In C-425/22 MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Mercedes-Benz Group AG Emiliou AG had opined in that a parent company cannot rely on the competition law concept of economic unit to establish jurisdiction where it has its registered seat, re a claim for damages for the harm suffered by its subsidiaries. I referred in my review of the Opinion to my colleague Joeri Vananroye summarising it as :
“In corporate law terms: yes to outsider veil piercing, no to insider reverse veil piercing. Outsiders may disregard legal structure and go for economic reality; but not those who set up that structure. See also: rules on derivate damages.”
The CJEU confirmed early July (yes, I have a blog queue to tackle…): [44]
the objectives of proximity and predictability of the rules governing jurisdiction and consistency between the forum and the applicable law, and the unhindered possibility of claiming damages for the harm arising from an infringement of competition law affecting a member of the economic unit, preclude a reverse application of the concept of ‘economic unit’ for the determination of the place where the damage occurred, for the purposes of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012.
The CJEU further explains these principles in current context with reference to the same case-law as the AG and as reviewed in my post.
Geert.
EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.438 ff.
The CJEU in Grand Chamber held 10 days back in C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA. No English version was yet available at the time of writing.
The Court in essence confirms Spzunar AG’s Opinion which I reviewed here.
Its findings echo the language and sentiment of Article 16 of the EU’s anti-SLAPP Directive 2024/1069 (that Article addressing non-recognition of third country judgments).
The Grand Chamber emphasises mutual trust and the consequential very narrow room for refusal of recognition on ordre public grounds, even in the context of the application of the Charter’s Article 11 freedom of expression grounds: refusal must be exceptional, case-based, and not based on an entirely new balancing act.
However the court of enforcement must refuse to recognise if the Article 11 rights are fundamentally impacted. In exercising that assessment, it must i.a. take account of the distinction between the reputation of a legal cq natural person (the former lacking the ‘moral’ element of impacting on the ‘dignity’ of the person: [58]), the financial capacity of the defendant (accused to have libeled) [68], and the stiffing impact caused by a disproportionate difference between the actual damage suffered, and the libel award [62 ff].
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.
M. Koen Lenaerts est réélu président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne
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La Cour confirme largement la validité du Paquet mobilité
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