Flux européens

— This is the amended version of a post published on 14 June 2016. 

On 17 June 2016 the University Milano-Bicocca will host a conference on Divorce and parental responsibility under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

The participation to the colloquium is reserved to judges and attorneys selected by the Scuola Superiore della Magistratura and by the Associazione Italiana degli Avvocati per la famiglia e per i minori (AIAF).

Presentations will be given by academics from Italy, Croatia, Spain and Lithuania on issues such as the habitual residence and the hearing of the child, prorogation of jurisdiction and transfer of proceedings.

Speakers include Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Carola Ricci (Univ. Pavia) and Costanza Honorati (Univ. Milano Bicocca).

Further information may be found in the flyer of the initiative, available here.

Scade il 15 luglio 2016 il termine per iscriversi all’edizione 2016 di EULoS, una summer school sui temi del diritto del mare rivolta a laureati e dottorandi, organizzata dalle Università di Genova e Brema, dalla Hochschule Bremerhaven e dall’Institut für Seevölkerrecht und Internationales Meeresumweltrecht di Brema.

I corsi si terranno a Brema, fra il 22 agosto e il 2 settembre 2016.

Come la passata edizione, anche le lezioni di quest’anno toccheranno, fra gli altri, argomenti di interesse internazionalprivatistico.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Commission / Royaume-Uni
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
Le Royaume-Uni peut exiger que les bénéficiaires des allocations familiales et du crédit d’impôt pour enfant disposent d’un droit de séjour dans cet État

Commission / Royaume-Uni
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
Le Royaume-Uni peut exiger que les bénéficiaires des allocations familiales et du crédit d’impôt pour enfant disposent d’un droit de séjour dans cet État

Commission / Royaume-Uni
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
Le Royaume-Uni peut exiger que les bénéficiaires des allocations familiales et du crédit d’impôt pour enfant disposent d’un droit de séjour dans cet État

On 17 June 2016 the University Milano-Bicocca will host a conference on Divorce and parental responsibility under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

Presentations will be given by academics from Croatia, Spain and Lithuania on issues such as the habitual residence and the hearing of the child, prorogation of jurisdiction and transfer of proceedings.

Further information may be found in the flyer of the initiative, available here.

According to a document of 3 June 2016 (9770/16), the Council of the European Union is expected to confirm a general approach on the Commission’s proposals for two regulations on the property regimes of international couples.

The regulations are meant to implement enhanced cooperation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, and on the property consequences of registered partnerships.

The general approach refers to the texts of the regulations as result, respectively, from document 8115/16 and document 8118/16 of the Council, both dated 30 May 2016.

As noticed in an earlier post, eighteen Member States have expressed the intention to take part in the enhanced cooperation.

The adoption of the regulations will take place once the European Parliament has given its opinion in accordance with Article 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

In Case C-185/15 Kostanjevec, Kokott AG (not available in English at the time of writing) advised on a number of issues in relation to a counterclaim under Article 6(3) Brussels I (now 8(3) of the Recast). At the core of the dispute lies a leasing contract and the consumer counterclaiming for restitution per unjust enrichment, of the sums she had transferred to counterparty. The counterclaim follows the annulment of the contract between the two, even though Marjan Kostanjevec had initially been ordered to pay.

The first relates to the temporal scope not of the Recast Brussels I Regulation viz Brussels I, but rather simply of Regulation 44/2001, in particular with respect to a Member State (Slovenia) which joined the EU on 1 May 2004. The Brussels Convention had never applied to Slovenia. The proceedings between parties  go back to 1995, prompting the EC among others to suggest that per Article 66 of the Regulation (This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted…after the entry into force thereof) it simply does not apply. Kokott AG however suggests first of all that the new claim in restitution, followed the use of a separate means of redress under Slovenian law, instituted after the initial claim by the leasing company had been wrapped up in its entirety. Moreover, other language versions refer not to ‘proceedings’ but rather to a claim (defined in C-341/93 Danvaern Production as claims by defendants which seek the pronouncement of a separate judgment or decree. It does not apply to the situation where a defendant raises, as a pure defence, a claim which he allegedly has against the plaintiff (at 18). 

Regulation 44/2001 applies therefore, in the view of the AG. I would agree that it should: this is particularly relevant where parties have a long and complex history of litigation. (Similarities here may exist with Nikiforidis, which is in my blog pile). Applying Danvaern Production however for the interpretation of Article 66 I think may be problematic. The raison d’être of Article 6(3) is to help avoid conflicting decisions in cases that are closely related. Even if, per Danvaern, they seek a separate pronouncement, they do essentially relate to reciprocal commitments which are part of the same bundle of facts. (See also Kokott AG herself, in para 44 of her Opinion with reference to the Jenard Report and to Léger AG in Danvaern). It feels a little inconsistent to call upon arguments developed viz inseparable claims (under Art.6(3): Danvaern) to support a thesis of separability (viz the application ratione temporis: they are separate claims even if they have a common history in fact and in contractual liaison).

With reference to C-297/14 Hobohm, the AG subsequently also advises that the counterclaim is covered by the Regulation’s consumer contracts title as having a ‘close link’ with the consumer contract, and, for the sake of completeness, and with reference to Profit SIM, that claims for restitution are covered by (now) Article 7(1) ‘s forum contractus even if they are grounded in the contract at issue not actually having existed.

I am curious how the Court will approach the temporal application issue.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1.a, Heading 2.2.21.3, Heading 2.1.1

 

 

Depesme et Kerrou
Libre circulation des personnes
Selon l’avocat général Wathelet, un enfant au sein d’une famille recomposée peut être considéré comme l’enfant du beau-parent en matière d’avantage social transfrontalier

Depesme et Kerrou
Libre circulation des personnes
Selon l’avocat général Wathelet, un enfant au sein d’une famille recomposée peut être considéré comme l’enfant du beau-parent en matière d’avantage social transfrontalier

Depesme et Kerrou
Libre circulation des personnes
Selon l’avocat général Wathelet, un enfant au sein d’une famille recomposée peut être considéré comme l’enfant du beau-parent en matière d’avantage social transfrontalier

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

Pesce e.a.
Agriculture
La Commission peut obliger les États membres à enlever tous les végétaux susceptibles d’être infectés par la bactérie Xylella fastidiosa, même en l’absence de symptômes d’infection, lorsqu’ils se trouvent à proximité de végétaux déjà infectés par cette bactérie

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

EGEDA e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROP
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à ce que la compensation équitable destinée aux auteurs en cas de copie privée de leurs œuvres soit soumise à un système de financement budgétaire tel que celui institué en Espagne

Entrée en fonction de nouveaux juges au Tribunal

Entrée en fonction de nouveaux juges au Tribunal

In  AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR at Strasbourg held late May that Article 6 ECHR (right to fair trial) was engaged but not infringed by the Latvian’s Supreme Court’s application of Article 34(2( Brussel I (now Article 45(1) b Brussels I Recast).

The Article reads ‘A judgment shall not be recognised: (…) 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;…

In the case at issue applicant sought refusal by the Latvian court of recognition of a Cypriot judgment issued against him. After review of the Regulation’s core pedigree of mutual recognition and mutual trust, burden of proof particularly exercised the Court: at 121:

‘The fact that the applicant relied on that Article (34(2), GAVC) without having challenged the judgment as required necessarily raised the question of the availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the circumstances of the present case. In such a situation the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 January 2007, for not appealing against the judgment concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of the burden of proof with regard to the existence and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to verify that this condition was satisfied, in the absence of which it could not refuse to examine the applicant’s complaint. The Court considers that the determination of the burden of proof, which, as the European Commission stressed (see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by European Union law, was therefore decisive in the present case. Hence, that point should have been examined in adversarial proceedings leading to reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof lay with the defendant or that such a remedy had in fact been available to the applicant. This approach, which reflects a literal and automatic application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the protection afforded was manifestly deficient such that the presumption of equivalent protection of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific circumstances of the present application the Court does not consider this to be the case, although this shortcoming is regrettable.’

Those ‘specific circumstances’ include in particular the applicant’s professional background: at 124:

‘the applicant, who was an investment consultant, should have been aware of the legal consequences of the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, concerned a sum of money borrowed by the applicant from a Cypriot company and contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have ensured that he was familiar with the manner in which possible proceedings would be conducted before the Cypriot courts (…). Having omitted to obtain information on the subject he contributed to a large extent, as a result of his inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about the situation of which he complained before the Court and which he could have prevented so as to avoid incurring any damage’. 

I am not convinced by the Court’s view on the burden of proof ad on the national court’s duty to assess the law in the State of origin sua sponte. Judges Lemmens and Briede, jointly concurring but for different reasons as the court, in my view have the better argument where they say

‘If the applicant wanted to argue that no remedy had in fact been available to him in Cyprus, in our opinion it would have been for him to raise this issue explicitly before the Supreme Court. We question whether he could expect the Supreme Court to raise that issue of its own motion. And we definitely consider that he cannot complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of an explicit response to an argument that was not explicitly made.’

The end result is the same at the ECtHR. For future application of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation however it makes a big difference.

Geert.