Droit international général

Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR, vol. I, Brüssel Ia-VO, 4a ed., Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 2015, pp. 1456, ISBN 9783504472023, Euro 249.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Rechtzeitig zum Inkrafttreten 2015 wird in Band I der 4. Auflage des Großkommentars EuZPR/EuIPR die reformierte Fassung der Brüssel I-Verordnung, die Brüssel Ia-Verordnung, mit den wichtigen Neuerungen kommentiert. So finden Sie z.B. alles zu den erheblichen Änderungen im Verfahren der Vollstreckung von ausländischen Zivilurteilen, zu dem Recht der parallelen Rechtshängigkeit sowie zu den Möglichkeiten der signifikant gestärkten Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen. Das Lugano-Übereinkommmen 2007, das erst die Anpassung an die bisherige Verordnung vollzieht, weicht damit bereits wieder deutlich vom EU-Instrument ab und wird in diesen wesentlichen Abweichungen behandelt.

Maggiori informazioni sul volume, che ha per autori Stefan Leible, Peter Mankowski, Ansgar Staudinger e Steffen Pabst, sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

At the Institute for Foreign and Private International Law of the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany), a vacancy has to be filled at the chair for private law, private international law and comparative law (chairholder: Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein), from 1 January, 2016 with

a legal research assistant (salary scale E 13 TV-L, personnel quota 50%)
limited for 2 years.

The assistant is supposed to support the organizational and educational work of the chairholder, to participate in research projects of the chair as well as to teach his or her own courses (students’ exercise). Applicants are offered the opportunity to obtain a doctorate.

Applicants are expected to be interested in the chair’s main areas of research. They should possess an above-average German First State Examination (at least “vollbefriedigend”) or a foreign equivalent degree and be fluent in German. In addition, a thorough knowledge of German civil law as well as conflict of laws, comparative law and/or international procedural law is a necessity. Severely handicapped persons will be preferred provided that their qualification is equal.

Please send your application (curriculum vitae, certificates and, if available, further proofs of talent) to Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Abt. III, Peterhof, Niemensstr. 10, D-79098 Freiburg (Germany) no later than 30 November, 2015.

As the application documents will not be returned, applicants are kindly requested to submit only unauthenticated copies. Alternatively, the documents may be sent as a pdf-file via e-mail to ipr3@jura.uni-freiburg.de.

“These general terms and conditions will be governed by and construed in accordance with English law. 

With respect to any suit, action or proceedings relating to these general terms and conditions each party irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the English courts.”

In Anchorage, the High Court had already dismissed a semantic approach to choice of court agreements in contracts (and choice of court clauses) subject to English law. In Global Maritime Investments Cyprus v O.W., Teare J considered in summary judgment, sought by GMI, whether the aforementioned clause is exclusive, and if not, whether proceedings commenced by GMI in England, block any future proceedings on the same (or wider) contractual issues sought by OW in Denmark. GMI had started proceedings in England following OW’s November 2014 filing for bankruptcy in Denmark. OW had initiated proceedings in Denmark in March 2015. At issue was among others the ‘netting-out’ provisions between parties (effectively, a final settlement of reciprocal dues in different currencies, with derivatives of commodity transactions being the underlying transactions between the parties in this case).

Teare J held that the clause even if not so phrased verbatim, was meant to be exclusive, among others in line with what ‘the reasonable commercial man’ (the bonus mercator, if you like) would have understood the clause to be, especially under the lex contractus, English law. All the more so in light of the use of ‘irrevocably’. At 51 he does offer sound commercial advice to avoid disputes such as the one at issue: it is desirable to employ transitive language, such as in ‘each party agrees to submit all claims’.

I do not think there is justification for the Court not to have considered the impact of the Brussels I (and /or Recast) Regulation on the clause: the judgment keeps entirely shtum about it. Under the rules of the Regulation, all clauses are considered exclusive unless specifically stated. Saying that the clause expressis verbis amounts to non-exclusivity, would be quite a stretch. (I agree it is not clearly worded exclusively – however that is exactly where the Brussels I Regulation is of assistance).

It is quite clear to me that this judgment (issued 17 August – I have delayed reporting for exam reasons) will not be the end of the jurisdictional affair. In particular, parties I am sure will be at loggerheads as to what litigation is to be considered ‘relating to these general terms and conditions’, in particular with OW’s insolvency proceedings in the background.

Geert.

Matthias Lehmann, University of Bonn, has posted ‘Recognition as a Substitute for Conflict of Laws?’, a chapter in a forthcoming book on ‘General Principles of European Private International Law’ (Stefan Leible, ed.), on SSRN. The piece weighs a whole spectre of arguments for and against an EU version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the US constitution. It summarizes over a decade scholarly debate in Europe, fuelled by of ECJ decisions and Commission proposals. In the end, Lehmann rejects a general rule of recognition with regard to ‘legal situations’ created in other Member States. Yet he favours obliging authorities and courts to recognise such situations where they are recorded in official documents or public registers, provided that appropriate conditions and safeguards are in place. Among the latter is a sufficient connection between the legal situation and the Member State of origin of the document or register entry as well as a well-defined public policy exception. Lehmann concludes that recognition will not replace conflict of laws, but may be a welcome second pillar for achieving harmonious solutions in a judicial area with rising mobility of its citizens. He therefore encourages the European Commission to pursue his ambitious idea of introducing a rule of recognition into EU law.

The piece can be downloaded here.

Zheng Sophia Tang, Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Hart Publishing, 2015, ISBN 9781849466912, pp. 432, GBP 65.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – The second edition of this highly recommended work addresses the interaction between conflict of laws, electronic commerce and consumer contracts. In addition it identifies specific difficulties that conflicts lawyers and consumer lawyers encounter in electronic commerce and proposes original approaches to balance the conflict of interest between consumers’ access to justice and business efficiency. The European Union has played a leading role in this area of law and its initiatives are fully explored. It pays particular attention to the most recent development in collective redress and alternative/online dispute resolution. By adopting multiple research methods, including a comparative study of the EU/US approach; historical analysis of protective conflict of laws; doctrinal analysis of legal provisions and economic analysis of law to provide, it provides the most comprehensive examination of frameworks in cross-border consumer contracts.

Maggiori informazioni sono reperibili qui.

As a follow up to my post on the 25th Meeting of the GEDIP in Luxembourg I would like to add now the final document containing the Declaration on the Legal Status of Applicants for International Protection from Third Countries to the European Union, which Prof. van Loon has very kindly provided.

DECLARATION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF APPLICANTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FROM THIRD COUNTRIES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

 THE EUROPEAN GROUP FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

At its Twenty-fifth meeting held in Luxembourg, from 18 to 20 September 2015,

Considering that the current influx of applicants for international protection, among other migrants, from third countries to the European Union and their presence – even of a temporary character – in the Member States gives rise to urgent and important questions concerning their legal status, including in civil law, and requires that special attention be given to the clarification, and consistency across the European Union, of this status;

Recalling that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice of the European Union covers both policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters;

Considering that it is crucial that the measures to be taken meet both the immediate and future challenges arising from the influx of migrants from third countries;

Recalling, in particular:

– the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the United Nations Convention of 20 November 1989 on the Rights of the Child, and the United Nations Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol of 31 January 1967, all of which apply across the European Union,

– the Directives of the European Parliament and Council 2011/95/EU, 2013/32 and 2013/33/EU as well as Council Directive 2001/55/EC [1],

– Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of the Council [2] and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children of 19 October 1996[3] and on the Protection of Adults of 13 January 2000 [4] ;

CALLS ON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ON THE MEMBER STATES

1. TO ENSURE

Recording and recognition of facts and documents relating to civil status

– a) regarding any national of a third country and any stateless person present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union having presented an application for recognition of refugee status or granting of subsidiary protection status, or having obtained such status, registration as soon as possible – even provisionally – of the important facts relating to their personal status, such as births, marriages and deaths, as well as recognition of these records and documents relating thereto within the European Union;

Exercise of jurisdiction by national authorities to take measures of protection in civil matters

– b) regarding any child, especially when unaccompanied or separated from his or her parents, and any vulnerable adult, seeking or having obtained international protection, the exercise by the authorities of the Member State on whose territory that person is present of their jurisdiction to take measures of protection in civil matters whenever his or her situation so requires;

Refugee status, subsidiary protection status and provisional residence permits

– c) the coordination and mutual recognition, to the extent possible, of decisions on the recognition of refugee status, the granting of subsidiary protection status as well as the granting of provisional residence permits to applicants for international protection.

2. TO TAKE INITIATIVES WITH A VIEW

 Promotion of the instruments of private international law relating to personal status

 – a) to promoting the universal ratification of instruments of private international law aimed at ensuring legal certainty and mutual recognition of personal status, including the Hague Convention on Protection of Children (1996) [5] .

Common ratification of existing instruments and enhancing their effectiveness

 – b) to considering the possibility of signing and ratifying existing instruments at the global level, adopted by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, that may contribute to establishing a coherent global legal framework for migration, including of workers and their families, and the possibility of strengthening coordination and cooperation among States needed for the effective implementation of these instruments.

 Footnotes

[1] Directives 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals and stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), and 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). These directives apply across the European Union with the exception of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ireland and the United Kingdom are nevertheless bound by the preceding versions (2004/83/EC, 2008/85/EC and 2003/9/EC) of these directives. In respect of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, it is to be noted that no decision has (yet) been taken by the Council to make the directive applicable by a decision establishing “the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons” as foreseen in Article 5.

[2] Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of the Council of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 (“Regulation Brussels II A”). This Regulation applies across the European Union with the exception of Denmark.

[3] Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. This Convention applies across the European Union (for Italy as of 1 January 2016).

[4] Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults. This Convention is applicable in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Scotland only), and has been signed by Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. Outside of the European Union the Convention is applicable in Switzerland.

 [5] Currently this Convention, outside of the European Union, is applicable only in the following States: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Ecuador, Georgia, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uruguay. The Convention has been signed by Argentina and the United States

Si terrà a Milano il 30 ottobre 2015, nel quadro delle iniziative promosse per celebrare la Giornata europea della giustizia civile, un convegno dal titolo La tutela del credito e la cooperazione giudiziaria in Europa (su altre iniziative legate alla dodicesima edizione della Giornata europea, si veda questo post).

L’evento, organizzato dalla Scuola Superiore della Magistratura – Struttura territoriale di formazione decentrata del Distretto di Milano, dall’Ordine degli Avvocati di Milano e dall’Associazione dei laureati in Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Milano, coinvolgerà, fra gli altri, Roberta Clerici, Alberto Malatesta, Manlio Frigo, Luigi Fumagalli e Lidia Sandrini (tutti Univ. Milano).

Fra gli argomenti oggetto dell’incontro, si segnalano la circolazione delle sentenze nello spazio giudiziario europeo secondo il regolamento Bruxelles I bis, l’ingiunzione di pagamento europea, la cooperazione fra autorità di Stati membri diversi nell’assunzione di prove e l’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo di conti bancari, istituita dal regolamento n. 655/2014.

Per maggiori informazioni, compreso il programma, si veda qui.

This post has been written by Eva De Götzen.

On 10 September 2015, the ECJ delivered its judgment in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie (C-47/14), a case concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).

More specifically, the case involved the interpretation of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of the Regulation, which provide, respectively, for special heads of jurisdiction over contractual matters and matters relating to a tort or delict, as well as the interpretation of the rules laid down in Section 5 of Chapter II (Articles 18 to 21), on employment matters. The said provisions correspond, today, to Articles 7(1) and (2) and Articles 20 to 23 of Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (Brussels Ia Regulation).

The request for a preliminary ruling arose from a dispute involving a German national resident in Germany, Mr Spies von Büllesheim, who had entered a Dutch company’s service as a managing director, in addition to being a shareholder of that company. He had also been involved in the managing of three German subsidiaries of the company, for which he served as a director and an authorised agent.

The company brought a declaratory action and an action for damages in the Netherlands against Mr Spies von Büllesheim, claiming that he had performed his duties as director improperly, that he had acted unlawfully and that, aside from his capacity as a director, he had acted deceitfully or recklessly in the performance of the contract of employment under which the company had hired him as a managing director.

The Dutch lower courts seised of the matter took the view that they lacked jurisdiction either under Article 18(1) and Article 20(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, since the domicile of the defendant was outside the Netherlands, or under Article 5(1)(a), to be read in conjunction with Article 5(3).

When the case was brought before the Dutch Supreme Court, the latter referred three questions to the ECJ.

The first question was whether the special rules of jurisdiction for employment matters laid down in Regulation No 44/2001 preclude the application of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 5(3) of the same Regulation in a case where the claimant company alleges that the defendant is liable not only in his capacity as the managing director and employee of the company under a contract of employment, but also in his capacity as a director of that company and/or in tort.

The ECJ observed in this respect that one must ascertain, at the outset, whether the defendant could be considered to be bound to the company by an “individual contract of employment”. This would in fact make him a “worker” for the purposes of Article 18 of Regulation No 44/2001 and trigger the application of the rules on employment matters set forth in Section 5 of Chapter II, irrespective of whether the parties could also be tied by a relationship based on company law.

Relying on its case law, the ECJ found that the defendant performed services for and under the direction of the claimant company, in return for which he received remuneration, and that he was bound to that company by a lasting bond which brought him to some extent within the organisational framework of the business of the latter. In these circumstances, the provisions of Section 5  would in principle apply to the case, thereby precluding the application of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3).

The ECJ conceded, however, that if the defendant, in his capacity as a shareholder in the claimant company, was in a position to influence the decisions of the company’s administrative body, then no relationship of subordination would exist, and the characterisation of the matter for the purposes of jurisdiction would accordingly be different.

The second question raised by the Hoge Raad was whether Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation applies to a case where a company director, not bound by an employment relationship with the company in question, allegedly failed to perform his duties under company law.

The ECJ noted that, generally speaking, the legal relationship between a director and his company is contractual in nature for the purposes of Article 5(1), since it involves obligations that the parties have freely undertaken. More precisely, a relationship of this kind should be classified as a “provision of services” within the meaning of the second indent of Article 5(1)(b). Jurisdiction will accordingly lie, pursuant to the latter provision, with the court for the place where the director carried out his activity.

To identify this place, one might need to determine, as indicated in Wood Floor Solutions, where the services have been provided for the most part, based on the provisions of the contract. In the absence of any derogating stipulation in any other document (namely, in the articles of association of the company), the relevant place, for these purposes, is the place where the director in fact, for the most part, carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ agreed intentions.

Finally, inasmuch as national law makes it possible to base a claim by the company against its former manager simultaneously on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, the ECJ, answering the third question raised by the Hoge Raad, stated that such a claim may come under “tort, delict or quasi-delict” for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation whenever the alleged conduct does not concern the legal relationship of a contractual nature between the company and the manager.

The ECJ recalled in this connection that the Regulation, by referring to “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”, intends to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Insofar as the place of the event giving rise to the damage is concerned, reference should be made to the place where the director carried out his duties as a manager of the relevant company. For its part, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the damage alleged by the company actually manifests itself, regardless of the place where the adverse consequences may be felt of an event which has already caused a damage elsewhere.

This post has been written by Eva De Götzen.

On 10 September 2015, the ECJ delivered its judgment in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie (C-47/14), a case concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).

More specifically, the case involved the interpretation of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of the Regulation, which provide, respectively, for special heads of jurisdiction over contractual matters and matters relating to a tort or delict, as well as the interpretation of the rules laid down in Section 5 of Chapter II (Articles 18 to 21), on employment matters. The said provisions correspond, today, to Articles 7(1) and (2) and Articles 20 to 23 of Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (Brussels Ia Regulation).

The request for a preliminary ruling arose from a dispute involving a German national resident in Germany, Mr Spies von Büllesheim, who had entered a Dutch company’s service as a managing director, in addition to being a shareholder of that company. He had also been involved in the managing of three German subsidiaries of the company, for which he served as a director and an authorised agent.

The company brought a declaratory action and an action for damages in the Netherlands against Mr Spies von Büllesheim, claiming that he had performed his duties as director improperly, that he had acted unlawfully and that, aside from his capacity as a director, he had acted deceitfully or recklessly in the performance of the contract of employment under which the company had hired him as a managing director.

The Dutch lower courts seised of the matter took the view that they lacked jurisdiction either under Article 18(1) and Article 20(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, since the domicile of the defendant was outside the Netherlands, or under Article 5(1)(a), to be read in conjunction with Article 5(3).

When the case was brought before the Dutch Supreme Court, the latter referred three questions to the ECJ.

The first question was whether the special rules of jurisdiction for employment matters laid down in Regulation No 44/2001 preclude the application of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 5(3) of the same Regulation in a case where the claimant company alleges that the defendant is liable not only in his capacity as the managing director and employee of the company under a contract of employment, but also in his capacity as a director of that company and/or in tort.

The ECJ observed in this respect that one must ascertain, at the outset, whether the defendant could be considered to be bound to the company by an “individual contract of employment”. This would in fact make him a “worker” for the purposes of Article 18 of Regulation No 44/2001 and trigger the application of the rules on employment matters set forth in Section 5 of Chapter II, irrespective of whether the parties could also be tied by a relationship based on company law.

Relying on its case law, the ECJ found that the defendant performed services for and under the direction of the claimant company, in return for which he received remuneration, and that he was bound to that company by a lasting bond which brought him to some extent within the organisational framework of the business of the latter. In these circumstances, the provisions of Section 5  would in principle apply to the case, thereby precluding the application of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3).

The ECJ conceded, however, that if the defendant, in his capacity as a shareholder in the claimant company, was in a position to influence the decisions of the company’s administrative body, then no relationship of subordination would exist, and the characterisation of the matter for the purposes of jurisdiction would accordingly be different.

The second question raised by the Hoge Raad was whether Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation applies to a case where a company director, not bound by an employment relationship with the company in question, allegedly failed to perform his duties under company law.

The ECJ noted that, generally speaking, the legal relationship between a director and his company is contractual in nature for the purposes of Article 5(1), since it involves obligations that the parties have freely undertaken. More precisely, a relationship of this kind should be classified as a “provision of services” within the meaning of the second indent of Article 5(1)(b). Jurisdiction will accordingly lie, pursuant to the latter provision, with the court for the place where the director carried out his activity.

To identify this place, one might need to determine, as indicated in Wood Floor Solutions, where the services have been provided for the most part, based on the provisions of the contract. In the absence of any derogating stipulation in any other document (namely, in the articles of association of the company), the relevant place, for these purposes, is the place where the director in fact, for the most part, carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ agreed intentions.

Finally, inasmuch as national law makes it possible to base a claim by the company against its former manager simultaneously on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, the ECJ, answering the third question raised by the Hoge Raad, stated that such a claim may come under “tort, delict or quasi-delict” for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation whenever the alleged conduct does not concern the legal relationship of a contractual nature between the company and the manager.

The ECJ recalled in this connection that the Regulation, by referring to “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”, intends to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Insofar as the place of the event giving rise to the damage is concerned, reference should be made to the place where the director carried out his duties as a manager of the relevant company. For its part, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the damage alleged by the company actually manifests itself, regardless of the place where the adverse consequences may be felt of an event which has already caused a damage elsewhere.

The third issue of 2015 of the Dutch Journal on Private international Law, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, contains contributions on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, financial losses under the Brussels I Regulation, Recognition of Dutch insolvency orders in Switzerland, and Indonesian Private International Law.

Marta Pertegás, ‘Guest Editorial: Feeling the heat of disputes and finding the shade of forum selection’, p. 375-376.

Tomas Arons, ‘Case Note: On financial losses, prospectuses, liability, jurisdiction (clauses) and applicable law. European Court of Justice 28 January 2015, Case C-375/13 (Kolassa/Barclays Bank)’, p. 377-382.

The difficult question of where financial losses are directly sustained has been (partly) solved by the European Court of Justice on 28 January 2015. In Kolassa the ECJ ruled that an investor suffers direct financial losses as a result of corporate misinformation (i.e. misleading information published by a company issuing (traded) shares or bonds) in the place where he holds his securities account. The impact of this ruling is not limited to the question of international jurisdiction. The Rome II Regulation prescribes that the law applicable to tort claims is the law of the country in which the direct losses are sustained. The second part deals with the question whether an investor can be bound by an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the prospectus or other investor information document. In the near future the ECJ will rule on this matter in the Profit Investment SIM case. [free sample]

Raphael Brunner, ‘Latest Legal Practice: Switzerland discovers the Netherlands on the international insolvency map’, p. 383-389.

By a decision of March 27, 2015 the Swiss Federal Court ruled for the first time in a leading case that the Swiss Courts have to recognize Dutch insolvency orders. It is astonishing that up until now Dutch insolvency orders have not been recognised by the Swiss Courts and hence Dutch insolvency estates and liquidators or trustees (hereafter referred to as liquidators) neither had access to the assets of a Dutch insolvency estate in Switzerland nor to the jurisdiction of the Swiss Courts. The reason for this is that the private international laws of Switzerland and the Netherlands pursue completely different approaches in international insolvency matters. The new decision by the Swiss Federal Court is interesting both from a (theoretical) perspective of private international law as well as from the (practical) perspective of a Dutch liquidator of a Dutch insolvency estate having assets in Switzerland or claims against debtors in Switzerland.

Tiurma Allagan, ‘Foreign PIL – Developments in Indonesia: The Bill on Indonesian Private International Law’, p. 390-403.

This article discusses the background and contents of the proposal for an Indonesian Private International Law Act that was issued in November 2014.

If you are interested in contributing to this journal please contact the editorial manager Ms Wilma Wildeman  at w.wildeman@asser.nl.

Il 7 novembre 2015, l’Università di Messina ospiterà un convegno dedicato a La protezione dei dati personali e informatici nell’era della sorveglianza globale. 

La giornata di studi sarà articolata in due sessioni, una delle quali dedicata ai profili di diritto internazionale privato. La sessione sarà presieduta e moderata da Nerina Boschiero (Univ. Statale di Milano) ed ospiterà le relazioni di Paolo Bertoli (Univ. Insubria), Livio Scaffidi Runchella e Marcella Distefano (entrambi Univ. Messina).

Il programma completo ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Two weeks ago I had the pleasure of announcing the publication of the new edition of the EU-Zivilprozessrecht: EuZPR, authored by Prof. Schlosser and Hess. The Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg has decided to combine the launching of the book with a seminar entitled “The Departure of the European Law of Civil Procedure”, to take place next  November 11, at the MPI premises in Luxembourg. The seminar will count with the presence of Prof. Schlosser himself; other prominent speakers will be Judge Marko Ileši? (CJEU) and Prof. Jörg Pirrung. To download the full programme of the event click here.

The seminar starts at 4 pm and will be followed by a reception. It is open to all  those willing to attend upon registration (contact person: secretariat-prof.hess@mpi.lu).

How exactly is the EU bound by public international law? What is the justiciability of acts of foreign sovereign nations in EU courts? To what extent can an individual rely on customary or other sources of public international law, in national courts or at the CJEU?  All of these questions often puzzle non-lawyers (if something is illegal due to a higher rule, how can the lower rule still be in existence) and lawyers alike. At the EU level, things are complicated due to the hybrid (OK: sui generis) nature of the EU, and its complicated relationship with international law.

In Western Sahara Campaign UK, claimant is an independent voluntary organisation founded in 1984 with the aim of supporting the recognition of the right of the Saharawi people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence and to raise awareness of the unlawful occupation of the Western Sahara. Defendants are the Inland Revenue, challenged for the preferential tariff given on import to the UK of goods that are classified as being of Moroccan origin but in fact originate from the territory of Western Sahara. The second challenge is brought against the Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in respect of the intended application of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement to policy formation relating to fishing in the territorial waters of Western Sahara.

Essentially, it is claimed that defendants ought not to apply the relevant European agreements for these are, arguably, in violation of public international law. Claimant contends that Morocco has annexed the territory of Western Sahara and claims it as part of its sovereign territory despite decisions of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the people of Western Sahara have the right to self-determination. Accordingly it is said that Morocco’s occupation is in breach of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Under EU law, only the CJEU can establish the invalidity of EU law. Blake J decided to send the case to Luxembourg for preliminary review. Defendants opposed such reference primarily because they submit that the issues raised by the claimant are matters of public international law that the CJEU will decline to adjudicate on in the present circumstances. Precedent which they relied on is not unequivocal, however. This case therefore will be an opportunity for the CJEU (Grand Chamber, one would imagine) to clarify the relationship between EU and public international law.

Geert.

Sandra Mantu, Contingent Citizenship. The Law and Practice of Citizenship Deprivation in International, European and National Perspectives, Brill, 2015, ISBN: 9789004292994, pp. 388, 155 Euro.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – In Contingent citizenship, Sandra Mantu examines the changing rules of citizenship deprivation in the UK, France and Germany from the perspective of international and European legal standards. In practice, two grounds upon which loss of citizenship takes place stand out: fraud in the context of fraudulent acquisition of nationality and terrorism in the context of national security. Newly naturalised citizens and citizens of immigrant origin are mainly targeted by these measures. The resurrection of the importance attached to loyalty as the citizen’s main duty towards his/her state shows that the rules on loss of citizenship are capable of expressing ideals of membership and identity, while the citizenship status of certain citizens remains contingent upon meeting these ideals.

Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili qui.

TDM is pleased to announce a forthcoming special issue on international arbitration involving commercial and investment disputes in Africa.

Africa’s accelerating economic development is attracting a substantial increase in cross-border commerce, trade, and investment on the continent, and disputes arising from this increased economic activity are inevitably bound to follow. International arbitration will be the preferred method for resolving many of these disputes. Indeed, the growing focus on international arbitration to resolve commercial and investment disputes relating to Africa is reflected, among other ways, in the fact that the International Council on Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) will be holding its 22nd Congress for the first time in Africa in May 2016 in Mauritius.

To a great extent, the issues that arise in international arbitration in or relating to Africa will be no different than those that arise in arbitrations around the globe. Converging international arbitration procedures and the predictability and stability afforded by the New York Convention and Washington Convention help to ensure that this is the case. Yet party autonomy remains a core value of the international arbitral system, and, as such, regional approaches and local culture will continue to shape African-related arbitrations to a degree, just as they do elsewhere. Africa’s rapid development is also likely to play a role in shaping international arbitration in this region.

This special issue will explore topics of particular interest and relevance to international arbitration in light of Africa’s unique and evolving situation. The issue will focus on sub-Saharan Africa and will address issues pertaining to both commercial and investment arbitration. It will also likely explore alternative methods for resolving disputes, including litigation, mediation, and local dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Possible topics for submission to the special issue might include:

* The proliferation of international arbitral institutions in Africa and what the future holds for institutional arbitration on the African continent;

* The attitudes of African states and state-owned enterprises towards international commercial arbitration;

* Salient issues in the OHADA international arbitration framework;

* The influence of China and other Asian countries on international arbitration in Africa;

* Issues in enforcing arbitral awards in African states;

* Evolving attitudes in Africa towards bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the extent to which BITs are (or are not) helping African states attract foreign direct investment;

* South Africa’s draft investment law and other notable country-specific developments in Africa;

* Cultural issues impacting international arbitration in Africa;

* Empirical studies relating to international arbitration in Africa;

* Capacity building for arbitrators, judges, and practitioners in the region; and

* Alternative methods of resolving cross-border commercial and investment disputes in Africa.

We invite all those with an interest in the subject to contribute articles or notes on one of the above topics or any other relevant issue.

This special issue will be edited by Thomas R. Snider (Greenberg Traurig LLP), Professor Won Kidane (Seattle University Law School and the Addis Transnational Law Group), and Perry S. Bechky (International Trade & Investment Law PLLC).

Please address all questions and proposals to the editors at SniderT@gtlaw.com, kidanew@seattleu.edu, and pbechky@iti-law.com, copied to info@transnational-dispute-management.com.

Anche quest’anno, il 25 ottobre 2015 si celebra la giornata europea della giustizia civile. In questa occasione gli Stati del Consiglio d’Europa sono invitati ad organizzare incontri volti alla formazione degli operatori del diritto e alla sensibilizzazione delle persone verso i temi della giustizia civile, compresa la cooperazione giudiziaria.

In questo contesto, si segnalano, in Italia, due eventi in programma il 26 ottobre 2015, rispettivamente a Catania e a Firenze.

Il primo, organizzato dalla Scuola Superiore della Magistratura – Struttura territoriale di formazione decentrata del Distretto di Catania, avrà ad oggetto La responsabilità civile: nuove e vecchie questioni interne e prospettive europee (vedi qui). L’altro, a cura della Camera civile e della Corte d’appello di Firenze, sarà dedicato a Le successioni transfrontaliere. Cosa cambia dopo l’entrata in vigore del Regolamento Europeo n. 650/2012 (questo il programma).

Il 4 novembre 2015, poi, si terrà a Ferrara, sempre in relazione alla Giornata europea della Giustizia civile, un convegno interdisciplinare organizzato dal Tribunale e dal Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Ferrara.

Si parlerà de L’accesso alla giustizia dei consumatori: le controversie di consumo tra giustizia ordinaria e ADR (Giovanni De Cristofaro, Univ. Ferrara), de Le linee guida dell’ultima riforma della legge fallimentare alla luce delle raccomandazioni della Commissione europea su un nuovo approccio al fallimento delle imprese ed all’insolvenza (Andrea Lolli, Univ. Ferrara, e Stefano Giusberti, Trib. Ferrara), nonché di Nuovi strumenti per la tutela transnazionale del credito commerciale: dalla riforma del regolamento Bruxelles I all’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo dei conti bancari (Pietro Franzina, Univ. Ferrara).

La locandina di quest’ultimo evento è reperibile qui.

Le segnalazioni relative agli eventi programmati in occasione della giornata europea della giustizia civile nei diversi Stati del Consiglio d’Europa confluiscono in questi giorni a questo indirizzo.

Burkhard Hess, Cristina M. Mariottini, Protecting Privacy in Private International and Procedural Law and by Data Protection. European and American Developments, Ashgate, 2015, ISBN 9781472473301, pp. 400, GBP 72.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – A new volume has recently been published in the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg Book Series. Ensuring the effective right to privacy regarding the gathering and processing of personal data has become a key issue both in the internal market and in the international arena. The extent of one’s right to control their data, the implications of the ‘right to be forgotten’, the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decisions on personality rights, and recent defamation legislation are shaping a new understanding of data protection and the right to privacy. This book explores these issues with a view to assessing the status quo and prospective developments in this area of the law which is undergoing significant changes and reforms.

Ulteriori informazioni, compreso il sommario dell’opera, sono disponibili in inglese e in tedesco, rispettivamente, qui e qui.

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg is accepting applications for the 2016 Summer School on Approaches to Procedural Law: The Pluralism of Methods, organised in collaboration with the International Association of Procedural Law under the direction of Loïc Cadiet (Université Paris 1 – Sorbonne) and Burkhard Hess (MPI Luxembourg).

The Summer School will take place at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg between 10 and 13 July 2016. Up to 20 places will be available for applicants having procedural law and/or dispute resolution mechanisms as their main field of academic interest.

The deadline for applications is 31 January 2016.

[From the press release] – The first IAPL-MPI Summer School at the premises of the Max Planck Institute in Luxembourg in July 2014 was a successful experience, recently crowned by the publication of the collective book Procedural Science at the Crossroads of Different Generations (Nomos 2015). This success has encouraged the organization of a second edition in 2016. The second edition of IAPL-MPI Post-Doctoral Summer School aims like the first one to bring together outstanding young post-doc researchers of any nationality dealing with European and comparative procedural law, as well as with other relevant dispute mechanisms for civil controversies. Researchers at the very ending stage of their PhD project are also invited to apply. The School will give them an opportunity to openly share and discuss their current project of research with other young colleagues, but also with experienced law professors and practitioners. In this regard, Luxembourg is presently for many reasons one of the most interesting venues in Europe, where many opportunities for exchanges between procedural theory and practice are offered.

Further details can be found here

The Polish Yearbook of International Law has issued a call for unpublished papers addressing, inter alia, private international law topics, to be included in its next volume.

The deadline for submissions is 31 January 2016.

Further information can be found here.

In my posting on Lutz I flagged the increasing relevance of Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation. This Article neutralises the lex concursus in favour of the lex causae governing the act between a person (often a company) benefiting from an act detrimental to all the creditors, and the insolvent company. Classic example is a payment made by the insolvent company to one particular creditor. Evidently this is detrimental to the other creditors, who are confronted with reduced means against which they can exercise their rights. Article 13 reads

Detrimental acts. Article 4(2)(m) shall not apply where the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors provides proof that: – the said act is subject to the law of a Member State other than that of the State of the opening of proceedings, and – that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.

In the case at issue, C-310/14, Nike (incorporated in The Netherlands) had a franchise agreement with Sportland Oy, a Finnish company. This agreement is governed by Dutch law (through choice of law). Sportland paid for a number of Nike deliveries. Payments went ahead a few months before and after the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Sportland’s liquidator attempts to have the payments annulled, and to have Nike reimburse.

Under Finnish law, para 10 of the Law on recovery of assets provides that the payment of a debt within three months of the prescribed date may be challenged if it is paid with an unusual means of payment, is paid prematurely, or in an amount which, in view of the amount of the debtor’s estate, may be regarded as significant. Under Netherlands law, according to Article 47 of the Law on insolvency (Faillissementswet), the payment of an outstanding debt may be challenged only if it is proven that when the recipient received the payment he was aware that the application for insolvency proceedings had already been lodged or that the payment was agreed between the creditor and the debtor in order to give priority to that creditor to the detriment of the other creditors.

Nike first of all argued, unsuccessfully in the Finnish courts, that the payment was not ‘unusual’. The Finnish courts essentially held that under relevant Finnish law, the payment was unusual among others because the amount paid was quite high in relation to the overall assets of the company. Nike argues in subsidiary order that Dutch law, the lex causae of the franchise agreement, should be applied. Attention then focussed (and the CJEU held on) the burden of proof under Article 13, as well as the exact meaning of ‘that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.‘

Firstly, the Finnish version of the Regulation seemingly does not include wording identical or similar to ‘in the relevant case‘ (Article 13 in fine). Insisting on a restrictive interpretation of Article 13, which it had also held in Lutz, the CJEU held that all the circumstances of the cases need to be taken into account. The person profiting from the action cannot solely rely ‘in a purely abstract manner, on the unchallengeable character of the act at issue on the basis of a provision of the lex causae‘ (at 21).

Related to this issue the referring court had actually quoted the Virgos Schmit report, which reads in relevant part (at 137) ‘By “any means” it is understood that the act must not be capable of being challenged using either rules on insolvency or general rules of the national law applicable to the act’. This interpretation evidently reduces the comfort zone for the party who benefitted from the act. It widens the search area, so to speak. It was suggested, for instance, that Dutch law in general includes a prohibition of abuse of rights, which is wider than the limited circumstances of the Faillissementswet, referred to above.

The CJEU surprisingly does not quote the report however it does come to a similar conclusion: at 36: ‘the expression ‘does not allow any means of challenging that act …’ applies, in addition to the insolvency rules of the lex causae, to the general provisions and principles of that law, taken as a whole.’

Attention then shifted to the burden of proof: which party is required to plead that the circumstances for application of a provision of the lex causae leading to voidness, voidability or unenforceability of the act, do not exist? The CJEU held on the basis of Article 13’s wording and overall objectives that it is for the defendant in an action relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of an act to provide proof, on the basis of the lex causae, that the act cannot be challenged. Tthe defendant has to prove both the facts from which the conclusion can be drawn that the act is unchallengeable and the absence of any evidence that would militate against that conclusion (at 25).

However, (at 27) ‘although Article 13 of the regulation expressly governs where the burden of proof lies, it does not contain any provisions on more specific procedural aspects. For instance, that article does not set out, inter alia, the ways in which evidence is to be elicited, what evidence is to be admissible before the appropriate national court, or the principles governing that court’s assessment of the probative value of the evidence adduced before it.‘

‘(T)he issue of determining the criteria for ascertaining whether the applicant has in fact proven that the act can be challenged falls within the procedural autonomy of the relevant Member State, regard being had to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.’ (at 44)

The Court therefore once again bumps into the limits of autonomous interpretation. How ad hoc, concrete (as opposed to ‘in the abstract’: see the CJEU’s words, above) the defendant has to be in providing proof (and foreign expert testimony with it), may differ greatly in the various Member States. Watch this space for more judicial review of Article 13.

Geert.