Flux européens

Kinsa
Aide à l’entrée irrégulière fournie dans un but humanitaire : l’avocat général Richard de la Tour juge la directive 2002/90 valide et précise les conditions de l’incrimination en droit de l’Union et en droit national

Burdene
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Indemnisation des victimes de la criminalité violente : l’exclusion automatique de certains membres de la famille de la victime d’un homicide ne garantit pas une indemnisation « juste et appropriée »

Wizz Air Hungary / Commission (TAROM II; Covid-19)
Aide d'État
Aide d’État : le Tribunal rejette le recours de Wizz Air au sujet d’une aide accordée par la Roumanie à la compagnie aérienne nationale TAROM pour compenser les dommages subis en raison de la pandémie de Covid-19

Crédit agricole et Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank / Commission
Concurrence
Les banques Crédit agricole et Credit Suisse ont participé à un cartel dans le secteur des obligations suprasouveraines, des obligations souveraines et des obligations d’organismes publics libellées en dollars US (« SSA Bonds »)

Many thanks to Marta Pertegás for flagging Medeon Sarl v Siem Industries S.A. ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:1248, in which the Gerechtshof Den Haag (upon appeal in summary proceedings) confirmed recognition and enforcement of a High Court (London) default order for payment.

Exclusive choice of court for the English courts had been made by the parties in a Bond Transfer and Purchase Agreement – BTPA.

(Both parties are domiciled at Luxembourg. That the case contained enough ‘international’ elements was not at issue, see the limitations on this point in A1(2) of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention and see CJEU Inkreal’s reference to same).

Medeon’s grounds for refusal of recognition were all held to fail:

• [6.8] ff:  re A8(4) a Hague Convention: “Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired.”

The Court held that  A13(3) 2 of the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)’s ‘In considering whether to set aside or vary a [default] judgment (…), the matters to which the court must have regard include whether the person seeking to set aside the judgment made an application to do so promptly.” (emphasis added) clearly does not include a time limit yet clearly must be made timely.

A passing reference was made to English authorities seemingly referred to by Medeon. However the Dutch court generally held that it would be ‘unreasonable’ (6.11) to deny the enforceability to Siem, seeing as Medeon had all manner of time and options to introduce an opposition to the default order, even alongside negotiations on the amounts due. Its failure to do so must have consequences. Nemo auditur proprium turpitidnimen allegans, in other words.

 

• [6.13] ff: re A9 (c) Hague Convention:  [recognition may be refused if] “the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, including the essential elements of the claim,….i)  was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented his case without contesting notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to be contested..”:

Here the Court held that the part of a form prescribed by the English CPR rules which had not been duly notified to Siem to an agent’s address in London (identified in the BTPA) – but it was notified in Luxembourg, was not a relevant form for the Hague Convention-instructed notification of the document instituting the proceedings: this, it held, is the claim form, which was duly notified to Medeon in Luxembourg (permission for service out for that was not required seeing as there is exclusive choice of court for England).

 

• [6.18] ff the Court held that ordre public was not engaged and neither was the principle of compensation only for actual damages suffered: [6.22] Medeon’s arguments would require the type of révision au fond [6.21] which is proscribed by the Convention.

 

A good example of the impact of the Convention. Clearly, pre-Brexit this procedure would have been a lot more straightforward.

Geert.

 

 

Commission / Intel Corporation
Concurrence
La Cour de justice confirme l'annulation, par le Tribunal, de la décision de la Commission constatant un abus de position dominante de la part d’Intel et lui imposant une amende de 1,06 milliard d'euros

Kwantum Nederland et Kwantum België
Principes du droit communautaire
Propriété intellectuelle : les États membres sont tenus de protéger les œuvres d’art sur le territoire de l’Union, indépendamment du pays d’origine de ces œuvres ou de la nationalité de leur auteur

Kolin Inşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret
Liberté d'établissement
Les opérateurs économiques d’un pays tiers n’ayant pas conclu d’accord international avec l’Union en matière de marchés publics ne peuvent pas se prévaloir de l’égalité de traitement dans ce domaine

A resolution from the European Parliament on the policy implications of the development of virtual worlds was published last Thursday at the OJEU (the resolution itself is from January). It contains a few parts on private international law:

“Private international law

13. Stresses that certain traditional territorial principles on applicable law and jurisdiction might prove inadequate to virtual worlds, whose non-territoriality is enabled by the use of decentralised technologies such as blockchain, and give rise to problems when it comes to ensuring the applicability of EU law and the protection of the rights of consumers and businesses;

14. Notes more specifically that, since anyone anywhere in the world can access virtual worlds, the ‘mosaic criterion’ established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, by which the injured party may seek compensation in the courts of the countries where at least a part of the harm occurred, might not hold; recalls, however, that the Court established an additional criterion whereby injured parties can claim compensation through the courts of the country in which they have their main interest and affirms that the codification of this criterion into the Brussels I Regulation could be considered;

Read more: Virtual worlds and Private International Law

15. Observes that the definition of ‘consumer’ in the Brussels I Regulation is currently based on a direct contractual relationship, which is missing for instance between the issuer of a non-fungible token (NFT) and the purchaser when the NFT is put on a secondary market; notes that, consequently, in the event of a dispute with the issuer, the final purchaser would be deprived of the jurisdictional treatment that the Brussels I Regulation grants to consumers;

16. Calls on the Commission to take into account these and other potentially problematic situations and to assess the appropriateness of the existing provisions of private international law applicable in the EU, proposing appropriate amendments, where necessary, to guarantee that citizens and businesses do not have to systematically litigate in foreign courts or under foreign laws in order to enforce their rights, thus making sure that their rights under the EU regulatory framework are fully guaranteed, while bearing in mind the risk of forum shopping, in particular on the part of non-EU companies”.

Source: Policy implications of the development of virtual worlds – civil, company, commercial and intellectual property law issues – European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2024 on policy implications of the development of virtual worlds – civil, company, commercial and intellectual property law issues (2023/2062(INI)), OJ C, C/2024/5720, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5720/oj

Santander Bank Polska
Rapprochement des législations
Remboursement anticipé d’un crédit immobilier : le consommateur peut récupérer une partie de la commission liée à l’octroi du crédit s’il n’a pas été informé que cette dernière ne dépend pas de la durée du contrat

Sony Computer Entertainment Europe
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
La directive concernant la protection juridique des programmes d’ordinateur ne permet pas au titulaire de cette protection d’interdire la commercialisation par un tiers d’un logiciel qui ne fait que modifier des variables insérées temporairement dans la mémoire vive d’une console de jeu

In my August conflict of laws exams I asked the students the following question:

In Case C-494/23 Maha, facts are as follows. On 19 August 2017, applicants purchased a motor vehicle in Germany. On 12 September 2017, the vehicle was seized by the Police of the Czech Republic on the ground that it is the subject of suspicion of the criminal offence of theft committed in France. Subsequently, the Police placed the vehicle in custody. Applicants then filed an application with the Czech court for the release of the vehicle from custody.

Given that, in previous proceedings, other persons had claimed a right to the vehicle, according to Czech law consent of all of the persons concerned is required for the release of the subject of custody, or the substitution of their consent by a court ruling. Consequently, applicants filed an application with the same court against defendants resident in France, for the substitution of their consent to the release of the item from custody. The defendants did not attend the proceedings

The CJEU is asked to determine

1. 1. 1. 1. whether proceedings concerning the substitution of the defendant’s consent to the release of an item from judicial custody in which the item was placed by a law enforcement authority in criminal proceedings, falls within the autonomous term of EU law of a ‘civil and commercial matter’ as defined in Brussels Ia.; and
         2. if it indeed does fall within that term, whether an application initiating such proceedings may be deemed to constitute an application in ‘any other third-party proceedings’ within the meaning of A8(2) Brussels Ia.

How in your view should the CJEU respond? Answer both questions, even if you argue that the answer to question 1 should be in the negative.

I was of course expecting students to review the core ‘civil and commercial’ cases as reviewed extensively on the blog -and in class; I don’t just ask students to read the blog ;-¬ , to highlight the continuing confusion /uncertainty, and to make a determination either way.

My two cents was on the claim indeed being civil and commercial. It is a claim in the periphery of a criminal investigation yet the claim itself is one in pure restitution /confirmation of ownership, between parties neither of whom are public authorities, where no extraordinary powers are being used by any of the parties involved.

The CJEU held differently two weeks ago. It is imo indicative of the state of confusion over this core trigger for Brussels Ia that another commentator, perfectly legitimately, finds the judgment ‘not surprising’.

Consider the reasons for the referring court to suggest the case might be civil and commercial, [19]:

The referring court is of the opinion that certain considerations lead to the conclusion that the proceedings for substituting consent to the release from court custody come within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and, consequently, within the material scope of that regulation. Accordingly, the purpose of court custody is to dispel, in the context of a civil action, any doubt as to which of the persons concerned may have the item returned to them by reason of a right to property or another right. Furthermore, those proceedings, which are inter partes, are governed by rules of civil procedure, more specifically by those relating to special court proceedings.

I won’t repeat all the references included by the CJEU seeing as they are the classic ones (all reviewed on the blog); this time the core port of call would seem to have been Lechouritou where the Court had summarised its position (in 2007) and with reference to other classics [Eurocontrol, Rüffer [7]; Gemeente Steenbergen [28]; Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der Nederlanden [20]; Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ [22]] as follows:

It is to be remembered that, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from the Brussels Convention for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the terms of that provision should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. It is thus clear from the Court’s settled case-law that ‘civil and commercial matters’ must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Brussels Convention and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems …

According to the Court, that interpretation results in the exclusion of certain legal actions and judicial decisions from the scope of the Brussels Convention, by reason either of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject matter of the action …

Thus, the Court has held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of the Brussels Convention, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public power.

Core of the CJEU’s Lechoritou reference in current case is in [44]. The referring court and the claimants had argued that the preliminary proceedings take place between individuals not involving law enforcement authorities, that the procedure is inter partes and that the detailed rules for its exercise are governed by rules of civil procedure (the kind of arguments which in other cases assisted in coming to a finding of ‘civil and commercial’). In Mahá the CJEU answers [44] with reference to Lechoritou ([41)}

the fact that the plaintiff acts on the basis of a claim which arises from an act in the exercise of public powers is sufficient for his action, whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law for that purpose, to be treated as being outside the scope of the Brussels Convention

Pro memoria: Lechoritou involved a claim by Greek nationals against the German State, on the basis of a nazi massacre in 1943. A money claim by private individuals against a foreign state (unlike current case between private parties) directly ‘arising from’ the ultimate act of sovereign power namely warfare.

The situation in current case is very very different.

[36] the CJEU insists that the current action is “based on”  –I do not think it is: it follows from it, it is not based on it– “the seizure proceedings ordered by the law enforcement authorities and the placing of the property in question in the custody of the court.” This, it says [36] “is an essential prerequisite for the release of the property from the custody of the court and the restoration of the property” and [37] “It follows that, in the light of both its subject matter and its basis, since proceedings to substitute consent are inextricably linked to the seizure of the property at issue by the law enforcement authorities and to the subsequent placing of the property in the custody of the court, they cannot be examined without having regard to those proceedings.” (emphasis added)

This focus on ‘inextricably linked’, the ‘prerequisite’ of the property claim and the vicinity of the criminal proceedings brings us close in my view to the context criterion adopted by the Court in Kuhn and  in my view is likely to lead to yet further confusion, as well as forum shopping possibilities. There is an infinite amount of civil claims which are inextricably linked to criminal proceedings which are the prerequisite of the civil claim at issue or arise form such a claim. Take libel actions which in many States are a criminal offence, or take follow-on damages claims in competition law or unfair competition: both are criminally sanctioned in all EU Member States. Leaving it up to national courts to decide whether the link is intimate enough to warrant exclusion from Brussels Ia is likely to endanger Brussels Ia’s number one DNA, which last time I looked, continues to be predictability.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, Heading 2.2.2.2.

 

In C-425/22 MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Mercedes-Benz Group AG Emiliou AG had opined in that a parent company cannot rely on the competition law concept of economic unit to establish jurisdiction where it has its registered seat, re a claim for damages for the harm suffered by its subsidiaries. I referred in my review of the Opinion to my colleague Joeri Vananroye summarising it as :

“In corporate law terms: yes to outsider veil piercing, no to insider reverse veil piercing. Outsiders may disregard legal structure and go for economic reality; but not those who set up that structure. See also: rules on derivate damages.”

The CJEU confirmed early July (yes, I have a blog queue to tackle…): [44]

the objectives of proximity and predictability of the rules governing jurisdiction and consistency between the forum and the applicable law, and the unhindered possibility of claiming damages for the harm arising from an infringement of competition law affecting a member of the economic unit, preclude a reverse application of the concept of ‘economic unit’ for the determination of the place where the damage occurred, for the purposes of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012.

The CJEU further explains these principles in current context with reference to the same case-law as the AG and as reviewed in my post.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.438 ff.

https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1809233522462183689

The CJEU in Grand Chamber held 10 days back in C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club  de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA. No English version was yet available at the time of writing.

The Court in essence confirms Spzunar AG’s Opinion which I reviewed here.

Its findings echo the language and sentiment of Article 16 of the EU’s anti-SLAPP Directive 2024/1069 (that Article addressing non-recognition of third country judgments).

The Grand Chamber emphasises mutual trust and the consequential very narrow room for refusal of recognition on ordre public grounds, even in the context of the application of the Charter’s Article 11 freedom of expression grounds: refusal must be exceptional, case-based, and not based on an entirely new balancing act.

However the court of enforcement must refuse to recognise if the Article 11 rights are fundamentally impacted. In exercising that assessment, it must i.a. take account of the distinction between the reputation of a legal cq natural person (the former lacking the ‘moral’ element of impacting on the ‘dignity’ of the person: [58]), the financial capacity of the defendant (accused to have libeled) [68], and the stiffing impact caused by a disproportionate difference between the actual damage suffered, and the libel award [62 ff].

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.

 

Transfert partiel de compétence de la Cour de justice au Tribunal : création au sein du Tribunal d’une chambre spécialisée en matière préjudicielle et élection d’avocats généraux

Élection de deux présidents de chambre du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

M. Maciej Szpunar est réélu premier avocat général de la Cour de justice

Élection des présidents des chambres à cinq juges de la Cour de justice

M. Thomas von Danwitz est élu vice-président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

M. Koen Lenaerts est réélu président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne