Flux européens

W Nagel (a firm) v Pluczenik& Ors [2022] EWHC 1714 (Comm) concerns litigation in the diamond sector. It is an appeal against permission for service out which triggers various jurisdictional considerations, including forum non, as well as disclosure and ‘clean hands’ concerns.

The judgment is a good illustration of claim and counterclaim serving jurisdictional purposes.

Defendants are a Belgium-domiciled diamond manufacturer (PDC) and its equally Belgium-based managing director Mr Pluczenik . Claimant Nagel is a UK based diamond broker. Nagel is defendant in Belgian proceedings brought in May 2015 by defendants in the E&W proceedings, who used a Belgian-based anchor defendant to sue the English claimant in Belgium (A8(1) Brussels Ia); Nagel are also defendant in a September 2015 Belgian claim brought by the same claimants and since consolidated by the Belgian courts. Nagel itself issued a claim against PDC in the English High Court in March 2015, did not serve it, but sent a letter before action which indicated that it intended to bring proceedings in England.

In June 2015, as direct reaction to the Belgian Claim, Nagel amended the English Claim to seek negative declaratory relief to the effect that it was not liable in respect of a number of contractual duties.

In July 2017 Popplewell J found for Nagel, including in respect of the negative declaratory relief: W Nagel (A Firm) v Pluczenik Diamond Company NV [2017] EWHC 1750 (Comm). His judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal: [2018] EWCA Civ 2640, payments were made and the E&W proceedings ended.

Come forward third defendant in the current E&W proceedings, Ms Shine, who was the CEO of a subsidiary of De Beers – De Beers Trading Company. She has never worked for either of the Claimant or the First or Second Defendants, but she gave a statement to the Belgian court in 2017, supporting PDC. Her statement was provoked it seems by the outcome of the E&W proceedings which did not match her recollection. Nagel originally objected to jurisdiction solely on the ground of lis pendens (A29-30 BIa).

In July 2020 (one can see that in this case the speed of Belgian proceedings is nothing like in the case I reported yesterday) the Belgian claimants put forward their arguments on jurisdiction based on Antwerp being forum contractus per A7(1) BIA (they argued centre of gravity or characteristic performance was in Antwerp) [20].

In an interim, February 2021 interim judgment the Belgian court held it had jurisdiction on the basis of A7 forum contractus. It considered the lis pendens issue noting that it could no longer apply now that the English Claim was concluded. It then concluded that it had jurisdiction to determine the dispute. The Court noted that “the defendants apparently do not (or no longer) dispute” that the services were performed in Antwerp. 

Nagel then dropped the jurisdictional arguments and at hearings 7 May 2021 onwards went for res judicata, arguing …the English judgment has the status of res judicata with regard to the present proceedings, so that the court on the basis of Article 23 and 25 Judicial Code [the Belgian CPR, GAVC] is currently prohibited from again deciding on the claim…” [30]. End of May 2021 Nagel then commenced the present claim in the Commercial Court. The claim alleges that the Belgian Claim constitutes a tortious abuse of process and forms part of an unlawful means conspiracy between the Defendants. Ms Shine is the Third Defendant. It is said that the provision of the Shine Statement and its (lack of) merits justify an inference that she was involved in the abuse of process and the conspiracy [31].

In September 2021 Moulder J gave permission for service out (required post Brexit) on the basis that the claim met limb (a) of the tort gateway viz “damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the jurisdiction” (Nagel trades from England, paid sums to Belgian lawyers from a bank account in England and has consequently suffered loss here; she also UKSC Brownlie for the damage gateway). She refused permission on two other gateways – necessary and proper party and tort committed within the jurisdiction. It is alleged by defendants that Moulder J was not given any indication of the Belgian interim judgment.

The Belgian Claim is now scheduled for trial in January 2023.

[64] Cockerill J holds that the Belgian findings on jurisdiction and the existence of a judgment which dealt in terms with jurisdiction should on any view have been put before Moulder J and [65] that this breach of duty of disclosure was deliberate. She also holds [70] that the picture sketched of the Belgian proceedings being ‘in limbo’ was plainly wrong: they were definitely active, and that it had been wrongfully suggested that the Belgian judge was not going to deal with the res judicata issue. On that basis, she would have set aside permission for service out [75] however this point turns out to be obiter for the reason for reversal of the order is that E&W are not the appropriate forum [76] ff. Relevant factors being that (i) the jurisdiction of the Belgian Courts appears to have been established by PDC and accepted by Nagel (at least on a prima facie basis), (ii) the Belgian claim is progressing and (iii) there is scope for determination of a res judicata issue (which replicates the issues sought to be brought here) and (iv) a determination of the res judicata issue is (and was) likely to be determined relatively soon.

Moreover, Belgium clearly is an appropriate forum [79] the Belgian Claim is one brought by a Belgian company (PDC), arising out of services provided in Belgium (as the Belgian Court has held), alleging fraud on the Belgian Court. (The serious issue to be tried discussion leads to an analysis of Article 4 Rome II as retained EU law).

A good illustration as I mentioned of claim, counterclaim, and of course the clean hands principle.

Geert.

Res judicata issues and claims of abuse of process by launching Belgian proceedings under Brussels Ia

W Nagel (a firm) v Pluczenik& Ors [2022] EWHC 1714 (Comm)https://t.co/UKQi3rEer9

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 6, 2022

Simon v Tache & Ors [2022] EWHC 1674 (Comm) is an interesting judgment which one assumes is very appealable given the untested Withdrawal Agreement and other angles.

At issue is i.a. whether Article 67 Withdrawal Agreement requires both sets of proceedings which are a candidate for Brussels Ia’s Article 29-30 lis pendens /related cases provisions, to have been pending prior to Brexit Implementation Date and what date needs to be considered the date of seizing.

Claimants argue, that the Belgian Proceedings, which I outline below, could only have become related on 3 May 2021 by the lodging of the 3 May Submissions, and that the English Court only became seized of the English proceedings after 31 December 2020, either on the making of Service Out Application or on the subsequent issue of the English Proceedings. On this basis it would not be open to the Defendants in the English proceedings to rely upon Article 67 as applying Articles 29 and 30 of Brussels Recast to the English Proceedings.

Claimant is a French national living in London. She is a medical doctor who previously practiced. She now focuses on art and design. Defendants are Belgian nationals, contemporary art dealers with a gallery website in English. This element notably raises issues whether the contract could qualify as a consumer contract. Defendants deny this, citing the very example I often give in class when teaching the relevance of language in the context of the Pammer Alpenhof criteria: the very use of English on websites, particularly in the art, design or hospitality sector in cities like Brussels are hardly an indication of direction of activities outside the location. The contract being a consumer contract seemingly was not flagged in claim form or submissions, it only came up at hearing.

Claimant and defendants having met in Paris, various artworks were delivered to claimant’s Paris address. Lex contractus is disputed [20]. The relationship soured and Belgian libel proceedings by defendants in the E&W proceedings were initiated end of October 2020. End of March 2021 Dr Simon was given permission to serve out. Her application mentioned the Belgian proceedings but argued that these were unrelated, ia in light of the different (non)contractual basis of those proceedings [35]. A claim form was sent to defendants’ lawyers early April 2021 and the claim form was filed 10 May 2021. On 3 May the defendants in the E&W proceedings amended thier Belgian claim, adding a request for declaration of non-liability: in other words they requested the Belgian court to declare that there was no wrongdoing on their part in the contractual relationship.

End of October 2021 the first instance Belgian court held it does have jurisdiction, but that no damage was proven. That court however declined to rule on the claim for a negative declaration because the allegations were before the English court. The Belgian court’s dictum on that issue is very brief, declaring only ‘“Whereas the ensuing dispute was never resolved and is currently the subject of a lawsuit in London, such that this court will refrain from commenting on the merits of that case.” : it did not specify why which clearly is a failure on its part.

[50] it is the Defendants’ case that the Belgian court was first seized on 3 May 2021, before the E&W Court was first seized on 10 May 2021 on the issue of proceedings. On the other hand, it is Dr Simon’s case that the E&W Court was first seized on the making of the Service Out Application and/or the making of the Service Order on 30 March 2021, alternatively on the issue of the Claim Form on 10 May 2021, but that the Belgian court was only seized when the Defendants’ claim for a negative declaration was filed on 5 August 2021.

It is undisputed [52] that as a matter of Belgian procedural law, it would be open to Dr Simon to raise a counterclaim in respect of the causes of action that she seeks to pursue by the English Proceedings in the Belgian Proceedings, and to do so notwithstanding that they are now before the Belgian Appeal Court. Expectations of the Court of Appeal ruling varied between one and five years [54] however in the end that Court surprised all and held after the English judge’s draft judgment had been circulated.

In November 2021 Dr Simon at her turn added a claim to her English claim form, one in dishonesty.

The judge holds [74] that BIa continues to apply to new claims added to proceedings commenced prior to 31 December 2020 and claims against new defendants joined to such proceedings after that date. He refers to  On the Beach Ltd v Ryanair UK Ltd [2022] EWHC 861 (Ch) in support (acknowledging that that case is not authority to him and that the parties in that case were in agreement on the issue).

On the issue of seizure, the judge holds [92] that this must be linked to the formal lodging of a claim form in order to issue proceedings, rather than the taking of some preliminary step to obtain permission with regard to the service of proceedings which might never be issued. I have sympathy with the view [85] that this gives the other party a great opportunity to torpedo proceedings.

‘“the same cause of action, between the same parties” is judged, despite an acknowledgment of EU autonomous interpretation, with reference to Belgian procedural law and expert reports on same [103]. That must be a vulnerable position.

Conclusion on A29 is that a stay must be ordered [114] and obiter [120] that one would have been ordered on A30 grounds.

Service out is discussed [121] in a bit of a vacuum because of course is BIa applies then service out is not required. Here reference is made to Rome I’s applicable law as an element of the gateway requirements (contract governed by English law) (held: no: Belgian law is prima facie lex contractus [134], with discussion ia of the consumer title. As a pudding, forum non conveniens is considered and this is surely where the jurisdictional arguments become excessive per Lord Briggs’ speech in Vedanta.

Then comes the final pousse-café: the Belgian Court of Appeal, unexpectedly fast, found it had no jurisdiction (this may be appealable to the Belgian Supreme Court), leaving the possibility of a negative conflict of jurisdiction which the parties were invited to comment upon.

A case to watch.

Geert.

Application of Brussels Ia's lis pendens (As 29-30) rules re concurrent Belgian proceedings, with BE Court of Appeal eventually holding, like the E&W courts, that it has no jurisdiction
More soon

Simon v Tache & Ors [2022] EWHC 1674 (Comm)https://t.co/APyROT7Fi9

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 6, 2022

The Belgian Data Protection Controller (DPA)’s decision of March 2022 (thank you Peter Craddock for alerting me to it at the time) has been travelling with me since it was issued mid March 2022: a late posting, I realise. There is however follow-up because Google have appealed.

The case concerns a classic ‘right to be forgotten’ aka delisting request, which Google refused, made by a practising solicitor with a criminal conviction and disciplinary measures taken against him. Google was rebuked, but not fined, for not dealing with the request promptly. However in substance the DPA agreed with Google’s refusal to delist, citing the link of the convictions to the applicant’s current profession, the recent nature of the conviction, and the severity of the facts.

This post however wants to signal the issue for which Google have appealed: the territorial reach of the GDPR under Article 3(1) v 3(2) GDPR,  as also explained in the European Data Protection Board (EDPA) December 2019 guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR (and something which the Belgian Court of Appeal has grappled with before, albeit not in the 3(1) v 3(2) setting).

Article 3(1) of the GDPR applies to “the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or processor in the Union, regardless of whether processing takes place in the Union or not“. Article 3(2) applies the GDPR to “the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union, or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union“.

Google Ireland was fast out off the picture by consent among the parties and the DPA [39-40]: it had no role at all in any of the processing. Google LL.C. admitted [44] that Article 3(1) applies to it, while Google Belgium [53] posits that as a mere internal consultancy /lobbying outfit for the Google group, it, too, has no role in the processing of the data.

Citing earlier decisions and CJEU Google Spain, the DPA nevertheless takes a broad view of ‘data processing’, arguing [64] that Google Spain identifies an ‘inextricable link’ between the various units of a group as sufficient to trigger DPA jurisdiction, even if one of these units has no role in the data processing.  While this reasoning ([68] and [71] in particular) suggests the wide notion of inextricable link triggers Article 3(1), in subsequent paras ([69] in particular) suggest the opposite causality: suggesting that because Article 3(1) applies, the activities are inextricably linked. Clearly, as Peter Craddock had pointed out before (I read it at the time but cannot find the source anymore I fear) that is a case of circular reasoning.

For Google, application of the GDPR to the US based entity as opposed to the EU based ones clearly is of significant difference. Its appeal with the Court of Appeal will be heard in the autumn.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd. ed. 2021, 2.256 ff.

 

Early July the courts at Rotterdam held in ITWF, Nautilus International and FNV v Marlow Navigation Netherlands BV et al that the International Transport Workers Federation (IT(W)F) Non Seafarers’ Work Clause, also known as the Dockers’ Clause, falls within the CJEU ‘Albany’ exception of EU competition law. The case se was brought against a number of shipowners who disregarded the clause.

In the interest of full disclosure, I should note I acted as expert witness for the ITWF.

The dockers’ Clause, negotiated between trade unions and employers, forms an integral part of a set of agreements primarily entered into by ITF and the Joint Negotiation Group (JNG – represent maritime owners from across the world) . In short  the clause amounts to a ban on ships’ crews carrying out work relating to securing and releasing the load on a ship (often: containers), collectively known as ‘lashing’ /’unlashing’ work. Tiredness and fatigue are some of the biggest risks for seafarers, who are expected to rest in the ports, not carry out the specialised and dangerous work of dockers. 

The Dockers’ Clause, together with the other employment conditions, was the result of an intensive and multi-year period of negotiations between a large number of social partners. Exemptions are possible under conditions.

Collective agreements of course are prima facie suspect under EU competition rules. The Albany ‘exception’ of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerns the core criteria which the CJEU employs in its competition law assessment of the activities carried out by organisations that organise social protection for workers in a given sector. The Court held (at 60) that

It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.

Article 85(1) is what is now Article 101 TFEU, and by ‘such objectives’ the Court (at 59) means ‘social policy objectives’.

Note, for conflicts lawyers, the application of Article 4-4 Rome I, and, viz some of the defendants, Article 4(1) Rome II, to conclude application of Dutch law.

The Court at Rotterdam held that the seafarers clause fits squarely within the Albany exception: it is ‘entered into in the framework of collective bargaining between employers and employees’, and it improves the employment and working conditions of workers’. Note at 4.38 the reference to these agreements necessarily involving a ‘package deal’ which implies that the interest of all involved will be weighed and that as a result of the collective bargaining, some of those concerned will get a better deal than others. However both the CJEU and the Court at Rotterdam leave that assessment to the negotiation process.

Further arguments based ia on free movement of workers, services, establishment  were rejected. (A narrow Covid19 exception was accepted for a narrow set of circumstances).

An important judgment for those interested in competition law and collective bargaining.

Geert.

Pleased to have contributed to this important finding on the collective agreements 'Albany' exception in EU competition law. https://t.co/MWaEiUfsUN

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 8, 2022

Council Decision (EU) 2022/1206 of 12 July 2022 concerning the accession of the European Union to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was published at the OJEU today (JOEU, L 187, 14.7.2022, p. 1).

Its Article 1 states: “The accession of the European Union to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters is hereby approved on behalf of the Union”.

Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.187.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A187%3ATOC

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑572/21 (CC v VO), which is about Brussels II bis and the transfer, during court proceedings, of the habitual residence of a child from a Member State to a third State party to the 1996 Hague Convention. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 du Conseil, du 27 novembre 2003 […] lu en combinaison avec l’article 61, sous a), de ce règlement, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une juridiction d’un État membre, saisie d’un litige en matière de responsabilité parentale, ne conserve pas la compétence pour statuer sur ce litige au titre de cet article 8, paragraphe 1, lorsque la résidence habituelle de l’enfant en cause a été transférée légalement, en cours d’instance, sur le territoire d’un État tiers qui est partie à la convention concernant la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance, l’exécution et la coopération en matière de responsabilité parentale et de mesures de protection des enfants, conclue à La Haye le 19 octobre 1996 ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=262946&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=FR&cid=148720

AG Szpunar delivered today his opinion in case C‑354/21 (R.J.R., Registrų centras), which is about the delimitation of the lex successionis and the lex registrii, with suggested decision in favour of the first one. The opinion is currently available in the vast majority of EU official languages, albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

Context : « Une femme vit en Allemagne, de même que son fils. Elle décède, laissant celui-ci pour seul héritier. Elle possédait des biens immobiliers en Allemagne et en Lituanie. Son fils obtient un certificat successoral européen des autorités allemandes, spécifiant qu’il est l’unique héritier de l’intégralité du patrimoine de la défunte. Il présente ce certificat aux autorités lituaniennes en demandant l’inscription au registre foncier d’un bien immobilier. Celles-ci refusent d’accéder à cette demande au motif que ledit certificat est incomplet.

2. La présente demande de décision préjudicielle soulève donc la question délicate de la délimitation des domaines d’application respectifs de la lex successionis  et de la lex registrii et, plus concrètement, de la répartition des compétences entre l’autorité émettrice d’un certificat successoral européen et l’autorité en charge du registre foncier, située dans un autre État membre ».

Suggested decision : « L’article 1er, paragraphe 2, sous l), l’article 68, sous l), et l’article 69, paragraphe 5, du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] s’opposent à l’application de dispositions de droit national en vertu desquelles un bien immobilier acquis par un héritier unique en vertu d’un droit successoral régi par le principe de la succession universelle, ne peut être inscrit au registre foncier de l’État membre sur le territoire duquel ce bien est situé sur le fondement d’un certificat successoral européen qu’à la condition que toutes les données d’identification du bien immeuble requises par le droit national de cet État membre soient indiquées dans ce certificat ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=262971&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1845309

“From 4 to 8 July 2022, the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1993 Adoption Convention was held […] The Special Commission reviewed the draft Toolkit on Preventing and Addressing Illicit Practices in Intercountry Adoption, developed by the Working Group on Preventing and Addressing Illicit Practices in Intercountry Adoption, as well as the draft Recommended Model Forms for use under the 1993 Adoption Convention, and approved them, in principle, subject to certain amendments. Both will be submitted to the Council on General Affairs and Policy in 2023 for final approval and publication. Post-adoption matters featured prominently in the discussions, resulting in several recommendations to Contracting Parties aimed at developing specialised and quality post-adoption services, including in the search for origins. Intrafamily adoptions and alternatives to full adoption, such as simple and open adoptions, were also discussed.

[…] The Special Commission adopted over 50 Conclusions & Recommendations, available” at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d56b7ba3-6695-4862-b49c-75c730e9d599.pdf

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=866

First Advocate-General Szpunar opined in C-265/21 AB, AB-CD v Z EF a few weeks back. The case-name is a victim of the anonymisation rules and I propose we name it ‘the São Paulo Panels’, this being its ultimate subject: 20 panels exhibited at the 1977 São Paulo Art Biennial (this much information one can read in the publicly available referral decision and the AG Opinion). Tobias Lutzi has summary of the most relevant sections in the Opinion here and in the interest of disclosure I should add I am instructed for Belgium in the case.

Early in the 1980s the original German artists handed over the panels to an art gallery in Belgium. The nature of the deposit (sale or deposit) is contested. The owner of the art gallery later sold the panels to her daughter and son-in-law, who requested Christie’s of London to sell the panels. That sale has been suspended since 2013 (hence the case is subject to Brussels I, not Brussels Ia however there is no material difference) in light of one of the original artists, the wife (her husband had passed away) claiming ownership; the wife in the meantime has passed away, too, and the proceedings are continued by their son. (The CJEU may find this of note, seeing as the original proceedings at the outset involved at least one of the original contracting parties).

Current proceedings result from the Belgian-domiciled claimants having requested the Belgian courts to confirm their ownership of the objects. The Belgian courts are asking the CJEU whether the case involves A7(1) special jurisdiction for contract and if so, where the forum contractus lies. Claimants argue the claim engages A7(1) on the basis of the original contract which they argue is one in sale, with performance in Belgium. The defendant argues the original contract was one of deposit, and that a declaratory claim such as the one at issue, with the parties to the proceedings not being parties to the original contract, does not engage A7(1) at all, instead only being subject to Article 4, domicile of the defendant.

Clearly the questions will enable the Court to clarify whether its Feniks, Flight Right etc case-law, with their extended notion of ‘contract’, applies across the board, without much need to take the specific context of those cases into account; or whether there ought to be some restraint on the reach of the forum contractus. One assumes it may seek some inspiration in its approach to distinguishing contracts and torts, eg in Wikingerhof (or Sharpston AG’s earlier ‘ancestry’ test for the Rome I and II distinction in Ergo). Without restraint, CJEU De Bloos’ great window of opportunity for claim formulation hence forum shopping is likely to be reinvigorated.

The AG (44) ff explains the initial restrictive approach to forum contractus per CJEU Handte, and (53) confesses not to be a fan of a restrictive interpretation of A7, arguing such interpretation would undermine the Regulation’s intention, in formulating the special jurisdictional rules, of ensuring that courts with a particular suitability to hear the case will have jurisdiction to do so. The alternative view is that too wide an interpretation undermines the Regulation’s DNA of predictability and the statutorily expressed view that A4 forum rei is the core principle of the Regulation, and the established case-law in support of this principle that exceptions to it need to be restrictively interpreted. The AG refers more than once in his Opinion to scholarship of one of my Doktorkinder, Dr Michiel Poesen, to substantiate the scholarly debate.

He subsequently discusses the later wider CJEU wider approach, starting with Engler and culminating in flight right, concludes that the current claim falls within that wider framework but does emphasise that the contract must lie at the foundation of the claim: ‘et sur laquelle se fonde l’action du demandeur’ (75).

(76) ff discusses the important question how far the judge, faced with opposition to her /his jurisdiction, must go in the consultation or interpretation of the contract, to establish whether or not the claim finds its foundation in contract. Per Kolassa and Universal Music, both the claimant’s and the defendant’s arguments to that effect are said by the AG to be of relevance. (83) Seeing as both parties argue their position with reference to a contract, the AG advises that on the facts of the case, the contractual foundation is clear; (84) that the contract which is the initial source of the rights and obligations (“la source originale des droits et obligations litigieux”) is the anchor point for the forum contractus, i.e. the disputed 1980s contract and not the later contract of sale; and (86) ff, that the judge will have to apply the classic A7(1) cascade: if the initial contract cannot be qualified as one for the sale of movable goods or a service, the CJEU Tessili Dunlop method of looking over the fence will have to be applied. (The referral decision is short on factual elements to help the AG opine on this point).

Fun with contracts…..

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.419 ff.

Opinion @maciejszpunar AG last week in C-265/21: yet more on 'contract' for jurisdictional purposes, A7(1) Brussels Ia. More later this week – I am a bit swamped.https://t.co/CPoq3x1PLS

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 20, 2022

In Case C-652/20 HW, ZF, MZ v Allianz Elementar Versicherungs AG, the CJEU held (no English version of the judgment is as yet available) end of June that A11(1)(b) Brussels Ia, determines jurisdiction not just of ‘the’ courts in a Member State (leaving territorial jurisdiction to be determined by national civil procedure rules) but rather of a specific court within that Member State. The judgment is a bit longer than might have been expected: that is because the referring judge did not qualify one or two elements which, particularly in an insurance context, can be quite convoluted. (Such as the nature and deliniation of ‘beneficiaries’, ‘insureds’, ‘victims’).

In accordance with the Article, ‘An insurer domiciled in a Member State may be sued: …(b) in another Member State, in the case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled’.

[35] The Court observes that in the Romanian (the language of the case) as well as the English and Finnish version of Brussels Ia use the plural ‘courts’ while in the other language versions, the singular is used. (Regular readers of the blog may be familiar with my earlier work on languages and interpretation). Coupled with the indications of territorial jurisdiction in the relevant section of the Report Jenard, and with the similar language in A7(1) and (2) and relevant case-law there (ex multi: Kareda, Volvo), the CJEU concludes that where A11(1)(b) and all its conditions apply, the Article identifies both national and territorial jurisdiction indeed.

Geert.

 

CJEU today in Allianz today. Brussels Ia insurance title determines national as well as territorial jurisdiction https://t.co/tnv51a8qWx

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 30, 2022

C-176/19 P & Commission/Servier e.a. et C 201/19 P & Servier e.a./Commission
Concurrence
Commercialisation du périndopril : l’avocate générale Kokott propose à la Cour de juger que tous les accords conclus par le groupe Servier avec des sociétés de médicaments génériques constituaient des restrictions de la concurrence par objet et d’annuler les constatations du Tribunal concernant les accords entre Servier et Krka, d’une part, et la définition du marché pertinent aux fins de l’application de l’article 102 TFUE, d’autre part

Puig Gordi e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Selon l’avocat général Richard de la Tour, une autorité judiciaire ne peut pas refuser d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen en se fondant sur le risque de violation du droit à un procès équitable de la personne réclamée si l’existence de défaillances systémiques ou généralisées touchant le système judiciaire de l’État membre d’émission n’est pas démontrée

C 128/20 GSMB Invest, C-134/20 Volkswagen et C 145/20 Porsche Inter Auto et Volkswagen
Rapprochement des législations
Un logiciel, équipant des véhicules Diesel, qui réduit l’efficacité du système de contrôle des émissions lors de températures habituelles et durant la majeure partie de l’année, constitue un dispositif d’invalidation interdit

C-59/18 & Italie/Conseil et C-182/18 & Comune di Milano/Conseil, dans les affaires jointes C-106/19 & Italie/Conseil et Parlement et C-232/19 & Comune di Milano/Parlement et Conseil, et dans l’affaire C-743/19 & Parlement/Conseil
Droit institutionnel
Fixation du siège de l’EMA et de l’ELA : la compétence pour en décider appartient au législateur de l’Union et non aux États membres

CC (Transfert de la résidence habituelle de l’enfant vers un État tiers)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une juridiction d’un État membre ne demeure pas compétente pour statuer en matière de garde d’enfant sur la base du règlement Bruxelles II bis  lorsque la résidence habituelle de l’enfant a légalement fait l’objet d’un transfert, en cours de procédure, sur le territoire d’un État tiers qui est partie à la convention de La Haye de 1996

Commission / Danemark (AOP Feta)
Agriculture
Le Danemark a manqué à ses obligations en ne cessant pas d’utiliser l’appellation « Feta » pour des fromages destinés à l’exportation vers des pays tiers

Procureur général près la cour d'appel d'Angers
DFON
Mandat d’arrêt européen et condition de la double incrimination du fait : une correspondance parfaite n’est pas requise entre les éléments constitutifs de l’infraction concernée dans l’État membre d’émission et dans l’État membre d’exécution

Universität Bremen / REA
Principes du droit communautaire
Un professeur de droit peut représenter sa propre université devant le Tribunal et la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

Illumina / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal confirme les décisions de la Commission acceptant une requête de renvoi de la France, à laquelle se sont joints d’autres États membres, lui demandant d'évaluer le projet d'acquisition de Grail par Illumina

On 8 July 2022, Pakistan acceded to the Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, which will enter into force for Pakistan on 9 March 2023.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=865