Agrégateur de flux

Dans un arrêt du 2 avril 2025, la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation confirme l’incompétence des juridictions françaises, saisies en méconnaissance d’une clause attributive de juridiction contenue dans un contrat entre une entrepreneure française et la société Meta Platform, pour l’utilisation d’un compte professionnel sur la plateforme Instagram. Pour la Cour, la validité de la clause ne peut être examinée qu’au regard du droit irlandais, en tant que droit du for du juge élu, de sorte que le moyen tiré de son invalidité au regard de l’éventuel déséquilibre significatif qu’elle causerait, en application de l’article 1171 du code civil, doit être écarté. 

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By Livia Solaro, PhD candidate at Maastricht University, working on the transnational restitution of Nazi-looted art

On 21 February 2025, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling in Republic of Hungary v. Simon,[1] a Holocaust restitution case with a lengthy procedural history. Delivering this unanimous decision, Justice Sotomayor confirmed the restrictive approach to cases involving foreign states inaugurated in 2021 by Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp.[2] In light of the importance of US practice for the development of customary law around sovereign immunity,[3] and its impact on questions of historical justice and transnational accountability, the Simon development deserves  particular attention.

The Jurisdictional Treatment of Foreign States as an “American Anomaly”[4]

In 2010, a group of Holocaust survivors filed a suit before the US District Court for the District of Columbia against the Republic of Hungary, the Hungarian State-owned national railway (Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., or MÁV) and its successor-in-interest Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt. (RCH), seeking compensation for the Hungarian government’s treatment of its Jewish population during World War II.[5] The survivors claimed that, in connection to their deportation, their properties had been expropriated and subsequently liquidated by defendants.

As the case repeatedly moved through federal courts (in fact, this was not the first time it reached the Supreme Court),[6] the possibility for the US judge to extend its adjudicative jurisdiction over the Hungarian State remained controversial. Claimants based their action on the so-called “expropriation exception” to sovereign immunity, codified by §1605(a)(3) of the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).[7] This provision  excludes immunity in all cases revolving around rights in property taken in violation of international law, at the condition that  that property, or any property exchanged for such property: 1) is present in the US in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the US by the foreign state, or 2) is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the US.

This exception represents an unicum within the law of sovereign immunity, as it allows courts to extend their jurisdiction over a state’s acta iure imperii (expropriations are indeed quintessential sovereign acts).[8] In recent years, this provision has often been invoked in claims of restitution of Nazi-looted art owned by European states (see, for example, Altmann v. Republic of Austria,[9] Toren v. Federal Republic of Germany,[10] Berg v. Kingdom of Netherlands,[11] Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain).[12] Crucially, this exception also requires a commercial nexus between the initial expropriation and the US. In its Simon decision, the US Supreme Court addressed the standard that plaintiffs need to meet to establish this commercial nexus in cases where the expropriated property was subsequently liquidated. The Court read a “tracing requirement” in the text of the provision, thus establishing a very high threshold.

Property Taken in Violation of International Law

The Court had recently addressed the interpretation of §1605(a)(3 in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, where the heirs of German Jewish art dealers sought the restitution of a collection of medieval reliquaries known as the Guelph Treasure (Welfenschatz), In that case, the Supreme Court focused on the opening line of the expropriation exception, which requires that the rights in property at issue were “taken in violation of international law”. By explicitly recognizing that this language incorporates the domestic takings rule,[13] the Court set in motion a trend of increasingly restrictive interpretations of the expropriation exception that is still developing today.

To reach this result, the Supreme Court interpreted the expropriation exception as referring specifically to the international law of expropriation. This narrow reading of §1605(a)(3) allowed the Court to assert that the domestic takings rule had “survived the advent of modern human rights law”, as the two remained insulated from one another. Accordingly, even if the Nazi plunder were considered as an act of genocide, in violation of human rights law and the Genocide Convention,[14] it would not fall under §1605(a)(3), as this provision only applies to property takings against aliens (reflecting the traditional opinion that international law is concerned solely with the relations between states). From this perspective, the Philipp decision adhered to the International Court of Justice’s highly criticized conclusion in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.  Italy) that immunity is not excluded by serious violations of ius cogens.[15]

The impact of this restrictive turn has already emerged in a couple of cases adjudicated after Philipp. In order to circumvent the domestic takings rule, claimants have tried to argue that the persecutory treatment of Jewish individuals by several states during the Holocaust deprived them of their nationality, rendering them either de iure or de facto stateless. In the wake of Philipp, courts have been sceptical of this statelessness theory – although they appear to have left the door ajar for stronger arguments in its support.[16] A recent decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia  has gone so far as to exclude the expropriation exception in cases involving a states’ taking of property from nationals of an enemy state in times of war.[17] The District Court followed the same reasoning as in Philipp: if §1605(a)(3) refers to the international law of expropriation, not only human rights law but also international humanitarian law are excluded by its scope of application. As I noted elsewhere,[18] post-Philipp court practice now excludes the expropriation exception in the vast majority of takings by sovereign actors, regardless of whether they targeted their own nationals, the nationals of an enemy state or stateless individuals.

The Commercial Nexus and the Commingling Theory

The recent Simon decision adopts the same restrictive approach as Philipp, but shifts focus to the expropriation exception’s second requirement: the commercial nexus with the US. Under §1605(a)(3), the property that was taken in violation of international law, or any property exchanged for such property (emphasis added), needs to have a connection with a commercial activity carried by the foreign state, or one of its agencies or instrumentalities, in the US. Crucially, the Hungarian government liquidated the assets allegedly expropriated from defendants. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the claimants’ allegation that Hungary used the proceedings to issue bonds in the US met the commercial nexus requirement. Complicating matters further, the proceeds were absorbed into the national treasury where, over the years, they had mingled with billions in other revenues.

The Simon question concerns an important portion of expropriation cases, since property is often taken for its monetary rather than intrinsic value. Therefore, with some specific exceptions (such as takings of artworks or land), expropriated properties are likely going to be liquidated, and the proceeds are bound to be commingled with other funds. Years after the initial liquidation, proving the location of the money originally exchanged for those properties is extremely challenging, if not impossible. In 2023, the Circuit Court had indeed concluded that “[r]equiring plaintiffs whose property was liquidated to allege and prove that they have traced funds in the foreign state’s or instrumentality’s possession to proceeds of the sale of their property would render the FSIA’s expropriation exception a nullity for virtually all claims involving liquidation”.[19]

The Simon claimants thus proposed a “commingling theory”, arguing that instead of tracing the initial proceeds, it is enough to show that they eventually mixed with funds later used in commercial activity in the US. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Sotomayor rejected this theory, reading a specific tracing requirement into the wording of the expropriation exception. In order to meet this requirement, claimants can identify a US account holding proceeds from expropriated property, or allege that a foreign sovereign spent all funds from a commingled account in the United States. As clarified by the Justice, these are but some examples of how a claimant might chose to proceed. Rather than examining various common law tracing principles, however, the Court here simply ruled that alleging that a foreign sovereign liquidated the expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with general funds, and later used some portion of those funds for commercial activities in the US does not establish a plausible commercial nexus. Although this ruling imposes a high bar for claimants seeking to invoke the expropriation exception, the Court found this outcome less detrimental to the FSIA’s rationale than accepting the “attenuated fiction” that commingled accounts still contain funds from the original property’s liquidation. In Simon, for example, while the initial commingling of funds occurred in the 1940s, the suit was only brought in the 2010s, after “several institutional collapses and regime changes”.

A Restrictive Parable

The Supreme Court based its Simon decision on a textual interpretation of the expropriation exception, which identifies “that property or any property exchanged for such property”, without providing a specific alternative criterion for property exchanged for money. The Court also looked at the legislative history of the FSIA, rooted in the 1964 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino decision.[20] The Sabbatino case prompted US Congress to pass the FSIA’s predecessor, the Second Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,  “to permit adjudication of claims the Sabbatino decision had avoided”.[21] In Simon, the Court read its Sabbatino precedent as part of the FSIA’s history, and as such relevant to its interpretation – especially considering that Sabbatino also revolved around property that had been liquidated. Crucially in Sabbatino “the proceeds . . . in controversy” could be clearly traced to a New York account, aligning the case with the tracing requirement identified in Simon.

The Simon Court also echoed the foreign relations concerns that it already discussed in Philipp, justifying its restrictive interpretation of the FSIA on the Act’s potential to cause international friction, and trigger reciprocity among other states’ courts. In this regard, the Philipp and Simon decisions seem particularly keen to do some “damage control” on the effects of the expropriation exception, reducing its scope from a “radical” to a “limited” departure from the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.

This restrictive turn mirrors the trajectory of human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).[22] Starting with the Second Circuit’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,[23] the 1789 ATS was used by US courts to extend their jurisdiction on human rights claims brought by aliens. In 2004 (the same year as the seminal Altmann decision on the FSIA’s retroactive application),[24] the Supreme Court rejected the interpretation of the ATS as a gateway for “foreign-cubed” human rights cases.[25] Warning against the risk of “adverse foreign policy consequences”, the Court provided a narrow interpretation of the ATS. This conservative approach has been framed as part of the shift in attitudes that marked the passage from the Third to the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.[26] The decision to restrict the reach of the ATS was in fact rooted in political considerations, as testified by the pressure exercised by the Bush administration to hear the case.[27] The new geopolitical landscape had diminished the strategic importance of vindicating international human rights law, and the use of domestic courts to advance public rights agendas had faced severe criticism, with US courts being accused of acting as judges of world history.[28] The Philipp and Simon interpretations of the FSIA reproduce this passage from an offensive to a defensive approach within the law of foreign sovereign immunity.

Conclusion

Since Philipp, the expropriation exception has been limited to property takings by foreign sovereigns against aliens during peacetime. This development has arguably returned the FSIA to its original intent: to protect the property of US citizens abroad, as an expression of “America’s free enterprise system”. With Simon, this provision’s application has been further restricted where the expropriated property was liquidated. This approach explicitly aims at aligning US law with international law. In this process, however, the US judiciary’s controversial yet proactive contribution to human rights litigation, with its potential to influence the development of customary law, is taking a more conservative and isolationist stance.

[1] Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. ___ (2025).

[2] Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U. S. 169 (2021).

[3] Thomas Giegerich, ‘The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated Pissarro Painting: Recent Us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity’ in Anne Peters and others (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Brill | Nijhoff 2014) 52. <https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004251632/B9789004251632_006.xml> accessed 11 December 2024. An important conference on the state of the art on the international law of foreign sovereign immunity recently took place at Villa Vigoni (Italy), under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. The full program of the event can be found here: https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/news/conferences-workshops/the-future-of-remedies-against.cfm.

[4] As described by Riccardo Pavoni, ‘An American Anomaly? On the ICJ’s Selective Reading of United States Practice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’ (2011) 21 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 143.

[5] For an historical contextualization, see Szabolcs Szita, ‘It Happened Seventy Years Ago, in Hungary’ [2014] Témoigner. Entre histoire et mémoire. Revue pluridisciplinaire de la Fondation Auschwitz 146.

[6] See Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 592 U. S. 207 (2021) (per curiam) (Supreme Court of the United States).

[7] The FSIA, enacted through Public Law 94-583 on October 21 on 1976, is codified in Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 97, Part IV – Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.

[8] Charlene Sun and Aloysius Llamzon, ‘Acta Iure Gestionis and Acta Iure Imperii’ (Oxford Constitutions – Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law [MPECCoL]) <https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e188> accessed 30 April 2025.

[9] Altmann v Republic of Austria [2001] 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (United States District Court, CD California).

[10] Toren v Federal Republic of Germany 2023 WL 7103263 (United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit) (unreported).

[11] Berg v Kingdom of the Netherlands 2020 WL 2829757 (United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division) (unreported).

[12] Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain [2006] 461 F.Supp.2d 1157 (United States District Court, CD California).

[13] Mayer Brown, ‘“Domestic Takings” Rule Bars Suit Against Foreign Nations in U.S. Court’ (Lexology, 3 February 2021) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d4af991-a497-47be-80f2-dd78c184baa1> accessed 30 April 2025.

[14] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277, 9 December 1948, https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/unga/1948/en/13495 [accessed 29 April 2025].

[15] Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,  I.C.J. Reports 2012. For a critical discussion of this judgment, see Benedetto Conforti, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of Foreign States: A Missed Opportunity’ (2011) 21 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 133.

[16] See Simon v Republic of Hungary [2023] 77 F4th 1077 (United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit). The court here clarified that its decision did not “foreclose the possibility that such support exists in sources of international law not before us in this case or based on arguments not advanced here”> Ibid,  para 1098.

[17] de Csepel v Republic of Hungary 2024 WL 4345811 (United States District Court, District of Columbia).

[18] Livia Solaro, ‘US Case Further Restricts Holocaust-Related Art Claims’ (The Institute of Art & Law, 11 November 2024) <https://ial.uk.com/author/livia-solaro/> accessed 30 April 2025.

[19] Simon v Republic of Hungary (n 16) para 1118.

[20]  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964) (Supreme Court of the United States).This case revolved around the expropriation of sugar by Cuba against a private company in protest for the reduction of the US sugar quota for this country. After the sugar in question was delivered to a customer in Morocco, both the Cuban state and the private company claimed the payment of the price, which in the meantime had been transferred to a New York commodity broker. The case eventually was adjudicated in favour of the National Bank of Cuba, based on the Act of State doctrine.

[21] As noted by the Court in  Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. ___ (2025) (Supreme Court of the United States) 15–16.

[22] 28 U.S. Code § 1350.

[23] Filartiga v Pena-Irala [1980] 630 F.2d 876 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit).

[24]  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677 (2004) (Supreme Court of the United States).

[25]  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692 (2004) (Supreme Court of the United States); for a definition of ‘foreign-cubed’ claims, see Robert S Wiener, ‘Foreign Jurisdictional Algebra and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Foreign Cubed And Foreign Squared Cases’ (2014) 32 North East Journal of Legal Studies 156, 157.

[26] See Thomas H Lee, ‘Customary International Law and U.S. Judicial Power: From the Third to the Fourth Restatements’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2020) <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3629791> accessed 14 March 2025.

[27] Naomi Norberg, ‘The US Supreme Court Affirms the Filartiga Paradigm’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 387, 390.

[28] Ugo Mattei, ‘A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance’ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 67, 420.

This post was written by Rose Wijeyesekera, Professor of Private and Comparative Law, Chair / Department of Private and Comparative Law – Faculty of Law, University of Colombo

Introduction

Sri Lanka (formerly known as ‘Ceylon’) is an island in the Indian Ocean, and is home to a total population of 21,763,170, consisting of Sinhalese 74.9%, Tamils 15.4%, Muslims 9.3%, and 0.5% consisting of others such as Veddhas, Burghers, and gypsies.The legal system of this island nation is a unique blend of native laws and the laws that were placed by the colonial powers from 1505 to 1947, when the country gained independence. Since then, Sri Lanka has been a democratic republic and a Unitary State governed by a constitution. The Sri Lankan legal system is primarily based on Roman-Dutch law, inherited from its colonial past under the Dutch, and English common law introduced by the British colonial rulers. Apart from these two, the legal system incorporates elements of Kandyan law (representing indigenous customs of the Sinhalese), Tesawalamai(customary laws of the Tamils of the Northern province of the country) and Muslim law. These personal laws apply in matters of personal law, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, depending on the community to which an individual belongs. All Muslims including the sub-categories such as Moors and Malays, are governed by Muslim Law in their personal matters, while Kandyan Sinhalese (a minority of the Sinhalese who hail from “Kandyan Provinces” / the hill country, are governed by Kandyan Law. These customary laws bear a territorial and/or a religious nature. Most of these laws are enacted, but some remain open leaving room for judicial interpretation. The court system in Sri Lanka is structured hierarchically and is designed to ensure justice through a combination of traditional and modern legal principles. The system comprises the Supreme Court at the apex, the Court of Appeal, Provincial High Courts, District Courts, Magistrate Courts, and tribunals such as Labour Tribunals, Quazi Courts, and Mediation Boards.

The legislative sources of private international law are derived from multiple frameworks in Sri Lanka including the Civil Procedure Code (1889), Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007, Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995 and Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Ordinance No. 41 of 1921 (REJO) and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Ordinance No. 3 of 1937 (EFJO) were the most relevant in the sphere of reciprocal recognition, registration and enforcement of foreign judgments. Yet, these statutes, which were enacted during the British colonial era, were limited in their application as they applied only in judgments relating to commercial matters. The lacunae created by the absence of legal direction with regard to the recognition of foreign judgments in matters relating to divorce, annulment and separation of spouses, was huge in a socio-economic context where outward migration has become unprecedently large in recent times.

 

Pre-legislative judicial activism  

In December 2023, the Court of Appeal had to face this lacuna, where Champika Harendra Silva v. M.B. Weerasekara Registrar General and Others. The case concerned a Sri Lankan-born couple who had registered their marriage in Sri Lanka and migrated thereafter to England, had obtained a divorce decree from a competent court in England. The divorcee man applied to the Registrar General (RG) of Sri Lanka to register the divorce, but it was rejected on the basis that the divorce was obtained from a British court, which according to the RG, was not a ‘competent court’ under the Marriage Registration Ordinance of Sri Lanka. Upon rejection by the RG, the divorcee filed for a writ of certiorari pleading the court to quash the RG’s rejection, and a writ of Mandamus recognizing the decree of divorce granted by the English court. The court made headlines when, through judicial interpretation, it granted both writs declaring that a foreign decree of dissolution of a marriage contracted in Sri Lanka is valid and effectual in Sri Lanka subject to three guidelines. (a) Such Court must be in law vested with the jurisdiction in respect of the dissolution of a marriage and be the ‘Competent Court’ in the foreign country; (b) the Parties must have been residents of the foreign country for a reasonable period of time; and (c) the parties must have been properly represented and participated in the legal proceedings according to the laws and procedures of the foreign country. The decision was progressive and timely, and reiterated the necessity and urgency of legislative intervention in addressing this issue of recognizing foreign judgments especially with regard to matrimonial matters.

The legislature intervened promptly to address this legal lacuna by introducing the Reciprocal Recognition, Registration, and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, No. 49 of 2024 (RRREFJ). The Act is effective from March 26, 2025, in respect of 53 countries listed in the Schedule. It repeals both REJO and EFJO.

 

Limited application of Private International law through REJO, EFJO, and Hague Conventions

REJO and EFJO, which were introduced to facilitate the cross-enforcement of foreign and Ceylonese (Sri Lanka as it was known then) judgments, had proved woefully inadequate to cater to the country’s ever increasing cross-border transactions in both commercial and personal matters. One of the main reasons was REJO’s limited scope, as it catered to rather uncomplicated monetary matters arose during the colonial times. It did not address matrimonial matters, perhaps because of limited overseas travel and limited marriages between Sri Lankans and foreigners. It has also been subjected to criticism due to stringent rules and procedural complexities, and understandably, they catered to procedural requirements of a far-less technologically facilitated financial world. Another deficiency was the absence of clear provisions for appeals. This hindered the enforcement process, and created legal uncertainty.

 

The RRREFJ Act of 2024

The 2024 Act comes in to bridge the gap between global realities and the local legal framework. Its scope is much wider than REJO, as it applies to the reciprocal recognition, registration and enforcement of foreign judgments regarding matrimonial matters, i.e. divorce, annulment and separation, as well as monetary obligations. It recognizes final and conclusive judgments of Scheduled jurisdictions. As at present, they are the 53 Commonwealth countries. An application for recognition, registration and enforcement of a foreign judgment can be made within a period of ten years from the final judgment, and by way of summary procedure as provided for in the Civil Procedure Code.

In terms of commercial transactions, its application extends to natural persons as well as companies, including Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies, which are increasing in the country. The Act does not apply to tax, charge, fine or other penalty payable under a judgment of a foreign court.

However, the Act is restrictive in terms of the application of matrimonial matters of persons whose marriages have been contracted under special personal laws, which are very much a part of the Sri Lankan law relating to marriage and family.

Section 3(1)(b) of the new Act of 2024 states that the Act applies to a foreign judgment for the dissolution or annulment of a marriage or separation of the parties to a marriage only if such judgment is obtained in respect of marriages entered under the General Marriages Ordinance No. 19 of 1907 (GMO) and where such judgment shall be deemed final and conclusive as long as either party to the marriage was domiciled in such country at the date of the judgement; habitual resident in such country for a period not less than one year before the date of  the judgment; was a national of such country at the time of the judgment; or both parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of such country. This leaves out Muslims who, under Sri Lankan law, are compelled to marry under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 13 of 1951 (MMDA), and the Knadyan Sinhalese who may choose to register their marriages under the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act 44 of 1952 (KMDA). While the majority of the population are governed by the General Law and are required to follow the GMO in matters relating to their marriages, a considerable percentage of the Sinhalese population who are recognized as ‘Kandyans’ still opt to marry under the KMDA. The Muslims who constitute 9.7% of the total population of the country have no choice but to contract their marriages under the MMDA. The exclusion of their marriages from the 2024 Act raises multiple concerns including their right to equality before the law, which is a fundamental right guaranteed under the national constitution.

 

Way forward

The RRREFJ of 2024 is a timely legislative intervention in the sphere of private international law in Sri Lanka as it addresses a socially relevant legal lacuna in the country. The legislative effort was well-recognized by the apex court of the country when the constitutionality of the RRREFJ Bill was challenged in S.C.(SD) No.80/2024 and S.C.(SD) 81/2024. However, the Act has room to be more democratic in terms of its application, especially in the current social context in which the nation is struggling to overcome socio-economic devastations caused by multiple reasons including ethnicity, race, and religion. With necessary amendments to avoid these obvious racial and religious exclusions, the Act can strengthen the countries ties with the global village more fully.

In preparation of the University of Bologna (Ravenna Campus) Summer School on Transnational Litigation, already noted on this blog, a warm-up webinar will take place on 6 May 2025, from 5 to 6 pm CET. The session will feature Ekaterina Aristova (Institute of Human Rights, Faculty of Law of the University of Oxford), who will […]

HCCH Monthly Update: April 2025

 

Membership

On 10 April 2025, Qatar applied to become a Member of the HCCH. On the same day, the Secretary General of the HCCH opened the six-month voting period during which all current Members of the HCCH may cast their vote on the proposal. Following this voting period, and provided a majority of votes are cast in favour, Qatar will be invited to become a Member by depositing an instrument of acceptance of the Statute of the HCCH. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 2 to 4 April 2025, the conference “15 Years of the HCCH Washington Declaration: Progress and Perspectives on International Family Relocation” was held at the Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C., United States of America. The conference was jointly organised by the Embassy of Canada, the International Academy of Family Lawyers (IAFL), and the HCCH. More information is available here.

From 7 to 11 April 2025, the Working Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group continued its consideration of draft provisions for one new instrument on legal parentage generally, including legal parentage resulting from an international surrogacy agreement. More information is available here.

On 30 April 2025, the seventh meeting of the Working Group established to complete the Country Profile and work on the draft Cooperation Request Recommended Model Form for the 1996 Child Protection Convention was held online, hosted by the Permanent Bureau. More information is available here.

 

Upcoming Events

The webinar “HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Bridging Global Justice” will be held via Zoom on Tuesday 6 May 2025 from 4.00 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. (Hong Kong time), hosted by the HCCH’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. Interested persons should register no later than this Friday, 2 May 2025, at 5.00 p.m. (Hong Kong time). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Novel Nutriology
Agriculture
La publicité au moyen d’allégations de santé relatives à des substances botaniques est actuellement interdite

Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt am Main (Exportation d'argent liquide en Russie)
Mesures restrictives : l’interdiction d’exporter des billets de banque libellés en euros ou dans une autre monnaie officielle d’un État membre vers la Russie s’applique aussi lorsque l’argent vise à financer des traitements médicaux

The second issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) for 2025 has been published. The following abstracts have been kindly provided by the editor of the journal. C. Budzikiewicz/H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner, European Conflict of Law 2024: Business as usual? [German] This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field […]

En droit européen de l’insolvabilité, les obligations exécutées au profit d’un débiteur soumis à une procédure d’insolvabilité, alors qu’elles auraient dû l’être au profit du praticien de l’insolvabilité de cette procédure, comprennent également l’exécution d’une obligation résultant d’un acte juridique passé par le débiteur après l’ouverture de ladite procédure d’insolvabilité et le transfert de la gestion des actifs au praticien de l’insolvabilité, à condition qu’un tel acte juridique soit opposable, conformément à la loi de l’État d’ouverture de cette procédure, aux créanciers parties à ladite procédure.

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By Jason Mitchell, barrister at Maitland Chambers in London and at Group 621 in Johannesburg.

The Supreme Court of Appeal delivered judgment today in East Asian Consortium v MTN Group. The judgment is available here.

East Asian Consortium, a Dutch company, was part of the Turkcell consortium. The consortium bid on an Iranian telecommunications licence. The consortium won the bid. East Asian Consortium alleged that it was later ousted as a shareholder of the ultimate license holder, the Irancell Telecommunications Services Company. East Asian Consortium sued, amongst others, several subsidiaries of the MTN Group, a South African telecommunications company, in South Africa. East Asian Consortium alleged that the defendants unlawfully induced the Iranian government to replace East Asian Consortium with one of the MTN subsidiaries.

In 2022, the South African High Court held that Iranian law applies to East Asian Consortium’s claims. But the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction based on, amongst other things, state immunity and the act of state doctrine. East Asian Consortium appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the High Court on state immunity and on the act of state doctrine. It reached the same conclusion as the High Court on the applicability of Iranian law, but for different reasons—and clarified that South African law uses the lex loci delicti as its general rule for choice of law in delict (or tort).

There are two immediate takeaways from the judgment:

South Africa’s act of state doctrine differs from the doctrine in English law

“…while we owe much to the English common law, and have much to learn from it, our common law is not a supplicant species.”

• English law (Belhaj, Deutche Bank) articulates the act of state doctrine as an exclusionary rule with limits and exceptions. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejects that approach, critiquing it as a doctrine “principally comprehended by what it is not.”
• Instead, the Supreme Court of Appeal adopts a broader balancing of interests: a “doctrine composed not of rules but of reasons that count for and against the court’s adjudication of a foreign state’s acts.”
• This interest-balancing version of the doctrine applies even when the lawfulness of the executive acts of a foreign country, taken within its territory, will have to be adjudicated by the South African court.
• The act of state doctrine is a common law doctrine, and the common law is subject to the Constitution. This means that the basis for the doctrine cannot be the separation of powers because, under the Constitution, foreign policy decisions are not beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Comity justifies the doctrine, but comity requires judicial pause not judicial abdication.
• Interest balancing considers, for example, the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (and, in particular, its right to have its dispute resolved in court), and the constitutional nature and implications of the claim (here, allegations of public corruption).

South Africa uses the lex loci delicti, but it can be displaced

• In 2010, the High Court in Burchell held that South Africa’s choice of law rule for delict is the legal system that has the most real or significant relationship to the dispute, with the lex loci delicti merely being one factor in that analysis.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal held that Burchell is wrong: the general rule is lex loci delicti. The lex loci delicti can be displaced if another legal system has a “manifestly closer connection”.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal also held that for transnational delicts (that is, when the relevant conduct or events do not happen in one country), a plurality approach should be taken to determine the lex loci delicti: the country in which the greater part of the events or conduct making up the elements of the delict took place.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected an approach of subsidiary rules for particular delicts. This approach causes uncertainty about which elements should be given primacy for certain delicts. More fundamentally, it is based on the “doctrinal heresy” that South Africa has a law of delicts (like the English law of torts); South Africa instead has a “unified scheme of liability”. Subsidiary rules for each type of delict does not rhyme with that unified scheme.

The judgment was a relatively rare 3-2 split. A further appeal to the Constitutional Court is possible.

This post was written by Hannah Buxbaum, the John E. Schiller Chair in Legal Ethics and Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law in the United States.

Last month, Judge Edward Davila, a federal judge sitting in the Northern District of California in the United States, granted a motion by Google for a rare type of equitable relief: a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction. In Google v. Nao Tsargrad Media, a Russian media company obtained a judgment against Google in Russia and then began proceedings to enforce it in nine different countries. Arguing that the judgment was obtained in violation of an exclusive forum selection clause, Google petitioned the court in California for an order to block Tsargrad from enforcing it.

As Ralf Michaels and I found in a recent analysis, the anti-enforcement injunction is an unusual but important device in transnational litigation. There aren’t many U.S. cases involving these orders, and one of the leading decisions arose in the context of the wildly complicated and somewhat anomalous Chevron Ecuador litigation. As a result, there is little U.S. authority on a number of important questions, including the legal standard that applies to this form of relief and the mix of factors that courts should assess in considering its availability. Judge Davila’s decision in the Google case addresses some of these questions.

Background

In 2020, Google terminated Tsargrad’s Google account in order to comply with U.S. sanctions law. Tsargrad sued, alleging that Google violated its terms of service in terminating the account. Although those same terms included an exclusive forum selection clause choosing California courts, Tsargrad initiated the litigation in Russia. It cited a Russian procedural law that vested Russian arbitrazh courts with “exclusive jurisdiction” over disputes involving sanctioned parties, arguing that this rule prevented it from bringing suit in California.

Tsargrad prevailed on the merits in that case. The court ordered Google to restore Tsargrad’s account or suffer a compounding monetary penalty. Google did not restore access, and the penalty mounted to more than twenty decillion dollars (in Judge Davila’s words, “a number equal to two followed by thirty-four zeroes”). Tsargrad then started filing actions to enforce its judgment in a number of foreign courts. This prompted Google to seek an anti-enforcement injunction in the Northern District of California.

What Legal Standard Applies to Anti-Enforcement Injunctions?

An anti-enforcement injunction orders a party not to initiate or continue legal proceedings to enforce a judgment. It looks like a species of anti-suit injunction and might therefore be subject to the test used to decide those. As Judge Davila correctly recognized, though, the two contexts are quite different.

An anti-suit injunction aims to prevent parallel litigation from developing in the first place, avoiding a race to judgment and the possibility of inconsistent judgments on a single matter. Those risks aren’t relevant to anti-enforcement injunctions, where the foreign court has already entered a judgment. In such cases, the policy of res judicata also comes into play. Anti-enforcement injunctions are also potentially much more intrusive into other legal systems than anti-suit injunctions. The type of injunction that Google sought would have worldwide effect, blocking legal proceedings not only in courts with concurrent jurisdiction over the underlying dispute but in any court, anywhere, in which an enforcement proceeding might be brought. For these reasons, Judge Davila chose instead to apply the normal test for preliminary injunctions, requiring Google to demonstrate: (1) likely success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) a balance of equities favoring injunction, and (4) public interest favoring injunction.

Does Breach of a Forum Selection Clause Justify an Anti-Enforcement Order?

Once a foreign court has entered a judgment, it is (and should be) very difficult for the judgment debtor to obtain an order from a U.S. court completely blocking any enforcement efforts. In this case, there were two possible grounds for granting that relief. First, as in the Chevron case, it appeared that Tsargrad’s enforcement campaign was vexatious and oppressive. Apparently, Tsargrad had itself described its strategy as a “global legal war”—and may have viewed the twenty-decillion-dollar penalty as leverage to extort a settlement or force Google to defend itself in multiple forums. Second, it appeared that Tsargrad had procured the Russian judgment in breach of an exclusive forum selection clause. As Google argued, issuing an anti-enforcement injunction under those circumstances would both preserve the jurisdiction of the chosen courts and vindicate Google’s contractual rights.

The case proceeded on the second theory. This raised two interesting questions regarding a post-judgment injunction. First, because the breach of the forum selection clause had already happened, was there any ongoing or future harm to justify injunctive relief? Judge Davila concluded that there was—not based on the forum selection clause itself, but based on an additional implied term “bar[ring] parties from enforcing judgments obtained in violation of [a] forum selection clause.”

Second, wouldn’t the balance of equities here suggest that Google was far too late in seeking injunctive relief? It could have filed an ordinary anti-suit injunction based on the exclusive forum selection clause when Tsargrad initiated the litigation in Russia, rather than waiting until that action proceeded to judgment. (In Ralf’s and my study, this kind of delay surfaced as one of the most common reasons to deny anti-enforcement injunctions.) Judge Davila maneuvered around this issue. The basis for injunctive relief, he said, wasn’t the breach of the forum selection clause but rather the breach of the implied promise not to enforce judgments procured in violation of the clause. And Google couldn’t have sought relief for that breach until Tsargrad actually began its enforcement efforts.

What About Comity?

Every country has its own rules regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It’s one thing for a U.S. court to deny enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States, under U.S. rules. But by barring a judgment holder from taking steps to enforce its judgment anywhere, a worldwide anti-enforcement injunction indirectly prevents other countries from considering the enforceability of that judgment under their rules. Judge Davila appreciated the serious comity concerns this raises. He concluded, however, that those concerns were outweighed in this case, citing the “grossly excessive” penalty imposed on Google and the vexatious nature of Tsargrad’s enforcement campaign. With the exception of Russia, then (“it is simply a bridge too far to enjoin a Russian citizen from enforcing a Russian judgment in Russian court”), he gave the order worldwide scope.

Conclusion

Pending a final decision on the merits, the court here did everything it could to block Tsargrad from enforcing the Russian judgment. In addition to entering the anti-enforcement injunction, the court entered an “anti-anti-suit injunction” barring Tsargrad from going back to Russia to seek an anti-suit injunction against the proceedings in California. The open question, as always, is what courts in other countries will do if Tsargard disregards the injunction and continues its efforts to enforce the Russian judgment.

This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog.

Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Récusation d’un juge de droit commun)
Principes du droit communautaire
Avocat général Spielmann : l’intervention d’un organe dépourvu de garantie d’indépendance dans une procédure de nomination d’un juge ne justifie pas, en soi, la récusation de celui-ci

Prezydent Miasta Mielca
Aide d'État
Aides d’État : la Cour précise les circonstances dans lesquelles des exonérations fiscales peuvent être interdites par le droit de l’Union

Fastned Deutschland
Liberté d'établissement
La Cour de justice précise les conditions dans lesquelles une concession peut être modifiée sans nouvelle procédure d’attribution

Commission / Malte (Citoyenneté par investissement)
Citoyenneté européenne
Citoyenneté de l’Union : le programme maltais de citoyenneté par investissement est contraire au droit de l’Union

This post was written by Lea Marion who is a Member of the Paris Bar. The legal characterization of claims for abrupt termination of established commercial relationships — an action specific to French law (Article L. 442-1, II of the French Commercial Code) — continues to be a fertile ground for uncertainty and doctrinal debate. […]

On 16 and 17 April 2025, the Australasian Association of Private International Law (AAPrIL) held its inaugural conference in Brisbane, Australia. Hosted by Griffith University—the home of AAPrIL President Mary Keyes—the conference featured stimulating panel presentations from speakers from around Australia and abroad.

The conference started with a panel on jurisdiction and judgments, chaired by Richard Garnett of Melbourne Law School. Reid Mortensen of USQ kicked things off with a presentation on Australia’s cross-vesting scheme. Priskila Penasthika of the Universitas Indonesia then spoke on ‘The Indonesian Language Contract Requirements versus Arbitration as a Choice of Forum’.

The second panel was on private international law and climate change, chaired by Lemuel Lopez of RMIT. Yao-Ming Hsu of the National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan, spoke on ‘Cross-border/Transnational Climate Change Litigation and Private International Law’, then Ekaterina Aristova of Oxford presented on ‘Private International Law and Climate Change: Trends in Transnational Litigation’.

In the afternoon, Reid chaired a panel on Private International Law and Technology. Richard spoke on ‘Private International Law Aspects of Blockchain Contracts’, followed by Nargiza Abdurakhmonova of Griffith University who covered ‘Private international law and data protection in the Eurasian Economic Union’.

The first day was capped off with drinks and dinner overlooking the Brisbane River at South Bank. I had fish and beers. They were delicious.

Sore heads backed up well for the morning session on day 2, chaired by Mary, which considered ‘Prenuptial Agreements: Comparative Perspectives from France, Australia and Hong Kong’. Susannah Quinn of Mills Oakley provided an ‘Australian perspective, examining how Australian law handles foreign prenuptial agreements’, then Shu Mei Hoon of Drew Napier, Singapore spoke to ‘Exploring the treatment of prenuptial agreements in Singapore’. Emmanuelle Bonboire-Barthélémy of Chauveau Mulon & Associés provided a ‘French perspective, addressing the recognition and application of foreign prenuptial agreements in France and the international circulation of French marriage contracts in cross-border scenarios’.

After snacks, I chaired a session where Lemuel spoke on ‘Islamic Law in Non-Muslim Majority Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Philippines and Australia’, followed by Inma Conde of the University of Sydney and the Office of International Law (Australia), who spoke on ‘Ernst Rabel and the PIL Framework for International Sales’.

In the final session, Brody Warren, Assistant Director of the Private International & Commercial Law Section, Attorney-General’s Department (Australia), and formerly of HCCH fame, chaired a session where I defamed him and also spoke on ‘Extraterritorial enforcement of Australia’s eSafety regulation’. Paul Abraham of the University of Newcastle then presented on ‘Anti-enforcement Injunctions: A Discussion of Principles and Trends’. Last but not least, Mary spoke on ‘ Anti-suit Injunctions and Choices of Court’.

The first AAPrIL Conference was a great event and a credit to the organisational skills of Mary Keyes and Mel Davies of Griffith University. I will remember it for the collegiality as much as the educational content. Please join us for the next one! You can follow us at https://aapril.org/ and on LinkedIn.

UN/CEFACT would like to invite you to attend:

The United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and E-business (UN/CEFACT) under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

The 7th and 8th Working Group Meetings:

• -30 Apr 9-10:00 am (CET-Geneva) and 5-6:00 pm (AEST) Dr. Susanne Guth-Orlowski, CEO 4TheRecord, Germany: The battery passport and value chain transparency at scale (Zoom)
• –14 May 9-10:00 am (CET-Geneva) and 5-6:00 pm (AEST), Dr. Sagi Peari, the University of Western Australia Law School: ‘The UK’s Digital Assets Project and Conflict of Laws: Implications for the data transfer in the CRM value chains’ (zoom)
• For the zoom link and previous meeting minutes, please refer to the project webpage Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability
• For the work-in-progress UN/CEFACT white paper: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sIT01KuoPFfQ9gMGVSLJxYBvXTzccjETWugflWs-6sY/edit?tab=t.0

The 6th Working Group Meeting

• –16 Apr 9-10:00 am (CET-Geneva) and 5-6:00 pm (AEST) , Dr.  Naeem AllahRakha, Tashkent State University of Law, Advocate High Court, Uzbekistan: Cross-border data protection and sharing in CRM-EV value chains (zoom)
• For the zoom link and previous meeting minutes, please refer to the project webpage Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability.

The 5th Working Group Meeting on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports in Cross-Border Value Chain:

–19 Mar 7-8:00 pm (Sydney Time), Dr. Fabian Sack, Sydney University (Zoom): Life cycle assessment

For the zoom link and previous meeting minutes, please refer to the project webpage Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability.

The 4th Working Group Meeting on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports in Cross-Border Value Chain:

–5 Mar 12-2:00 pm (Sydney Time), Dr. Yuhong Zhao, Chinese University of Hong Kong: ‘The Environmental Damage of Rare Earth Mining: Regulatory Challenges in China.’ (Hybrid)

For the zoom link and previous meeting minutes, please refer to the project webpage Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability.

For the whitepaper working outline, please refer to here. All comments are welcome. Please contact jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au.

The 3rd Working Group Meeting on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports in Cross-Border Value Chain, 12-1:00 pm Wednesday, 19 Feb 2025 (Sydney Time) Prof. Leslie López Arias, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano University, Chile: Mining regulations in Peru/Chile 

For the zoom link and previous meeting minutes, please refer to the project webpage Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability.

The 2nd Working Group Meeting on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports in Cross-Border Value Chain, 7:00-8:00 pm Wednesday, 5 February 2025 (Sydney Time)

Keynote Speaker: Mrs. Kamola Khusnutdinova, Economic Affairs Officer and Secretary to UN/CEFACT. For Zoom Link, please contact Associate Professor Jeanne Huang: jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au. We will continue working on the white paper outline. All comments are welcome. Please review the first meeting minute including the proposed white paper outline posted on the project page: Critical Minerals Traceability and Sustainability.

First Working Group Meeting Agenda

21 January 2025 (Sydney Time)

10:00 am – 11:00 am AEDT: The UN/CEFACT working group on ‘conflict of laws in the critical raw material (CRM) value chains’ meeting: Introduction and discussion of the UN/CEFACT White Paper draft outline

Moderator: Associate Professor Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Sydney University School of Law.

This is a hybrid event. Please contact jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au for zoom details.

11:00 am – 12:00 pm AEDT: Research interview with Dr. David Brown who is a researcher with Mighty Earth and has done a lot of research on deforestation in CRM value chains in Indonesia.  For his recent publication, “From Forests to EVs,” which he co-authored with Mighty Earth.  Kindly refer to https://mightyearth.org/article/from-forests-to-electric-vehicles/. (The interview is not open to the public due to the research ethics requirement)

12:00 pm – 13:00 pm AEST: Lunch

13:00 pm- 14:00 pm AEDT: Professor Philip M. Nichols keynote:

Does Compliance with the Global Anticorruption Regime Require the Use of Artificial Intelligence?: The Case of Managing Global Critical Raw Material Value Chains

Background

Business firms constantly hear that artificial intelligence has changed the world and that they must either utilize artificial intelligence or fall behind. By extension, this would be true of regulatory compliance as well as operations. This article challenges the mantra of artificial intelligence as a ubiquitous agent of change. It does so through the lens of the global anticorruption regime, a transnational web of laws, regulations and norms that work together to reign in corruption. As this article demonstrates, the global anticorruption regime imposes on business firms a requirement to implement effective and up-to-date antibribery programs. Given the prevailing conception of artificial intelligence as the newly-critical tool for business, it would be easy to interpret “effective” and “up-to-date” as requiring the use of artificial intelligence. To determine whether in fact the global anticorruption regime does, this article undertakes two analyses. First, it carefully determines the systems requirements of the type of artificial intelligence most applicable to antibribery programs – systems that can distinguish between honest and corrupt actors and transactions – and determines the regulatory constraints on the use of artificial intelligence in that way. This article then asks specifically what tasks artificial intelligence would be asked to do as part of an antibribery program, and evaluates the capacity of artificial intelligence to perform those tasks given the already determined system requirements and constraints. These analyses yield a surprising conclusion: in some instances the use of artificial intelligence would be helpful, but for most business firms, particularly for smaller firms or firms that have not experienced bribery, the use of artificial intelligence would not be helpful and could be harmful. Regulators and legal scholars must not think of artificial intelligence as a panacea; its potential use must be analyzed in the context of objectives and the capacities, needs, and limits of artificial intelligence.

Dr. Philip M. Nichols is the Joseph S. Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility in Business and Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He was Co-Chair, UN/CEFACT Law Group (United Nations experts committee on electronic commerce and trade facilitation), 1998 to 2005.

Event page: https://law-events.sydney.edu.au/event/globalanticorruptionregime_ai/

Registration: https://www.eventbrite.com.au/e/does-compliance-with-the-global-anticorruption-regime-require-the-use-of-ai-tickets-1143595548069?aff=oddtdtcreator UN/CEFACT would also like to call for participation:

White Paper on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports in Cross-border Value Chains 

Help draft the white paper on Addressing Conflict of Laws and Facilitating Digital Product Passports (DPPs) in Cross-border Value Chains to achieve legal coordination and establish traceability in global trade law. Aligned with regional and global initiatives, the White Paper seeks to address conflicts of law and foster the legal harmonization essential for the DPPs implementation across borders. The white paper will also ensure that DPPs comply with international standards, promoting interoperability and supporting a globally consistent approach. It will focus on the critical raw materials-the EV batteries value chain but will have broad implications for other industries.

The proposed White Paper will (1) present the status quo of conflict of laws in existing national and international laws relating to the implementation of DPPs, and (2) propose solutions for legal coordination and facilitate trade, especially:

1. Analyzing initial uptake of DPPs by industry stakeholders and anticipated impact;
2. Coordinating diversified national laws for cross-border data transfer involved in DPPs;
3. Obtaining mutual recognition of ESG certificates whose data are required by DPPs;
4. Promoting Interoperability between different DPPs; and
5. Incorporating UNTP and other UN/CEFACT industry standards/good practices into international and national trade laws to address legal conflicts in the adoption of DPPs.

Please provide your name/position/associations/email contacts;

Please indicate your expertise;

Please choose the ways to participate (multiple choice):

1. Participate as an active contributor in the working group to draft the White Paper (The group will typically have a one-hour meeting every two weeks from January to May 2025),
2. Participate as an observer in the working group to draft the White Paper,
3. Participate in research interviews, and
4. Any other ways that you think you can contribute.

Deadline to express your EOI is Friday 17 January 2025. Please contact the project lead Dr. Jie (Jeanne) Huang (Jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au) and forward your email to her research assistant Raven Yang (raven.yang@sydney.edu.au).

 

 

In every private international law system, the forum state reserves the right to reject the application of a foreign rule that deeply offends the forum’s fundamental sense of justice and fairness. In all systems, this “public policy reservation” (ordre public) operates as an exception to the forum’s choice-of-law rules, not its rules on jurisdiction or access to courts. Surprisingly, the First and Second Conflicts Restatements in the United States deviate from this international consensus by narrowly phrasing the exception as a ground for denying a forum to foreign causes of action rather than as a ground for refusing to apply other foreign rules, including those raised as defenses.

A forthcoming article by Symeon Symeonides titled The Public Policy Exception in Choice of Law: The American Version discusses the origins of this unique formulation in Judge Cardozo’s classic but misinterpreted decision in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, the problems it creates, its tacit rejection by most American courts, and the new flexible formulation of the exception in the proposed Third Conflicts Restatement.

The article will be published in Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax), as well as in a special issue of the Emory Journal of International Law dedicated to the renowned conflicts scholar Peter Hay.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

M. F. Müller-Berg: The effects of the new product liability directive on international product liability

The Swiss Federal Court had to decide on the international jurisdiction for a negative declaratory action in a product liability dispute in the case of cross-border manufacturing involving a division of labour. On the one hand, it affirmed the possibility of bringing a negative declaratory action in a product liability dispute at the place of action within the meaning of Art. 5 No. 3 Lugano Convention. On the other hand, in the case of cross-border manufacturing involving a division of labour, it considered the place of development to be the sole place of action for the product developer. This not only represents a rejection of a mutual attribution of the place of action in relation to other addressees under product liability law, but also an opening of the place of action in product liability to an interpretation specific to the addressee of liability.

 

N. C. Kranzhöfer: Third-party effect of a jurisdiction clause in a bill of lading by virtue of the consignee’s succession into the rights and obligations of the carrier

The ECJ had to decide whether a jurisdiction clause included in a bill of lading may be invoked against the consignee of the goods who has, pursuant to the applicable national law, succeeded in the carrier’s rights and obligations upon reception of the bill of lading. The Court drew on its case law beginning with the Tilly Russ case but was also required to answer questions that had been raised by inconsistencies in its more recent case law, in particular its judgment in the DelayFix case. The Court now rejects the choice-of-law rule formulated in the operative part of the DelayFix judgment pursuant to which the succession of the third party into the substantive rights and obligations of the original party to the jurisdiction clause is governed by the lex fori prorogati. Instead, the ECJ reaffirms its previous case law according to which the applicable law is to be determined pursuant to the private international law of the forum state. Moreover, the Court declares that national legal provisions are contrary to EU law if they make the third-party effect of a jurisdiction clause included in a bill of lading dependent on further conditions beyond the recipient’s full succession into the carrier’s substantive rights and obligations.

 

R. A. Schütze: Security for costs under the HCCH for Singapore residents in German courts

The Regional Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) Köln has decided that a claimant residing in Singapore is obliged to provide security for cost under sec. 110 German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) despite the fact that the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is already in force between Germany and Singapore. The Court thus dissented from an earlier decision of the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH). The Regional Court of Appeal Cologne erroneously did not apply the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements because it interpreted terms of the convention from the point of view of German Civil Procedure instead of applying an autonomous interpretation.

 

F. Hess: No anti-suit injunction to prevent enforcement of an ICSID award in third States

Investors cannot enforce intra-EU-investment treaty awards within the European Union. Against this background, investors seek to enforce awards abroad. To prevent an investor from enforcing an arbitral award issued by an ICSID tribunal in the United States or in other countries, Spain applied for an anti-enforcement injunction. The Regional Court of Essen refused to grant the injunction. It held that the claim was inadmissible because such an order would violate state sovereignty and was therefore incompatible with German and EU law. The article examines the interface between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and arbitration, noting that anti-arbitration and anti-enforcement injunction proceedings fall within the scope of the Regulation. It then argues that anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions are in principle incompatible with German law and that, unlike in disputes over standard essential patents where German courts have granted anti-anti-suit injunctions, there is no reason for an exception to this principle.

 

A. Schulz: One-year time limit and settling in under the Hague Child Abduction Convention

The Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart ruled that if a child is first wrongfully retained in one state and then taken to several other states without the consent of the left-behind parent, the first wrongful act – in this case the retention – remains decisive for the start of the one-year period under Art. 12 para. 2 Hague Child Abduction Convention, also in the state in which the child is present at the end. However, in line with a more recent opinion in legal literature, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart affirmed its discretion to order the child’s return even if the one-year period has expired and the child has settled in their current state of residence. It based this on an argumentum a fortiori in comparison with Art. 13 para. 1 lit. b) of the Convention and on the behaviour of the abducting mother, who had already ignored a Romanian return decision and declared that she would not allow the courts to dictate her country of residence and that of the child.

 

C. Uhlmann: The untraceable plaintiff in International Civil Litigation – possibilities and limitations of European Union law

In Credit Agricole Bank Polska, the ECJ decided upon the question which law governs international jurisdiction in a potential cross border case if defendant’s current residence cannot be localized: the Brussels Ia Regulation or national procedural law. The ECJ came to the conclusion that even in cases where the defendant is a national of a third state and a consumer, international jurisdiction under Art. 18(2) Brussels Ia Regulation is to be determined at the defendant’s last known residence as long as there is no firm evidence that the defendant’s residence is in another Member State or a third country. In „Toplofikatsia Sofia“ EAD, the ECJ dealt with national legislation with respect to Member State’s own nationals aiming to ensure a permanent domestic residence. Holding such national legislation contrary to EU law, the ECJ further articulated that international jurisdiction is governed exclusively by the Brussels Ia Regulation as soon as there are reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant resides in another Member State. The author agrees with the ECJ with respect to the result, but criticizes that its reasoning is not always conclusive.

 

J. Samtleben: International Procedure Law in the National Civil and Family Procedure Code of Mexico.

On 7 June 2023, a uniform Civil and Family Procedure Code for the entire Mexican state was promulgated in the Mexican Official Gazette. The legislatures of the federal area and the individual states have until 1 April 2027 to enact the Code and replace the corresponding procedural laws. In its Tenth Book, the Code contains a detailed catalogue of international procedural law that is partly based on traditional regulations, but which creates a new and detailed legal basis for many areas. For the first time, it expressly regulates the international jurisdiction of Mexican courts. The application of foreign law has also been regulated in detail. Among the provisions on international procedural cooperation, the enforcement of foreign protective measures and the use of videoconferencing are particularly noteworthy. As before, the enforcement of foreign judgments requires a request for legal assistance from the foreign court.