Agrégateur de flux

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a rendu, la même semaine, deux arrêts issus de litiges d’urbanisme. Deux décisions, techniques en apparence, mais qui rappellent que l’espace bâti n’est jamais neutre : il touche à la propriété, à la vie privée. Dans les deux cas, la Cour a constaté une violation de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme confirmant que l’urbanisme peut aussi être un terrain des droits fondamentaux. 

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In Cabris Investments, a case decided on 9 October 2025, the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of Article 25 of Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Brussels I bis). Article 25 is concerned with choice-of-court agreements. It applies where the parties to a dispute, “regardless of their […]

On 17 October 2025, Regulation (EU) 2025/2073 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings to replace its Annexes A and B was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The amendment reflects recent notifications by several Member States introducing new types […]

Neuf décisions. Six annulations. Trois retraits non motivés. Quinze ans. C’est le parcours traversé par un requérant malade qui a sollicité la délivrance d’un titre de séjour pour raisons de santé. Au moment où la Cour s’est prononcée, la semaine dernière, il n’avait toujours pas obtenu une décision définitive. L’arrêt rendu par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme contient, malgré son ancrage belge, des indications intéressantes qui pourraient avoir une portée plus générale en matière de droit des étrangers. 

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After two successful editions (here and here), the new edition of the EAPIL Winter School is scheduled to held on-site in Como, in the cloister of the Basilica di Sant’Abbondio, from 2 to 6 February 2026. It is organised by the European Association of Private International Law and the Department of Law, Economics and Cultures of the […]

A succinct note on Transworld Payment Solutions UK Ltd & Anor v First Curacao International Bank NV & Anor [2025] EWHC 2480 (Ch) in which Leech J held on both limitation issues under Rome II v the former English rules and the statutory intervention by the  FLPA (Foreign Limitation Periods Act) 1985.

As for the latter, the FLPA [103, with reference to Dicey] adopted the general principle that the limitation period of the lex causae are to be applied to actions in England, as opposed to the previous more complex distinction [101] between  procedural and substantive limitation rules and the distinction between rights and remedies. However the judgment is not very clear on what the discussion implies in casu and I have not managed to extract the relevance here despite multiple readings of the judgment.

On applicable law to the claim, here the issue [749 ff] is whether A12 applies at all (readily accepted [751] following defendant’s correct submission [750]) and if so, whether A12(1) did not lead to a putative lex contractus, hence effectively resurrecting A4’s lex locus damni as a result of A12(2). The judge summarily holds for the putative lex contractus, Curacao law, also dismissing the attempt at fog (did party so and so actually become a party to contract such and such) seeing as A12(1) clearly holds that the actual conclusion of a contract is not relevant.

Geert.

Ia issues of limitation periods viz Rome II and application of A12 Rome II: culpa in contrahendoTransworld Payment Solutions UK Ltd & Anor v First Curacao International Bank NV & Anor [2025] EWHC 2480 (Ch)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-10-02T07:20:26.163Z

Earlier this year, Symeon Symeonides posted on SSRN an essay written in the occasion of a symposium titled 50 Years in the Conflicts Vineyard, which was held in the author’s honor in May 2024 at Willamette University Law School and sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. The essay […]

The third issue of the RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht) for 2025 has been finalized. This is a special issue with contributions that were presented at the memorial symposium in honour of the late Jürgen Basedow, held in Hamburg on 29 November 2024, under the title “Private International Law – Uniform Law […]

Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (Notion de "bagages")
Transport
Responsabilité des transporteurs aériens : les animaux de compagnie ne sont pas exclus de la notion de « bagages »

AirHelp Germany (Avion frappé par la foudre)
Transport

Un impact de foudre sur un avion peut constituer une circonstance extraordinaire

The PAX Moot case for the 2026 moot competition on Private International Law was published. The 2026 Round is dedicated to Vladimir Koutikov, a distinguished Bulgarian scholar and expert in private international law The Vladimir Koutikov Round of the competition requires participants to deal with matters related to an international sale of goods between an Italian […]

The third issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé for 2025 was just published. It contains three articles dealing with conflict issues (and a fourth concerned with immigration law) and a number of casenotes. In the first article, Etienne Farnoux (University of Strasbourg) discusses the relationship between fundamental rights and the public policy […]

La chambre criminelle délivre deux enseignements majeurs, d’une part, quant aux formalités nécessaires à la mise à exécution d’une saisie en France sur délégation du procureur européen d’un autre État membre et, d’autre part, quant à l’office de la chambre de l’instruction lorsqu’une telle mesure d’exécution lui est soumise.

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This post was contributed by Heloise Meur, who is a lecturer at Paris 8 University. International distribution agreements are a significant source of litigation which result in legal uncertainty. First, these contracts are not typical ones: they belong to a group of contracts which organize a kind of cooperation between the parties. Second, they are […]

On 19 and 20 November 2025, the 35th Conference on Private International Law, entitled The Role of Judicial Actors in Shaping Private International Law: A Comparative Perspective” will take place at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in Lausanne. This year’s edition will focus on the vital role of judicial actors — including judges, lawyers, […]

Elena Bargelli (University of Pisa), Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) and and François Trémosa (Notary) have edited, in cooperation with  Paul Patreider (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) and Elisa Stracqualursi (University of Pisa), Extra-Judicial Administration of Justice in Cross-Border Family and Succession Matters ‒ Comparative and Policy Perspectives with Giuffrè. The book examines […]

ZVglRWiss – Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 3/2025

A new issue of ZVglRWiss – Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft is now available and includes contributions on EU private law, comparative law, private international law, and individual European private law regimes.

The full table of content can be accessed here.

The new issue 3/2025 includes:

Jürgen Basedow’s Contribution to Comparative Law Methodology and Its Future Role

Katharina Boele-Woelki reflects Basedow’s contributions to comparative law and its future role, with a focus on his views on the methodological principles of comparative legal research. In the wider ongoing debate on methodology in comparative law, Basedow provides practical, concrete arguments. Key discussions include functional versus cultural approaches, and micro- versus macro-comparative research.

Der kollektive Prozessvergleich aus rechtsvergleichender Perspektive

Karl Wörle discusses the relevance of elaborate procedural mechanisms to protect the interests of represented consumers. The US class action with its strong tradition of private dispute resolution would offer valuable impulses, which have been strongly adopted in the Netherlands. The prolific international experience should be capitalized on for Germany and Austria – considering the peculiarities of collective redress procedures and national legal cultures – to derive impulses for future legislative policy.

Lawsuits as Weapons? The EU’s Anti-Slapp Directive Strikes Back

Madeleine Petersen Weiner investigates and discusses the EU’s Anti-Slapp provisions and compares the European Directive with the U.S. Anti-Slapp Legislation. Having originated in the U.S., SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) now increasingly also occur in the EU. SLAPPs are considered abusive lawsuits as plaintiffs use the civil court system to silence opponents. Due to their threat to public participation – and ultimately to protect and foster democratic debate – the EU has enacted the so-called Anti-SLAPP Directive.

Unechte Inlandsfälle unter der Brüssel Ia-VO

Salih Okur investigates the CJEU’s decision in Inkreal and in FTI. In Inkreal, the CJEU recently held that an international element in the sense of the Brussels Ia Regulation can be established by a jurisdiction agreement between parties domiciled in the same Member State in favour of another Member State. Not a year later, in FTI, the CJEU held that the international element could also be established by the foreign destination of a package travel arrangement between parties domiciled in the same Member State. This paper proposes to understand the “international element” as an “international conflict of jurisdiction”. Against this standard, the CJEU’s decision in Inkreal is convincing while the opinion on FTI is not.

As has become tradition, the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will be hosting a Winter School in Como, from 2 to 6 February 2026. The general topic of the upcoming edition is Values in Private International Law.

The teaching staff will consist of Laura Carpaneto (University of Genoa), Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), Maria Asunción Cebrian Salvat (University of Murcia), Gilles Cuniberti (EAPIL President, University of Luxembourg), Sara De Vido (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice), Stefano Dominelli (University of Genova), Cristina González Beilfuss (University of Barcelona), Thomas Kadner Graziano (University of Geneva), Eva Maria Kieninger (University of Würzburg), Silvia Marino (University of Insubria and coordinator of the Winter School), Johan Meeusen (University of Antwerp), Nadia Rusinova (The Hague University, Attorney at law), Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh), Erik Sinander (Stockholm University), Sara Tonolo (University of Padua), Geert van Calster (KU Leuven), Hans van Loon (HCCH Former Secretary General), and Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University in Kraków).

The University of Insubria will host the 2026 edition, as it did in 2024 and 2025 (see here and here), in cooperation with University of Murcia and the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

Those interested in attending the Winter School must apply by 20 January 2026 by completing the online form available here.

More information is available here.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

The CJEU this morning kicked open a door already so wide open in in Case C‑540/24 Cabris Investments v Revetas Capital Advisors, I hope no one was walking behind it for they would have been brutally knocked out.

On 6 May 2020, Cabris Investments and Revetas Capital Advisors, companies both established in the UK, entered into a consultancy contract, which was accompanied by a letter, both of which contained a jurisdiction clause worded

‘This contract and the relationship between the parties shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Austrian law. The Handelsgericht Wien [(Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement or its enforcement or validity.’

On 30 June 2023, Cabris brought an action before the Commercial Court, Vienna) to seek fulfillment of a contractual payment obligation under that contract relating to the role of CFO. Revetas challenge the international jurisdiction of the referring court, arguing that, since BIA has not been applicable in respect of legal relationships involving the UK since the end of the transition period provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement, A25 BIa, as interpreted in Inkreal  is not applicable.

The referring court has doubts

first as to whether A25 BIa and the Inkreal principles remain applicable viz choice of court concluded during the transition period between two parties having their head offices in the UK, which designates a court of a Member State to hear their dispute, where that court has been seised after both UK withdrawal and the end of the transition period, and the contractual relationship underlying the dispute has no connection with that Member State.

Second, if the CJEU were to conclude that A25 does not apply in such a situation, whether the Brussels Convention, and in particular A17 and 18, or, failing that, the British-Austrian Convention, is applicable. According to the referring court, the answer to that question depends on whether A68 and 69 BIa definitively repealed those two conventions. That court is of the view that the principles of public international law governing the termination of treaties and the fact that those various legal instruments govern related matters support the interpretation that the applicability of those conventions, as regards legal relationships involving the UK, is precluded

Third, whether A50(3) TEU and A82(1)(b)(i) of Part 4 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 of 4 March 2019  preclude the Brussels Convention from applying in general.

These are scholarly exciting questions and the referring Austrian court referred to following long list of verbosely formulated questions, after having given the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement context: 

‘(1)      Is [A25 BIa to be interpreted as meaning that an agreement conferring jurisdiction in which the contracting parties, who are domiciled in the [UK] and therefore (now) in a third State, agree that the courts of a Member State of the [EU] are to have jurisdiction over disputes arising under that contract, falls within the scope of that provision, even if the underlying contract has no further connection with that Member State chosen as the place of jurisdiction? Do the underlying principles of [Inkreal] therefore also apply in the same way if the date of conclusion of a jurisdiction agreement between two parties domiciled in the UK still falls within the period before the end of the [Brexit transition period] on 31 December 2020, but the action was only brought after Brexit took effect? This is taking into account the fact that the contractual situation between these (now) third-country nationals has no further connection to the chosen [EU] Member State (see, however, Recitals 13 and 14 of [that regulation]) and, in addition, A50(3) TEU … generally excludes the applicability of the European treaties for the [UK] after Brexit.

If [the Court] rejects the application of [A25] in the third-country scenario in question, the following further questions arise:

(2)      Is [A68 BIa] to be interpreted as meaning that it has definitively repealed [the Brussels Convention] – including in proceedings relating to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit) – so that recourse to this Convention is currently no longer possible for a Member State of the [EU]?

(3)      Are [A69 BIa] in the version of [List 3] and [A55 Brussels Convention], 13th indent, to be interpreted as meaning that they have also definitively repealed the [British-Austrian Convention], so that in proceedings relating to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit), recourse to that international treaty … is no longer possible? This is also taking into account the fact that, pursuant to [A70(1) BIa], the conventions referred to in [A69] of [that regulation] retain their validity for those areas of law to which the regulation does not apply. Can [a] treaty concluded with [Austria] that has already been declared “superseded” by primary law in the past be declared retroactively applicable again between those states after Brexit (so-called “revival of an international treaty”) pursuant to Article 70(1) of [that regulation] with regard to the [UK]?

If so: Would such a “revival” also apply within the scope of application of [A56 Brussels Convention], which is similar in this respect?

(4)      Is [A50(3)] TEU to be interpreted as meaning that it also precludes the application or “revival” of [A 17 and 18 Brussels Convention] in relation to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit) if, in proceedings initiated in Austria, two litigants domiciled in the [UK] are facing each other who have agreed in their contract – concluded on 6 May 2020 – that the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) has exclusive jurisdiction? Does the provision in [A50(3)] TEU take precedence over [A66 Brussels Convention], according to which the Brussels Convention “[is concluded] for an unlimited period”?

(5)      [(a)]      Should [the Court] come to the conclusion that the Brussels Convention also takes precedence in the sense of [Q]uestions 2 to 4 above in relation to the [UK], the question arises: Does the fundamental primacy of the Brussels Convention preclude an arrangement in the [UK] according to which recourse to the Brussels Convention is also expressly excluded with regard to jurisdiction agreements that were concluded prior to Brexit taking effect (see the UK provision under Section 82(1)(b)(i) of the “Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/479)”, which [was] valid until 29 February 2024 and is obviously still applicable here, as the action was brought on 30 June 2023)?

[(b)]      If not: When examining the validity of a jurisdiction agreement concluded on 6 May 2020 (i.e. before Brexit) between two British companies with the choice of an Austrian forum, is an Austrian court nevertheless bound by this exclusion of application of the Brussels Convention – standardised in the [UK] – pursuant to Section 82(1)(b)(i) of Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/479), in particular due to the primacy of primary law, which would in principle prevent effective enforcement in the United Kingdom ([t]he last question assumes, for the purposes of [Q]uestion 3), the expiry of the [British-Austrian Convention]?’

 

The CJEU, without AG Opinion, cut the conversation short:

[31] a choice of court clause must be assessed as at the date on which the legal proceedings are brought (reference ia to CJEU Tilman);

[35] A25 BIa clearly applies regardless of the domicile of the parties;

[37] despite BIa serving internal market objectives, BIa emphasises in recital 14 that ‘to respect the autonomy of the parties, certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the defendant’s domicile’ – ditto [43] another clear support by the CJEU of party autonomy as a strong driving principle of EU PrivIntLaw.

[40] the ‘international element required to trigger BIa is very widely interpreted (reference ex multi to Inkreal);

[47-48] that choice of court was concluded during the transition period and that that court is seised of a dispute after the end of that period, is not capable of altering the answer to be given to the present question: the Withdrawal Agreement does not govern such a situation, and notwithstanding ex-EU domicile of the parties to a dispute, A25 explicitly covers such situation.

The remainder of the questions therefore, are not entertained……

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.311 ff.

 

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

What is the forum contractus in an action for recovery of a consumer’s claim arising from a contract of carriage by air, acquired by a trader by way of assignment? Contracts solely for transport famously are excluded from the consumer title of the Regulation, and cases like C‑913/19 CNP and C‑393/20 T.B. and D. have not brought much clarification on forum contractus in cases of assignment. Choice of court on the basis of A25 (such as was at issue in in Ryanair v DelayFix) would not seem to have been on the horizon oddly (the referral decision does not specify why not) and of course the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims might have been able to have helped however as Marco Pasque reports on this very day, it has been withdrawn!

In De Bloos [13[ the CJEU held that

‘for the purpose of determining the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5 (now A7(1) Brussels Ia, GAVC] … the obligation to be taken into account is that which corresponds to the contractual right on which the plaintiff’s action is based’.

The question which arises in Case C‑551/24 Deutsche Lufthansa AG v AirHelp Germany GmbH in which the Court held this morning, is whether the dispute at issue concerns the recovery of a claim arising from the assignment agreement  which assigned the claim to claimant, or the contract for the provision of services: in the present case, a contract of carriage by air. (An additional question on A7(5) branch jurisdiction was [30] declared inadmissible for lack of detail given by the referring court).

The confusion among the Polish courts (and they are far from alone!) is a result of the confusion following De Bloos. As I already noted in my review of CJEU Bosworth, it would be good for the Court to clarify whether De Bloos is still good authority, given the many textual changes and case-law considerations of (now) Article 7(1).

[36] the core question is

whether the fact that a claim, arising from the performance of a contract of carriage by air concluded between a consumer and a trader, has been transferred by that consumer to a company specialising in the recovery of air passengers’ claims is such as to preclude the application of the second indent of [A7(1)(b) BIa] in order to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation brought by the assignee against the air carrier.

[37] (unlike in the case of protected categories), the rule of special jurisdiction laid down A7(1)(b) is not intended to protect the weaker party in a contractual relationship. That that rule was not established in the light of the status of the contracting parties, but is based on the existence of a close connection between the court seised and the contract concerned. In those circumstances, the Court holds that the fact that the consumer’s claim for compensation has been transferred to a trader has no bearing on the application of that rule.

[38]: see similarly in CJEU Ofab and CDC: in the context of a dispute concerning claims relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, the transfer of claims by the initial creditor cannot, by itself, have an impact on the determination of the court having jurisdiction. [40] A dispute concerning the recovery of a claim arising from the performance of a contract for the provision of services continues to have a close connection (which the court points out is the raison d’être of A7(1)) with the place of performance of the obligation in question, namely the place in a Member State where, under that contract, the services were provided or should have been provided, within the meaning of the second indent of A7(1)(b), even though that claim has been transferred to a third party.

Therefore C-20/21 LOT Airlines comes into play: the place of departure of a flight corresponds to one of the main places of provision of the services which are the subject of that contract and therefore ensures the close connection required by the rules of special jurisdiction set out in A7(1) between that contract and the court which has territorial jurisdiction over that place. The Polish courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the action in the main proceedings [42] and [44-45}neither the particular features of the assignment agreement at issue nor the absence of a contractual link between the parties to the dispute are such as to call that jurisdiction into question:

First, the fact that, as is apparent from the order for reference, under the terms of the assignment agreement at issue, the assigning consumer does not transfer, under Polish law, his or her procedural rights to the assignee trader is not relevant for the application of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in the second indent of [A7(1)(b)]. That rule is based on the obligation in question, that is to say, the subject matter of the dispute, determined by that of the contract concerned, since the assignment agreement confers standing to bring proceedings solely on the assignee.

Second, as regards the fact that the parties in the main proceedings are not directly bound by a contract, … it should be observed that, in so far as the assignment agreement confers on the assignee the rights enjoyed by the assignor in relation to the carrier and therefore the right to bring proceedings for the recovery of the claim arising from the contract of carriage by air, that fact is also not such as to preclude the application of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provision.

The judgment makes much sense. Assignment does not change the nature of the claim nor its forum contractus. This assists the defendant with predictability and it would serve no Brussels Ia-relevant purpose to change the equation for claimant and defendant alike simply because the claim has been assigned.

Geert.