Droit international général

The third issue of 2025 of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, is out. Various articles featured in the new issue will likely be of interest for the readers of this blog, including one by Helmut Ortner, Veronika Korom and Marion Neumann, in English, titled Pacta Sunt Servanda’s Soliloquy Amidst Sanctions: The Impact of EU […]

This post was written by Paul Eichmüller, University of Vienna. A recent decision by the Regional Civil Court of Vienna has sparked controversy in Austrian media. The outcry was due to the fact that the court allowed the enforcement of a domestic arbitral award that was based on “Islamic law (Ahl as-Sunna wa-l-Ǧamāʿa) according to […]

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

C. Krapfl/N. V. Krahn: Can Parties Gather Evidence for Arbitration by Utilizing Freedom of Information Laws? [Article published in English]

This article examines the use of freedom of information laws, specifically the German Freedom of Information Act (“IFG”) and the United States Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), to gather evidence for arbitration. Both acts grant public access to government-held information but include exemptions. Recent German court decisions in the German car toll system case confirm that freedom of information requests can provide evidence for arbitration, emphasizing that such claims cannot be overridden by private arbitration agreements. The courts also ruled that transparency regarding documents enhances due process and does not undermine arbitral tribunals. The article concludes that freedom of information laws, including the IFG and FOIA, offer significant opportunities to gather evidence for arbitration, particularly when one party is a state or government entity, ensuring a fairer and more transparent arbitration process.

 

B. Schmitz: Protection Principle instead of Preferential Law Approach: A Dutch Alternative for Interpreting Article 6 (2) Rome I Regulation

Article 6 (2) Rome I Regulation allows parties to a consumer contract to choose the applicable law, but “such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded” under the non-derogable rules of the consumer’s habitual place of residence. This article introduces the reader to two distinctly different ways of interpreting this restriction to party autonomy: the preferential law approach, which is followed by German scholars, and the protection principle approach, which is followed by the majority of Dutch scholars. The article argues that whilst the preferential law approach is likely to be the correct interpretation in the eyes of the CJEU, the “Dutch method” bears many advantages.

 

L. Hübner: Determination of the place where the harmful event occurred in lawsuits against manufacturers in the diesel emissions’ scandal

This article examines the question of how the place where the harmful event occurred is to be determined in the context of the tort jurisdiction of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in actions brought by purchasers against the manufacturers of emissions-manipulated motor vehicles. While the ECJ had defined the place of acquisition as the place of success in the VKI case, the ECJ had to define the place of acquisition more precisely in FCA Italy. In doing so, the Court continues its questionable line of case law from the VKI decision. The article takes the criticism of the ECJ’s case law as an opportunity to also assess the alternative solutions considered in the literature.

 

W. Wurmnest: The single economic entity concept does not apply to claimants when determining international jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) Brussel Ibis Regulation

In MOL, the CJEU rejected the application of the single economic entity doctrine to the claimant to localise “the place where the harmful event occurred” according to Art. 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation. Consequentially, a parent company cannot bring an action for damages at its registered office to remedy the losses caused to its subsidiaries in various EU Member States through the acquisition of allegedly cartelised goods at supra-competitive prices. As the parent company is merely indirectly harmed, the damage caused to the subsidiaries is the relevant damage under Art. 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation. The economic entity doctrine that was developed in EU competition law does not alter this finding. The CJEU’s interpretation is sound from the perspective of procedural law. Making the indirect losses of the parent company the cornerstone of jurisdictional analysis based on the single economic entity doctrine would contradict the Regulation’s objectives of proximity and predictability of the rules governing jurisdiction.

 

M. Lehmann: The United Kingdom as a Fourth State? Controversy About the Continued Application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation after Brexit

Can EU consumers sue a British business in their home Member State? The answer seems obvious, but it has recently been the subject of a heated discussion between several German courts of appeal. At the heart of the debate is the Withdrawal Agreement, which was concluded between the EU and the UK in 2019. The article sheds light on its role and its relation to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

Furthermore, the merits of the disputes underlying the actions will be addressed. They concerned a specific type of instrument under German law, the “Genussrecht” or “participation right”, which confers on its holders benefits usually reserved for shareholders. Holders of an Austrian issuer of these instruments sued its successor, a British company, in Germany. The article analyses the law governing their claims from various perspectives (contract law, tort law, M&A).

 

G. Freise: Brussels Ibis and CMR: Primacy of Application and Breach of Jurisdiction Agreements as Grounds for Refusal of Recognition

The preliminary ruling procedure discussed in this article addresses two issues. Firstly, it deals with the relationship between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the CMR, a topic that has previously been considered by the ECJ on several occasions. In this instance, the referring court raised the question of whether the priority given to the more specific CMR in Article 71 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation also applies in the case of a jurisdiction agreement. In contrast to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the CMR does not recognise exclusive jurisdiction agreements, which is why the court considered a violation of the essential principles of the Brussels Ibis Regulation possible. Unfortunately, due to its lack of relevance to the decision, the ECJ did not comment on this intriguing question. According to the view presented here, however, the CMR should continue to take precedence even without the possibility of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Secondly, the referring court raised the question of whether decisions must be recognised if a jurisdiction agreement has been disregarded. On this point, the ECJ upheld its previous case law, reaffirming the principles of mutual trust and recognition. The Court clarified that disregarding a jurisdiction agreement does not constitute grounds for refusing recognition, particularly on the basis of a breach of public policy.

 

R. Wagner: Club de Fútbol Real Madrid vs. Le Monde before the ECJ: Does “the Spanish decision” violate French public policy

“The [European] Union offers an area of freedom, security and justice …” (Art. 67 TFEU). The area of justice makes it possible to enforce civil court decisions from one EU Member State in another EU Member State. This possibility is based on the principle of mutual trust. However, trust in the judiciary of the other EU member states does not have to be completely unlimited. For example, the ECJ ruled, among other things, that a Spanish decision won by the football club Real Madrid against Le Monde does not have to be enforced in France, “… to the extent that this would result in a manifest violation of the freedom of the press, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, …”. The following article explains and evaluates this decision.

 

M. Andrae: On the Delimitation of the Provisions on Jurisdiction of the Brussels IIb Regulation and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention (CPC)

The decision of the ECJ in case C-572/21 provides an opportunity to define the territorial scope of application of the individual provisions of the Brussels IIb Regulation, the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention (CPC), and the German Act on Proceedings in Family Matters (FamFG) regarding the international jurisdiction of courts in matters of parental responsibility. With the entry into force of the Brussels IIb Regulation, this issue has not lost its practical significance. A considerable part of the discussion focuses on Article 10 of the Brussels IIb Regulation, which regulates the court’s jurisdiction based on a choice-of-court agreement. It is argued that such an agreement loses its effect if, after its conclusion but before the proceedings are concluded, the child lawfully relocates and establishes habitual residence in a Contracting State that is not bound by the Regulation. In this case, jurisdiction is determined by the CPC, and the principle of perpetuatio fori does not apply. The jurisdiction of the agreed court can only arise from ancillary jurisdiction under Article 10 of the CPC in such circumstances.

 

F. Berner: Settlement of estates in cases with a foreign element

Complex estate settlements can become even more difficult when potential heirs live abroad. The Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf ) had to decide how a fraction of heirs could be registered in the German land register (Grundbuch) if another part of their community of heirs did not participate in the German proceedings and could not be reached by the land registry office.

 

C. v. Bary: The public law of names in cross-border situations taking into account the reform of the private law of names of 1 May 2025

The German law of names is divided between private and public law. In cross-border cases, this has been leading to questions of characterisation (in private international law) and scope of application (in public law) already in the past, with the decision of the Berlin Administrative Court concerning the latter. The answers to these questions are now reconsidered in light of the 2025 reform of the law of names because the scope of application of the private and public law of names now differ from each other. Therefore, a need for reform remains, which should ideally be resolved by abolishing the distinction between private and public law in the law of names altogether.

 

B. Hess: Shallows and abysses of the contractual jurisdiction, Art. 7 No. 1 b) and a) of the Regulation Brussels Ibis – the Higher Regional Court of Dresden in the interfaces between the German and the European laws of civil procedure

The contractual jurisdiction of Article 7 No. 1 of the Brussels I-bis Regulation still causes difficulties for the courts of the EU member states. This demonstrates a judgment rendered by the Dresden Higher Regional Court dated 29 November 2024, that, unfortunately, misunderstood the meaning and the function of European procedural law.

 

L. D. Loacker/G. A. Capaul: Enforceability of foreign arbitration settlements or: Unequal treatment due to gradual differences?

The enforceability of arbitral settlements under German procedural law is subject to considerable restrictions. Based on a recent decision of the Bavarian Higher Regional Court (BayObLG), the authors discuss the extent to which the widespread refusal to enforce foreign arbitral settlements appears justified. Overall, they advocate a more enforcement-friendly approach. Such an approach can be achieved by understanding the scope of application of the UN Arbitration Convention in a way that is more closely aligned with the party-autonomous nature of arbitral dispute resolution. In particular, the reference to the UN Arbitration Convention contained in section 1061 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) does not have to preclude the enforcement of arbitral settlements. In all cases, however, it is important not to fall short of sufficient requirements for the enforceability of arbitral settlements. This is due to the fact that not all forms of arbitral settlements are suitable for a cross-border extension of their effect with regard to enforcement.

 

A. S. Zimmermann: Accelerated Enforcement Proceedings for Cross-Border Child Abductions: European Parameters for Domestic Procedural Law

Child abduction cases are among the most sensitive matters in international family law. The 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction, which today connects more than 100 contracting parties, has led to great progress in this area. Its guiding principle is the child’s best interest, which generally requires an abducted child to be returned immediately. The Brussels II, II bis and II ter Regulations incorporated this guiding principle into EU law. Nevertheless, there is no agreement among the Member States as to how much procedural acceleration the child’s best interest requires. In the decision discussed here, the ECJ clarified how much (or rather: how little) the enforceability of return orders may be postponed by national law.

 

S. C. Symeonides: The Public Policy Exception in Choice of Law: The American Version [Article published in English]

To the surprise of many foreign readers, the American version of the public policy reservation (ordre public) is phrased exclusively in terms of jurisdiction and access to courts rather than as an exception to choice of law. At least in its “official” iteration in the First and Second Restatements, the exception allows courts to refuse to entertain a foreign cause of action that offends the forum’s public policy rather than to refuse to apply an offensive foreign law provision while adjudicating a (foreign or domestic) cause of action. This essay discusses the historical origins of this narrow and rather unique formulation, the problems it creates, its tacit rejection by most American courts, and the new flexible formulation of the exception in the proposed Third Conflicts Restatement.

 

A. Hermann: Applicability of the Hague Convention in British-European Legal Relations to Contracts Concluded before Brexit Confirmed

The Belgian Cour de Cassation has ruled that the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements became effective in the United Kingdom and, from the perspective of the EU Member States, in relation to the United Kingdom on 1 October 2015 and has been in force continuously since then. With this decision, the Cour de Cassation helps to eliminate uncertainty for future British-European legal relations.

Lilian Larribère (Université Paris Nanterre) and Étienne Nédellec (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) are the leaders of a project aimed at offering retrospective interviews (in French) of leading French scholars (En Chair(e)). The second interviewee is Pierre Mayer, who is Professor emeritus at the University Paris I and a leading French scholar of private international law […]

Originally posted on NGPIL blog on 26 August 2025

The Nigeria Group on Private International Law invites submissions for the annual NGPIL Conflict of Laws’ Competition. The winner will be awarded for the best essay on any aspect of Nigerian conflict of laws. Entries will be accepted from the following: an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any Nigerian lawyer five years call or below practising and residing in Nigeria. The essay should be unpublished at the time of submission. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Submitted essays should also be within five to eight thousand words. Competitors may be citizens of any nation, age or gender but must be an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any lawyer below five years post-call experience practising and residing in Nigeria.

The first prize is 200,000 Naira (NGN), and the winner of the competition will be encouraged to publish the paper in any high-quality peer reviewed journal on private international law (conflict of laws). The second prize is 120,000 Naira (NGN), and third prize is 80,000 Naira (NGN). The prize is sponsored by and will be awarded by NGPIL.

Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received no later than 31 October 2025. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. The winner will be announced no later than 2 months after the deadline. Decisions of the NGPIL on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to ngpilaw@gmail.com. All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.

Previous Winners

Peace George  (Winner for the 2023/2024 session)

Oluwabusola Fagbemi (Winner for the 2022/2023 session)

Solomon Adegboyo (Winner for the 2021/2022 session)

Family law in the European Union is an intricate, fast-evolving, and politically sensitive area of judicial cooperation. With issues ranging from cross-border divorce to international child abduction, and from parental responsibility to maintenance obligations, practitioners and judges must constantly navigate overlapping instruments, shifting jurisdictional rules, and complex interactions between national and EU law.

The Practical Handbook on EU Family Law: Part I – Key Concepts, Legal Terminology, and CJEU Case Law in Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation, authored by Nadia Rusinova and freely available online for download, positions itself as a much-needed companion in this field. Drawing on the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisprudence and the architecture of EU family law, the handbook provides a clear roadmap through legal terminology, concepts, and cross-instrument mechanisms.

Structure and Foundations

The opening Unit 1 sets the stage by outlining the purpose, audience, and method of the handbook. It presents itself as a practical tool designed to support judges, lawyers, academics, and students in navigating the complexities of cross-border family cases. Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis on English as a tool of legal harmonization, highlighting its role as a neutral bridge across diverse national legal systems and a means of fostering greater coherence in judicial cooperation.

EU Family Law in Context

Unit 2 provides the legal and institutional backdrop. It introduces the competence of the EU under Article 81 TFEU, the limits imposed by the special legislative procedure, and the use of enhanced cooperation (e.g., in matrimonial property regimes). It also offers a historical overview, tracing family law’s evolution within the broader framework of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The treatment of the Brussels II system is especially helpful in showing how successive instruments have created the backbone of today’s EU family law. For readers less familiar with EU competences, the discussion of direct applicability, primacy, and the role of domestic courts situates family law firmly within the EU’s constitutional order.

Cross-Instrument Legal Concepts

The third unit is a central part of the handbook, bringing together core legal concepts that recur across family law instruments. These include:

• Structural terms: “civil matters”, “court”, “habitual residence”, “central authorities”.
• Applicable law concepts: universal application, renvoi, and party autonomy.
• Safeguards: public policy and the best interests of the child.
• Jurisdictional coordination: lis pendens, related actions, prorogation, residual jurisdiction.
• Recognition and enforcement: the circulation of decisions, exequatur, enforcement measures, and grounds for refusal.

This cross-instrument perspective demonstrates how family law rules form part of a system of judicial cooperation, requiring coherent interpretation across instruments. The integration of CJEU case law grounds the discussion in practice.

Matrimonial Matters

Unit 4 turns to marriage-related proceedings: divorce, legal separation, annulment, and the recognition of non-judicial divorces involving public authorities. The coverage of jurisdictional bases (such as the habitual residence of spouses and counterclaims) and the recognition of decisions highlights the challenges courts face when marriages break down across borders.

Parental Responsibility

One of the most sensitive aspects of family law, Unit 5 addresses custody, access rights, and parental responsibility. Concepts such as continuing jurisdiction, transfer of jurisdiction, and urgent measures are explained with clarity. The section on perpetuatio fori, which ensures stability of jurisdiction once proceedings are initiated, is particularly insightful. The discussion of enforcement balances the importance of privileged decisions (such as those automatically enforceable) with the role of coercive and non-coercive measures in practice.

International Child Abduction

Unit 6 provides a well-structured synthesis of the 1980 Hague Convention and the EU’s overriding mechanism. It covers wrongful removal or retention, return procedures, and exceptions such as grave risk of harm or settlement of the child. The attention to post-decision scenario, such as further abduction or non-compliance, demonstrates the handbook’s practical orientation and awareness of the complexities courts encounter in real-world cases.

Maintenance Obligations

Unit 7 completes the thematic coverage with maintenance obligations. It clarifies terminology (creditor, debtor, subrogation of public bodies) and explains jurisdictional bases, including forum necessitatis, which safeguards access to justice where no other court is available. The treatment of applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of maintenance decisions is highly useful for practitioners managing the financial dimensions of cross-border disputes.

Annexes and Added Value

The annexes provide a set of especially useful practical tools:

• An alphabetical glossary of terms for quick reference.
• Tables and figures that map out jurisdictional rules and procedures.
• CJEU case law indexed by legal term.

In Conclusion

With this work, Nadia Rusinova has produced a handbook that renders EU family law accessible, well-structured, and firmly practice-oriented, while at the same time combining doctrinal depth with methodological precision. This dual quality enables the handbook to serve not only as a reliable guide for practitioners confronted with cross-border family law issues, but also as a valuable scholarly contribution to the academic study of EU judicial cooperation. Its layered design – beginning with foundational principles, moving through cross-cutting concepts, and then addressing specific domains – makes the handbook equally indispensable for lawyers, judges, and academics alike.

Congratulations, Nadia!

Following Brexit, the Brussels I bis Regulation ceased to apply in the UK. The regulation’s rules of jurisdiction in consumer and employment matters (Chapter II, Sections 4 and 5, Articles 17-23) were replaced by Sections 15A-15E of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. The Explanatory Memorandum to the amendments to the 1982 Act introducing […]

The Faculty of Law at the University of Rijeka has announced the upcoming edition of RIDOC: Rijeka Doctoral Conference, which will take place on Friday, 12 December 2025 in Rijeka, Croatia.

RIDOC is an international academic conference designed for doctoral students in law and related disciplines. It offers a unique platform for early-career researchers to present, test and discuss their research ideas in front of an expert academic audience and fellow PhD candidates from across Europe and beyond.

Key Information:

Conference date: 12 December 2025
Location: Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka (Croatia)

Abstract deadline: 20 October 2025
Submission email: ridoc@pravri.uniri.hr
More information on the web

Contributions from all areas of legal research are welcome, including private international law and related areas. The language of the conference is English.

Katharina Boele-Woelki (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg) and Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg (Uppsala University) edited What Family Law for Europe? with Intersentia. The blurb reads as follows: In what ways does contemporary European family law respond to evolving societal dynamics and the growing imperative to uphold human rights? This volume addresses this question by taking a crossnational, comparative […]

This guest post was written by Ezzatollah Pabakhsh, Master’s Student at the University of Antwerp

The European Union has taken an unprecedented step by regulating artificial intelligence (AI) through the EU AI Act, which is the world’s first comprehensive legal framework for AI governance. According to Recital 61, Article 6(2) and Annex III, 8(a), AI tools used in legal or administrative decision-making processes—including alternative dispute resolution (ADR), when used similarly to courts and producing legal effects—are considered high risk. These tools must comply with the strict requirements outlined in Articles 8 through 27.

These provisions are designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and respect for fundamental rights. This obligation will take effect on August 2, 2026, according to Article 113. Notably, the Act’s extraterritorial scope, as outlined in Articles 2(1)(c) and (g), applies to any AI system that affects individuals within the European Union. This applies regardless of where the system is developed or used. It also applies to providers and deployers outside the EU whose output is used within the Union. This raises a critical question: can non?compliance with the EU AI Act serve as a basis for courts in EU Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award on procedural or public?policy grounds?[1]

Consider the following scenario: Two EU-based technology companies, one Belgian and one German, agree to resolve their disputes through US-seated arbitration. Suppose the ADR center uses AI-powered tools that do not comply with the EU AI Act‘s high-risk system requirements. How would enforcement of the resulting award play out before national courts in the EU?

This scenario presents a direct legal conflict. If the winning party seeks to enforce the award in a national court of an EU Member State, two well-established legal grounds for refusing enforcement may arise.[2] First, the losing party may invoke Article V(1)(d) of the 1958 New York Convention, together with the applicable national arbitration law. They could argue that reliance on AI systems that do not comply with the EU AI Act constitutes a procedural irregularity, as it departs from the parties’ agreed arbitration procedure and undermines the integrity of the arbitral process.[3] Second, under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention, the enforcing court may refuse recognition on its own motion if it finds that using non-compliant AI violates the forum’s public policy, especially when fundamental rights or procedural fairness are at stake.[4] The following section will examine these two scenarios in more detail.

Scenario 1: Procedural Irregularity under Article V(1)

Imagine that the ADR center uses an AI tool to assist the tribunal in drafting the award during the proceedings. This AI system uses complex algorithms that cannot produce transparent, human-readable explanations of how key conclusions were reached. The final award relies on these outputs, yet it offers no meaningful reasoning or justification for several significant findings. Furthermore, the tribunal does not disclose the extent to which it relies on the AI system, nor is there any clear evidence of human oversight in the deliberation process.

When the losing party in Belgium contests enforcement of the award, they invoke Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention, arguing that the arbitral procedure did not align with the parties’ expectations or the applicable law. This objection is also found in Article 1721 of the Belgian Judicial Code (BJC), inspired by Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and, to a large extent, mirroring the grounds of Article V of the New York Convention. Among these, two are especially relevant to the use of AI in the arbitral process and are central to the objection in this case.

First, under Article 1721(1)(d), a party may argue that the award lacks proper reasoning[5], which violates a core procedural guarantee under Belgian law.[6]  This requirement ensures that parties can understand the legal and factual basis for the tribunal’s decision and respond accordingly.[7] In this case, however, the award’s reliance on opaque, AI-generated conclusions, particularly those produced by “black box” systems, renders the reasoning inaccessible and legally inadequate.[8] The EU AI Act further reinforces this objection. Articles 13, 16, and 17 require transparency, traceability, and documentation for high-risk AI systems. Meanwhile, Article 86 grants limited right to explanation for affected persons where a deployer’s decision is based on Annex III systems and produces legal effects. If an award fails to meet these standards, it may not align with Belgian procedural norms.

Second, under Article 1721(1)(e), a party may argue that the tribunal’s composition or procedure deviated from the parties’ agreement or the law of the seat. For example, if the arbitration agreement contemplated adjudication by human arbitrators and the tribunal instead relied on AI tools that materially influenced its reasoning without disclosure or consent, this could constitute a procedural irregularity. According to Article 14 of the EU AI Act, there must be effective human oversight of high-risk AI systems. Where such oversight is lacking or merely formal and AI outputs are adopted without critical human assessment, the legitimacy of the proceedings may be seriously undermined. Belgian courts have consistently held that procedural deviations capable of affecting the outcome may justify refusal of recognition and enforcement.[9]

Scenario 2: Public Policy under Article V(2)(b)

In this scenario, the court may refuse to enforce the award on its own initiative if it is found to be contrary to public policy[10] under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, or Article 1721(3) of the Belgian Judicial Code (BJC). These provisions allow courts to deny recognition and enforcement if the underlying procedure or outcome conflicts with fundamental principles of justice in national and European legal systems.[11]

In comparative international practice, public policy has both substantive and procedural dimensions. When a breach of fundamental and widely recognized procedural principles renders an arbitral decision incompatible with the core values and legal order of a state governed by the rule of law, procedural public policy is engaged. Examples include violations of due process, lack of tribunal independence, breach of equality of arms, and other essential guarantees of fair adjudication.[12]

In this case, the use of non-transparent AI systems may fall within this category.[13] If a tribunal relies on these tools without disclosing their use or without providing understandable justifications, the process could violate Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This article guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. This issue, along with case law, could provide a reasonable basis for refusal based on public policy.[14] When applying EU-relevant norms, Belgian courts are bound to interpret procedural guarantees in accordance with the Charter. [15]

Comparative case law provides additional support. In Dutco, for example, the French Cour de cassation annulled an arbitral award for violating the equality of arms in the tribunal’s constitution, which is an archetypal breach of procedural public policy.[16] Similarly, in a 2016 decision under § 611(2)(5) ZPO, the Austrian Supreme Court annulled an award where the arbitral procedure was found to be incompatible[17] with Austria’s fundamental legal values.[18] These rulings confirm that courts may deny enforcement when arbitral mechanisms, especially those that affect the outcome, compromise procedural integrity.

Belgian courts have consistently held that recognition and enforcement must be refused where the underlying proceedings are incompatible with ordre public international belge, particularly where fundamental principles such as transparency, reasoned decision-making, and party equality are undermined.[19] In this context, reliance on non-transparent AI—without adequate procedural safeguards—may constitute a violation of procedural public policy. As a result, enforcement may lawfully be denied ex officio under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention and Article 1721(3) of the Belgian Judicial Code, thereby preserving the integrity of both the Belgian and broader EU legal frameworks. Ultimately, courts retain wide discretion under public policy grounds to decide with real control whether or not to enforce AI-assisted awards.[20]

These potential refusals of enforcement within the EU highlight a broader trend, as domestic procedural safeguards are increasingly influenced by global regulatory developments, prompting questions about whether the EU’s approach to AI in arbitration will remain a regional standard or evolve into an international benchmark.

The EU AI Act as a Global Regulatory Model?

The EU has a proven history of establishing global legal benchmarks—rules that, while originating in Europe, shape laws and practices far beyond its borders.[21] The GDPR is the clearest example of this. Its extraterritorial scope, strict compliance obligations, and enforcement mechanisms have prompted countries ranging from Brazil to Japan to adopt similar data protection frameworks.[22]

In arbitration, a comparable pattern could emerge. If EU courts apply the EU AI Act’s high-risk requirements when deciding on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, other jurisdictions may adopt comparable standards, encouraging convergence in AI governance across dispute resolution systems. Conversely, inconsistent enforcement approaches could foster fragmentation rather than harmonisation. In any case, the Act’s influence is already being felt beyond Europe, prompting arbitration stakeholders to address new questions regarding procedural legitimacy, technological oversight, and cross-border enforceability.

 

Conclusion

The interplay between the EU AI Act and the enforcement of arbitral awards highlights how technological regulation is shaping the concept of procedural fairness in cross-border dispute resolution. Whether the Act becomes a catalyst for global standards or a source of jurisdictional friction, parties and institutions cannot ignore its requirements. As AI tools move deeper into arbitral practice, compliance will become not just a regulatory obligation but a strategic necessity for ensuring the enforceability of awards in key jurisdictions.

 

[1] Tariq K Alhasan, ‘Integrating AI Into Arbitration: Balancing Efficiency With Fairness and Legal Compliance’ (2025) 42 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 523, 524.

[2] ibid 525.

[3] Jordan Bakst and others, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Arbitration: A US Perspective’ (2022) 16 Dispute Resolution International 7, 23; Sanjana Reddy Jeeri and Vinita Singh, ‘Soft Law, Hard Justice: Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration’ (2024) 17 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 191, 222.

[4] Sean Shih and Eric Chin-Ru Chang, ‘The Application of AI in Arbitration: How Far Away Are We from AI Arbitrators?’ (2024) 17 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 69, 81.

[5] Horst Eidenmuller and Faidon Varesis, ‘What Is an Arbitration? Artificial Intelligence and the Vanishing Human Arbitrator’ (2020) 17 New York University Journal of Law and Business 49, 72.

[6] Dilyara Nigmatullina and Beatrix Vanlerberghe, ‘Arbitration Related Lessons: Insights from the Supreme Courts around the World’ (2020) 2020 b-Arbitra | Belgian Review of Arbitration 307, 354.

[7] Gizem Kasap, ‘Can Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) Replace Human Arbitrators? Technological Concerns and Legal Implications’ (2021) 2021 Journal of Dispute Resolution 209, 230, 249.

[8] Shih and Chang (n 4) 79.

[9] Koen De Winter and Michaël De Vroey, ‘Belgium’ in Baker McKenzie International Arbitration Yearbook: 10th Anniversary Edition 2016–2017 (Baker McKenzie 2017), 81, 82, 85.

[10] Eidenmuller and Varesis (n 5) 80–81; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Arbitrability; Due Process; and Public Policy Under Article V of the New York Convention Belgian and French Perspectives’ (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 721, 729–730.

[11] Kasap (n 7) 252; Annabelle O Onyefulu, ‘Artificial Intelligence in International Arbitration: A Step Too Far?’ (2023) 89 Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 56, 63.

[12] Nigmatullina and Vanlerberghe (n 6) 351–352.

[13] Shih and Chang (n 4) 86.

[14] Nigmatullina and Vanlerberghe (n 6) 353.

[15] A de Zitter, ‘The Impact of EU Public Policy on Annulment, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in International Commercial Arbitration’ (University of Oxford 2019) 5, 251–253.

[16] Stefan Kröll, ‘Siemens – Dutco Revisited? Balancing Party Autonomy and Equality of the Parties in the Appointment Process in Multiparty Cases | Kluwer Arbitration Blog’ <https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/siemens-dutco-revisited-balancing-party-autonomy-and-equality-of-the-parties-in-the-appointment-process-in-multiparty-cases/> accessed 18 August 2025; Nigmatullina and Vanlerberghe (n 6) 351.

[17] Alexander Zollner, ‘Austrian Supreme Court Set aside an Arbitral Award Due to a Violation of the Procedural Ordre Public’ (Global Arbitration News, 21 June 2017) <https://www.globalarbitrationnews.com/2017/06/21/austrian-supreme-court-set-aside-arbitral-award-for-violation-of-public-policy/> accessed 18 August 2025. ; Franz Schwarz and Helmut Ortner, ‘Austria’ in Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, James Hosking and Yasmine Lahlou (eds), Does a Right to a Physical Hearing Exist in International Arbitration? (ICCA Reports, 2020) 26, https://www.arbitration-icca.org/right-to-a-physical-hearing-international-arbitration accessed 5 August 2025

[18] Nigmatullina and Vanlerberghe (n 6) 351.

[19] Alhasan (n 1) 5–6.

[20] Shih and Chang (n 4) 87; Hanotiau (n 10) 737.

[21] Arturo J Carrillo and Matías Jackson, ‘Follow the Leader? A Comparative Law Study of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation’s Impact in Latin America’ (2022) 16 ICL Journal 177, 178; Michelle Goddard, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): European Regulation That Has a Global Impact’ (2017) 59 International Journal of Market Research 703, 703–704.

[22] Carrillo and Jackson (n 21) 242–245.

By Dr Sarah McKibbin, University of Southern Queensland

The Supreme Court of New South Wales’ decision in Isaacman v King [No 2][1] is the kind of case that tempts one to say ‘nothing to see here’, and yet it richly rewards a closer look. On a conventional application of Voth v Manildra Flour Mills[2] — the leading Australian authority on forum non conveniens — Garling J stayed proceedings that attempted to litigate a New York relationship dispute in Sydney, being ‘well satisfied’ that the NSW Supreme Court was a clearly inappropriate forum.[3] The reasons, though brief by design,[4] illuminate the transaction costs of jurisdictional overreach,[5] show how the Voth framework handles an extreme set of facts, and offer a careful case study for empirical debates about Australian ‘parochialism’ in jurisdictional decision-making.

The Factual Background

The facts almost read like a hypothetical designed to test the outer limits of exorbitant, or long-arm, jurisdiction. A US biotech executive residing in New York sued his former partner, an Australian marketing consultant, in the NSW Supreme Court for alleged negligent transmission of herpes simplex virus during their relationship in New York. The relationship began and ended in New York; the alleged transmission occurred there; the plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment took place there; and the defendant, though Australian, lived overseas and was only ordinarily resident in Victoria when in Australia. The plaintiff had a four-month period in 2022 split between Sydney, New South Wales, and Melbourne, Victoria, with visits to Queensland, while exploring business opportunities for skincare ventures. He pointed to social friendships in Sydney and his one-off membership of the North Bondi Returned Services League Club.[6]

None of this impressed Garling J as a meaningful link to New South Wales. As Garling J readily observed in the case’s earlier procedural judgment, there was ‘no connection whatsoever between either of the parties, and the pleaded cause of action and the State of New South Wales.’[7] The RSL membership did not establish ‘any connection at all with the forum’.[8] The pleading itself underscored the foreignness of the dispute: by notice under New South Wales’ court rules,[9] the plaintiff relied on New York law, in particular New York Public Health Law § 2307, alongside common law claims available under New York law.[10]

The decision

The stay analysis proceeded squarely under Voth. Garling J recited the familiar principles: the onus lies on the defendant; the question is whether the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum, not whether an alternative is more convenient; it is relevant that another forum can provide justice; and the need to determine foreign law is not conclusive but is a significant factor.[11] The only explicit nod to the English test in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd[12] came through the High Court’s own endorsement in Voth of Lord Templeman’s aspiration for brevity in such applications. [13] Yet Garling J noted that an issue arising in oral submissions required further written submissions, precluding an ex tempore disposition, but nonetheless kept the reasons concise.[14]

On the facts, the connecting factors all pointed away from New South Wales. The conduct giving rise to the claim, the governing law, and the evidentiary base were in New York. Neither party had assets in NSW, so any judgment, whether for damages or for costs, would have to be enforced elsewhere, compounding expense.[15] Garling J accepted, and the parties did not dispute, that New York courts could exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant; that acceptance underpinned the conclusion that there was another forum where the plaintiff could ‘obtain justice’.[16] The upshot was decisive but orthodox: the Supreme Court of New South Wales was a clearly inappropriate forum, and the proceedings would be stayed.[17]

The conditional order deserves to be recorded with some precision. The stay was to take effect seven days after publication of the judgment. Within that same seven-day period, the defendant was to file and serve a written undertaking that, if the plaintiff brought civil proceedings in the State of New York concerning the subject matter of the NSW suit, she would not plead any New York limitations defence, provided the plaintiff commenced in New York within three months of the stay taking effect and provided the claims were not statute-barred when the NSW proceeding was commenced.[18] Framed this way, the undertaking did not expand the analysis beyond Voth. It neutralised limitation prejudice, as long as the plaintiff did not delay commencing proceedings, and ensured practical access to the natural forum. Garling J also ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of the forum non conveniens application.[19]

Two ancillary applications were left untouched. A motion seeking transfer to the Supreme Court of Victoria and a late-filed non-publication motion were not determined.[20] Given the stay, it was not appropriate to go on to decide further issues between the parties. Garling J added that ordering a transfer could impinge on the plaintiff’s own choices about where to proceed next; and with the matter stayed, non-publication orders served no useful purpose.[21]

Comments

Situating Isaacman v King [No 2] in the post-Voth jurisprudence helps explain both the ease and the limits of the result. Voth’s ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test was announced as only a slight departure from the English Spiliada test,[22] but, as Richard Garnett’s early survey of the doctrine shows,[23] its operation had been variegated.[24] In the years immediately after Voth, Australian courts often refused stays where there were meaningful Australian connections — even if the governing law or much of the evidence was foreign — and sometimes gave generous weight to local juridical advantages.[25] Mary Keyes’ analysis in the Australian family law context underscores why this felt unpredictable: a forum-centric test with broad judicial discretion risks certainty, predictability and cost.[26] Understandably then, Keyes argues for an explicitly comparative, Spiliada-style inquiry that focuses on effective, complete and efficient resolution, the parties’ ability to participate, costs and enforceability.[27]

At the same time, the High Court tempered Voth in specific contexts. In Henry v Henry,[28]  the majority effectively created a presumption in favour of a stay where truly parallel foreign proceedings between the same parties on the same controversy were already on foot, explicitly invoking comity and the risks of inconsistent outcomes.[29] In CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd,[30] the High Court went further. Even without identity of issues, the ‘controversy as a whole’ analysis could render local proceedings oppressive where their dominant purpose was to frustrate access to relief available only abroad.[31] These qualifications that, outside the special case of parallel litigation, Voth directs attention to the suitability of the local forum in its own terms; but where duplication looms in the form of parallel proceedings, the analysis necessarily broadens. That broader, comparative posture is also what Ardavan Arzandeh shows Australian courts actually do in practice, despite Voth’s formal language.[32]

Isaacman v King [No 2] belongs to a different, more straightforward strand in that story: the ‘little or no connection with Australia’ cases in which stays have been ordered because the action and the parties’ controversy are overwhelmingly foreign.[33] Unlike the contested margins Garnett identifies, there was no pleaded Australian statutory right of a kind sometimes relied on as a juridical advantage; no contest about the availability of a competent foreign forum; and no tactical race between parallel proceedings. Garling J canvassed the classic connecting factors, noted the New York law pleaded, recorded the practical burdens of proof and enforcement, and concluded that New South Wales was clearly an inappropriate forum. That emphasis on concrete, case-specific connections and on consequences for the conduct and enforcement of the litigation fits both Keyes’ call for structured, predictable decision-making and Arzandeh’s demonstration that Australian courts, in substance, weigh the same considerations as Spiliada.[34]

Two implications follow. First, the decision is a neat instance of Voth doing exactly what it was designed to do when the forum is only nominally engaged. It offers little purchase for testing the harder comparative question whether, at the margins, Voth’s rhetoric yields different outcomes from Spiliada’s ‘more appropriate forum’ inquiry. That is consistent with Arzandeh’s view that the supposed gap is, in practice, vanishingly small.[35] Secondly, it gives texture to the practical burdens that inappropriate forum choices impose. Expert evidence on New York law would have been required; witnesses and records are in the United States; neither party’s assets are in New South Wales; and the court itself, even in this ‘easy’ case, could not resolve the application wholly on the basis of oral submissions because an issue warranted further written argument. Those are precisely the private and public costs Keyes highlights as reasons to favour a clearer, more comparative framework ex ante, rather than leaving calibration to ex post discretion.[36]

There is, then, a narrow lesson and a broader one. Narrowly, Isaacman v King [No 2] confirms that Australian courts will not entertain a claim whose only local anchors are social relationships and what amounts to a meal-discount club card. Broadly, it supplies one more controlled observation for comparative and empirical work: an extreme outlier that aligns with ‘no connection’ line of authority.[37] It also leaves open — indeed, usefully highlights — the need for data drawn from genuinely contested cases, where juridical advantage and practical adequacy are engaged on the evidence, if we are to assess how far Voth diverges, in practice, from its common law counterparts.[38]

Conclusion

Isaacman v King [No 2] therefore earns its place not because it breaks doctrinal ground, but because it shows the doctrine working as intended. The plaintiff’s Sydney friendships and RSL membership could not anchor a transatlantic dispute in a NSW court; New York law, evidence and enforcement pointed inexorably elsewhere; and a conditional stay ensured that the plaintiff would not be procedurally disadvantaged by being sent to the forum where the dispute belongs. If some forum non conveniens applications can be resolved quickly,[39] this was not one of them. But it was, in the end, a straightforward exercise of judicial discipline about where litigation should be done.

[1] [2025] NSWSC 381.

[2] (1990) 171 CLR 538 (‘Voth’).

[3] Isaacman v King [No 2] (n 1) [50].

[4] Voth (n 2) 565.

[5] See Andrew Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003; J J Spigelman, ‘Transaction Costs and International Litigation’ (2006) 80(7) Australian Law Journal 438, 441–3.

[6] Ibid [22].

[7] Isaacman v King [2024] NSWSC 1291, [85]. The earlier judgment dealt with preliminary procedural matters including the plaintiff’s failed attempt to proceed pseudonymously.

[8] Isaacman v King [No 2] (n 1) [41]–[42].

[9] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

[10] Isaacman v King [No 2] (n 1) [14], [45]–[46].

[11] Ibid [35]–[36].

[12] [1987] AC 460.

[13] Isaacman v King [No 2] (n 1) [37], quoting Voth (n 2) 565. One wonders how often Lord Templeman’s aspiration is realised.

[14] Isaacman v King [No 2] (n 1) [37]–[38].

[15] Ibid [43], [46]–[49].

[16] Ibid [47].

[17] Ibid [39]–[51].

[18] Ibid [4], [56].

[19] Ibid [56].

[20] Ibid [7], [52]–[53].

[21] Ibid [8], [52]–[55].

[22] Voth (n 2) 558.

[23] Richard Garnett, ‘Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A “Clearly Inappropriate” Test?’ (1999) 23(1) Melbourne University Law Review 30.

[24] Cf Ardavan Arzandeh, ‘Reconsidering the Australian Forum (Non) Conveniens Doctrine’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 475.

[25] Garnett (n 22) 39–48.

[26] Mary Keyes, ‘Jurisdiction in International Family Litigation: A Critical Analysis’ (2004) 27 UNSW Law Journal 42, 63–4.

[27] Ibid.

[28] (1995) 185 CLR 571.

[29] Ibid 590–1; Garnett (n 22) 52–4.

[30] (1997) 189 CLR 345.

[31] Ibid 400–1; Garnett (n 22) 57–9.

[32] Arzandeh (n 23) 485, 486.

[33] Garnett (n 22) 45–6.

[34] Keyes (n 26) 63–4; Arzandeh (n 23).

[35] Arzandeh (n 23) 491.

[36] Keyes (n 26) 59–60.

[37] Garnett (n 22) 45–6.

[38] On the need for empirical research in this area, see Christopher A Whytock, ‘Sticky Beliefs about Transnational Litigation’ (2022) 28(2) Southwestern Journal of International Law 284.

[39] Spiliada (n 12) 465.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

DHV v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (Rev1) [2025] EWHC 2002 (KB) is an interesting case to discuss statutory construction of EU law, specifically (and this is mostly how it ended up on the blog) with respect to Rome II’s ‘evidence and procedure’ carve-out and the impact of its recital 33 on same.

Those interested in the use of experts in proceedings generally, may want to read the first 80 or so paras of the judgment as well, for the account by Dias J of the various experts and their credibility is most informative, as is [45]

Two accident reconstruction experts gave live evidence: …..The factual conclusions the court reaches must be based on the totality of evidence, combining expert and all other relevant evidence. The court is not bound by the conclusions of any expert if it offends logic and common sense. We do not have trial by experts. This principle applies with equal force to the other pairs of experts, on Spanish law, actuarial evidence and medico-legal matters. I will not repeat that important warning and qualification. (emphasis added)

Now, to the conflict of laws issues at hand:

The judgment on this issue kicks off with general observations on determining applicable law, and the precise implications of ‘foreign law as fact’ with [82] reference ia to Lambert v MIB as well [83 ff] as how exactly that foreign law needs to be applied: entirely as it has been done by the relevant foreign courts (possibly all the way up to their supreme court), or, if their is evidence (provided by the experts) that these foreign courts have not actually properly applied their own laws, by the English court’s ‘proper’ reading of those laws.

[85] ff then discuss Rome II’s ‘evidence and procedure’ carve-out, which I review in the handbook with reference to all authorities reviewed in current case. Pro memoria, relevant statutory provisions are

Article 1(3)

This Regulation shall not apply to evidence and procedure,
without prejudice to Articles 21 and 22.

Note ! this is a proper and entire carve-out altogether from the scope of the Regulation, different from Article 1(2) which excludes certain issues which as a result of Article 1(1) are within its scope, but are then excepted.

(Articles 21 and 22 are of no relevance to the case at issue; see on those Articles eg Quilombola, X v Y (parental responsibility) or X v Y ( monies viz real estate transaction).

Article 15 ‘Scope of the law applicable’

Article 15
Scope of the law applicable
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this Regulation shall govern in particular:
(a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them;
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of liability c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed;
(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures which a court may take to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of compensation;
(e) the question whether a right to claim damages or a remedy may be transferred, including by inheritance;
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained personally;
(g) liability for the acts of another person;
(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of prescription or limitation.

Of further relevance is recital 33

According to the current national rules on compensation awarded to victims of road traffic accidents, when quantifying damages for personal injury in cases in which the accident takes place in a State other than that of the habitual residence of the victim, the court seised should take into account all the relevant actual circumstances of the specific victim, including in particular the actual losses and costs of after-care and medical attention.

Wall v Mutuelle of course is the core reference employed although as I have said before, it is wrong to suggest such as the judge does here [87] that “While [the evidence and procedure carve-out] is a derogation from article 15, it must be narrowly construed”.

A first bone of contention is whether Rome II applies at all to the case. It’s probably me who does not quite see how that argument is made. The question in the end is not all that relevant given the answer to the second issue: whether recital 33 has a substantive impact on the case. The judge held it does not.

I have not recently looked at Recital 33, nor done a detailed study of its travaux. That word in fact gives the recital too much credit: a recital can be part of the travaux of a statutory provision. It does not have its own travaux, given that recitals plainly are not EU statutory law. In the case of current recital, it was a plaster to sooth the European Parliament’s failure to introduce what would have been in effect a harmonisation of substantive law on full compensation (the restitutio in integrum principle; the judge here refers ia to prof Dickinson’s discussion of the recital).

Dias J also discusses Halsbury on EU statutory law as a general background to the application of EU law. He is wrong in my opinion to [114] suggest that “the current national rules on compensation” as used in recital 33, are a reference to the applicable lex causae (which he incompletely refers to as the ‘lex loci’: ‘damni’ should be added to that). ‘The current national rules’ refers to ius commune as eg the French version shows: ‘En vertu des règles nationales existantes en matière d’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation routière.’

Conclusion [127]: recital 33 is not a legal rule. At the most it may be of relevance in an A4(3) ‘more closely connected’ scenario – which is not the case here.

A case of interest for Rome II. Another example, too, of where continental courts in all likelihood would not have allowed the arguments to run quite to the intensity they were argued here (contributing of course to the costs of proceedings in English courts).

Geert.

On 21 August 2025, the UNSW School of Private and Commercial Law, the Journal of Equity and Allens jointly hosted the 2025 Journal of Equity Conference. This year’s one-day Conference focused on important questions at the intersection of equity, trusts and private international law. It featured four papers delivered by judges and scholars, each of which was followed by ample time for insightful questions and discussion among over 30 judges, lawyers and scholars attending the office of Allens in (rainy) Sydney.

After the Acknowledgement of Country and welcoming address by Professor Ying Khai Liew (University of Melbourne), The Honourable Andrew Bell (Chief Justice of New South Wales) delivered opening remarks, emphasising the importance of private international law and the application of its rules in equity and trusts in the modern global economy. Drawing references from old and new cases and academic materials, the Chief Justice discussed the tensions among various potential choices of law for equity and trusts, and highlighted the increasingly important role of the question of characterisation when analysing equitable doctrines and remedies.

The first paper by Professor Richard Garnett (University of Melbourne) and The Honourable Andrew Bell focused on the enforcement of trusts in international litigation. Professor Garnett considered private international law principles applied by common law courts to disputes specifically involving trusts with connections to civil law jurisdictions. Drawing from a wealth of judicial decisions, Professor Garnett examined the approaches taken by common law jurisdictions to issues of jurisdiction and applicable law in relation to both express and constructive trusts. The Chief Justice further considered the question of jurisdiction clauses (particularly in Crociani v Crociani [2014] UKPC 40, [2015] WTLR 975) and arbitrability in the enforcement of trusts in private international law. It was noted that there is fertile ground for future cases to develop more sophisticated rules.

The second paper by Professor Tiong Min Yeo (Singapore Management University) considered the problems and approaches in the characterisation of equitable doctrines. Starting with the traditional choice-of-law methodology, Professor Yeo discussed several difficulties when characterising equitable doctrines, most notably that these equitable doctrines often cross doctrinal categories in domestic law and functional categories in choice of law. Taking a functional characterisation perspective of private international law, Professor Yeo suggested looking at how the case is argued and the functions of the doctrine being pleaded. This was illustrated by reference to constructive and resulting trusts, which can fall in either the category of property or the law of obligations, or both, depending on the issue before the court. Multiple cases showed that courts have yet to engage in detail with the question of characterisation.

The third paper by Professor Man Yip (Singapore Management University) looked at the equitable origins and private international law developments of the anti-suit injunction. Professor Yip emphasised the in personam, discretionary nature of the injunction, involving considerations of comity and unconscionability. Professor Yip revealed and discussed various themes of equity within the modern framework of the anti-suit relief, including the different conceptions of comity, the recourse to equitable ideas such as ‘conscience’ (in ‘unconscionable conduct’), and the different bases for the grant of anti-suit relief (equitable jurisdiction vs inherent jurisdiction). The close relationship between equity and comity was further demonstrated by anti-suit injunctions granted in support of foreign litigation or arbitration.

The fourth paper by Associate Professor Adeline Chong (Singapore Management University) investigated the extent of the role of the lex situs in trusts claims. After explaining the rationales for applying the lex situs to questions of property generally, Professor Chong provided an in-depth account of the choice-of-law approach under the Hague Trusts Convention (the HCCH Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition) for express trusts, including the situs as a factor in identifying the applicable law of the trust, and the relevance of the lex situs when the applicable law of the trust is not the lex situs, particularly if the lex situs does not recognise trusts or the proprietary aspects of trusts. Professor Chong then turned to common law rules on resulting and constructive trusts, pointing out tensions between applying the lex fori, the lex situs, and the law governing the cause of action, event or obligation. Among these approaches, it was suggested that the lex situs should be accorded a primary role in determining whether a trust can be created in the first place, before other laws – such as those governing the cause of action, event or obligation, or those governing the relationship between the parties – come into play.

Overall, the Conference has provided all attendees with much food for thought. It is evident that these issues have no clear and easy answers, and deserve further judicial and academic attention.

Readers who are interested in the topic may wish to consult, as a starting point, Professor Yeo’s monograph, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford University Press 2004), as well as various judicial decisions which were frequently featured throughout the Conference, including (in chronological order, and certainly not being an exhaustive list):

• Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 (EWCA);
• Lightning v Lightning Electrical Contractors Ltd (unreported, 23 April 1998) (EWCA);
• Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492 (NSWCA);
• Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (SGCA);
• Murakami v Wiryadi (2010) 268 ALR 377 (NSWCA);
• First Laser Ltd v Fujian Enterprises (Holdings) Co Ltd (2012) 15 HKCFAR 569;
• Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6, [2017] AC 424;
• Trisuryo Garuda Nusa Pte Ltd v SKP Pradiksi (North) Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 SLR 814;
• Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Co Ltd v Eton Properties Ltd [2020] HKCFA 32, (2020) 23 HKCFAR 348; and
• Byers v Saudi National Bank [2023] UKSC 51, [2024] AC 1191.

Lilian Larribère (Université Paris Nanterre) and Étienne Nédellec (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) are the leaders of a project aimed at offering retrospective interviews (in French) of leading French scholars (En Chair(e)). The first interviewee is Paul Lagarde, who is Professor emeritus at the University Paris I and a leading French scholar of private international law […]

As the readers of this blog will recall, the Lindemann Fellowship for Private International Law was established in 2024 to provide early-career researchers with the opportunity to build a network with academics from all over Europe. Fellows are accepted for a three-year period, with new Fellows joining each year, as existing Fellows complete their tenure. […]

THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION REAFFIRMED PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION IS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE

By: Priskila Pratita Penasthika[1]

 

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-XXI/2023, issued on 3 September 2024, confirms that parental child abduction is a criminal offence under Article 330(1) of the Indonesian Criminal Code. Prior to this Decision, Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code was understood as a provision that could not criminalise someone for child abduction if the abduction was committed by one of the biological parents.

After 3 September 2024, through this Constitutional Court Decision, the abduction of a child by one of the biological parents, when the parent does not have custody based on a final court decision, is reaffirmed as a criminal offence.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION

Facts

On 15 November 2023, five single mothers (Petitioners) whose children have been abducted by their ex-husbands submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court on 11 October 2023, challenging Article 330 (1) of the Indonesian Criminal Code, which states, “Anyone who, with deliberate intent, removes a minor from the authority which in accordance with the laws is assigned to him, or from the supervision of a person authorised to do so, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of seven years.”

The Petitioners shared a common experience: after divorcing their husbands, they were granted custody of their children through a court ruling. However, they have been deprived of this right because their ex-husband abducted their child.

The Petitioners also asserted that they had reported the ex-husband’s actions to the police under Article 330 (1) of the Criminal Code. However, in practice, the report was either dismissed or considered invalid because the police were of the view that the person who abducted the child was the biological father himself and, therefore, could not be prosecuted.

Given this background, the Petitioners believe that the phrase “anyone” (“barang siapa” in Indonesian) in Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code could be interpreted to mean that the biological father or mother of a child cannot be held accountable for the accusation of abducting their own child. Therefore, they submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court requesting a judicial review of Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Petitioners argue that the phrase “anyone” in Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code should encompass all individuals, including the child’s biological father or mother, as a legal subject. There should be no exceptions that grant absolute authority to the father or mother and exclude him or her from any legal action if he or she violates the child’s rights. Protecting children’s rights is a fundamental aspect of human rights, and the state has a responsibility to provide protection, oversight, and law enforcement to promote children’s welfare. Consequently, the state has the authority to act against parents who violate children’s rights.

Furthermore, the Petitioners request the Constitutional Court to declare that the phrase “anyone” in Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code, which was derived from the Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Staatsblad 1915 Number 732), and later enacted under Law Number 1 of 1946 on the Criminal Code in conjunction with Law Number 73 of 1958 on the Entry into Force of Law No. 1 of 1946 on the Criminal Code for the Entire Territory of the Republic of Indonesia, is unconstitutional, insofar as it is not interpreted to mean “anyone, without exception the biological father or mother of the child.”

The Decision

The Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 140/PUU-XXI/2023, which consists of nine Constitutional Judges, rejected the Petitioners’ request in its entirety.

The Constitutional Court Judges believe that Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code is an explicit and well-defined provision (expressive verbis), so there is no need to interpret it or add any supplementary meaning to it. The Judges asserted that the phrase “anyone” encompasses every individual without exception, including the biological father or mother of the child. The Court also noted that adding a new meaning to Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code, as requested by the Petitioners, could potentially restrict the scope of the legal subjects covered by that provision and other provisions in the Criminal Code that use the phrase “anyone”. This could result in legal uncertainty, according to the Judges.

In its legal deliberation, the Constitutional Court Judges referred to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), to which Indonesia is a state party, and its provisions are incorporated into Law Number 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, as amended by Law Number 35 of 2014 (Law on Child Protection). Furthermore, the Law on Child Protection recognises that the best interests of the child, as stipulated in the UNCRC, are a fundamental principle for child protection. According to the Official Elucidation of Law on Child Protection, the best interests of the child mean that, in all actions concerning children undertaken by the government, society, legislative bodies, and judiciary, the child’s best interest must be the primary consideration.

In cases of parental child abduction, aside from the child being the victim, the Constitutional Court recognises that the parent, who is forcibly separated from their child by the other parent, can also become a victim, particularly on a psychological level. This indicates that the psychological bond between parents and their biological children should not be severed, emphasising that the child’s best interests must take precedence. In this context, the Constitutional Court Judges emphasise that criminalising one of the child’s biological parents who breaches the provisions of Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code should only be considered as a last resort (ultimum remedium).

In another part of its Decision, the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of the Petitioners whose reports were rejected by the police. The Constitutional Court Judges stated that they had no authority to assess this matter. However, they affirmed in the Decision that law enforcement officers, especially police investigators, should have no hesitation in accepting any report concerning the application of Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code, even if it involves the child’s biological parents. This is because the term “anyone” includes every individual without exception, including, in this case, the child’s biological father and mother.

The Constitutional Court concluded that Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code provides legal protection for children and ensures fair legal certainty as outlined in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, the Court states that the Petitioners’ request is rejected in its entirety.

Dissenting Opinion

The nine Constitutional Judges did not reach a unanimous decision. Judge Guntur Hamzah expressed his dissenting opinion, arguing that the Constitutional Court should have partially granted the Petitioners’ request.

Judge Hamzah views the Petitioners’ case as also involving the enforcement of a norm that breaches the principles of justice, the constitution, and human rights. Due to numerous cases of parental child abduction, often committed by biological fathers, Judge Hamzah believes it is appropriate for the Constitutional Court to act as the defender of citizens’ constitutional rights in this matter. This aims to safeguard the constitutional rights of biological mothers who hold custody, whether naturally or legally granted by the court, from acts of child abduction or forced removal by biological fathers. It not only ensures legal certainty but also offers reassurance to both the child and the parent who holds the legal custody rights.

Judge Hamzah is of the opinion that the Constitutional Court should have partially granted the Petitioners’ request by inserting the phrase “including the biological father/mother” into Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code. This would have made Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code to read, “Anyone who, with deliberate intent, removes a minor from the authority which in accordance with the laws is assigned to him, including his biological father/mother, or from the supervision of a person authorised to do so, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of seven years.”

REMARKS

It is worth noting that Law Number 1 of 2023 on the Criminal Code (New Criminal Code) was approved by the Indonesian House of Representatives on 2 January 2023. The New Criminal Code will come into effect on 2 January 2026. There are no significant changes regarding the concept of child abduction in the New Criminal Code. Article 452(1) of the New Criminal Code is equivalent to Article 330(1) of the current Criminal Code. Article 452(1) of the New Criminal Code states: “Every person who removes a Child from the authority which in accordance with the statutory regulations is assigned to him or from the supervision of a person authorised to do so, shall be punished by a maximum imprisonment of 6 (six) years or a maximum fine of category IV.”

It is quite unfortunate that there has been no shift in the perspective towards parental child abduction cases in Indonesia. In early 2023, Indonesian lawmakers, as indicated in Article 452(1) of the New Criminal Code, still regard parental child abduction cases primarily from a criminal perspective. This stance is later reaffirmed in 2024 by the Court, as stated in the Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-XXI/2023.

Although the Constitutional Court Judges, in their Decision, recognise the psychological bond between parents and the child as part of the child’s best interests and acknowledge that criminalising a parent over child abduction is a last resort, parental child abduction is still viewed from a criminal perspective. Consequently, this Constitutional Court Decision does not provide an effective solution. The five petitioners remain unable to access their abducted children because they do not know their children’s whereabouts or how to contact them.

The Constitutional Court Judges also hold conflicting views in their deliberations. On one hand, they acknowledge that the psychological bond between parents and a child must be prioritised as part of the child’s best interests. On the other hand, they affirm the provision of Article 330(1) of the Criminal Code, which permits the criminalisation and imprisonment of the parent who commits child abduction, albeit as a last resort. It seems that the judges overlooked the possibility that criminalising and imprisoning the parent involved in child abduction could also harm the child’s best interests, as it would deprive the child of access to that parent.

It is also regrettable that none of the Judges or the expert witnesses involved in the proceedings mentioned the HCCH 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention), which provides a perspective on parental child abduction from its civil aspects. Consequently, the procedures for returning the wrongfully removed child to their habitual residence—while safeguarding access rights and prioritising the child’s best interests as stipulated by the Convention—remain unfamiliar and unexplored in Indonesia.

The Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-XXI/2023, which considers parental child abduction from its criminal aspect, reveals a legal gap in Indonesian law that can only be filled in by the HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention. The Convention could serve as an instrument providing civil measures in cases of parental child abduction in Indonesia and promote a more effective resolution by ensuring the child’s prompt return without depriving access to either parent. In other words, Indonesia’s accession to the Convention has become more urgent to ensure that the child’s best interests, as recognised by Indonesian Law on Child Protection, are adequately protected.

Recognising that many adjustments within Indonesian laws and regulations will still be necessary, the Author of this article has long hoped that Indonesia will eventually accede to the HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention, hopefully sooner rather than later.

 

[1] Assistant professor in private international law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia.

On 18 September 2025, the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana will be hosting a conference on the occasion of the annual meeting of GEDIP, the European Group of Private International Law, due to take place in the following days (the latter meeting is only open the Group’s members). The event consists of […]

We are delighted to announce another addition to our Editorial Board: Elsabe Schoeman.

Elsabe has long been one of the leading scholars of private international law in South Africa, having authored countless publications in the areas of jurisdiction in cross-border commercial litigation and choice of law in contract, delict/tort and selected areas of family law, with a recent focus on access to justice for victims of human rights infringements and environmental torts. She has also advised a variety of law commissions and private law firms on these topics.

Elsabe has just left the office of Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria and will be focusing her work for the blog on legal developments in South Africa.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

In  SC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky & Ors [2025] EWHC 1987 (Ch), Trower J covers a lot of ground (2025 paras of ground).

At the time of the events with which these proceedings are concerned, claimant Privatbank (‘the Bank’) was Ukraine’s largest bank.  It was declared insolvent by the National Bank of Ukraine on 18 December 2016 and was nationalised over the course of the following days.  These proceedings have been brought by the Bank against two of its founding shareholders, first defendant Igor Kolomoisky and second defendant Gennadiy Bogolyubov (the ‘individual defendants’) and six companies (‘the corporate defendants) said to be owned or controlled by them seeking compensation for harm caused by what the Bank alleges to have been their participation in a fraudulent scheme carried out prior to nationalisation. The Bank also claims in unjust enrichment against a number of defendants.

Of relevance to the blog is the discussion of Article 10 (assimilated) Rome II on unjust enrichment, viz a number of restitution claims, and application of Article 26 Rome II on limitation periods and public policy.

Firstly, on Article 10 Rome II: the law applicable to the claim in unjust enrichment.

The Bank contends that its claims against the Corporate Defendants in unjust enrichment are governed by Ukrainian law per A10(2) and (4) Rome II. The Corporate Defendants contend that any claims against them in unjust enrichment are governed by Cypriot law and they rely on A10(2) Rome II.

For ease of digesting this post: Article 10 Rome II reads

1. If a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received, concerns a relationship existing between the parties, such as one arising out of a contract or a tort/delict, that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that relationship.

2. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of paragraph 1 and the parties have their habitual residence in the same country when the event giving rise to unjust enrichment occurs, the law of that country shall apply.

3. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of paragraphs 1 or 2, it shall be the law of the country in which the unjust enrichment took place.

4. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the law of that other country shall apply.

[1581] The language of A10 requires the court first to consider whether the non-contractual obligation concerns a relationship existing between the Bank and the Corporate Defendants, which is closely connected with the unjust  enrichment.  If it does, the law that governs that relationship must be applied unless A10(4) is engaged.  The Bank submitted that its restitutionary claim against the Corporate Defendants engaged A10(1) because it concerned the relationship arising out of its tortious claim under Ukrainian law against the Corporate Defendants.

[1583] Trower J follows Tear J in Banque Cantonale de Geneve v. Polevent:  it is insufficient that, after the tort had been committed, there was a relationship between victim and tortfeasor “with legal consequences”, to engage A10(1).

Pro memoria: Article 10(1) reads

“If a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received, concerns a relationship existing between the parties, such as one arising out of a contract or a tort/delict, that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that relationship”

A relationship “existing” between the parties, it is held, must be one that existed prior to the events giving rise to the claim.

A10(2) was not argued by the parties, nor in fact was A4. This leaves the question, first, of the identification of the country in which enrichment took place, and second, whether by application of A10(4), the laws of that country might be displaced by the laws of another country that is manifestly more closely connected to the non-contractual obligation.

On the first issue [1585]: the locus of the enrichment:

… the country in which the unjust enrichment took place for the purpose of determining the effect of Article 10(3).  There is no real dispute about this. The relevant country is Cyprus, because the Bank’s allegation is that the Corporate Defendants were enriched by acquiring property in the form of prepayments under the RSAs in circumstances in which they have never complied with their purported obligations under the RSAs or returned the Unreturned Prepayments.  It is therefore the Bank’s case that the enrichment comes from the acquisition of property in the form of money which occurred with the crediting of the Corporate Defendants’ accounts at the Cyprus branch of the Bank.

Here Trower J [1593] sides with the bank, not readily it seems but firmly nevertheless.

[1586-1587] the Bank’s arguments are outlined (these have a strong Universal Music echo – of course that case was jurisdictional, not applicable law):

[the Bank argues] the only relevant factor which connects the claim in unjust enrichment to Cyprus is the location of the Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts, which adds nothing because that is no more than the justification for applying Article 10(3) in the first place.  The Bank also submitted that Cyprus as a location was of no particular significance, because the Corporate Defendants could equally have had their accounts with another non-Ukrainian subsidiary of the Bank (e.g., in Latvia).  The only point which mattered was that the destination of the funds should be outside Ukraine.

More positively, Ukraine was said to be manifestly more closely connected to the restitutionary obligation than Cyprus, because the Corporate Defendants received the Unreturned Prepayments as part of a fraudulent scheme controlled by two Ukrainian oligarchs with the purpose and effect of misappropriating funds from a Ukrainian Bank.  The Bank also relied on the fact that the scheme was actually implemented by and with the involvement of a number of individuals, including people said to be the UBOs of the Corporate Defendants, who were based in Ukraine (…).  It also relied on the fact that the Corporate Defendants knew that the Unreturned Prepayments were funded by fraudulent loans from the Bank in Ukraine and the whole structure was designed to conceal breaches of Ukrainian currency control regulations.

[1588] are the defendants’ arguments:

it  could not possibly be said that the connections to Cyprus were not real and substantial.  The Corporate Defendants were not themselves Ukrainian (they were incorporated in England and the BVI) and they were managed by Cypriot professional directors; indeed it was the Bank’s own case that the Individual Defendants’ control of and influence over the Corporate Defendants was through Primecap, a Cypriot corporate services provider established by Cypriot lawyers.  [It was also argued] that Cyprus was the country in which the money which was the subject of the Bank’s claim continued to be located when it was transferred on by the Corporate Defendants.  Another factor which counted against a manifestly closer connection to Ukraine was that the prepayments were received by the Corporate Defendants in US$ rather than UAH.

Of note in the judge’s analysis (which of course kicks off [1589] with the observation that ‘all circumstances’ and ‘manifestly’ mandate a high bar for A10(4)) are

• [1589] the comparison is between countries, not laws: “the court’s task is to ascertain whether there is a country, which has a manifestly closer connection to the restitutionary obligation – i.e., the focus is on the country not the law.  In the present case, the exercise required by Article 10(4) is a comparison of the connection between the restitutionary obligation and Cyprus on the one hand and between the restitutionary obligation and Ukraine on the other.”
• [1590] “The comparison is between connections to Cyprus and connections to Ukraine.  Connections to third countries may go to show that not every factor apart from the place of receipt points inexorably to Ukraine, but if they do not point to Cyprus, their usefulness is limited”. (Unless of course, one assumes, if they were to point to a third country hence also its applicable law altogether, but that does not seem to be the case here).

I do not think this is correct. Those wishing to show that A10(3) is to be dislodged by application of A10(4), need to show that that the obligation in unjust enrichment, is manifestly more closely connected to another country, following from all circumstances of the case. Arguably the connections to third countries undermine the A10(4) analysis and therefore are most useful: even if they do not point to the A10(3) country. Of note in this context is that A10(3) is not the result of a most closely connected analysis: it is simply a vector introduced for predictability and certainty. I imagine this may have featured in permission to appeal.

• [1591]: control over Primecap’s activities was exercised by individuals in Ukraine, both generally and for the specific transactions concerned. “The connection to Cyprus is in fact and substance more limited than the place of its establishment and operations might otherwise indicate.  The enrichment occurred in Cyprus (a factor which will always of course be present where it said that Article 10(4) should displace the prima facie rule in Article 10(3)), but the expense was sustained by the Bank in the Ukraine.  I also think that, because steps which gave rise to an unjust enrichment were component parts of a fraud practised on a Ukrainian bank, structured in the way that it was to avoid Ukrainian currency control obligations, and closely interrelated to torts governed by Ukrainian law in which the loss was sustained in Ukraine, points to a very close connection to Ukraine.”

The finding in favour of engaging A10(4) comes despite what the judge [1592] called an argument “with real substance”: the DNA of the whole scheme:

“a transfer out of Ukraine, and (more importantly for the claim in unjust enrichment) a receipt by a recipient outside Ukraine, was an essential element of what all parties accept (for different reasons) was a loan recycling scheme intended to avoid Ukraine’s currency control regulations.  I agree that the fact that it was necessary for any enrichment to occur outside Ukraine, detracts from any connection between the restitutionary obligation and Ukraine, and makes it more difficult for the Bank to say that the connection to Ukraine is manifestly closer than Cyprus.”

All in all it is the ‘control’ element it seems which swayed the judge. If that finding stands, it would be useful eg in the Dyson claims.

Next, on the application of Article 26 Rome II on limitation periods and public policy.

The findings on A26 were made obiter [1995] ff, and with reference ia to the Court of Appeal in Begum v Maran: in essence, Trower J notes the very high bar for Article 26 and would have held that that bar has not been reached in casu.

If and when I hear of an appeal, I shall update.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, Chapter 4.

Consideration ia of A10 Rome II: law applicable to unjust enrichmentSC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky & Ors [2025] EWHC 1987 (Ch) http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH&#8230;

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-08-06T10:16:52.929Z

Vesna Lazic (Asser Institute, Utrecht University) has published an interesting case note on the complex case of CJEU Judgment C-394/22 Oilchart International NV v O.W. Bunker Nederland BV, ING Bank NV in Revue de Droit Commercial Belge. This case dealt with the interaction between the Brussels I-bis Regulation and the Insolvency Regulation. You can read it here: 2025 Note rdc_tbh2025_2p308 .

In this case, the Court held that:

Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, must be interpreted as not applying to an action brought in a Member State against a company seeking payment for goods delivered which does not mention either the insolvency proceedings opened previously against that company in another Member State or the fact that the claim was already declared in the insolvency estate.