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You are invited to the next Migration Talk organized by the Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the European Union and in Türkiye.

Speakers: Dr. Hamed Abdollahpour Ranjbar (Istinye University), Khaled Elazab, MA (Clark University), Yomna Nassar, MA (Koç University), Farah Amayreh (Koç University), Dr. Ibrahim Yigit (Florida State University), Prof. Dr. Janet Molzan Turan (Koç University), and Prof. Dr. Bülent Turan (Koç University)

Title:Stigma in the Lives of Refugees Living in Turkey

Date and Time: Monday, May 4, 2026 – 12:30 PM – 1:20 PM (Turkish Time)
Event Location: via Zoom (The Zoom link shall be provided upon request: migration@bilkent.edu.tr)

The event will be held in English.

Abstract
The research is conducted with Syrian and Afghan refugees living in Istanbul, Turkiye to explore and examine effects of stigma and microaggressions in these populations.
It is based on 8 focus groups separately for men and women, four groups with Syrian refugees and four with Afghan refugees, with 4-10 participants in each group. Participants shared that stigma and microaggressions were central forces shaping every dimension of their daily life, well-being, and future plans. The intensity and ubiquity of these experiences appeared to exceed what is commonly documented in other stigmatized populations, owing in part to the visibility and politicization of refugee identity in the current sociopolitical climate in Türkiye, which allows and condones stigma and microaggressions against these populations. Refugees described that they and their children experienced mental and physical health problems not only due to trauma and difficulties faced before and during migration, but also due to post-displacement stigma and microaggressions that they experienced on a daily basis. Refugees employed a range of coping strategies to deal with these challenges, avoidance of interactions with Turks, forms of identity concealment (e.g., not revealing nationality, changing names, or not speaking their native language in public), avoidance of confrontation, and in some cases educating their neighbors to confront and correct stereotypes.

In the quantitative phase of the research, the research group developed the Refugee Stigma Scale (RSS) informed by the literature and qualitative and quantitative data. The scale includes four theoretical dimensions of stigma: perceived community stigma, experienced stigma, anticipated stigma, and internalized stigma. In a sample of 404 Syrian and 447 Afghan refugees in Türkiye, confirmatory factor analysis supported the hypothesized four-factor structure of the RSS. Results also supported convergent validity of the four subscales showing correlations with validated measures of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), somatic symptoms, post-migration difficulties, and contact experiences.

The research group also developed a subscale assessing microaggressions (subtle/ambiguous discriminatory remarks or behaviors). Convergent validity of the Microaggression Scale for Refugees (MSR) was supported by high correlations between microaggressions and experienced stigma, somatic symptoms, post-migration difficulties, and contact experiences with the host country. Importantly, both experienced stigma and microaggressions contributed independently to explaining variance in psychological and somatic symptoms.

It is also explored the concept of identity denial in the context of refugee stigma using the new scales. Even after many years of immigrating, immigrants can have their new cultural identity (in this case, their Turkish identity) denied or unacknowledged. Based on a survey of 156 young Syrian adults living in Türkiye for many years, the research found that Turkish identity denial was associated with higher depressive symptoms and lower psychological well-being, mediated by perceived and anticipated stigma. Furthermore, a challenged sense of belonging was an independent parallel mediating mechanism by which identity denial was associated with psychological well-being and depressive symptoms.

As report earlier on this blog, the third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, from 18 to 20 June 2026. Under the title “Shaping the Future of Private International Law in Europe – Putting Together the Pieces & Filling Gaps”, the conference will address structural developments, unresolved issues, and emerging challenges in European private international law.  The program is available on the conference’s website.

Registration will close in two weeks, on 17 May 2026. You are welcome to register using this link.

EAPIL is looking forward to seeing you in Geneva!

The third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 18-20 June 2026. The conference will present current developments in Private International Law. Presentations will then focus on a proposal to consolidate the current European Private International Law regulations in one single instrument (EuPIL Act), on […]

In an increasingly multipolar world, national and regional actors are reasserting regulatory control over cross-border economic activities. States such as the United States and China, as well as the European Union, are increasingly relying on unilateral measures with extraterritorial reach – particularly in areas such as sanctions, digital regulation, supply chains, competition law, and data protection. At the same time, the multilateral order appears to be under strain: international organizations are being sidelined, agreements are terminated or ignored, and established norms are openly challenged.

To explore the implications of these developments for international (economic) law and the future of global economic cooperation, the German Society of International Law (DGIR) will host a conference in Munich on 11–12 June 2026. Focusing on “Law without Borders? Extraterritorial Regulation and Unilateral Action” the event promises to provide a timely and critical forum for discussing the evolving role of extraterritorial regulation and unilateralism in shaping the international legal order.

Programme

Thursday, 11 June 2026 – National (Regional) Law and Global Markets
The first day will focus on national (regional) law and the regulation of global markets. It will feature presentations by Moritz Renner (Mannheim)  and Romy Klimke (BSP Business and Law School Berlin) followed by a commentary by Andreas Ziegler (Lausanne).

In the evening, Frank Hoffmeister (Brussels) will deliver a practitioner keynote on “The European Union as an Actor in International Economic Law,” followed by a reception.

Friday, 12 June 2026 – Economic Sanctions and International Conflicts
The second day will deal with economic sanctions and international conflicts. Presentations will be delivered Till Patrik Holterhus (Saarbrücken) and Markus Lieberknecht (Osnabrück) followed with a commentary by Tanja Domej (Zurich).

Venue and Registration

The conference will take place at the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation in Munich (Südliches Schlossrondell 23, 80638 Munich). If you wish to join please register before 31 May via this linke: https://eveeno.com/dgir-kurztagung-2026.

The conference is organized by Christian Walter (LMU Munich), Markus Krajewski (FAU Erlangen) and Giesela Rühl (Humboldt University of Berlin). For further questions please contact the organizing team at dgir-kurztagung-2026@jura.uni-muenchen.de.

The Frankfurt Law Review is currently looking for submissions for a special edition dedicated to the topic of Digital Transformation.

Submissions can be drafted specifically for the review but may also be based on seminar papers or other academic assignments; they are accepted until 31 May 2026.

The full call for papers can be found here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 30 March to 1 April, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) held its fifth meeting. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG continued to make progress in its study of the jurisdiction and applicable law issues raised by the cross-border use and transfers of CBDCs, including the desirability and feasibility of a possible future instrument on these issues, with particular attention to their use in payments with a cross-border or international element. More information is available here.

From 15 to 17 April 2026, the High-Level Conference on the Universalisation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Hague Conference on Private International Law was held in Dakar (Senegal). The conference convened ministers and senior officials from French-speaking States in Africa for a high-level discussion on the benefits and practicalities of strengthened engagement with the PCA and the HCCH. More information is available here.

On 8 and 22 April 2026, the first and second meetings of the Working Group on the operation of Article 33 of the 1996 Child Protection Convention were held online, hosted by the Permanent Bureau. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group worked on the development of a Model Form for requests under Article 33. More information is available here and here.

 

Upcoming events

The 14th International Forum on the electronic Apostille Programme will take place on 12 and 13 May 2026 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Forum will provide a unique international platform for governments, organisations, and the private sector to learn more about the benefits of the e-APP, to promote its effective implementation, and to discuss the latest developments in relation to the e-APP worldwide. Interested persons should register via this form no later than Friday 1 May 2026, 5.00 p.m. (CEST). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

On 16–17 April 2026, the elegant setting of Villa Ruspoli in Florence hosted the First National Congress of ASGiC – the Society for the Study of Consensual Justice, titled Giustizia e cooperazione: il valore del consenso (Justice and Cooperation: The Value of Consent). Marked by a large and engaged participation, the event offered a valuable opportunity for both the Society’s members and a wider community of scholars and practitioners to reflect on the role of consent in contemporary conceptions of justice.

The Congress opened with introductory remarks by the Society’s President, Silvana Dalla Bontà, who set out the themes and objectives guiding the initiative. Against this backdrop, the keynote lectures delivered by Tommaso Greco, Andrea Simoncini, and Filippo Danovi developed a first, coherent reflection on consensual justice, identifying a variety of core concepts – trust, consent, justice, solidarity, Constitution, language, and dialogue – that are likely to orient the Society’s future research and activities.

This conceptual framework found further expression in the conferral of honorary membership upon Francesco Paolo Luiso, Marta Cartabia, Adolfo Ceretti, and Luciana Breggia. The laudationes underscored how, from different perspectives – civil procedure, constitutional adjudication, criminology, and judicial practice – their work has contributed to shaping approaches to justice grounded in participation, dialogue, and shared responsibility.

The discussion then broadened through the interdisciplinary roundtable moderated by Pierluigi Consorti. Contributions from Maurizio Biggeri, Marco Cadinu, Marianella Sclavi, Valeria Cantoni Mamiani, Stefano Rozzi, and Luca Toschi moved beyond strict legal analysis, engaging with insights from the social sciences and communication studies to explore more deeply the relationship between interpersonal dynamics and consent.

In her concluding remarks, Vice-President Paola Lucarelli drew together the main threads of the Congress, emphasising the importance of maintaining a close connection between theoretical reflection and practical application. The General Assembly that followed endorsed the Society’s programmatic lines, consolidating the directions that had emerged over the course of the two days.

Looking ahead, ASGiC announced its next steps: a Colloquium to be held in 2027 at the University of Trento and the Second National Congress in 2028 in Taormina, to be organised by founding members Marco Gradi and Antonio Cappuccio of the University of Messina.

In this perspective, the Florence Congress may be construed as the starting point of a broader and ongoing reflection on consensual justice – one that seeks to connect doctrinal inquiry with practice, and to contribute to current debates on more participatory and dialogical models of dispute resolution.

Multinationals and Human Rights in Asia

Edited by Jason Ho Ching Cheung and Kazuaki Nishioka

 

This book investigates the availability in Asian jurisdictions of civil remedies against multinational businesses for human rights abuses.

 

It assesses whether the norms of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have taken root in Asia by first considering the international state of play. It then presents case studies of corporate governance and human rights in Asia, before examining emerging issues, and considering how Asia has dealt and can deal with corporate responsibility in connection with those matters. By way of conclusion, the book offers an action plan for implementing the UN Guiding Principles in Asia.

 

Jason Ho Ching Cheung is a Hong Kong barrister and New York attorney practicing from Albert Luk’s Chambers, Hong Kong and Yodoyabashi & Yamagami LPC, Japan. He is also a part-time lecturer at the Graduate School of Law and the Institute for the Liberal Arts at Doshisha University, Japan.

Kazuaki Nishioka is a specially appointed Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Law of Kobe University, Japan.

 

Apr 2026   |   9781509980406   |   328pp   |   Hbk   |    RRP: £100

Discount Price: £80

Order online at www.hartpublishing.co.uk  – use the code GLR BD8 to get 20% off!

Sign up to our email list to receive updates about our new titles.

 

On 18 March 2026, the European Commission presented the proposal for a Regulation on the 28th regime corporate legal framework – ‘EU inc.’. The initiative introduces a new, optional European limited liability company, conceived as a “28th regime”. Rather than approximating national laws, the proposal establishes a self-standing and directly applicable corporate framework, coexisting with […]

As already announced, there will be an international conference “International Filiation Law in the EU” dealing with questions of filiation law resulting from the EU Parenthood Proposal.

Everybody interested in legal questions of cross-border filiation is welcome. Participation is free, but registration will be required (details follow soon). Any inquiries can be directed to sekretariat.goessl@jura.uni-bonn.de.

 

The programme reads:

Day 1: 24.09.2026

13:00

Martin Böse, Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Bonn: Welcome Address
Susanne Gössl, University of Bonn: Introduction
Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The EU Commission’s Parenthood Proposal (Overview)

14:15

Ulrike Kjestina Janzen, German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection: The Commission’s Parenthood Proposal – Considerations and Policy Interests and Expectations from a Member State’s Perspective
Alina Tryfonidou, University of Cyprus: Filiation and EU Primary Law: The Portability of the Parent-Child Status in CJEU Case-law

15:00

Velina Todorova,  University of Plovdiv & Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The Human Rights Frame in International Filiation Law (1): The Rights of the Child, esp. the Right to Know One’s Origins
Rachele Zamperini, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The Human Rights Frame in International Filiation Law (2): LGBTIAQ* Rights and Women’s Rights

16:45

Patrick Wautelet, University of Liège: Many Faces of Birth Certificates in International Filiation Law
Nicolas Nord, ICCS: Filiation Certificate and a Central Registry in the EU

Day 2: 25.09.2026

09:30

Laima Vaige, University of Uppsala: Scope of the EU Parenthood Proposal and Relationship to Other International and EU Instruments
Cristina González Beilfuss, University of Barcelona: Which Rules of Jurisdiction for International Filiation?

11:15

Martina Melcher, University of Graz: How Should the Law Governing International Filiation be Determined?
Susanne Gössl, University of Bonn: Recognition of Court Decisions and the Public Policy Exception in International Filiation Law

12:30

Final Remarks and Conclusions

Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law) and Adrian Rycerski (SWPS University in Poznan) have issued a call for abstracts in view of the international scientific conference titled Modern Problems of Private International Law. The conference will take place online on 19 November 2026. The focus will be on modern problems of private international law, with […]

 

Many thanks to Karim El Chazli  (Consulting and Testifying Expert on Arab Laws) for the tip-off

 

I. Introduction

The field of foreign judgments in the MENA region has witnessed additional legal developments. After Morocco, which adopted in February a new Code of Civil Procedure containing an updated regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments (see my previous on this blog), Saudi Arabia followed suit by adopting a new Execution Law (Nizam at-Tanfidh), approved by the Council of Ministers on 15 April 2026 (27–28 Shawwal 1447 H), which contains rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments. The new law replaces the existing Execution Law promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/53 of 3 July 2012 (13 Sha’baan1433 H).

The Execution Law governs, inter alia, the execution of “titles of obligation” (sanadat tanfidhiyya (pl.), sanad tanfidhi (sing.); lit. “enforceable titles”) in general, as defined by the Law. These include, among others, foreign judgments, foreign arbitral awards, and foreign authentic instruments declared enforceable in accordance with the rules set out in the Law. The new Execution Law (new Article 7) adds to the existing list (former Article 9) mediated settlement agreements concluded abroad. This addition appears to be linked to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a State Party to the 2018 Singapore Convention, which was ratified on 5 May 2020 and entered into force on 5 November of the same year.

 

II. Enforcement Requirements

With respect to the regime applicable to the enforcement of foreign judgments, the new conditions are now laid down in new article 9 of the new Law.

 New Article 9(1) of the 2026 Execution Law reads as follows (loose tentative translation):

1. Without prejudice to the obligations of the Kingdom under international treaties and agreements, the court [the Execution Court] shall not declare enforceable a foreign judgment or order except on the basis of reciprocity and after examining that the following conditions are met:

a) The dispute in which the foreign judgment or order was rendered does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Kingdom.

b) There is no similar case pending in the Kingdom that was filed before the case in which the foreign judgment or order was rendered.

c) The parties to the proceedings in which the foreign judgment was rendered were duly summoned, properly represented, and given the opportunity to defend themselves.

d) The foreign judgment or order has become final, in accordance with the law governing the competent judicial authority that rendered it.

e)  The foreign judgment or order does not conflict with a prior judgment or order—on the same subject matter—rendered by a competent judicial authority in the Kingdom.

f) The foreign judgment or order does not violate the public policy of the Kingdom.

Paragraph 2 deals with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign mediated settlement agreements, while paragraph 3 deals with the enforcement of foreign authentic instruments.

 

III. Observations

If we compare the new enforcement requirements with those set out in the 2012 Execution Law, we can see that most of them have been reproduced without any significant modification, although in some cases slightly different wording has been used. This is particularly true of the requirements listed in items (c) [service and the right of defence], (d) [finality], (e) [conflicting judgments], and (f) [public policy], as well as of the proviso, which contains a reference to the reciprocity requirement.

At the same time, some significant differences can be observed, particularly with respect to the rules on indirect jurisdiction (1) and the existence of a pending case before Saudi courts (2). Further important clarifications relate to two other fundamental issues: the prohibition of révision au fond (3) and the limitation period for enforcing titles of obligation (4).

 

1. Indirect Jurisdiction

First, the most notable change concerns the control of the indirect jurisdiction of the rendering court. Indeed, under the 2012 Execution Law, the jurisdiction of the foreign rendering court was subject to a double control: first, by verifying that the dispute did not fall within the jurisdiction of Saudi courts (in general, and without any specific limitation); and second, by checking that the rendering court had jurisdiction in accordance with its own rules of international jurisdiction.

The new Execution Law significantly modifies the scope of the jurisdictional requirement and limits it to cases over which Saudi courts have exclusive jurisdiction. In doing so, the Saudi legislator joins other countries in the region that have adopted similar approaches, notably Tunisia (see Béligh Elbalti, “The Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts and the Enforcement of their Judgments in Tunisia: A Need for Reconsideration”, 8(2) Journal of Private International Law (2012) 195, and recently Morocco (see Béligh Elbalti, “The New Moroccan Framework on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgment Enforcement – A Preliminary Critical Assessment”, on this blog. For a comparative overview on the various approaches adopted in the MENA region, see Béligh Elbalti, “The recognition of foreign judgments as a tool of economic integration: Views from Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf countries”, in P. Sooksripaisarnkit and S. R. Garimella (eds.), China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law (Routledge, 2018) 226; idem, “Perspective from the Arab World”, in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook (Hart, 2023) 187 ).

The problem with the new rule, however, is that Saudi law on international jurisdiction does not contain clear rules on what constitutes “exclusive jurisdiction.” The relevant provisions on international jurisdiction contained in the Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts (Nizam al-Murafa’at al-Shar’iyya, Royal Decree No. M/1 of 24 November 2013 (22 Muharram 1435H), Articles 24 to 30) do not define or clearly identify which heads of jurisdiction are exclusive. As a result, the scope of the requirement may remain uncertain in practice, which could lead to a restrictive or inconsistent approach in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

 

2. Pending case before Saudi Courts

Item (b) of Article 9 of the new Law is an addition that has no equivalent in Article 11 of the 2012 Execution Law. While this requirement is generally found in the international conventions applicable in the region (notably the 1983 Riyadh Convention and the 1995 GCC Convention), it has almost no equivalent in the domestic legislation of Arab countries (with the notable exception of Lebanon. See Elbalti, “Perspective from the Arab World”, op. cit., 192). It should be noted, however, that Article 9(b) requires that the action previously brought before Saudi courts and still pending be “similar (mumathila)” to the one in which the foreign judgment was rendered. While the terminology used is somewhat vague, this suggests that both actions should involve the same subject matter (as is more clearly required in Article 9(e) concerning conflicting judgments). It is, however, unclear whether this requirement also extends to the identity of the parties.

 

3. Explicit prohibition to review the merits of foreign judgments

Under the 2012 Execution Law, there is no explicit provision prohibiting a review of the merits of foreign judgments. Nevertheless, such a prohibition may be inferred from the imposition of a number of formal and procedural requirements for having foreign judgments declared enforceable. In judicial practice, the principle of the prohibition of révision au fond is frequently affirmed; however, some decisions suggest that it has not always been strictly observed (see Elbalti, “Perspective from the Arab World”, op. cit., 185). The new Law has addressed this issue expressly in Article 4(2), which provides that “Subject to the provisions of Article (9) of the Law, the court shall ensure that the title of obligation satisfies its statutory requirements, without examining the merits of the right forming its subject matter”.

 

4. Limitation period to execution of the titles of obligations

The new Enforcement Law clarifies the limitation period applicable to the execution of titles of obligation. Under new Article 11, execution lapses upon the expiry of ten (10) years from the date on which the title becomes due and enforceable. Although this rule also applies to foreign judgments as titles of obligation (Article 7 of the new Law), the wording of the provision suggests that it concerns foreign judgments only once they have been declared enforceable by the Execution Court. The Law, however, contains no specific limitation period governing the filing of an application for a foreign judgment to be declared enforceable in Saudi Arabia. This suggests that, in principle, judgment creditors may apply at any time for such a declaration. By contrast, once enforceability has been granted, actual execution will be barred upon the expiry of the ten-year limitation period.

 

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 30 April 2026 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is: The HCCH Work Agenda in 2026. Opportunities and Challenges for AMEDIP, which will be presented by Ignacio Goicoechea, Representative of the HCCH Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86063956094?pwd=dat8bYxVWnLfBbjiNDBY4ijwMlqRo7.1

Meeting ID: 860 6395 6094

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Emilia Sandri is a doctoral candidate at the University of Antwerp. Yet another victim could be claimed by the free circulation of judgments: this time, it is choice-of-court agreements that must face the test of mutual trust. On 23 April 2026, Advocate General Emiliou delivered his Opinion in Babcock Montajes: a lis pendens case raising […]

The author of this post is Javier Carrascosa González who is a professor of private international law at University of Murcia. Determining which law should govern a case with foreign elements where the theoretically applicable foreign law has not been adequately proven before the Spanish courts has always been a highly controversial issue in Spanish […]

Contributed by Adriani Dori

Online Research Seminar Series: Call for expressions of interest

Submission Deadline:  Rolling base
Open to: Scholars, practitioners, and early-career researchers

Contact details: ecjc@law.eur.nl

Following the publication of the handbook European Civil Procedure (De Gruyter 2026), the European Civil Justice Centre (ECJC) is pleased to announce a new initiative.

ECJC ‘Civil Justice Conversations’

The ECJC ‘Civil Justice Conversations’ is a new series of online research seminars designed to foster scholarly exchange and collaboration in the field of European civil justice.

Purpose & Scope: Advancing European Civil Justice Dialogue

The seminar series aims to provide a regular forum for the presentation and discussion of research in European civil justice and related fields. It seeks to strengthen academic exchange across jurisdictions and to support the development of ongoing research projects.

Seminar Conception: Interactive & Dialogical Exchange

The seminars are designed as informal and interactive sessions in which participants may:

• Present work-in-progress or more developed research
• Receive constructive feedback on emerging ideas
• Engage in discussion with a designated discussant and a wider audience

Particular emphasis is placed on sessions that bring together contrasting or opposing perspectives, fostering critical and constructive academic dialogue.

Online Format: Accessible, Inclusive & Transnational

While in-person events are also envisaged, the online format has been chosen to:

• Facilitate broad participation across jurisdictions
• Enable regular and accessible academic exchange
• Address practical and budgetary constraints

Participation: Open Call for Scholars & Practitioners

Participation is open to all scholars and practitioners with an interest in European civil justice. Affiliation with the ECJC is not required.

We particularly welcome contributions from Early Career Researchers with a developed idea or ongoing project aligned with the Centre’s thematic areas, including collective actions, digitalisation of civil justice, ADR/ODR, legal aid and litigation funding, and anti-SLAPPs.

Selection will take into account the originality of the proposal, its stage of development, and its alignment with the Centre’s research themes.

How to Apply

Expressions of interest should include:

• A curriculum vitae
• An abstract of the proposed presentation
• Optionally, the name of a potential discussant, if already identified

Please send your application to: ecjc@law.eur.nl

Europa Law Publishing has recently published the fifth edition of the Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law written by Michael Bogdan (University of Lund) and Marta Pertegás Sender (Maastricht University and University of Antwerp). The fifth edition of this concise book is mainly intended to be used as an introduction to the rules of […]

I. Introduction

This is certainly a genuinely interesting case from Bahrain, involving the application of “foreign” Jewish customs in a succession dispute that appears to be between Jewish Bahraini nationals. Although the case seems to lack any foreign element, its relevance to conflict of laws is nonetheless clear, since – to my knowledge – this is the first case in which the applicability of “foreign” religious customs in matters of personal status has been explicitly admitted in what appears a purely domestic case. The case also provides a broader analytical framework, raising questions about the place and applicability of non-state law in private international law (this contrasts of the recent decision of the French Supreme Court denying the applicability of Jewish law, albeit in a different context) and, more generally, about the compatibility of non-Islamic religious norms with domestic public policy frameworks in Muslim-majority legal systems.

 

II. Facts

The case concerns a domestic succession dispute involving Jews in Bahrain. Although the ruling does not expressly state this, the absence of any reference to choice-of-law rules strongly suggests that the parties involved were Bahraini Jews and that the case contained no foreign elements.

Following their brother’s death, Y1 (the deceased’s brother) brought proceedings in 2024 before the High Civil Court against Y2 (the deceased’s nephew) and Y3 (the deceased’s sister), seeking the opening of the estate, the identification of the heirs, an inventory of the assets, and the devolution of the estate. The court ordered the opening of the estate and held that Y1 and Y2 were entitled to equal shares.

X et al. (the deceased’s sisters), who were not parties to the original proceedings, filed a third-party objection seeking annulment of the judgment and a redistribution of the estate among all heirs, including themselves, in equal shares, based on Jewish inheritance customs or, subsidiarily, Islamic law. The objection was dismissed on the merits, and this outcome was upheld on appeal. X et al. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Bahrain, challenging their exclusion from the inheritance.

Before the Supreme Court, X et al. argued that the lower courts had relied on Chapter 27 of the Torah (the Old Testament), a text which, they contended, no longer reflects contemporary Jewish social or religious practice. They maintained that Jewish inheritance rules have evolved over time and that current customs within Jewish communities grant women equal inheritance rights in the absence of a will, an approach adopted by many rabbinical courts worldwide. In the absence of established Jewish inheritance rules or locally recognised custom in Bahrain, they argued that prevailing foreign custom should apply, since it does not conflict with Bahraini public policy.

 

III. Ruling

In its decision of 1 December 2025, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of X et al. holding as follows (detailed summary):

Under Bahraini law, the High Civil Courts have jurisdiction over all personal status matters concerning non-Muslims. Where no statutory rule applies, Article 1 of the Civil Code requires courts to apply the customs of the religious community concerned.

Such customs are not limited to those established locally in Bahrain. If no local custom is proven, courts may apply general or foreign customs, provided that they are genuinely observed by the members of the religion concerned. The application of foreign custom is subject to two conditions: first, that it is actually and consistently followed and regarded as binding within the community, that is, it has not fallen into disuse; and second, that it does not conflict with public policy in Bahrain. Where these conditions are met, the relevant foreign custom governs matters of personal status concerning members of the religion in question.

In this case, the lower court applied Chapter 27 of the Torah on the ground that no local Jewish custom governing the distribution of inheritance existed in Bahrain, thereby excluding any consideration of customs prevailing outside the Kingdom. However, once its existence is established, foreign custom may be disregarded only where it conflicts with a statutory provision or with public policy. The failure to examine whether relevant foreign Jewish inheritance customs existed and satisfied the required conditions—namely, that they are applied in a consistent, continuous, and well-known manner among members of the Jewish faith, that they are regarded by them as binding, and that they do not violate public policy—justifies the quashing of the decision and the remittal of the case.

 

III. Comments

Generally speaking, the application of foreign law in the MENA region has long been a challenging issue question marked by uncertainty and resistance in practice (for a general comparative overview, with a special focus on civil and commercial matters, see Béligh Elbalti, “Choice of Law in International Contract and Foreign Law before MENA Arab Courts from the Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative”, in Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit, Sai Ramani Garimella (eds.), Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – Private International Law Considerations (Routledge, 2025), pp. 145-150). Against this background, the acceptance by the Bahraini Supreme Court of the application of foreign customs in matters of personal status in a purely domestic case is all the more noteworthy, insofar as certain conditions are met.

The case raises in particular two fundamental questions: (1) the applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain; and (2) the relevance of public policy in this context.

 

1. The applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain

a) General Applicable framework

Unlike some non-neighboring countries in the region, where matters of personal status of non-Muslims—whether foreigners or nationals—may be governed by special legislation (see, for example, UAE federal legislation on Civil Personal Status), Bahrain has not adopted any specific legal framework applicable to non-Muslims.

There are, however, a few notable exceptions.

First, the 1971 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (CCCP) sets out conflict-of-laws rules that are expressly applicable to personal status matters involving non-Muslims (Article 21 of the Bahraini CCCP).

Second, Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 regulates inheritance and the devolution of estates of foreign non-Muslims.

Third, Legislative Decree No. 42 of 2002 on Judicial Jurisdiction provides, in Article 6, that disputes relating to the personal status of non-Muslims fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, as opposed to the Muslim Sharia courts, which, by contrast, have subject-matter jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the personal status of Muslims, with the exception of certain disputes relating to succession, which fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Article 13). In this context, the Muslim Sharia courts are required to apply Bahrain’s Family Law of 2017 (Law No. 17 of 2017), which to date constitutes the only legislative framework governing family law matters in Bahrain. This law, however, applies exclusively before the Muslim Sharia courts, which lack jurisdiction over disputes involving non-Muslims.

Accordingly, while the civil courts have jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear personal status disputes involving non-Muslims, Bahraini law does not specify the substantive law to be applied by those courts in such matters—except where the parties are foreigners and foreign law is applicable pursuant to Bahraini choice-of-law rules, or where the dispute concerns the succession of foreign non-Muslims, in which case Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 applies.

 

b) Customs as a source of law

It is in this context that the Bahraini Supreme Court relied on Article 1 of the Bahraini Civil Code of 2001, which authorizes courts to apply customs (‘urf) in the absence of legislative provisions. The reference to customs is significant, given that Bahraini family law does not contain any provision allowing non-Muslims to invoke the application of their own religious law, unlike several neighbouring jurisdictions in the region (see Article 1(2) of the UAE Personal Status Law of 2024; Article 364 of the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law of 2007; Article 4 of the Qatari Family Law of 2006; and Article 282 of the Omani Personal Status Law of 1997).

The Bahraini Supreme Court’s case law is consistent on this point. In a previous decision of 4 April 2023, the Supreme Court quashed a lower court judgment that had applied the 2017 Bahraini Family Law to a dispute involving spouses of the Bahá’í faith, without examining whether there existed any laws or regulations among members of the Bahá’í faith in Bahrain governing their personal status matters, or whether any customs regulated such matters. Unlike the case discussed here, the 2023 decision did involve a conflict-of-laws issue in the sense of private international law, which was resolved by applying Bahraini law as the lex patriae of the husband (Article 21(3) of the CCCP). It was at then that the Supreme Court emphasized the absence of Bahraini legislation governing personal status matters for non-Muslims and justified recourse to Article 1 of the Civil Code, thereby overruling the lower court’s decision for failing to consider the applicability of Bahá’í law or custom.

However, what is remarkable in the present case is that the court extended the scope of the “customs” referred to in Article 1 of the Civil Code to include “general and foreign (external) customs”, in the absence of a local one (‘urf mahalli). Reference to foreign (external) customs is, however, subject to two cumulative conditions: (1) the foreign customs must be generally observed by members of the relevant religious community, in the sense that they must not have fallen into disuse; and (2) they must not be inconsistent with public policy in Bahrain. With respect to the first condition, the appellants argued that the classical Jewish rule prioritizing male heirs and allowing women to inherit only in the absence of sons has become obsolete in contemporary Jewish social and religious communities. They contended that it has become common practice across Jewish communities worldwide to allow women to inherit on an equal basis, a practice consistently endorsed by rabbinic courts in various legal systems worldwide.

 

2. Consistency with public policy

Another key question concerns whether succession rules that depart from Islamic Sharia should be regarded as contrary to public policy. Given the centrality of Islamic Sharia in the legal systems of many MENA countries, succession rules raise a particularly sensitive issue when they diverge from its principles. This is more so, knowing that, in some jurisdictions, such as Egypt, where non-Muslims are permitted to apply their own religious rules in matters of family law, succession remains governed by a unified regime based on Islamic Sharia, which applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the present case before the Bahraini courts, the applicable Islamic Sharia rules would have entitled the deceased’s sisters to inherit, but only on the basis of the principle that a male heir receives a share equal to that of two female heirs (Quran 4:176). In addition, remote male agnates, such as nephews, will be excluded. It is therefore understandable that X et al. invoked Islamic Sharia in the alternative, since, unlike the classical Jewish rule at issue, it would at least secure them a share in the estate, albeit an unequal one (on the reliance of Jewish community on Islamic Sharia courts, see Jessica M. Marglin, “Jews in Shari‘a Courts: A Family Dispute From the Cairo Geniza”, in A. E. Franklin et al. (eds.), Jews, Christians and Muslims in Medieval and Early Modern Times – A Festschrift in Honor of Mark Cohen (Brill, 2014), pp. 207-25).

The central issue, however, is whether an equal division of the estate among all potential heirs, without gender distinction, would raise concerns of Islamic public policy. On this point, comparative practice in the region shows a consistent reluctance to treat divergence from Islamic Sharia rules as such a violation. Courts across the Middle East have generally held that, in disputes involving non-Muslims, the application of foreign or religious rules differing from Islamic inheritance principles does not, in itself, offend public policy (for a detailed analysis from a private international law perspective, see Béligh Elbalti, “Applicable Law in Succession Matters in the MENA Arab Jurisdictions – Special Focus on Interfaith Successions and Difference of Religion as Impediment to Inheritance”, RabelsZ, Vol. 88(4), 2024, pp. 734). Against this background, it is unlikely that the Bahraini courts would consider an equal distribution of the estate among heirs to be contrary to public policy, particularly where the applicable framework already permits recourse to religious or customary norms in the absence of specific legislation.

by Arvid Kerschnitzki, University of Augsburg

On 23 April 2026, Advocate General Emiliou published his opinion on Case C-799/24 – Babcock Montajes S.A. v Kanadevia Inova Steinmüller GmbH. It adds another piece to the puzzle that is the CJEU’s broad interpretation of the term ‘judgment’ in the Brussels Ia Regulation. At the same time, the case highlights the persisting problems with procedural coordination under the regulation.

I. Facts of the case

The facts of the case as well as the procedural history have already been summarised in detail by Lino Bernard and Marta Requejo Isidro respectively, here and here.

To summarize:

A German and a Spanish company concluded a contract with an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in favour of a German court. Despite this agreement, the Spanish company initiated proceedings before a Spanish court in Madrid, seeking payment allegedly owed under the contract in connection with a bank guarantee invoked by the German company. Shortly thereafter, the German company brought proceedings before the designated German court in Cologne, seeking a declaration that the Spanish company was under an obligation to reimburse the German company and/or to pay damages.

The Madrid court affirmed its international jurisdiction without addressing the choice-of-court agreement, but declined territorial competence and referred the case to the court in San Sebastián (Spain). Although the German company did not challenge the Madrid court’s decision, it subsequently contested the international jurisdiction before the San Sebastián court. This objection was rejected in an interim decision, with the court relying on the prior determination of the Madrid court.

In parallel, the German court seized by the German company dismissed the action as inadmissible, holding that it was bound, pursuant to Art. 36(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, to recognise the decision of the San Sebastián court, even though the choice-of-court agreement had been disregarded. On appeal, however, the German appellate court overturned this decision, finding that it retained international jurisdiction despite the Spanish court’s ruling. This was due to the appellate court’s assertion that the interim decision did not constitute a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The Spanish company appealed to the German Federal Court of Justice, which referred the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

1. Is the term ‘judgment’ in Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels I Regulation’) to be interpreted to the effect that the court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation confers exclusive jurisdiction (Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation) must recognise a judgment by which a non-designated court of a Member State finds that the courts of that Member State have international jurisdiction if the judgment in question is an interim judgment, in other words, is not a decision which terminates a dispute?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is, in principle, in the affirmative: Does recognition of the interim judgment also depend on whether the interim judgment affirming the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State is binding on the non-designated court itself and/or whether the affirmation of international jurisdiction may be varied in the context of an appeal?

II. Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou

AG Emiliou addressed the questions jointly, understanding them as asking ‘whether an interim decision adopted by a court of a Member State, in which that court (only) declares itself to have international jurisdiction, but which does not yet make any determination on the merits of the claim, is covered by the concept of “judgment” within the meaning of Art. 36(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and must therefore be recognised in accordance with that provision, even if that decision allegedly contradicts an exclusive choice-of-court agreement designating the courts of another Member State.’ (para 27).

He begins by emphasising that an infringement of a choice-of-court agreement cannot justify refusal of recognition (paras 38–56). This is based on the prohibition of a révision au fond (para 39), as also confirmed by the Gjensidige judgement (C?90/22) (para 42).

Turning to the central issue – whether an interim decision by which a court of a Member State declares itself to have jurisdiction, allegedly in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation – AG Emiliou relies on the Court’s case law, in particular Maersk (Joined Cases C-345/22 to C-347/22) and Gothaer (C-456/11), to show that procedural decisions are not excluded from the concept of a ‘judgment’ (para 67–73). While acknowledging that these cases do not directly address the present issue (para 69), he argues that there is no convincing reason to distinguish between a decision declining jurisdiction (as in Gothaer) and one confirming jurisdiction (as in the present case) (para 79).

The AG then highlights the importance of the concept of ‘judgment’ in the context of lis pendens (para 74). He notes that the proper functioning of the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) would be uncertain if a purely jurisdictional decision were not regarded as a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition (para 76).

AG Emiliou emphasises that, although safeguarding the practical effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements is a legitimate concern, the protection afforded by Art. 31(2) does not justify excluding decisions containing only jurisdictional findings from the concept of a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation (paras 86–88). Refusing recognition of such an interim decision would effectively permit parallel proceedings and thereby create a risk of conflicting judgments – undermining the very objectives of the lis pendens rules (para 89). In such circumstances, Art. 29(3) should take precedence over Art. 31(2) once it becomes clear that parallel proceedings cannot be avoided through the mechanisms of Art. 31(2) (para 90).

Finally, AG Emiliou argues that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) may arise at different stages of the proceedings, depending on whether the defendant is still able to contest jurisdiction. The court second seised should only decline jurisdiction once it can be safely assumed that the court first seised will proceed to examine the case on the merits (para 96). Referring to the wording of Art. 38(a), he concludes that the obligation to recognise a judgment containing only a jurisdictional determination may arise irrespective of whether that judgment is final. By contrast, the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised has been established in such a way that it can no longer be contested (para 98).

In response to the second question referred, Emiliou further suggests that a jurisdictional determination may produce res judicata effects which cannot subsequently be set aside by the courts with priority (paras 99–101).

To summarise the Opinion of AG Emiliou: an interim decision, even if given in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Regulation and must be recognised. While the obligation of recognition arises irrespective of whether the decision is final, the obligation of the court designated in the choice-of-court agreement to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised can no longer be contested in the ongoing proceedings.

III. Comment

The present proceedings will likely make a further contribution to the CJEU’s emerging, controversial line of case law on what constitutes a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition within the meaning of Art. 36 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Prominent examples include H Limited (C-568/20), London Steam-Ship (C-700/20) and Gothaer (C-456/11), all of which are referenced in the Opinion (Fn. 32, 34, 39).

To date, the Court has consistently adopted a broad interpretation of this concept, notwithstanding substantial criticism from scholars. The Opinion of AG Emiliou continues this approach by interpreting ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation as encompassing interim decisions, even where they are given in breach of Art. 31(2).

Even though (German) scholarship remains cautious with regard to the recognition of such decisions, the reasoning of AG Emiliou is largely convincing, albeit with some caveats.

The main reservation concerns his argument that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) needs to be reinforced by treating jurisdictional decisions as recognisable judgments (paras 76–78). This step does not appear necessary. As he himself acknowledges (para 78), the same line of reasoning could lead to the opposite conclusion, namely that Art. 29(3) already provides a sufficient mechanism, making the recognition of an interim judgment in such circumstances superfluous.

However, the Opinion remains firmly in line with the Court’s existing case law, with the judgment in Gothaer (see especially Nr. 79). It is convincing in emphasising that, while the Regulation seeks to protect choice-of-court agreements, the prevention of parallel proceedings – and thus of conflicting judgments – carries greater weight (paras 89–90). This is further underpinned by the emphasis on mutual trust and the free circulation of judgments (paras 38–40, 82, 85, 87).

It is, however, somewhat surprising that AG Emiliou initially relies on Art. 29(3) as a key argument in favour of recognising the interim judgment, yet ultimately maintains a substantive distinction between the obligation to recognise such a judgment under Art. 36(1) and the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3). In the present case, this distinction does not appear to affect the outcome. It remains to be seen in which situations it might lead to different results.

Ultimately, however, the case reveals a more fundamental issue. As Lino Bernard has aptly observed, it is, in essence, concerned with procedural coordination under the Brussels Ia Regulation. Since a violation of the lis pendens rules does not constitute a ground for refusal of recognition (Liberato – C-386/17; see also AG Emiliou’s Opinion, Nr. 53), the question whether an interim decision is capable of recognition becomes particularly significant in this context. By contrast, if the lis pendens rules were enforced at the level of Art. 45(1), the issue of recognisability would be far less consequential, as recognition could be refused on that basis.

In this regard, it is remarkable that AG Emiliou’s decision prima facie strengthens (see para 76) the lis pendens rules at the stage of recognition. It may provide a workable interim solution for the principle of priority under Art. 29(1) and (3). But at the same time, as the present case illustrates, it sacrifices the protection of choice-of-court agreements under Art. 31(2). This could conceivably create new opportunities to misuse the lis pendens rules and encourage a race to the courts, particularly for claimants  with the ability to convince the court to issue an early interim decision.

Accordingly, the case once again highlights the need to elevate the entire lis pendens regime to a ground for refusal of recognition. Encouragingly, the Commission’s Report on the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation suggests that the recast may address this issue.

Independent of any reform of the Regulation, it remains to be seen whether the Court will follow AG Emiliou’s broad understanding of ‘judgment’ and continue its line of extending the interpretation of that concept within the meaning of the Regulation.

On 29 May 2026, the symposium Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands will take place at the University of Groningen. Organised by Benedikt Schmitz (University of Groningen), the symposium will bring together leading and upcoming scholars to explore how digital transformation – from AI in adjudication to fully online proceedings – is […]