in the realm of insolvency, for good cause. Their court-based and debtor-centred nature made it necessary and easy to agree on a system based on judgment recognition for traditional liquidation-oriented bankruptcy procedures, which encompass both winding-ups and (prepacked) going-concern sales.

Third, the paper argues that these principles and assumption cannot work well for restructurings because these are not asset-oriented but debt-oriented procedures and thus trigger the weak spots in today’s cross-border insolvency framework.

Finally, the paper argues that an ideal cross-border restructuring regime should take the following shape: (1) Debt restructurings under the restructuring (and insolvency) law of the lex causae would be effective globally due to the principles of Private International Law for modifications of substantive rights. When such a debt restructuring is also confirmed by a court, the recognition of such judgments abroad should be facilitated (‘automatic recognition based on the closest connection’). (2) Any debt restructuring under other rules than the lex causae, in particular under a lex fori (concursus), should require a degree of connection to the lex causae. If only a sufficient connection is established between the state of proceedings and the state of the lex causae, jurisdiction is an option and recognition may be conditional (‘controlled recognition based on sufficient connection’). (3) Without even a sufficient connection, debt-oriented proceedings shall not commence and any debt modification cannot assume to be recognised.

The paper does not propose any specific legal reform. Its taxonomy aims at describing an ideal state of cross-border law for a global restructuring practice. The paper intents to inform policymakers when considering the introduction or modernisation of a cross-border restructuring framework, potentially as part of a general restructuring and insolvency law reform. The paper would particularly suggest that there should be more flexibility in a cross-border restructuring framework as it is not at all structurally bound to a COMI concept.

The fourth German Conference for Young Scholars in Private International Law, held on site at the Sigmund Freud University in Vienna on 23 and 24 February 2023 (we have posted about the event previously here), has issued a call for papers. Proposals are invited for conference presentations (20 min.; to be published) and short presentations (5-10 min.; non-published). Furthermore, the organizers proudly announced that the keynote lecture will be delivered by Professor Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po).

The organizers describe the purpose of these proposals and the goals of the conference as follows (emphasis added):

 

“The theme of the conference will be

Deference to the foreign
– empty phrase or guiding principle of private international law?

As part of any legal system, rules of private international law are determined by the principles of the respective national jurisdiction, but they also open up the national system to foreign rules. This creates the challenge of reconciling foreign law and foreign values with the national legal system. At the conference, we will seek to explore whether and to what extent deference to the foreign is a pervasive principle in private international law. In doing so, we will look at the methods of private international law as well as interdisciplinary approaches to the justification and implementation of said principle.

 

The theme invites discussion of fundamental questions:

• What is the history of deference to the foreign in private international law?
• Does European Union law lead to a new understanding of the foreign and, in particular, to a stronger delineation from third countries?
• To what extent does mutual trust function as a basis of deference to the foreign in the pro- cess of internationalisation and Europeanisation?
• What is the relationship between deference to the foreign and escape clauses, overriding mandatory provisions, preliminary questions, local data theory (Datumtheorie), renvoi, and public policy clauses?
• What is the role of fundamental and human rights in the context of deference to the foreign?
• Are there tendencies in private international law, specific to or across different areas of law, towards a decline of the principle of deference to the foreign?
• Which levels of acceptance, integration, or assimilation are recognised in private interna- tional law?
• What is the importance of deference to the foreign in the European area of justice?

 

Contributions can also focus on the relationship between deference to the foreign and the methods of private international law:

• What is the role of methods and private international law concepts in implementing the principle of deference to the foreign (e.g. substitution or recognition)?
• Which insights does legal pluralism offer in relation to deference to the foreign?
• What are the insights of interdisciplinary approaches to the justification and methodological implementation of the principle of deference to the foreign?
• Are there parallels between the conflict of laws approach to deference to the foreign and approaches in other sciences or arts?

 

Various examples can serve as illustrations of whether and how private international law imple- ments the principles of deference to the foreign in specific areas, for instance:

• The influence of EU freedom of movement on the recognition of legal situations or a per- son’s status, such as same-sex marriages or parenthood
• The recognition of foreign citizenship of multinationals
• The importance of deference to the foreign in the regulation of international supply chains
• Deference to the foreign in economic law within the EU, g. by means of the European Passport in banking and capital market law

 

We are looking forward to contributions which take up the theme of deference to the foreign. The examples given above are mere suggestions and should not limit the scope of suitable topics. We welcome contributions from all areas of private international law and international civil procedure as well as from international arbitration and uniform law.

 

Formalities

Speakers are invited to give a presentation of approximately 20 minutes (in either German or English). The written contributions will later be published in a conference volume with Mohr Siebeck.

The conference programme will also include smaller discussion rounds in which short presentations of approximately 5-10 minutes can be given. These contributions will not be published. We are also looking forward to abstracts for such short presentations.

The deadline for the submission of proposals is 12 September 2022. Please send your proposal to ipr@sfu.ac.at. The proposal should contain:

• an anonymised abstract (not exceeding 800 words) in pdf format, and
• a short cover letter, preferably in the e-mail, containing the speaker’s name, address, and institutional affiliation, as well as
• the indication whether the abstract proposes a conference presentation (20 minutes)

and/or a short presentation in the smaller discussion rounds.

 

Please do not hesitate to contact us, if you have any further questions (ipr@sfu.ac.at).

We are very much looking forward to your proposals.

 

Kind regards:
Andreas Engel | Florian Heindler | Katharina Kaesling | Ben Köhler
Martina Melcher | Bettina Rentsch | Susanna Roßbach | Johannes Ungerer

 

More information is available at https://tinyurl.com/YoungPIL.”

Written by Pedro Lacasa, Legal Consultant, Universidad Nacional de Asunción

There is no doubt that the use of emerging technologies has impacted the international arbitration arena. This tech revolution was unprecedently accelerated by the 2020 pandemic whilst national States’ borders were closed, and travel activity diminished (if not directly forbidden by some States).

The increase of the application of the Blockchain technology in commercial contracts and the proliferation of smart contracts (even though some think they are in essence merely a piece of software code[1]) have reached the point of being a relevant part of international commerce and suddenly they demand more attention than before (see the overview of these new technologies and its impact in arbitration here http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/27/2018-in-review-blockchain-technology-and-arbitration/).

The omnipresence of technology in arbitration and the application of the blockchain technology to dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena led to the naissance of the ‘blockchain arbitration’.

But just because a method focuses on dispute resolution, is not ipso facto a proper ‘arbitration’.

While the utilization of a trusted chain of information enhanced by technology is encouraged in arbitration proceedings, particularly in international arbitrations, we must underscore the fact that not any dispute resolution mechanism is a proper ‘arbitration’… not even if based on the blockchain.

Blockchain arbitration models do not share some of the essential features of arbitration. The parties cannot choose the arbitrator in charge freely. They cannot easily choose aspects like the language of the procedure, the nationality of the arbitrators, the qualification of the arbitrators, the applicable law, etc. If the parties choose the arbitrators based on their qualifications or nationality, such choices can directly impact the availability of the existing ‘blockchain arbitrators’. A fortiori, the parties cannot choose the applicable law to the arbitration itself or to the merits of the dispute either.

Nominating the arbitrators

In Kleros, one of the most popular blockchain arbitration applications, the candidates for adjudicators first self-select themselves into specific courts (i.e., specific types of disputes) and then, the final selection of the adjudicators is done randomly (meaning a party cannot directly nominate someone in particular as an arbitrator for the underlying dispute). As it specifies in its whitepaper[2] “contracts will specify the options available for jurors to vote”, meaning the contract itself is the first factor that restrain party autonomy. In Kleros anyone can be an adjudicator. The probability of being drawn as an adjudicator for a dispute is proportional to the amount of tokens such user stakes within the platform.

Whilst other platforms such as Aragon[3] use the same drafting (of adjudicators) system, networks such as Jur[4], Mattereum and Sagewise[5] use a system that go a step closer to the International Arbitration legal framework (like the 1958 New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, etc.) in order to make their awards more enforceable worldwide but still lack the flexibility of a wider private autonomy and the role of the conflicts of laws, both present in classical international commercial arbitration processes.

These blockchain-based dispute resolution adjudicators are referred also as ‘jurors’[6]. ‘Jurors’ are Blockchain users elected to vote in favor of one of the parties to the underlying dispute utilizing the Schelling Point method.

But without even analyzing what the Schelling Point methodology has to do with the art of rendering justice in a definitive and final manner, we must ask the question: if the ‘jurors’ have more features of a jury and not of an arbitrator, why do we call a mechanism that solves disputes through decisions made by jurors and not by arbitrators arbitration?

Moreover, these jurors, like users of the Blockchain, have a direct economic interest in serving as jurors in the dispute at hand[7]. However, to think that an arbitrator decided to assume the task of being a part of an arbitral tribunal in an international arbitration constituted to resolve an international dispute, only because that would mean eventually more money to him, is an obscure idea at best. Such arbitrator was elected because of his or her qualities, experience, background, and reputation. This also occurs in domestic arbitrations. Nonetheless, such private autonomy is not possible in some blockchain arbitrations.

It is one thing to refer to such mechanisms as blockchain-based methods. But it is completely different is to maintain that such mechanisms are indeed ‘arbitrations’ stricto sensu[8], just like suggested by many authors[9] and professional associations such as the Blockchain Arbitration Society

Although the global society must embrace all the tech innovations regarding dispute resolution, the clear definition of what is an ‘arbitration’ and what is not should be a healthy practice.

Conclusion

Overall, the technology evolution within the dispute resolution mechanisms is here to stay. This disruption needs a twofold adaptation: on one hand, the parties on an international contractual commercial relationship must adapt themselves to the new ways of solving disputes. The same goes for Sovereign States, that must update their domestic and international legislation to recognize and somehow regulate such new dispute resolution mechanisms.

On the other hand, these platforms for dispute resolution must adapt to the historical surrounding of the conflict solving industry, calling a dispute resolution mechanism for what it is and avoid euphemisms.

Lastly, the misconception on the dispute resolution mechanisms and international arbitration procedures may provoke a confusion to the detriment of the users of such digital networks.

 

[1] See Charlie Morgan ‘Will the Commercialisation of Blockchain Technologies Change the Face of Arbitration?’ [Kluwer Arbitration Blog, March 5, 2018] available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/05/topic-to-be-confirmed/.

[2] Kleros white paper [September 2019] available at https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf.

[3] See “Juror staking” and “ Juror drafting” https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper.

[4] See “Open Justice Platform” in Jur’s whitepaper V 3.0.0  [March 2021], available at https://jur.io/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/jur-white-paper-v.3.0.0.pdf.

[5] See Darcy W.E. Allen, Aaron M. Lane & Marta Poblet, ‘The Governance of Blockchain Dispute Resolution’ [Harvard Negotiation Law Review, vol. 25, issue 1, Fall 2019] 75-102.

[6] Maxime Chevalier, ‘From Smart Contract Litigation to Blockchain Arbitration, a New Decentralized Approach Leading Towards the Blockchain Arbitral Order’ [Journal of International Dispute Settlement, vol. 12, issue 4, December 2021] 558 – 584 https://academic.oup.com/jids/article-abstract/12/4/558/6414874?redirectedFrom=PDF.

[7] Kleros white paper [September 2019] available at https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf.

[8] See for example Sharath Mulia & Romi Kumari, ‘Blockchain Arbitration: The Future of Dispute Resolution’ [Fox Mandal, November 2021] available at https://www.foxmandal.in/blockchain-arbitration-the-future-of-dispute-resolution/.

[9] For example, see Ritika Bansal, ‘Enforceability of Awards from Blockchain Arbitrations in India [August 2019] available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/21/enforceability-of-awards-from-blockchain-arbitrations-in-india/.

A post I started writing on 14 December 2021 so it’s about time I’ld finish it. In  Guistra v Twitter 2021 BCCA 466 (the case echoes Haaretz in Ontario) the Supreme Court of British Columbia with  Grauer J delivering the unanimous opinion, upheld jurisdiction for the BC courts on the basis of the claim pointing to a tort having been committed in BC, BC therefore being locus delicti commissi. The Court held that damage in the jurisdiction, locus damni, needs then not separately be argued.

Mr. Giustra, a British Columbia resident, alleges that Twitter published tweets that defamed him in British Columbia, as well as elsewhere.  Twitter asserts nota bene that, in law, it cannot properly be considered a “publisher” of tweets that were authored and posted on its platform by its users. That issue is deferred for the merits of the claim: at the jurisdiction level, the pleading is what is important: compare with the situation under Brussels Ia.

A forum non conveniens challenge in favour of the courts at California was rejected, where reference was made ia to Google v Equustek. There is an elephant in the room here, so identified, namely that a claim in California is doomed to fail on free speech grounds, and that an eventual Canadian judgment is doomed to be unenforceable at least in the US.

A good judgment for comparative purposes.

Geert.

Forum delicti commissi, no need to establish forum damni, damage to reputation in the jurisdiction. Rejection of forum non conveniens jurisdiction challenge also upheld.
Via @Greg_Callus https://t.co/OrRV0fsrFi

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 14, 2021

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (19 May 2022) its judgment in case C‑33/21 (Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Ryanair DAC):

“Article 14(2)(a)(i) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 [on social security] must be interpreted as meaning that the social security legislation applicable to the flight and cabin crew of an airline, established in a Member State, which crew is not covered by E101 certificates and which work for 45 minutes per day in premises intended to be used by staff, known as the ‘crew room’, which that airline has in the territory of another Member State in which that flight and cabin crew reside and, which for the remaining working time, are on board that airline’s aircraft is the legislation of the latter Member State”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259607&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=1267764

The INSOL Europe Academic Forum (IEAF) is inviting submission for its 18th annual conference, taking place from 5-6 October 2022 in Dubrovnik (Croatia). Expressions of interest are invited for the delivery of research papers within the overall theme of the academic conference: “Insolvency Law in Times of Crisis”

The conference is intended to focus on, inter alia, the following overall topics:

• The longer-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on insolvency and restructuring laws in the EU and elsewhere;
• The impact of geopolitical crises and macro-economic uncertainties on insolvency and restructuring laws in the EU and elsewhere;
• Reflections on the implementation of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 2019/1023 Directive;
• Cross-border issues relating to the new restructuring frameworks, and
• Reflections on the EU initiative for further harmonization of insolvency laws.

The IEAF board also invites submissions on other topics that fall with in the scope of the overall theme of the conference.

 

Conference methodology

In line with the practice established in our past academic conferences, the intention for the autumn conference is to have research papers that challenge existing approaches, stimulate debate and ask, and attempt to answer, comparative and interdisciplinary questions about the above-mentioned topics. Accordingly, proposals are invited that do more than just outline a topic of interest in respect of any given jurisdiction, but seek to understand, analyse and critique the fundamentals of insolvency and restructuring systems in ways that are relevant across jurisdictions and across fields of academic inquiry. All contributions must be in English.

 

Presenting at the IEAF conference

Expressions of interest in delivering papers within the conference theme should be sent by email on or before 15 June 2022 to the INSOL Europe Academic Forum’s Secretary. Authors of papers selected for presentation will benefit from a waiver of the participation fee for the academic conference, however, they will be responsible for their own travel and accommodation costs. A limited number of travel grants will be available to junior scholars invited to present.

For further information, see: www.insol-europe.org/academic-forum-events

Our esteemed co-editor Mukarrum Ahmed has recently published a book titled Brexit and the Future of Private International Law in English Courts with Oxford University Press. He has kindly provided us with the following summary:

This book is the first full length study of the private international law implications of Brexit in a single consolidated resource. It provides an analytical and authoritative commentary on the impact of Brexit upon jurisdiction, foreign judgments, and the applicable law in civil and commercial matters. By discussing the principal post-Brexit changes in England, this book faces towards the future of private international law in English courts. It utilises a once-in-a-generation opportunity to analyse, understand, and reframe some fundamental assumptions about private international law with a view to suggesting adjustments and law reform.

Ahmed argues that a conscious unlearning of the central precepts of EU private international law would be detrimental to the future of English private international law. The multilateral issues that lie ahead for the discipline rely on the legal epistemology of EU private international law, which also serves as a useful reference point when comparing aspects of English private international law. Unshackled from the EU’s external competence constraints, the UK will have the opportunity to play a more prominent role in the development of the Hague Conference’s global instruments. A methodologically pluralist approach to English private international law may be the best route to sustain its global leadership in this field, as well as simultaneously assimilating the best private international law developments from the Commonwealth, Europe, and beyond.

In the context of the Vici project ‘Affordable Access to Justice’ at Erasmus School of Law (financed by the Dutch Research Council – NWO), the Project team organises a series of seminars dedicated to the Trends and Challenges in Costs and Funding of Civil Justice.

The Project’s Fifth Seminar is scheduled, in an online format, for Wednesday, 25 May 2022 (15:00-17:00 CEST) on the topic “Funding and Costs of ADR in the Civil Justice System”.

Speakers: Sue Prince (University of Exeter, UK), Nicolas Kyriakides (University of Nicosia, Cyprus), Dorcas Quek Anderson (Singapore Management University, Singapore); Moderator: Masood Ahmed (University of Leicester, UK).

For the complete program and online registration, please see here.

The Project’s Sixth Seminar, which concludes the series, will take place on Wednesday, 22 June 2022 (14:00-18:00 CEST) in a hybrid format (online and in-person attendance possible) on the topic “Future Regulation of Third-Party Litigation Funding”.

Session I – Current Status and the Need for Further Regulation?: Keynote address by Geert Van Calster (KU Leuven, Belgium); Roundtable with the participation of Paulien van der Grinten (Senior Legislative Lawyer, Ministry of Justice and Security, the Netherlands), Johan Skog (Partner, Kapatens, Sweden), David Greene (Partner, Edwin Coe, England); Moderator: Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht University, the Netherlands).

Session II – Modes and Levels of Regulation: Discussion panel with the participation of Kai Zenner (European Parliament, Head of Office (MEP Axel Voss)), Tets Ishikawa (Managing Director, LionFish Litigation Finance Ltd, England), Victoria Sahani (Arizona State University, USA), Albert Henke (Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy); Moderator: Eva Storskrubb (Uppsala University, Sweden) (member of the VICI project at Erasmus University Rotterdam).

The Sixth Seminar is set up in a hybrid format. The complete program and a more detailed description of the two sessions may be found here. You can register and participate either in person or online.

With thanks to Eduardo Silva de Freitas for the tip-off.

On 14 and 15 May 2022 the EAPIL Young Research Network has successfully held a conference on Jurisdiction Over Non-EU Defendants – Should the Brussels Ia Regulation be Extended? in Dubrovnik, Croatia.

The event, which was organized by Tobias Lutzi (University of Cologne), Ennio Piovesani (University of Torino), and Dora Zgrabljić Rotar (University of Zagreb), with the generous support of the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb, the Croatian Ministry of Science and Education, and the European Commission in Croatia, brought together around 30 scholars from all around Europe (and beyond) to discuss the findings from the Young Research Network’s third research project.

As such, the conference started with a presentation of the project’s Comparative Report, which the organizers had compiled on the basis of a total of 17 national reports on the domestic provisions on international jurisdiction in the EU Member States. It was followed by two panels, in which the national reporters discussed specific aspects of their respective national laws. The first panel, which was chaired by Tess Bens (Tilburg University), focused on the influence of the Brussels regime on the national laws of the Member States and included contributions from Stefano Dominelli (University of Genoa), Dafina Sarbinova (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”), and Benjamin Saumier (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne). The second panel, which was chaired by Vassiliki Marazopoulou (Hellenic Energy Exchange), on the other hand, focused on features of the national laws on international jurisdiction that are peculiar to only certain legal systems and contained contributions from Giedirius Ožiūnas (Mykolas Romeris University), Ioannis Revolidis (University of Malta), and Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University).

These first three panels, which were all focused on the comparative part of the project, provided the basis for a wider discussion of the desirability of extending the Brussels Ia Regulation to defendants not domiciled in the EU, potentially at the expense of the national rules on international jurisdiction. Professors Ronald Brand (University of Pittsburgh), Burkhard Hess (MPI Luxembourg), and Margherita Salvadori (University of Torino) all agreed that there was a lot to be said in favour of such an extension, albeit with different emphases. Johannes Ungerer (University of Oxford) and Marko Jovanović (University of Belgrade) were more cautious in their remarks, which focused on the prespectives of non-EU countries.

The conference concluded with a talk by Ning Zhao (HCCH), who presented the work of the Hague Conference on international jurisdiction and discussed its interplay with a possible extension of the Brussels Ia Regulation.

Over the two days of the conference, there appeared to emerge a strong consensus that although the comparative work of the research project provided an excellent basis for the necessary discussion of whether or not the Brussels Ia Regulation should be extended to non-EU defendants, more work needed to be done on the implications on recognition and enforcement of any reform of the Regulation. Thus, the Dubrovnik conference – the contributions to which will be published together with the comparative and national reports will be published later this year by Hart Publishing – marked not only the end of the current project of the Young Research Network but may have also already foreshadowed its next one.

The European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), C/2022/2428, has been published this week at the OJEU (L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30).

Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.138.01.0030.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A138%3ATOC

The Grand Chamber delivered on 17 May 2022 its judgment in case C‑869/19 (L v Unicaja Banco SA, formerly Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria SAU), which is about Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair terms in consumer contracts and national rules of procedure:

“Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding the application of principles of national judicial procedure, under which a national court, hearing an appeal against a judgment temporally limiting the repayment of sums wrongly paid by the consumer under a term declared to be unfair, cannot raise of its own motion a ground relating to the infringement of that provision and order the repayment of those sums in full, where the failure of the consumer concerned to challenge that temporal limitation cannot be attributed to his or her complete inaction”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259430&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=922860

The Court of Justice delivered on 12 May 2022 its judgment in case C‑644/20, which is about not the Maintenance Regulation itself but the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3 du protocole de La Haye, du 23 novembre 2007, sur la loi applicable aux obligations alimentaires […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, aux fins de la détermination de la loi applicable à la créance alimentaire d’un enfant mineur déplacé par l’un de ses parents sur le territoire d’un État membre, la circonstance qu’une juridiction de cet État membre a ordonné, dans le cadre d’une procédure distincte, le retour de cet enfant dans l’État où il résidait habituellement avec ses parents immédiatement avant son déplacement, ne suffit pas à empêcher que ledit enfant puisse acquérir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire de cet État membre ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259145&text=&dir=&doclang=FR&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=209782

AG Collins delivered on 5 May 2022 his opinion in case C‑700/20 (The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain), which is about Brussels I (recognition of a judgment given in another Member State, a judgment irreconcilable with a judgment incorporating an arbitral award given between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought).

Background: “Slightly under two decades ago, in November 2002, the M/T Prestige (‘the vessel’), a single-hull oil tanker registered in the Bahamas, broke into two sections and sank off the coast of Galicia (Spain). At the time the vessel was carrying 70 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil and the resulting oil spill caused significant damage to beaches, towns and villages along the northern coastline of Spain and the western coastline of France. […] the sinking of the vessel generated a lengthy dispute between its insurers and the Spanish State pursued by way of two different procedures in two Member States. It resulted in two judgments: one delivered by the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña, Spain), the other handed down by the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (United Kingdom). The Spanish State ultimately sought to have the judgment of the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) recognised by the courts of England & Wales. In the last days of the transitional period after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) made a reference for preliminary ruling seeking an interpretation by the Court of Justice of Article 1(2)(d) and Article 34(1) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters”.

[…]

13. At the time the vessel sank, its owners (‘the owners’) had Protection & Indemnity (‘P&I’) insurance with The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited (‘the Club’), (7) pursuant to an insurance contract concluded by a certificate of entry dated 20 February 2002 (‘the insurance contract’). By that contract, the Club agreed to provide P&I cover for the owners in respect of, inter alia, any one occurrence of liability for pollution up to a maximum aggregate amount of 1 billion United States dollars (USD). The insurance contract was subject to the Club’s Rules, that is, the standard terms and conditions of the insurance policy incorporated into the certificate of entry. Rule 3, entitled ‘Right to recover’, provided for a ‘pay to be paid’ clause (8) in the terms following:

‘3.1 If any member shall incur liabilities, costs or expenses for which he is insured he shall be entitled to recovery from the Association out of the funds of this Class, PROVIDED that:

3.1.1 actual payment (out of monies belonging to him absolutely and not by way of loan or otherwise) by the Member of the full amount of such liabilities, costs and expenses shall be a condition precedent to his right of recovery;…’

14. Rule 43 of the Club’s Rules, entitled ‘Jurisdiction and law’, contained an arbitration clause whereby ‘if any difference or dispute shall arise between a Member and the Association’, ‘such difference or dispute’ was to be referred to arbitration in London (United Kingdom) before a sole legal arbitrator subject to English law and the Arbitration Act 1996.

15. In late 2002, criminal proceedings were initiated in Spain against, inter alia, the vessel’s master, chief officer and chief engineer.

16. In or about June 2010, at the conclusion of the investigatory stage of the criminal proceedings, several legal entities, including the Spanish State, brought civil claims against a number of defendants, including the Club as the owners’ liability insurer under the insurance contract pursuant to a right of direct action under Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code. The Club did not take part in the Spanish proceedings.

17. On 16 January 2012, the Club initiated arbitration proceedings in London, whereby it sought declarations to the effect that, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the insurance contract, the Spanish State was bound to pursue its claims under Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code in London and that the Club was not liable to the Spanish State in respect of such claims as a matter of English law and/or under that contract. The Spanish State did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. (9)

18. By an award delivered on 13 February 2013 (‘the Award’), the arbitral tribunal held that, since the claims in question were of a contractual nature under English conflict of law rules, English law applied to the contract. The Spanish State could not thus benefit from the owners’ contractual rights without complying with both the arbitration clause and the ‘pay to be paid’ clause. Moreover the Spanish State ought to have initiated arbitration proceedings in London to recover payment from the Club. The Award also declared that, in the absence of prior payment of the insured liability by the owners, the Club was not liable to the Spanish State in respect of the claims. In any event, the Club’s liability did not exceed USD 1 billion.

19. In March 2013, the Club applied to the referring court under section 66(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 for leave to enforce the Award in the jurisdiction in the same manner as a judgment or order and for a judgment to be entered in the terms of the Award. The Spanish State opposed that application. It sought orders to set aside the Award and/or to declare the Award of no effect, pursuant to sections 67 and/or 72 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Those sections provide that an English arbitral award may be challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction and that the relevant dispute could not properly be submitted to arbitration. The Spanish State also argued that the referring court should decline to exercise its discretion to enter judgment.

20. Following a seven-day trial in the course of which factual evidence together with expert evidence of Spanish law was heard, on 22 October 2013 the referring court delivered judgment. It ordered that the Spanish State’s applications be dismissed, granted the Club, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996, leave to enforce the Award and declared that, pursuant to section 66(2) of that act, judgment was to be entered against the Spanish State in the terms of the Award. On the same date it delivered a separate formal judgment which stated that ‘pursuant to section 66(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, judgment is entered against the [Spanish State] in the terms of the Award’. (10)

21. The Spanish State appealed against the section 66 judgment to the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom). By judgment of 1 April 2015, that court dismissed the appeal.

22. On 13 November 2013, the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) gave judgment in the Spanish proceedings. It made no finding as to the civil liability of the owners or of the Club. Various parties appealed against that judgment to the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain). By judgment of 14 January 2016, that court held, inter alia, that the master and the owners were liable in respect of the civil claims and that the Club was directly liable pursuant to Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code, subject to the global limit of liability of USD 1 billion. It remitted the matter to the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) to determine the quantum of the respective liabilities of the defendants to the Spanish proceedings. By judgment of 15 November 2017 (rectified on 11 January 2018), that court held that, as a result of the accident, the master, the owners and the Club were liable to over 200 separate parties (including the Spanish State) in sums in excess of EUR 1.6 billion, subject, in the case of the Club, to the global limit of liability of USD 1 billion. Various parties appealed against that judgment before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), which, by judgment of 19 December 2018 (amended on 21 January 2019), upheld it, subject to a limited number of variations.

23. On 1 March 2019, the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) issued an execution order setting out the amounts that each of the claimants, including the Spanish State, were entitled to enforce against the respective defendants, including the Club (‘the Spanish judgment’).

24. On 25 March 2019, the Spanish State applied to the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) to have the Spanish judgment recognised under Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001. That court acceded to that application by order of 28 May 2019 (‘the registration order’). (11)

25. On 26 June 2019, the Club lodged an appeal against the registration order under Article 43 of Regulation No 44/2001. It relied on two grounds. First, it argued that, pursuant to Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, the Spanish judgment was irreconcilable with the section 66 judgment which the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) had upheld on 1 April 2015. Second, by reference to Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, it submitted that recognition or enforcement of the Spanish judgment was manifestly contrary to English public policy. The Spanish State contested the Club’s appeal. It asked the referring court to refer six questions for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001.

26. In those circumstances, on 22 December 2020, the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Given the nature of the issues which the national court is required to determine in deciding whether to enter judgment in the terms of an award under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment granted pursuant to that provision capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of [Regulation No 44/2001]?

(2) Given that a judgment entered in the terms of an award, such as a judgment under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment falling outside the material scope of Regulation No 44/2001 by reason of the Article l(2)(d) arbitration exception, is such a judgment capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of the regulation?

(3) On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition or enforcement or [does] Article 34(3) and (4) of the regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?’”

Suggested decision: “A judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award pursuant to section 66(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 is capable of constituting a relevant ‘judgment’ of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 […], notwithstanding that such a judgment falls outside the scope of that regulation by reason of Article 1(2)(d) thereof”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=258882&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212120