Il volume n. 375 del Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye, uscito a Novembre 2015, comprende, fra gli altri, uno scritto di Ted M. de Boer intitolato Choice of Law in Arbitration Proceedings.
[Dal sito dell’editore] – Contrary to national courts, arbitral tribunals are not bound to local rules of private international law: there is no lex fori determining the choice-of-law issues that may be raised in arbitration proceedings. Arbitrators are thus faced with the problem of choosing (a) the law governing disputes on the existence and validity of arbitration agreements, (b) the law governing the merits of the case, and (c) the law governing the proceedings as such. Most of these problems could be solved by an express choice of law by the parties. However, apart from the question of whether such a choice is valid and permissible and which law applies to that issue, the principle of party autonomy is of no avail in the absence of a (valid) agreement on the applicable law. In this course, various solutions to the choice-of-law problems that may arise in arbitration proceedings are discussed and evaluated.
Ulteriori informazioni sull’intero volume, compresi gli indici degli articoli, sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.
Regular readers of the blog will know I do not easily stray from the legal menu. When I do, it has to be for something extraordinary. Master in the kitchen is just that, for it takes away all excuses not to spend time with family and friends preparing and enjoying great food produce. (Instead of just food products). Plus the site’s photography offers a lot of eye candy.
To all readers, Merry Christmas or alternative seasons’s greetings.
Geert.
Leuven Law is recruiting 2 full-time chairs, at professorial level (the actual grade in which the chair will be appointed will depend on candidates’ experience) in both EU institutional and constitutional law, and public international law. The latter is a joint appointment with Open University of The Netherlands.
Questions on the chairs can be put to the dean (see the chair notice) however as Head of the Department of International and EU law, I am happy to entertain queries, too: preferably after the Christmas break for there is no rush. Deadline for applications is 10 March, 2016.
Geert.
Jana Felicia Dickler, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Reform der EuGVVO – Standort Europa zwischen Stagnation und Fortschritt, Mohr Siebeck, 2015, ISBN 9783161539862, pp. 241, Euro 69.
[Dal sito dell’editore] Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ist die wohl bekannteste und auch wirtschaftlich bedeutendste Möglichkeit außergerichtlicher Konfliktbewältigung. Trotzdem bestehen in weiten Teilen Überschneidungsbereiche zur staatlichen Gerichtsbarkeit. Um als Standort Europa auch in Zukunft wettbewerbsfähig zu sein, müssen aus gesetzgeberischer Perspektive für diesen Bereich der alternativen zivilrechtlichen Streitbeilegung adäquate normative Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund beleuchtet Jana Dickler den über zehnjährigen Reformprozess, den das maßgebliche europäische Regelungsinstrument auf dem Gebiet zivilrechtlicher Verfahrenskoordinierung – die EuGVVO – durchlaufen hat, und bewertet das Ergebnis mit Blick auf die konfliktträchtigen Überschneidungsbereiche zwischen staatlicher und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit um auf dieser Grundlage einen eigenen Lösungsvorschlag zu entwickeln.
Per ulteriori informazioni si veda qui.
The CJEU (General Court) sided with Sweden in T-521/14, concerning the failure, by the Commission, to adopt measures concerning the specification of scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties.
To improve the free movement of biocidal products in the EU, while ensuring a high level of protection of human and animal health and the environment, the EU adopted Regulation 528/2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products. It sets out the active substances which, in principle, cannot be approved. They include active substances which, on the basis of criteria to be established, are regarded as having endocrine-disrupting properties which may be harmful to humans, or which have been designated as having those properties. It also provides that, by 13 December 2013 at the latest, the Commission was to adopt the delegated acts as regards the specification of the scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties.
The EC cited criticism following its presentation of draft scientific criteria, as well as the need to make the various possible solutions subject to an impact assessment. The CJEU first of all held that the Commission had a clear, precise and unconditional obligation to adopt delegated acts as regards the specification of the scientific criteria for the determination of the endocrine-disrupting properties and that that was to be done by 13 December 2013.
With respect to the impact assessment, the General Court finds that there is no provision of the regulation which requires such an impact analysis. What is more, even if the Commission ought to have carried out such an impact analysis, that does not in any way exonerate it, in the absence of provisions to that effect, from complying with the deadline set for the adoption of those delegated acts.
I like this judgment (it will no doubt be appealed by the EC). It reinforces the need to respect clearly defined dates and deadlines. And it takes a bit of the shine off impact assessments, the duration, extend, and lobbying of which can often lead to death by impact analysis.
Geert.
I have referred repeatedly in the past to an inevitable attraction which some find in harmonising private, incuding contract law, in the Member States. The Common European Sales Law (CESL) proposal is dead, and for good reason. Its demise however has not led to the European Commission leaving the path of harmonisation in contract law. The EC has now selected bits and pieces of the CESL approach which it reckons might pass Member States objections. The proposed ‘fully harmonised’ rules on e-commerce formally do not close the door on party autonomy in the contracts under their scope of application. Yet in forcing regulatory convergence top-down, the aim is to make choice of law for these contracts effectively nugatory.
The EC itself formulates it as follows (COM(2015)634, p.1:
“This initiative is composed of (i) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content (COM(2015)634 final), and (ii) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods (COM(2015)635 final). These two proposals draw on the experience acquired during the negotiations for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law. In particular, they no longer follow the approach of an optional regime and a comprehensive set of rules. Instead, the proposals contain a targeted and focused set of fully harmonised rules.”
Consequently the same proposal reads in recital 49 ‘Nothing in this Directive should prejudice the application of the rules of private international law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council‘: that is, respectively, Rome I and Brussels I Recast’.
Consequently and gradually, choice of law for digital B2C contracts becomes redundant, for the content of national law converges. Support for this in my view is not rooted in fact (the EC’s data on the need for regulation have not fundamentally changed since its doomed CESL proposal), neither is it a good development even for the consumer. National consumer law is able to adapt, often precisely to the benefit of the consumer, through national Statute and case-law. Turning the EU regulatory tanker is much more cumbersome. The circular economy, recently often debated, is a case in point. Many national authorities point to limitations in contract law (incuding warranty periods and design requirements) as an obstacle to forcing manufacturers, including for consumer goods, to adopt more sustainable manufacturing and distribution models. The EC’s current proposals do no meet those challenges, rather, they obstruct them.
Geert.
On 4 February 2016, the University Jean Moulin Lyon 3 will host a workshop on Global Phenomena and Social Sciences.
The event will feature five panels, which will address the topic, respectively, from the point of view of politics, business, economics, anthropology and law.
Among the speakers of the latter panel, Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (Univ. Jean Moulin Lyon 3) will talk of Border Crossing Phenomenon and the Law.
Further information in the flier of the initiative.
In Florin Lazar, a judgment rendered on 10 December 2015 (C-350/14), the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).
Pursuant to this provision, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is “the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.
The case concerned a traffic accident occurred in Italy, which resulted in the death of a woman. Some close relatives of the victim, not directly involved in the crash, had brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.
In these circumstances, the issue arose of whether, in order to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence” of the event, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.
In its judgment, the Court held that the damage related to the death of a person in an accident which took place in the Member State of the court seised and sustained by the close relatives of that person who reside in another Member State must be classified as “indirect consequences” of that accident, within the meaning of Article 4(1).
To reach this conclusion, the ECJ began by observing that, according to Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation, “damage shall cover any consequence arising out of tort/delict”. The Court added that, as stated in Recital 16, the uniform conflict-of-laws provisions laid down in the Regulation purport to “enhance the foreseeability of court decisions” and to “ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage”, and that “a connection with the country where the direct damage occurred … strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage”.
The Court also noted that Recital 17 of the Regulation makes clear that “in cases of personal injury or damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged respectively”.
It follows that, where it is possible to identify the occurrence of direct damage, the place where the direct damage occurred is the relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law, regardless of the indirect consequences of the tort. In the case of a road traffic accident, the damage is constituted by the injuries suffered by the direct victim, while the damage sustained by the close relatives of the latter must be regarded as indirect consequences of the accident.
In the Court’s view, this interpretation is confirmed by Article 15(f) of the Regulation which confers on the applicable law the task of determining which are the persons entitled to claim damages, including, as the case may be, the close relatives of the victim.
Having regard to the travaux préparatoires of the Regulation, the ECJ asserted that the law specified by the provisions of the Regulation also determines the persons entitled to compensation for damage they have sustained personally. That concept covers, in particular, whether a person other than the direct victim may obtain compensation “by ricochet”, following damage sustained by the victim. That damage may be psychological, for example, the suffering caused by the death of a close relative, or financial, sustained for example by the children or spouse of a deceased person.
This reading, the Court added, contributes to the objective set out in Recital 16 to ensure the foreseeability of the applicable law, while avoiding the risk that the tort or delict is broken up in to several elements, each subject to a different law according to the places where the persons other than the direct victim have sustained a damage.
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