Conflictoflaws

You are invited to the next Migration Talk organized by the Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the European Union and in Türkiye.

Speakers: Dr. Hamed Abdollahpour Ranjbar (Istinye University), Khaled Elazab, MA (Clark University), Yomna Nassar, MA (Koç University), Farah Amayreh (Koç University), Dr. Ibrahim Yigit (Florida State University), Prof. Dr. Janet Molzan Turan (Koç University), and Prof. Dr. Bülent Turan (Koç University)

Title:Stigma in the Lives of Refugees Living in Turkey

Date and Time: Monday, May 4, 2026 – 12:30 PM – 1:20 PM (Turkish Time)
Event Location: via Zoom (The Zoom link shall be provided upon request: migration@bilkent.edu.tr)

The event will be held in English.

Abstract
The research is conducted with Syrian and Afghan refugees living in Istanbul, Turkiye to explore and examine effects of stigma and microaggressions in these populations.
It is based on 8 focus groups separately for men and women, four groups with Syrian refugees and four with Afghan refugees, with 4-10 participants in each group. Participants shared that stigma and microaggressions were central forces shaping every dimension of their daily life, well-being, and future plans. The intensity and ubiquity of these experiences appeared to exceed what is commonly documented in other stigmatized populations, owing in part to the visibility and politicization of refugee identity in the current sociopolitical climate in Türkiye, which allows and condones stigma and microaggressions against these populations. Refugees described that they and their children experienced mental and physical health problems not only due to trauma and difficulties faced before and during migration, but also due to post-displacement stigma and microaggressions that they experienced on a daily basis. Refugees employed a range of coping strategies to deal with these challenges, avoidance of interactions with Turks, forms of identity concealment (e.g., not revealing nationality, changing names, or not speaking their native language in public), avoidance of confrontation, and in some cases educating their neighbors to confront and correct stereotypes.

In the quantitative phase of the research, the research group developed the Refugee Stigma Scale (RSS) informed by the literature and qualitative and quantitative data. The scale includes four theoretical dimensions of stigma: perceived community stigma, experienced stigma, anticipated stigma, and internalized stigma. In a sample of 404 Syrian and 447 Afghan refugees in Türkiye, confirmatory factor analysis supported the hypothesized four-factor structure of the RSS. Results also supported convergent validity of the four subscales showing correlations with validated measures of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), somatic symptoms, post-migration difficulties, and contact experiences.

The research group also developed a subscale assessing microaggressions (subtle/ambiguous discriminatory remarks or behaviors). Convergent validity of the Microaggression Scale for Refugees (MSR) was supported by high correlations between microaggressions and experienced stigma, somatic symptoms, post-migration difficulties, and contact experiences with the host country. Importantly, both experienced stigma and microaggressions contributed independently to explaining variance in psychological and somatic symptoms.

It is also explored the concept of identity denial in the context of refugee stigma using the new scales. Even after many years of immigrating, immigrants can have their new cultural identity (in this case, their Turkish identity) denied or unacknowledged. Based on a survey of 156 young Syrian adults living in Türkiye for many years, the research found that Turkish identity denial was associated with higher depressive symptoms and lower psychological well-being, mediated by perceived and anticipated stigma. Furthermore, a challenged sense of belonging was an independent parallel mediating mechanism by which identity denial was associated with psychological well-being and depressive symptoms.

As report earlier on this blog, the third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, from 18 to 20 June 2026. Under the title “Shaping the Future of Private International Law in Europe – Putting Together the Pieces & Filling Gaps”, the conference will address structural developments, unresolved issues, and emerging challenges in European private international law.  The program is available on the conference’s website.

Registration will close in two weeks, on 17 May 2026. You are welcome to register using this link.

EAPIL is looking forward to seeing you in Geneva!

In an increasingly multipolar world, national and regional actors are reasserting regulatory control over cross-border economic activities. States such as the United States and China, as well as the European Union, are increasingly relying on unilateral measures with extraterritorial reach – particularly in areas such as sanctions, digital regulation, supply chains, competition law, and data protection. At the same time, the multilateral order appears to be under strain: international organizations are being sidelined, agreements are terminated or ignored, and established norms are openly challenged.

To explore the implications of these developments for international (economic) law and the future of global economic cooperation, the German Society of International Law (DGIR) will host a conference in Munich on 11–12 June 2026. Focusing on “Law without Borders? Extraterritorial Regulation and Unilateral Action” the event promises to provide a timely and critical forum for discussing the evolving role of extraterritorial regulation and unilateralism in shaping the international legal order.

Programme

Thursday, 11 June 2026 – National (Regional) Law and Global Markets
The first day will focus on national (regional) law and the regulation of global markets. It will feature presentations by Moritz Renner (Mannheim)  and Romy Klimke (BSP Business and Law School Berlin) followed by a commentary by Andreas Ziegler (Lausanne).

In the evening, Frank Hoffmeister (Brussels) will deliver a practitioner keynote on “The European Union as an Actor in International Economic Law,” followed by a reception.

Friday, 12 June 2026 – Economic Sanctions and International Conflicts
The second day will deal with economic sanctions and international conflicts. Presentations will be delivered Till Patrik Holterhus (Saarbrücken) and Markus Lieberknecht (Osnabrück) followed with a commentary by Tanja Domej (Zurich).

Venue and Registration

The conference will take place at the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation in Munich (Südliches Schlossrondell 23, 80638 Munich). If you wish to join please register before 31 May via this linke: https://eveeno.com/dgir-kurztagung-2026.

The conference is organized by Christian Walter (LMU Munich), Markus Krajewski (FAU Erlangen) and Giesela Rühl (Humboldt University of Berlin). For further questions please contact the organizing team at dgir-kurztagung-2026@jura.uni-muenchen.de.

The Frankfurt Law Review is currently looking for submissions for a special edition dedicated to the topic of Digital Transformation.

Submissions can be drafted specifically for the review but may also be based on seminar papers or other academic assignments; they are accepted until 31 May 2026.

The full call for papers can be found here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 30 March to 1 April, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) held its fifth meeting. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG continued to make progress in its study of the jurisdiction and applicable law issues raised by the cross-border use and transfers of CBDCs, including the desirability and feasibility of a possible future instrument on these issues, with particular attention to their use in payments with a cross-border or international element. More information is available here.

From 15 to 17 April 2026, the High-Level Conference on the Universalisation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Hague Conference on Private International Law was held in Dakar (Senegal). The conference convened ministers and senior officials from French-speaking States in Africa for a high-level discussion on the benefits and practicalities of strengthened engagement with the PCA and the HCCH. More information is available here.

On 8 and 22 April 2026, the first and second meetings of the Working Group on the operation of Article 33 of the 1996 Child Protection Convention were held online, hosted by the Permanent Bureau. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group worked on the development of a Model Form for requests under Article 33. More information is available here and here.

 

Upcoming events

The 14th International Forum on the electronic Apostille Programme will take place on 12 and 13 May 2026 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Forum will provide a unique international platform for governments, organisations, and the private sector to learn more about the benefits of the e-APP, to promote its effective implementation, and to discuss the latest developments in relation to the e-APP worldwide. Interested persons should register via this form no later than Friday 1 May 2026, 5.00 p.m. (CEST). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

On 16–17 April 2026, the elegant setting of Villa Ruspoli in Florence hosted the First National Congress of ASGiC – the Society for the Study of Consensual Justice, titled Giustizia e cooperazione: il valore del consenso (Justice and Cooperation: The Value of Consent). Marked by a large and engaged participation, the event offered a valuable opportunity for both the Society’s members and a wider community of scholars and practitioners to reflect on the role of consent in contemporary conceptions of justice.

The Congress opened with introductory remarks by the Society’s President, Silvana Dalla Bontà, who set out the themes and objectives guiding the initiative. Against this backdrop, the keynote lectures delivered by Tommaso Greco, Andrea Simoncini, and Filippo Danovi developed a first, coherent reflection on consensual justice, identifying a variety of core concepts – trust, consent, justice, solidarity, Constitution, language, and dialogue – that are likely to orient the Society’s future research and activities.

This conceptual framework found further expression in the conferral of honorary membership upon Francesco Paolo Luiso, Marta Cartabia, Adolfo Ceretti, and Luciana Breggia. The laudationes underscored how, from different perspectives – civil procedure, constitutional adjudication, criminology, and judicial practice – their work has contributed to shaping approaches to justice grounded in participation, dialogue, and shared responsibility.

The discussion then broadened through the interdisciplinary roundtable moderated by Pierluigi Consorti. Contributions from Maurizio Biggeri, Marco Cadinu, Marianella Sclavi, Valeria Cantoni Mamiani, Stefano Rozzi, and Luca Toschi moved beyond strict legal analysis, engaging with insights from the social sciences and communication studies to explore more deeply the relationship between interpersonal dynamics and consent.

In her concluding remarks, Vice-President Paola Lucarelli drew together the main threads of the Congress, emphasising the importance of maintaining a close connection between theoretical reflection and practical application. The General Assembly that followed endorsed the Society’s programmatic lines, consolidating the directions that had emerged over the course of the two days.

Looking ahead, ASGiC announced its next steps: a Colloquium to be held in 2027 at the University of Trento and the Second National Congress in 2028 in Taormina, to be organised by founding members Marco Gradi and Antonio Cappuccio of the University of Messina.

In this perspective, the Florence Congress may be construed as the starting point of a broader and ongoing reflection on consensual justice – one that seeks to connect doctrinal inquiry with practice, and to contribute to current debates on more participatory and dialogical models of dispute resolution.

Multinationals and Human Rights in Asia

Edited by Jason Ho Ching Cheung and Kazuaki Nishioka

 

This book investigates the availability in Asian jurisdictions of civil remedies against multinational businesses for human rights abuses.

 

It assesses whether the norms of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have taken root in Asia by first considering the international state of play. It then presents case studies of corporate governance and human rights in Asia, before examining emerging issues, and considering how Asia has dealt and can deal with corporate responsibility in connection with those matters. By way of conclusion, the book offers an action plan for implementing the UN Guiding Principles in Asia.

 

Jason Ho Ching Cheung is a Hong Kong barrister and New York attorney practicing from Albert Luk’s Chambers, Hong Kong and Yodoyabashi & Yamagami LPC, Japan. He is also a part-time lecturer at the Graduate School of Law and the Institute for the Liberal Arts at Doshisha University, Japan.

Kazuaki Nishioka is a specially appointed Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Law of Kobe University, Japan.

 

Apr 2026   |   9781509980406   |   328pp   |   Hbk   |    RRP: £100

Discount Price: £80

Order online at www.hartpublishing.co.uk  – use the code GLR BD8 to get 20% off!

Sign up to our email list to receive updates about our new titles.

 

As already announced, there will be an international conference “International Filiation Law in the EU” dealing with questions of filiation law resulting from the EU Parenthood Proposal.

Everybody interested in legal questions of cross-border filiation is welcome. Participation is free, but registration will be required (details follow soon). Any inquiries can be directed to sekretariat.goessl@jura.uni-bonn.de.

 

The programme reads:

Day 1: 24.09.2026

13:00

Martin Böse, Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Bonn: Welcome Address
Susanne Gössl, University of Bonn: Introduction
Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The EU Commission’s Parenthood Proposal (Overview)

14:15

Ulrike Kjestina Janzen, German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection: The Commission’s Parenthood Proposal – Considerations and Policy Interests and Expectations from a Member State’s Perspective
Alina Tryfonidou, University of Cyprus: Filiation and EU Primary Law: The Portability of the Parent-Child Status in CJEU Case-law

15:00

Velina Todorova,  University of Plovdiv & Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The Human Rights Frame in International Filiation Law (1): The Rights of the Child, esp. the Right to Know One’s Origins
Rachele Zamperini, Swiss Institute for Comparative Law: The Human Rights Frame in International Filiation Law (2): LGBTIAQ* Rights and Women’s Rights

16:45

Patrick Wautelet, University of Liège: Many Faces of Birth Certificates in International Filiation Law
Nicolas Nord, ICCS: Filiation Certificate and a Central Registry in the EU

Day 2: 25.09.2026

09:30

Laima Vaige, University of Uppsala: Scope of the EU Parenthood Proposal and Relationship to Other International and EU Instruments
Cristina González Beilfuss, University of Barcelona: Which Rules of Jurisdiction for International Filiation?

11:15

Martina Melcher, University of Graz: How Should the Law Governing International Filiation be Determined?
Susanne Gössl, University of Bonn: Recognition of Court Decisions and the Public Policy Exception in International Filiation Law

12:30

Final Remarks and Conclusions

 

Many thanks to Karim El Chazli  (Consulting and Testifying Expert on Arab Laws) for the tip-off

 

I. Introduction

The field of foreign judgments in the MENA region has witnessed additional legal developments. After Morocco, which adopted in February a new Code of Civil Procedure containing an updated regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments (see my previous on this blog), Saudi Arabia followed suit by adopting a new Execution Law (Nizam at-Tanfidh), approved by the Council of Ministers on 15 April 2026 (27–28 Shawwal 1447 H), which contains rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments. The new law replaces the existing Execution Law promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/53 of 3 July 2012 (13 Sha’baan1433 H).

The Execution Law governs, inter alia, the execution of “titles of obligation” (sanadat tanfidhiyya (pl.), sanad tanfidhi (sing.); lit. “enforceable titles”) in general, as defined by the Law. These include, among others, foreign judgments, foreign arbitral awards, and foreign authentic instruments declared enforceable in accordance with the rules set out in the Law. The new Execution Law (new Article 7) adds to the existing list (former Article 9) mediated settlement agreements concluded abroad. This addition appears to be linked to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a State Party to the 2018 Singapore Convention, which was ratified on 5 May 2020 and entered into force on 5 November of the same year.

 

II. Enforcement Requirements

With respect to the regime applicable to the enforcement of foreign judgments, the new conditions are now laid down in new article 9 of the new Law.

 New Article 9(1) of the 2026 Execution Law reads as follows (loose tentative translation):

1. Without prejudice to the obligations of the Kingdom under international treaties and agreements, the court [the Execution Court] shall not declare enforceable a foreign judgment or order except on the basis of reciprocity and after examining that the following conditions are met:

a) The dispute in which the foreign judgment or order was rendered does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Kingdom.

b) There is no similar case pending in the Kingdom that was filed before the case in which the foreign judgment or order was rendered.

c) The parties to the proceedings in which the foreign judgment was rendered were duly summoned, properly represented, and given the opportunity to defend themselves.

d) The foreign judgment or order has become final, in accordance with the law governing the competent judicial authority that rendered it.

e)  The foreign judgment or order does not conflict with a prior judgment or order—on the same subject matter—rendered by a competent judicial authority in the Kingdom.

f) The foreign judgment or order does not violate the public policy of the Kingdom.

Paragraph 2 deals with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign mediated settlement agreements, while paragraph 3 deals with the enforcement of foreign authentic instruments.

 

III. Observations

If we compare the new enforcement requirements with those set out in the 2012 Execution Law, we can see that most of them have been reproduced without any significant modification, although in some cases slightly different wording has been used. This is particularly true of the requirements listed in items (c) [service and the right of defence], (d) [finality], (e) [conflicting judgments], and (f) [public policy], as well as of the proviso, which contains a reference to the reciprocity requirement.

At the same time, some significant differences can be observed, particularly with respect to the rules on indirect jurisdiction (1) and the existence of a pending case before Saudi courts (2). Further important clarifications relate to two other fundamental issues: the prohibition of révision au fond (3) and the limitation period for enforcing titles of obligation (4).

 

1. Indirect Jurisdiction

First, the most notable change concerns the control of the indirect jurisdiction of the rendering court. Indeed, under the 2012 Execution Law, the jurisdiction of the foreign rendering court was subject to a double control: first, by verifying that the dispute did not fall within the jurisdiction of Saudi courts (in general, and without any specific limitation); and second, by checking that the rendering court had jurisdiction in accordance with its own rules of international jurisdiction.

The new Execution Law significantly modifies the scope of the jurisdictional requirement and limits it to cases over which Saudi courts have exclusive jurisdiction. In doing so, the Saudi legislator joins other countries in the region that have adopted similar approaches, notably Tunisia (see Béligh Elbalti, “The Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts and the Enforcement of their Judgments in Tunisia: A Need for Reconsideration”, 8(2) Journal of Private International Law (2012) 195, and recently Morocco (see Béligh Elbalti, “The New Moroccan Framework on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgment Enforcement – A Preliminary Critical Assessment”, on this blog. For a comparative overview on the various approaches adopted in the MENA region, see Béligh Elbalti, “The recognition of foreign judgments as a tool of economic integration: Views from Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf countries”, in P. Sooksripaisarnkit and S. R. Garimella (eds.), China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law (Routledge, 2018) 226; idem, “Perspective from the Arab World”, in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook (Hart, 2023) 187 ).

The problem with the new rule, however, is that Saudi law on international jurisdiction does not contain clear rules on what constitutes “exclusive jurisdiction.” The relevant provisions on international jurisdiction contained in the Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts (Nizam al-Murafa’at al-Shar’iyya, Royal Decree No. M/1 of 24 November 2013 (22 Muharram 1435H), Articles 24 to 30) do not define or clearly identify which heads of jurisdiction are exclusive. As a result, the scope of the requirement may remain uncertain in practice, which could lead to a restrictive or inconsistent approach in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

 

2. Pending case before Saudi Courts

Item (b) of Article 9 of the new Law is an addition that has no equivalent in Article 11 of the 2012 Execution Law. While this requirement is generally found in the international conventions applicable in the region (notably the 1983 Riyadh Convention and the 1995 GCC Convention), it has almost no equivalent in the domestic legislation of Arab countries (with the notable exception of Lebanon. See Elbalti, “Perspective from the Arab World”, op. cit., 192). It should be noted, however, that Article 9(b) requires that the action previously brought before Saudi courts and still pending be “similar (mumathila)” to the one in which the foreign judgment was rendered. While the terminology used is somewhat vague, this suggests that both actions should involve the same subject matter (as is more clearly required in Article 9(e) concerning conflicting judgments). It is, however, unclear whether this requirement also extends to the identity of the parties.

 

3. Explicit prohibition to review the merits of foreign judgments

Under the 2012 Execution Law, there is no explicit provision prohibiting a review of the merits of foreign judgments. Nevertheless, such a prohibition may be inferred from the imposition of a number of formal and procedural requirements for having foreign judgments declared enforceable. In judicial practice, the principle of the prohibition of révision au fond is frequently affirmed; however, some decisions suggest that it has not always been strictly observed (see Elbalti, “Perspective from the Arab World”, op. cit., 185). The new Law has addressed this issue expressly in Article 4(2), which provides that “Subject to the provisions of Article (9) of the Law, the court shall ensure that the title of obligation satisfies its statutory requirements, without examining the merits of the right forming its subject matter”.

 

4. Limitation period to execution of the titles of obligations

The new Enforcement Law clarifies the limitation period applicable to the execution of titles of obligation. Under new Article 11, execution lapses upon the expiry of ten (10) years from the date on which the title becomes due and enforceable. Although this rule also applies to foreign judgments as titles of obligation (Article 7 of the new Law), the wording of the provision suggests that it concerns foreign judgments only once they have been declared enforceable by the Execution Court. The Law, however, contains no specific limitation period governing the filing of an application for a foreign judgment to be declared enforceable in Saudi Arabia. This suggests that, in principle, judgment creditors may apply at any time for such a declaration. By contrast, once enforceability has been granted, actual execution will be barred upon the expiry of the ten-year limitation period.

 

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 30 April 2026 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is: The HCCH Work Agenda in 2026. Opportunities and Challenges for AMEDIP, which will be presented by Ignacio Goicoechea, Representative of the HCCH Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86063956094?pwd=dat8bYxVWnLfBbjiNDBY4ijwMlqRo7.1

Meeting ID: 860 6395 6094

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Contributed by Adriani Dori

Online Research Seminar Series: Call for expressions of interest

Submission Deadline:  Rolling base
Open to: Scholars, practitioners, and early-career researchers

Contact details: ecjc@law.eur.nl

Following the publication of the handbook European Civil Procedure (De Gruyter 2026), the European Civil Justice Centre (ECJC) is pleased to announce a new initiative.

ECJC ‘Civil Justice Conversations’

The ECJC ‘Civil Justice Conversations’ is a new series of online research seminars designed to foster scholarly exchange and collaboration in the field of European civil justice.

Purpose & Scope: Advancing European Civil Justice Dialogue

The seminar series aims to provide a regular forum for the presentation and discussion of research in European civil justice and related fields. It seeks to strengthen academic exchange across jurisdictions and to support the development of ongoing research projects.

Seminar Conception: Interactive & Dialogical Exchange

The seminars are designed as informal and interactive sessions in which participants may:

• Present work-in-progress or more developed research
• Receive constructive feedback on emerging ideas
• Engage in discussion with a designated discussant and a wider audience

Particular emphasis is placed on sessions that bring together contrasting or opposing perspectives, fostering critical and constructive academic dialogue.

Online Format: Accessible, Inclusive & Transnational

While in-person events are also envisaged, the online format has been chosen to:

• Facilitate broad participation across jurisdictions
• Enable regular and accessible academic exchange
• Address practical and budgetary constraints

Participation: Open Call for Scholars & Practitioners

Participation is open to all scholars and practitioners with an interest in European civil justice. Affiliation with the ECJC is not required.

We particularly welcome contributions from Early Career Researchers with a developed idea or ongoing project aligned with the Centre’s thematic areas, including collective actions, digitalisation of civil justice, ADR/ODR, legal aid and litigation funding, and anti-SLAPPs.

Selection will take into account the originality of the proposal, its stage of development, and its alignment with the Centre’s research themes.

How to Apply

Expressions of interest should include:

• A curriculum vitae
• An abstract of the proposed presentation
• Optionally, the name of a potential discussant, if already identified

Please send your application to: ecjc@law.eur.nl

I. Introduction

This is certainly a genuinely interesting case from Bahrain, involving the application of “foreign” Jewish customs in a succession dispute that appears to be between Jewish Bahraini nationals. Although the case seems to lack any foreign element, its relevance to conflict of laws is nonetheless clear, since – to my knowledge – this is the first case in which the applicability of “foreign” religious customs in matters of personal status has been explicitly admitted in what appears a purely domestic case. The case also provides a broader analytical framework, raising questions about the place and applicability of non-state law in private international law (this contrasts of the recent decision of the French Supreme Court denying the applicability of Jewish law, albeit in a different context) and, more generally, about the compatibility of non-Islamic religious norms with domestic public policy frameworks in Muslim-majority legal systems.

 

II. Facts

The case concerns a domestic succession dispute involving Jews in Bahrain. Although the ruling does not expressly state this, the absence of any reference to choice-of-law rules strongly suggests that the parties involved were Bahraini Jews and that the case contained no foreign elements.

Following their brother’s death, Y1 (the deceased’s brother) brought proceedings in 2024 before the High Civil Court against Y2 (the deceased’s nephew) and Y3 (the deceased’s sister), seeking the opening of the estate, the identification of the heirs, an inventory of the assets, and the devolution of the estate. The court ordered the opening of the estate and held that Y1 and Y2 were entitled to equal shares.

X et al. (the deceased’s sisters), who were not parties to the original proceedings, filed a third-party objection seeking annulment of the judgment and a redistribution of the estate among all heirs, including themselves, in equal shares, based on Jewish inheritance customs or, subsidiarily, Islamic law. The objection was dismissed on the merits, and this outcome was upheld on appeal. X et al. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Bahrain, challenging their exclusion from the inheritance.

Before the Supreme Court, X et al. argued that the lower courts had relied on Chapter 27 of the Torah (the Old Testament), a text which, they contended, no longer reflects contemporary Jewish social or religious practice. They maintained that Jewish inheritance rules have evolved over time and that current customs within Jewish communities grant women equal inheritance rights in the absence of a will, an approach adopted by many rabbinical courts worldwide. In the absence of established Jewish inheritance rules or locally recognised custom in Bahrain, they argued that prevailing foreign custom should apply, since it does not conflict with Bahraini public policy.

 

III. Ruling

In its decision of 1 December 2025, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of X et al. holding as follows (detailed summary):

Under Bahraini law, the High Civil Courts have jurisdiction over all personal status matters concerning non-Muslims. Where no statutory rule applies, Article 1 of the Civil Code requires courts to apply the customs of the religious community concerned.

Such customs are not limited to those established locally in Bahrain. If no local custom is proven, courts may apply general or foreign customs, provided that they are genuinely observed by the members of the religion concerned. The application of foreign custom is subject to two conditions: first, that it is actually and consistently followed and regarded as binding within the community, that is, it has not fallen into disuse; and second, that it does not conflict with public policy in Bahrain. Where these conditions are met, the relevant foreign custom governs matters of personal status concerning members of the religion in question.

In this case, the lower court applied Chapter 27 of the Torah on the ground that no local Jewish custom governing the distribution of inheritance existed in Bahrain, thereby excluding any consideration of customs prevailing outside the Kingdom. However, once its existence is established, foreign custom may be disregarded only where it conflicts with a statutory provision or with public policy. The failure to examine whether relevant foreign Jewish inheritance customs existed and satisfied the required conditions—namely, that they are applied in a consistent, continuous, and well-known manner among members of the Jewish faith, that they are regarded by them as binding, and that they do not violate public policy—justifies the quashing of the decision and the remittal of the case.

 

III. Comments

Generally speaking, the application of foreign law in the MENA region has long been a challenging issue question marked by uncertainty and resistance in practice (for a general comparative overview, with a special focus on civil and commercial matters, see Béligh Elbalti, “Choice of Law in International Contract and Foreign Law before MENA Arab Courts from the Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative”, in Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit, Sai Ramani Garimella (eds.), Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – Private International Law Considerations (Routledge, 2025), pp. 145-150). Against this background, the acceptance by the Bahraini Supreme Court of the application of foreign customs in matters of personal status in a purely domestic case is all the more noteworthy, insofar as certain conditions are met.

The case raises in particular two fundamental questions: (1) the applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain; and (2) the relevance of public policy in this context.

 

1. The applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain

a) General Applicable framework

Unlike some non-neighboring countries in the region, where matters of personal status of non-Muslims—whether foreigners or nationals—may be governed by special legislation (see, for example, UAE federal legislation on Civil Personal Status), Bahrain has not adopted any specific legal framework applicable to non-Muslims.

There are, however, a few notable exceptions.

First, the 1971 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (CCCP) sets out conflict-of-laws rules that are expressly applicable to personal status matters involving non-Muslims (Article 21 of the Bahraini CCCP).

Second, Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 regulates inheritance and the devolution of estates of foreign non-Muslims.

Third, Legislative Decree No. 42 of 2002 on Judicial Jurisdiction provides, in Article 6, that disputes relating to the personal status of non-Muslims fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, as opposed to the Muslim Sharia courts, which, by contrast, have subject-matter jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the personal status of Muslims, with the exception of certain disputes relating to succession, which fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Article 13). In this context, the Muslim Sharia courts are required to apply Bahrain’s Family Law of 2017 (Law No. 17 of 2017), which to date constitutes the only legislative framework governing family law matters in Bahrain. This law, however, applies exclusively before the Muslim Sharia courts, which lack jurisdiction over disputes involving non-Muslims.

Accordingly, while the civil courts have jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear personal status disputes involving non-Muslims, Bahraini law does not specify the substantive law to be applied by those courts in such matters—except where the parties are foreigners and foreign law is applicable pursuant to Bahraini choice-of-law rules, or where the dispute concerns the succession of foreign non-Muslims, in which case Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 applies.

 

b) Customs as a source of law

It is in this context that the Bahraini Supreme Court relied on Article 1 of the Bahraini Civil Code of 2001, which authorizes courts to apply customs (‘urf) in the absence of legislative provisions. The reference to customs is significant, given that Bahraini family law does not contain any provision allowing non-Muslims to invoke the application of their own religious law, unlike several neighbouring jurisdictions in the region (see Article 1(2) of the UAE Personal Status Law of 2024; Article 364 of the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law of 2007; Article 4 of the Qatari Family Law of 2006; and Article 282 of the Omani Personal Status Law of 1997).

The Bahraini Supreme Court’s case law is consistent on this point. In a previous decision of 4 April 2023, the Supreme Court quashed a lower court judgment that had applied the 2017 Bahraini Family Law to a dispute involving spouses of the Bahá’í faith, without examining whether there existed any laws or regulations among members of the Bahá’í faith in Bahrain governing their personal status matters, or whether any customs regulated such matters. Unlike the case discussed here, the 2023 decision did involve a conflict-of-laws issue in the sense of private international law, which was resolved by applying Bahraini law as the lex patriae of the husband (Article 21(3) of the CCCP). It was at then that the Supreme Court emphasized the absence of Bahraini legislation governing personal status matters for non-Muslims and justified recourse to Article 1 of the Civil Code, thereby overruling the lower court’s decision for failing to consider the applicability of Bahá’í law or custom.

However, what is remarkable in the present case is that the court extended the scope of the “customs” referred to in Article 1 of the Civil Code to include “general and foreign (external) customs”, in the absence of a local one (‘urf mahalli). Reference to foreign (external) customs is, however, subject to two cumulative conditions: (1) the foreign customs must be generally observed by members of the relevant religious community, in the sense that they must not have fallen into disuse; and (2) they must not be inconsistent with public policy in Bahrain. With respect to the first condition, the appellants argued that the classical Jewish rule prioritizing male heirs and allowing women to inherit only in the absence of sons has become obsolete in contemporary Jewish social and religious communities. They contended that it has become common practice across Jewish communities worldwide to allow women to inherit on an equal basis, a practice consistently endorsed by rabbinic courts in various legal systems worldwide.

 

2. Consistency with public policy

Another key question concerns whether succession rules that depart from Islamic Sharia should be regarded as contrary to public policy. Given the centrality of Islamic Sharia in the legal systems of many MENA countries, succession rules raise a particularly sensitive issue when they diverge from its principles. This is more so, knowing that, in some jurisdictions, such as Egypt, where non-Muslims are permitted to apply their own religious rules in matters of family law, succession remains governed by a unified regime based on Islamic Sharia, which applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the present case before the Bahraini courts, the applicable Islamic Sharia rules would have entitled the deceased’s sisters to inherit, but only on the basis of the principle that a male heir receives a share equal to that of two female heirs (Quran 4:176). In addition, remote male agnates, such as nephews, will be excluded. It is therefore understandable that X et al. invoked Islamic Sharia in the alternative, since, unlike the classical Jewish rule at issue, it would at least secure them a share in the estate, albeit an unequal one (on the reliance of Jewish community on Islamic Sharia courts, see Jessica M. Marglin, “Jews in Shari‘a Courts: A Family Dispute From the Cairo Geniza”, in A. E. Franklin et al. (eds.), Jews, Christians and Muslims in Medieval and Early Modern Times – A Festschrift in Honor of Mark Cohen (Brill, 2014), pp. 207-25).

The central issue, however, is whether an equal division of the estate among all potential heirs, without gender distinction, would raise concerns of Islamic public policy. On this point, comparative practice in the region shows a consistent reluctance to treat divergence from Islamic Sharia rules as such a violation. Courts across the Middle East have generally held that, in disputes involving non-Muslims, the application of foreign or religious rules differing from Islamic inheritance principles does not, in itself, offend public policy (for a detailed analysis from a private international law perspective, see Béligh Elbalti, “Applicable Law in Succession Matters in the MENA Arab Jurisdictions – Special Focus on Interfaith Successions and Difference of Religion as Impediment to Inheritance”, RabelsZ, Vol. 88(4), 2024, pp. 734). Against this background, it is unlikely that the Bahraini courts would consider an equal distribution of the estate among heirs to be contrary to public policy, particularly where the applicable framework already permits recourse to religious or customary norms in the absence of specific legislation.

by Arvid Kerschnitzki, University of Augsburg

On 23 April 2026, Advocate General Emiliou published his opinion on Case C-799/24 – Babcock Montajes S.A. v Kanadevia Inova Steinmüller GmbH. It adds another piece to the puzzle that is the CJEU’s broad interpretation of the term ‘judgment’ in the Brussels Ia Regulation. At the same time, the case highlights the persisting problems with procedural coordination under the regulation.

I. Facts of the case

The facts of the case as well as the procedural history have already been summarised in detail by Lino Bernard and Marta Requejo Isidro respectively, here and here.

To summarize:

A German and a Spanish company concluded a contract with an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in favour of a German court. Despite this agreement, the Spanish company initiated proceedings before a Spanish court in Madrid, seeking payment allegedly owed under the contract in connection with a bank guarantee invoked by the German company. Shortly thereafter, the German company brought proceedings before the designated German court in Cologne, seeking a declaration that the Spanish company was under an obligation to reimburse the German company and/or to pay damages.

The Madrid court affirmed its international jurisdiction without addressing the choice-of-court agreement, but declined territorial competence and referred the case to the court in San Sebastián (Spain). Although the German company did not challenge the Madrid court’s decision, it subsequently contested the international jurisdiction before the San Sebastián court. This objection was rejected in an interim decision, with the court relying on the prior determination of the Madrid court.

In parallel, the German court seized by the German company dismissed the action as inadmissible, holding that it was bound, pursuant to Art. 36(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, to recognise the decision of the San Sebastián court, even though the choice-of-court agreement had been disregarded. On appeal, however, the German appellate court overturned this decision, finding that it retained international jurisdiction despite the Spanish court’s ruling. This was due to the appellate court’s assertion that the interim decision did not constitute a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The Spanish company appealed to the German Federal Court of Justice, which referred the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

1. Is the term ‘judgment’ in Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels I Regulation’) to be interpreted to the effect that the court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation confers exclusive jurisdiction (Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation) must recognise a judgment by which a non-designated court of a Member State finds that the courts of that Member State have international jurisdiction if the judgment in question is an interim judgment, in other words, is not a decision which terminates a dispute?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is, in principle, in the affirmative: Does recognition of the interim judgment also depend on whether the interim judgment affirming the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State is binding on the non-designated court itself and/or whether the affirmation of international jurisdiction may be varied in the context of an appeal?

II. Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou

AG Emiliou addressed the questions jointly, understanding them as asking ‘whether an interim decision adopted by a court of a Member State, in which that court (only) declares itself to have international jurisdiction, but which does not yet make any determination on the merits of the claim, is covered by the concept of “judgment” within the meaning of Art. 36(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and must therefore be recognised in accordance with that provision, even if that decision allegedly contradicts an exclusive choice-of-court agreement designating the courts of another Member State.’ (para 27).

He begins by emphasising that an infringement of a choice-of-court agreement cannot justify refusal of recognition (paras 38–56). This is based on the prohibition of a révision au fond (para 39), as also confirmed by the Gjensidige judgement (C?90/22) (para 42).

Turning to the central issue – whether an interim decision by which a court of a Member State declares itself to have jurisdiction, allegedly in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation – AG Emiliou relies on the Court’s case law, in particular Maersk (Joined Cases C-345/22 to C-347/22) and Gothaer (C-456/11), to show that procedural decisions are not excluded from the concept of a ‘judgment’ (para 67–73). While acknowledging that these cases do not directly address the present issue (para 69), he argues that there is no convincing reason to distinguish between a decision declining jurisdiction (as in Gothaer) and one confirming jurisdiction (as in the present case) (para 79).

The AG then highlights the importance of the concept of ‘judgment’ in the context of lis pendens (para 74). He notes that the proper functioning of the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) would be uncertain if a purely jurisdictional decision were not regarded as a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition (para 76).

AG Emiliou emphasises that, although safeguarding the practical effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements is a legitimate concern, the protection afforded by Art. 31(2) does not justify excluding decisions containing only jurisdictional findings from the concept of a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation (paras 86–88). Refusing recognition of such an interim decision would effectively permit parallel proceedings and thereby create a risk of conflicting judgments – undermining the very objectives of the lis pendens rules (para 89). In such circumstances, Art. 29(3) should take precedence over Art. 31(2) once it becomes clear that parallel proceedings cannot be avoided through the mechanisms of Art. 31(2) (para 90).

Finally, AG Emiliou argues that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) may arise at different stages of the proceedings, depending on whether the defendant is still able to contest jurisdiction. The court second seised should only decline jurisdiction once it can be safely assumed that the court first seised will proceed to examine the case on the merits (para 96). Referring to the wording of Art. 38(a), he concludes that the obligation to recognise a judgment containing only a jurisdictional determination may arise irrespective of whether that judgment is final. By contrast, the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised has been established in such a way that it can no longer be contested (para 98).

In response to the second question referred, Emiliou further suggests that a jurisdictional determination may produce res judicata effects which cannot subsequently be set aside by the courts with priority (paras 99–101).

To summarise the Opinion of AG Emiliou: an interim decision, even if given in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Regulation and must be recognised. While the obligation of recognition arises irrespective of whether the decision is final, the obligation of the court designated in the choice-of-court agreement to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised can no longer be contested in the ongoing proceedings.

III. Comment

The present proceedings will likely make a further contribution to the CJEU’s emerging, controversial line of case law on what constitutes a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition within the meaning of Art. 36 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Prominent examples include H Limited (C-568/20), London Steam-Ship (C-700/20) and Gothaer (C-456/11), all of which are referenced in the Opinion (Fn. 32, 34, 39).

To date, the Court has consistently adopted a broad interpretation of this concept, notwithstanding substantial criticism from scholars. The Opinion of AG Emiliou continues this approach by interpreting ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation as encompassing interim decisions, even where they are given in breach of Art. 31(2).

Even though (German) scholarship remains cautious with regard to the recognition of such decisions, the reasoning of AG Emiliou is largely convincing, albeit with some caveats.

The main reservation concerns his argument that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) needs to be reinforced by treating jurisdictional decisions as recognisable judgments (paras 76–78). This step does not appear necessary. As he himself acknowledges (para 78), the same line of reasoning could lead to the opposite conclusion, namely that Art. 29(3) already provides a sufficient mechanism, making the recognition of an interim judgment in such circumstances superfluous.

However, the Opinion remains firmly in line with the Court’s existing case law, with the judgment in Gothaer (see especially Nr. 79). It is convincing in emphasising that, while the Regulation seeks to protect choice-of-court agreements, the prevention of parallel proceedings – and thus of conflicting judgments – carries greater weight (paras 89–90). This is further underpinned by the emphasis on mutual trust and the free circulation of judgments (paras 38–40, 82, 85, 87).

It is, however, somewhat surprising that AG Emiliou initially relies on Art. 29(3) as a key argument in favour of recognising the interim judgment, yet ultimately maintains a substantive distinction between the obligation to recognise such a judgment under Art. 36(1) and the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3). In the present case, this distinction does not appear to affect the outcome. It remains to be seen in which situations it might lead to different results.

Ultimately, however, the case reveals a more fundamental issue. As Lino Bernard has aptly observed, it is, in essence, concerned with procedural coordination under the Brussels Ia Regulation. Since a violation of the lis pendens rules does not constitute a ground for refusal of recognition (Liberato – C-386/17; see also AG Emiliou’s Opinion, Nr. 53), the question whether an interim decision is capable of recognition becomes particularly significant in this context. By contrast, if the lis pendens rules were enforced at the level of Art. 45(1), the issue of recognisability would be far less consequential, as recognition could be refused on that basis.

In this regard, it is remarkable that AG Emiliou’s decision prima facie strengthens (see para 76) the lis pendens rules at the stage of recognition. It may provide a workable interim solution for the principle of priority under Art. 29(1) and (3). But at the same time, as the present case illustrates, it sacrifices the protection of choice-of-court agreements under Art. 31(2). This could conceivably create new opportunities to misuse the lis pendens rules and encourage a race to the courts, particularly for claimants  with the ability to convince the court to issue an early interim decision.

Accordingly, the case once again highlights the need to elevate the entire lis pendens regime to a ground for refusal of recognition. Encouragingly, the Commission’s Report on the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation suggests that the recast may address this issue.

Independent of any reform of the Regulation, it remains to be seen whether the Court will follow AG Emiliou’s broad understanding of ‘judgment’ and continue its line of extending the interpretation of that concept within the meaning of the Regulation.

 

The announcement below is kindly provided by Agatha Brandão de Oliveira (University of Lucerne, Switzerland)

 

After several years of intensive work, the Choice of Law Dataverse (CoLD) is ready to be shared with the wider community. The platform is an open-access resource gathering more than 17,000 data points — including legislation, court decisions, and other materials from 100 jurisdictions around the world. After collecting and processing this information, we have analyzed and systematized these choice-of-law rules into pedagogical country reports, now freely available for research, teaching, and practice. The project was recently awarded the Swiss National ORD Prize 2025.

We would be delighted to share this milestone with colleagues whose work continues to shape the field.

 

Date and Venue

28.04.2026 | Tuesday, 11.30 a.m. CEST, Online via Zoom

No registration required, calendar invitation with connection link attached

Participants are welcome to join the full programme or drop in for individual sessions — the Zoom link remains open throughout the day, and no registration is required.

 

Programme

11:30 – Understanding the Choice of Law Dataverse

Agatha Brandão (University of Lucerne, Switzerland) will demonstrate the platform’s main features.

12h – Party Autonomy: Sacred Principle or Legal Fiction?
A debate not to be missed between Professor Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po, France), Professor Béligh Elbalti (University of Osaka, Japan), and Professor Gérald Goldstein (Université de Montréal), moderated by Professor Daniel Girsberger (University of Lucerne, Switzerland), on the myths and enduring significance of party autonomy in international contract law.

13h – Permanent Bureau Remarks on Ten Years of the HCCH Principles

Raquel Peixoto offers a retrospective on a decade of the HCCH Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts — what has been achieved, what lies ahead, and how this work intersects with CoLD.

14h – Bilateral Q&A

Participants may also request a 15-minute private session to explore the Dataverse for their own research purposes, ask questions about the project, or sign up as a specialist for their jurisdiction.

17h – Using the Dataverse for Advancing PIL Research

A session we particularly recommend for doctoral candidates and young researchers: Rorick Tovar (University of Lucerne, Switzerland), Solomon Okorley (University of Johannesburg, South Africa), and Ying Wang (Université de Montréal, Canada) discuss how CoLD supports comparative law and case law analysis in their own research.

Further information: cold.global/event/launch
For any questions, please contact agatha.brandao@unilu.ch.

We hope you can join us online for our launch event!

CoLD

Choice of Law Dataverse

University of Lucerne

 

cold.global | LinkedIn | Newsletter

The following call for papers has kindly been shared with us by the editors of The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI)

This Call for Papers of the Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) concerns the first issue to be published at the end of March 2027 and is devoted to the Securitisation of Supply Chains: Critical Raw Materials Between Energy Security and the Green Transition. This issue will be edited by the Editors-in-Chief of the JLMI (Lorenza Mola, Cristina Poncibò and Riccardo de Caria), along with Pritam Banerjee and Vishakha Srivastava as guest co-editor. You can find the call with all the details at the following link:

SECURITISATION OF SUPPLY CHAINS: CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS BETWEEN ENERGY SECURITY AND THE GREEN TRANSITION

The Call invites contributions on the subject of Securitisation of Supply Chains: Critical Raw Materials Between Energy Security and the Green Transition. The growing use of trade policy to advance national and economic security objectives is blurring the boundary between legitimate security measures and disguised restrictions on trade. Countries are increasingly giving new dimensions to traditional instruments such as trade defence instruments, import restrictions, export controls, local content requirements, subsidies tied to trusted supply chains, traceability and transparency requirements, among others, to serve strategic purposes. Moreover, concerns around energy security are translating into the securitisation of trade through control over critical raw materials, with security and resilience of supply chains emerging as the legal and political vocabulary for legitimising discriminatory trade measures.

The authors are called to explore the link between energy security and the green transition with regard to the regulation of trade in critical raw materials, particularly the tension between dependence on critical raw materials and decarbonisation commitments. In this context, the submissions examine the governance of critical raw materials, with a particular focus on their treatment as strategic assets rather than ordinary tradable goods.

The issue will also address the risk factors for security and resilience of supply chains, such as vulnerabilities arising from technological dependencies and asymmetries in access to key technologies.

We invite submissions that analyse state priorities, primarily driven by critical raw materials availability divide, and firm priorities, primarily driven by resilience of supply chains. Submissions may explore treatification, unilateral measures, contract clauses on critical raw materials, as well as their broader implications for global trade.

The Editorial Board will select articles based on the quality of research and writing, diversity, and relevance of the topic. The novelty of the academic contribution is also an essential requirement.

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of full papers to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it by 20 July 2026. Submissions will undergo a preliminary selection process by the editorial board: authors will be notified of the outcome of this preliminary selection by 10 September 2026.  Selected articles will then undergo a rigorous double- blind peer-review process. Typically, the JLMI accepts contributions within the range of 10.000-15.000 words, including footnotes, but both shorter and longer articles will be considered. We ask prospective authors to kindly make sure that their submission conforms to the JLMI Code of Ethics and Authors’ guidelines (also with regard to disclosure of simultaneous submission to other journals: authors are required to disclose if they have submitted their article elsewhere, both in case of negative and pending reviews, and promptly update the editorial board of any changes in this regard, throughout the whole editorial process with the JLMI). Perspective authors are kindly required to follow the JLMI style guide, and abide by the OSCOLA citation standard. For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, please email us at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

The University of Edinburgh is recruiting a postdoctoral research fellow in private international law to work on an exciting new research project funded by the UKRI Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) entitled “Fashion’s PLACE – Private (International) Law and Circular Economy”. The project explores the private law and private international law components of legal design for a just circular economy transition in global value chains. It takes the fashion industry as a case study, examining the journey of textiles from the places of production, via the marketplaces of consumption, to the places of disposal.

The post-holder will be line managed by Professor Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm and will be based in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh. The post-holder will work closely with other investigators at the University of Edinburgh and Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, namely Dr Antonia Sommerfeld, Dr Michael Picard and Professor Ralf Michaels.

The post is full-time (35 hours per week).

The deadline for application is May 4th 2026.

More information on the project here, on the call here.

The next webinar in the Crossroads in Private International Law webinar series will be given by Prof. Csongor Nagy (University of Galway) on the topic “EU Law and Sports Arbitration: When Global and Regional Regimes Meet“.

The webinar is scheduled for 22 April 2026, 14:00 – 15:00 UTC.

More information about the event and registration is available here, at the webpage of the organiser – the Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen.

This post has previously been published by PAX Moot (with minor changes). Photo: University of Ljubljana Team. 

The PAX Moot 2026 — Vladimir Koutikov Round has come to an end, and what an incredible edition it has been. We hope it was an unforgettable experience for all participants — a unique opportunity to engage in high-level argumentation on Private International Law, grow advocacy skills, and forge lasting friendships along the way.

Without further ado, we are proud to announce the results of this year’s competition:

• Winner — University of Ljubljana
• Runner-up — Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski

Best Written Submission (shared 1st place) University of Warsaw & University of Ljubljana
Honourable Mention for Written Submission: Singapore Management University | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid | University of Antwerp

Best Oralist Awards:

• 1st place — Chloe Xin Ying Chia (Singapore Management University)
• 2nd place — Lara Vangoethem (Maastricht University)
• 3rd place — Benedetta Gargiulo (Maastricht University)

We extend our deepest gratitude to our hosts from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, and to the European Commission for their generous funding, which makes this incredible event possible.

To every team, coach, judge, and volunteer who contributed to making PAX Moot 2026 a success: thank you.

Photo credit: Mayela Celis

The following Call for Contributions has been kindly shared with us by Sandrine Brachotte (UAntwerpen):

The organizers are pleased to invite you to contribute to a book and conference on the theme of decoloniality and legal methodology in Europe, given the political importance of methodology. This subject requires Europeans to draw inspiration from the knowledge and experience of the regions they colonised. Legal scholars must also learn from civil society and studies carried out in the social sciences.

Editors/Organisers:

Sandrine Brachotte, UAntwerpen

Christine Frison, ULiège

Lina Álvarez-Villarreal, Universidad de los Andes

Project Description

This book aims to connect European legal methodology to decoloniality. It examines the compatibility of European legal methodologies for teaching, studying, writing about, elaborating on and applying law with the demands of decoloniality. It will also suggest ways to address areas of conflict, inadequacy and structural misalignment between the two. The book’s focus on legal methodology rather than law reflects the assumption that methods are not apolitical and constitute ways of viewing the world (Gordon, Escobar).

The decolonial perspective exposes how the dominant worldview at the global level continues to marginalise the sensitivities to the world (Mignolo) of people from former colonies and their identities, using not only race and ethnicity, but also gender and sexual orientation (Lugones, Segato). It includes the argument that coloniality has built on the “world-of-One”: one hegemonic – capitalist, anthropocentric, modern, patriarchal, etc. – way of being human (Escobar), shaped primarily by Europe in a history of continuous dispossession of non-European peoples, territories, and nature, and the imposition of modern European values, norms and conceptions of knowledge. Decoloniality further highlights the need to redress this power imbalance as a matter of justice and equality by compensating for the structural peripherality of these sensitivities and identities. To do so, the voices of the people concerned must be listened to in the first place.

In this respect, the law must be reconsidered, as it is one of the main instruments of the modernity/coloniality tandem (Quijano). Its association with state law in legal theory is a product of modernity (Liotta and Szpiga). State law was used by European colonial powers to legitimise the colonial enterprise (García-López and Winter-Pereira), and it remains in place in formerly colonised states. This means that European epistemologies and values, both past and present, continue to govern the lives of formerly colonised communities to some extent (Bazán Seminario). Because coloniality operates on a global scale (Quijano), the decolonial project speaks to the entire world, including Europe. Moreover, as former colonial powers, European states have a special responsibility to address decolonial demands, which requires them to acknowledge a darker truth about themselves and thus the negative impact of coloniality on Europe (du Bois, Césaire, Àlvarez-Villarreal). Furthermore, Europe has much to learn from the epistemologies and struggles of colonised peoples (Comaroff and Comaroff) in order to address the contemporary crises of our time, such as reorganising knowledge (Lander), politics (Walsh, Gutiérrez-Aguilar, Tzul-Tzul), economics (Àlvarez-Villarreal), and dealing with climate and ecological crises (Millán, Escobar).

Decolonial approaches are gaining traction, including within legal studies (eg Achiume, Al Attar & Abdelkarim, Barreto, Kapur, Moreno, Nesiah). In this context, a few scholars have highlighted the need to rethink legal education and research in European universities (Adébísí), as well as the foundations of law and the content of legal rules in European states and at the EU level (eg Ashiagbor, Solanke, Zenouvou, Salaymeh & Michaels, Eklund, Brachotte). International law must of course also be rethought from a decolonial perspective, including in European universities. Yet, the concrete methodological implications of decoloniality for law in Europe remain poorly defined. In this regard, the rich work of several decolonial social scientists (eg Bhambra, Diagne, Carneiro, Galcerán Huguet, Moosavi, Mbembe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Omodan, Ribeiro, Udah), scholars working in Indigenous studies (eg Borrows, Datta, Denscombe, Ewing, Krenak, Monchalin, Napoleon, Thambinathan & Kinsella, Smith, Tuhiwai Smith) and decolonial legal scholars from formerly colonised states (eg de Almeida, Diouf, Mosaka) must be built upon.

Audience

The book is intended for legal students, researchers and practitioners, as well as for civil society organisations.

Scope and Themes

The volume seeks contributions addressing, inter alia, the following questions:

• What does decoloniality require from legal research and writing, especially in view of the empirical turn, the historicisation of law, and the decolonial demand to go for “undisciplinarity”?
• How compatible are European universities’ legal and ethical standards, as well as the acquisition policies of their libraries, with these requirements?
• What does decoloniality require of legal education, both in terms of subject matter and pedagogical techniques?
• What does decoloniality require from the legal methods and techniques that are used in legal practice, to draft legislation or to take judicial or administrative decisions considering (i) law in general and (ii) the specificities of each branch of law, such as comparative law, public international law, private international law, European Union law, civil law, criminal law, and migration law?
• Regarding legal research, legal education and legal practice, to what extent can decolonial methods developed in formerly colonised states be implemented in Europe to enhance methodological compatibility, and what are alternative methods to reach that goal?

Type of Contributions and Selection Process

We invite original and unpublished chapter proposals of approximately 8,000–10,000 words (including footnotes and references).

We welcome authors who have a social sciences or legal background or who claim undisciplinarity, and who are in academia, in legal practice, or in civil society organisations.

We strongly encourage authors who do not feel comfortable in English to submit an abstract in their own language.

Abstracts will be selected on the basis of academic quality, with due regard to representativity and inclusiveness, including diversity in geographical backgrounds, gender, and career stages, in order to ensure a pluralistic discussion.

Conference

The conference will take place at UAntwerp (Belgium) on 25, 26 and 27 January 2027, starting after lunchtime on the first day and finishing before lunchtime on the last day. We are delighted to be able to already announce that Dr. Leon Moosavi will act as a keynote speaker.

 

Participants will be expected to cover their own travel and accommodation expenses. However, the organisers are firmly committed to ensuring that financial constraints do not constitute an obstacle to participation. Scholars who may face difficulties in covering travel or accommodation costs are warmly encouraged to contact the organisers in confidence to discuss possible arrangements.

In addition, where travel is not possible (for example, due to visa restrictions, institutional limitations, or personal circumstances), remote participation will be facilitated, including participation in the conference discussions via online means.

The organisers aim to ensure an inclusive and accessible academic exchange, irrespective of geographic or financial constraints.

Submission Guidelines

Interested contributors are invited to submit:

• An abstract (300–500 words)
• A short biographical note (100–150 words)

Deadline: 30 April 2026

Timeline

• Notification of acceptance: 30 May 2026
• Draft chapter submission: 30 July 2026

• Feedback to authors from external peer reviewers and editors: 30 September 2026

• Final chapter submission (subject to modifications following the conference): 20 December 2026

Contact

Proposals should be sent to: dlmsineurope@gmail.com

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

B. Heiderhoff/C. Rüsing: Dealing with parallel proceedings in Third Countries – from Germany via Brussels to The Hague? [German]

The extent to which civil proceedings pending in a third country preclude proceedings before domestic courts varies considerably across jurisdictions. Autonomous German law with its quite strict first-seized rule accords substantial deference to proceedings initiated earlier in third countries. Other legal systems have adopted a more cautious approach, most notably common law jurisdictions, which rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation reacts to these differences. At least for some grounds of jurisdiction, it allows the Member State courts to exercise discretion and suspend proceedings if a foreign court has been seized earlier. Ultimately, both autonomous German law and European law attach great importance to priority and to international jurisdiction.

Against this background, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has published a draft convention on parallel proceedings. It seeks to combine jurisdiction- and priority-based approaches with elements of the forum non conveniens doctrine. This article therefore reconsiders, at a more fundamental level, the appropriate response to parallel proceedings. It first compares the German and European approaches and demonstrates why, de lege lata, Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot be applied by analogy under autonomous German law. On this basis, the article evaluates the draft Hague Convention and critically assesses its underlying orientation.

 

L. d´Avout: Trojan following Coman, Pancharevo and Mirin: Another step forward or an editorial misstep? [German]

According to Trojan, under EU law and despite constitutional prohibitions, a Member State is obliged to directly recognise a same-sex marriage validly concluded in another Member State, without any restrictions on the purposes and scope of direct recognition (free enjoyment of EU citizens’ rights). Here, the CJEU appears to be going one step further. The motivation behind the recognition order is innovative; however, in reality, the court ruling acts as a mere echo of the ECtHR’s case law on defective national personal and family law. Omnis interpretatio sub lege europae periculosa est.

 

K. A. Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe: No jurisdiction of German courts to determine the heirs of Pope Benedict XVI. [German]

In this decision, the Munich Court of Appeal (“OLG München”) deals with the international jurisdiction for the appointment of a curator of the estate for the purpose of determining unknown heirs of Pope Emeritus Benedict XIV, who died in 2022. Since he had his habitual residence in the Vatican City State, where he also died, at least since his election as Pope in 2005, the jurisdiction of German courts under Art. 4 EU Succession Regulation was ruled out. The OLG also denied subsidiary jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 10 EU Succession Regulation, as none of the deceased’s estate assets were located in Germany. It also considered that the requirements for emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 11 EU Succession Regulation were not met, as neither the impossibility nor the unreasonableness of initiating or conducting proceedings before the courts of the Vatican City State could be assumed. The court did not, however, address the obvious question of whether the measure could be based on Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation. Ultimately, the OLG can be agreed with, even though the reasoning should have been more detailed in some respects; in particular, it should have addressed the jurisdiction under Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation, which was, however, also to be rejected here because there is no genuine link between the requested measure and the territorial jurisdiction of German courts.

 

M. Gebauer: Renvoi under the European Succession Regulation and its consequences: characterisation in foreign choice-of-law rules; substitution; preliminary questions; adaptation; parallel proceedings [German]

The underlying constellation of the decision proves to be a prototype for the more complex follow-up questions that arise after a renvoi under the European Succession Regulation. These include the characterisation of the third state’s choice-of-law rules according to its own criteria; partial renvoi; the secondary characterisation of the substantive rules of the lex fori, to which the third state’s choice-of-law rules refer; preliminary questions of matrimonial property law within the substantive succession rules; substitution and adaptation. A typical procedural challenge arises when the deceased had the last habitual residence in a third state because the extensive subsidiary jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States according to the European Succession Regulation often leads to parallel proceedings in the respective third states.

 

B. Heiderhoff: Change of applicable law and adjustment of an Islamic mahr to German post-marital claims [German]

The OLG Düsseldorf decided that the agreed amount of an Islamic mahr (dower) may be reduced if the basis of the transaction ceases to exist as a consequence of a change of the applicable law. While the contract was originally concluded under Iranian Law, the court held that due to the acquisition of German citizenship German law became applicable. The court applied section 313 of the German Civil Code (BGB) (“Interference with the basis of the transaction”) because – unlike under Iranian law – the wife can claim division of pension rights under German law. The author first shows that under the Matrimonial Property Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103) the law applicable to the mahr will no longer change when Iranian citizens are naturalised in Germany. However, even if one followed the court in assuming a change of the applicable law, section 313 of the BGB cannot be applied as easily as the OLG Düsseldorf held.

 

F. Berner: Cross-border favours [German]

The decision of the Munich Court of Appeal (OLG München) deals with a cross-border favour. Although the OLG correctly concludes that German substantive law applies in the individual case, the decision raises the question of how claims arising from the breach of a duty of care in the context of favours should actually be characterised. For example, it is not entirely clear whether substantive tortious claims in this context always fall under the Rome II Regulation or whether they do not fall – at least partially – under the Rome I Regulation. Equally problematic is the characterisation of the “relationship of favour” (“Gefälligkeitsverhältnis”) – a category between contract and tort. Finally, the decision is also of interest because of its treatment of a comparative law argument within substantive law.

 

M. Stürner: Between lex fori and lex causae: The claim for reduction in price in the event of defective work under Italian law [German]

The Court of Appeal Dresden had to deal with a warranty claim to which Italian law applied as the defendant contractor had its seat in Italy. The claimant’s request was interpreted by the Senate as a declaration of a reduction in price by applying the lex fori, although, pursuant to Article 12 (1) lit. c) Rome I Regulation, the law applicable to the contractual obligation (i.e. Italian law) also determines the consequences of the (partial) non-fulfilment of the contractual obligation. Even if the diverging approaches did not produce different results in the end, it once again shows the difficulties in distinguishing between the fundamental categories of lex fori and lex causae.

 

C. Thole: Judicial Review of fair trial and public policy in exequatur proceedings regarding foreign arbitral awards [German]

The Bavarian Court of Appeal (BayObLG) had to decide upon the enforceability of a Danish arbitral award, against which the respondent, among other things, objected on the grounds of a violation of the right to be heard. The judgment is largely based on the specific circumstances of the individual case and the respondent’s failure to sufficiently substantiate his objections. However, the court decision also points to still unresolved legal questions reaching beyond the case at hand.

 

G. Freise/L. Vollert: Choice of court agreements and overriding mandatory provisions: Does Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation allow for lois de police? [German]

Several EU regulations allow for overriding mandatory provisions. The French Cour de cassation had to decide whether Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation likewise allows for such a reservation in favour of lois de police. The Cour de cassation, however, held that Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation does not allow the application of overriding mandatory provisions. According to the view taken here, the ruling should be seen in connection with the recent case law of the CJEU. The CJEU has, in its more recent decisions, significantly limited the scope for review of jurisdiction agreements falling under Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation. From this perspective, the Cour de cassation’s decision is convincing. Nevertheless, some concerns regarding the right to a fair trial remain.

 

A. Spickhoff: Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws [German]

Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws exhibits certain peculiarities due to various actors being involved on the production side. This necessitates a closer examination, particularly in private international law, of the group of parties entitled to be sued under Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation. Before this examination, however, the place of the tort establishing jurisdiction, meaning the place of injury or the place at which the tortious act occurred, must be specified in a ubiquitous manner. From the Austrian perspective, in case of a remote tort, only the place of conduct is relevant.

 

S. Vuattoux-Bock: The law applicable to the last purchaser’s direct action [German]

In cross-border supply chains, defects may only become apparent after goods have been resold, giving rise to complex liability issues across multiple links in the chain. Under French law, subsequent purchasers have a direct contractual claim (“action directe”) against all prior sellers, including the manufacturer. However, the applicable law for such claims in international chains has been uncertain. In two landmark rulings on 28 May 2025, the French Cour de Cassation ruled that the “action directe” is governed by the Rome II Regulation. This rejected its previous contractual classification in favour of a tort-based approach for private international law purposes. These decisions have significant implications, particularly for German manufacturers, as they greatly reduce the predictability of liability exposure in the supply chain. Ultimately, the rulings strengthen the position of French, Belgian or Luxembourgish end buyers in international supply chains, but raise substantial concerns regarding legal certainty and risk assessment for manufacturers and intermediaries. This article critically examines these rulings, highlighting the tension between EU-wide coherence and legal certainty. It also discusses possible alternative approaches, including the application of Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, to better balance the foreseeability of liability for suppliers with the protection of end buyers.

 

M. Weller: Governmental interest analysis and Nazi-looted art [German]

The judgment to be discussed here implements the previous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court: In actions against states and their instrumentalities, e.g. for the restitution of Nazi-looted art based on the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which the federal court seised with the matter is located (here California) are to be applied, rather than federal choice of law rules. However, in accordance with this requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again applied Spanish law on acquisitive prescription under the governmental interest analysis as practiced in California and thus dismissed the action in favor of the state-owned Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza in Madrid, as it had done before under federal choice of law. California took this as an opportunity to enact legislation in direct response to the ruling in cases like the present one, ordering the application of California substantive law. This prompted the plaintiff to pursue his claim with further legal remedies aimed at rehearing the case, currently with a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision on this petition is still pending. The judgment presented here illustrates the functioning and weaknesses of governmental interest analysis in an exemplary manner. At the same time, the decision is equally exemplary in revealing that – after more than 20 years of proceedings – the processing of historical injustice before state courts under applicable law has its limits. The U.S. should follow its own international plea for “just and fair solutions” and provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as Germany, for example, has been doing since 2003.

 

GEDIP: The law applicable to rights in rem in corporeal assets [English]

GEDIP: Guidelines on the Influence of European Union Law on Member States Law on Nationality [English]

GEDIP: Guidelines on the treatment of renvoi in European Union instruments on applicable law in civil matters [English]

C. Kohler: The renvoi in European conflict of laws – Meeting of the European Group of Private International Law 2025 [German]