Flux européens

There are many scientific and legal /regulatory angles to the pollution caused by micro and nanoplastics (MNPs). I was pleased to have been invited to be part of a scoping exercise with the European Commissions Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, following which that Group issued its initial statement early July.

MNPs is an issue where the EU undoubtedly can recognise its regulatory leadership – at the same time appreciating that the challenge is of a truly global nature (many of the worst plastics pollution issues are located in river deltas way outside EU borders). At the scientific level, studies particularly in the marine environment show cause for great concern – but not necessarily easy fixes.

I accepted therefore to be part of the SAPEA Consortium (Science Advice for Policy by European Academies) Working Group on MNPs, which will oversee in first instance the collation of the state of the art: from a regulatory as well as a scientific point of view – and subject to tight deadlines.

Autumn should be interesting.

Geert.

 

Many thanks to Julien Juret for asking me contribute to l’Observateur de Bruxelles, the review of the French Bar representation in Brussels (la Délégation des barreaux de France). I wrote this piece on the rather problematic implications of the GDPR, the General Data Protection Regulation, on jurisdictional grounds for invasion of privacy.

I conclude that the Commission’s introduction of Article 79 GDPR without much debate or justification, will lead to a patchwork of fora for infringement of personality rights. Not only will it take a while to settle the many complex issues which arise in their precise application. Their very existence arguably will distract from harmonised compliance of the GDPR rules.

I owe Julien and his colleagues the French translation (as well as their patience in my late delivery) for I wrote the piece initially in English. Readers who would like to receive a copy of that EN original, please just send me an e-mail.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.5.

Commission / Espagne
Environnement et consommateurs
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre la directive sur le traitement des eaux urbaines résiduaires, l’Espagne est condamnée à payer une somme forfaitaire de 12 millions d’euros et une astreinte d’environ 11 millions d’euros par semestre de retard

Commission / United Parcel Service
Concurrence
L’avocat général Kokott propose à la Cour de confirmer que la décision par laquelle la Commission a interdit l’acquisition de TNT Express par UPS doit être annulée pour vice de procédure

Union européenne / Gascogne Sack Deutschland et Gascogne
Droit institutionnel
L’avocat général Wahl propose à la Cour d’annuler les arrêts par lesquels le Tribunal de l’UE a condamné l’Union européenne à réparer le préjudice matériel subi par plusieurs sociétés en raison de la durée excessive de la procédure menée devant lui

Vernaza Ayovi
DFON
L’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée ne s’oppose pas à ce que les travailleurs non permanents de l’administration espagnole ne bénéficient pas d’une garantie de réintégration en cas de licenciement disciplinaire abusif

AY
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne peut être refusée au motif qu’une décision du ministère public a mis fin à une enquête pénale lorsque, au cours de celle-ci, la personne recherchée n’a été entendue qu’en qualité de témoin

Société des produits Nestlé / Mondelez UK Holdings & Services
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’EUIPO doit réexaminer si la forme tridimensionnelle correspondant au produit « Kit Kat 4 barres » peut être maintenue comme marque de l’Union

Dyson
Énergie
Le fait de ne pas fournir au consommateur des informations sur les conditions d’essai ayant abouti à la classification renseignée sur l’étiquette énergétique des aspirateurs ne constitue pas une « omission trompeuse »

Commission / Espagne e.a.
Aide d'État
La Cour annule l’arrêt du Tribunal sur le « régime espagnol de leasing fiscal »

Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie)
DFON
L’éventuel examen, avant l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, des conditions de détention dans l’État membre d’émission doit se limiter aux établissements pénitentiaires dans lesquels il est concrètement envisagé que la personne concernée sera détenue

Minister for Justice and Equality
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une autorité judiciaire appelée à exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen doit s’abstenir d’y donner suite si elle estime que la personne concernée risquerait de subir une violation de son droit fondamental à un tribunal indépendant et, partant, du contenu essentiel de son droit fondamental à un procès équitable, en raison de défaillances susceptibles d’affecter l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire dans l’État membre d’émission

Alheto
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Un Palestinien qui bénéficie du statut de réfugié auprès de l’UNRWA ne peut pas obtenir le statut de réfugié dans l’Union tant qu’il jouit d’une protection ou d’une assistance effective de cet organisme des Nations unies

Confédération paysanne e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Les organismes obtenus par mutagenèse constituent des OGM et sont, en principe, soumis aux obligations prévues par la directive sur les OGM

This one long overdue – I am adding it to the blog for completeness’ sake. C‑649/16 Valach was held end of December 2017. The CJEU relies heavily on Tunkers and recital 6 of the (old) Insolvency Regulation: the regulation should be confined to provisions governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings and judgments which are ‘delivered directly on the basis of the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected with such proceedings’: the latter two criteria guide the CJEU.

In the case at issue, the action for liability at issue in the main proceedings is the direct and inseparable consequence of the performance by the committee of creditors, a statutory body established by Slovak law when insolvency proceedings are opened, of the task specifically assigned to them by the provisions of national law governing such procedures. Consequently, it is clear that the obligations which form the basis of bringing an action for liability in tort against a committee of creditors, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, originate in rules that are specific to insolvency proceedings (at 35-36).

As for the second criterion, it is the closeness of the link between a court action and the insolvency proceedings that is decisive for the purposes of deciding whether the Brussels I Recast’s insolvency exception is triggered. That is the case here: at 38: in order to ascertain whether the liability of the members of the committee of creditors may be engaged because of the rejection of the restructuring plan, it will be necessary to analyse in particular the extent of that committee’s obligations in the insolvency proceedings and the compatibility of the rejection with those obligations. Such an analysis clearly presents a direct and close link with the insolvency proceedings, and is therefore closely connected with the course of those proceedings.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5 Heading 5.4.1. Chapter 2 Heading 2.2.2.10.1

 

A short post on manufactured nanomaterials and data. (Readers will be aware that although the blog focuses mostly on litigation, I dabble in regulatory research and practice, too. And that nanotechnology regulation has been a consistent interest of mine).

Thank you Lynn Bergeson and Carla Hutton for flagging the study by EUON on data collection and reporting methodology for manufactured nanomaterials. EUON, the European Union’s Observatory for Nanomaterials, is hosted by ECHA – the EU’s Chemicals Agency. The study’s purpose is made clear on p.15 (only) of the report: the overall context is for the regulators to have an overview of the heterogeneous market for nanomaterials. In order to do so, the study measures the reliability etc of existing reports and studies on the nanomaterials market. It concludes that a Delphi study of the existing research would be required.

For those of you with an interest in information flows and the transparency of data, the implications are clear: part of the exercise of regulating new technologies is to know what is out there; and manufacturers’ data clearly are not making it into the public domain in a transparent and coherent manner. Consider alongside this report, for instance the proposed US EPA rule on transparency in regulator science.

Geert.

 

Time to tackle the judgments left over from the exam queue. I reviewed Bobek AG’s Opinion in C-27/17 flyLAL here. The CJEU held early July.

Pro memoria: the AG’s suggested for locus damni not place of financial loss, rather the place within the markets affected by the competition law infringement where the claimant alleges loss of sales: damage located in a Mozaik fashion in other words; for locus delicti commissi with full jurisdiction, the AG distinguishes between Article 101 TFEU (place of the conclusion of the agreement) and 102 TFEU (place where the predatory prices were offered and applied); finally with respect to (now) Article 7(5), the activities of a branch: offering the fixed prices or otherwise having been instrumental in concluding contracts for services at those prices suffices for that branch to have participated in the tort.

The Court itself,

• for locus damni reminds us of the findings in Marinari (which tempered the implications of Bier), implying that one needs to decide whether loss of income of the kind alleged by flyLAL may be regarded as ‘initial damage’, or whether it constitutes solely consequential financial damage which cannot, in itself, lead to a forum under Article 7(2). The Court, like the AG, opts for Mozaik, referring inter alia to its judgment in Concurrences: each place where the loss of income consisting in loss of sales occurred, that is to say, the place of the market which is affected by that conduct and on which the victim claims to have suffered those losses, opens up partial jurisdiction. As I noted in my review of the Opinion, this interpretation aids the tortfeasor: locus damni leading to shattered jurisdiction facilitates anti-competitive behaviour.
• for locus delicti commissi, under Article 101 TFEU (cartels), with reference to CDC, the CJEU opts for courts for the place in which the agreement was definitively concluded: this truly is extraordinary for it allows for forum shopping by the cartel participants. For Article 102 TFEU (abuse of dominant position)
  • Prima facie at 52 there is one consolation for those suffering anti-competitive behaviour: the Court holds that the event giving rise to the damage in the case of abuse of a dominant position is not based on an agreement, but rather on the implementation of that abuse, that is to say, the acts performed by the dominant undertaking to put the abuse into practice, in particular by offering and applying predatory pricing in the market concerned. That would seem to suggest full jurisdiction for each of those places where the pricing is offered and applied. However in that para 52 the Court does not verbatim links this to jurisdiction: this it does do in
  • Para 53: ‘If it were to be established that the events giving rise to the main proceedings were part of a common strategy intended to oust flyLAL from the market of flights to and from Vilnius Airport and that those events all contributed to giving rise to the damage alleged, it would be for the referring court to identify the event of most importance in implementing such a strategy out of the chain of events at issue in the main proceedings.‘ Courts holding on jurisdiction must not delve too deep into the substance of the case but still have to employ, without looking too deeply at the merits of the case, the lex causae for the anti-competitive behaviour (per Rome II) to identify that event of most importance. In para 54 too the Court emphasises the need to limit the amount of potential jurisdictions (reference here is also made to Universal Music). I cannot be sure: does the combination of paras 52 and 53 suggest that the Court does not accept jurisdiction for all places where the pricing is offered and applied?
• Finally with respect to Article 7(5), the CJEU at 64 holds that the national courts must in particular review whether the activities carried out by the branch included actual acts of offering and applying the predatory pricing alleged and whether such participation in the alleged abuse of a dominant position was sufficiently significant to be regarded as a close link with the dispute in the main proceedings. Separate accounts are not required to conduct that exercise (at 65).

Essentially therefore the Court firmly pulls the Brussels I Recast’s ‘predictability’ card. This is in the interest of companies behaving anti-competitively. I do not read in this judgment a definitive answer however for as I suggested, the combination of paras 52 ff is simply not clear.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law), 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2

 

 

 

 

Given that discovery plays an important factor in forum shopping, Hogan J’s very critical comments on the extensive possibilities in Ireland are quite relevant. Arthur Cox have good analysis of [2018] IECA 230 Tobin v MOD here  and I am in general happy to refer.  Those of you interested in comparative litigation really should take a moment to read the Judge’s comments in full. Yet again, it seems to me, a topic for serious PhD (in comparative civil procedure) analysis.

Geert.

Those of us who are familiar with the issue of multilingualism and international courts, will  enjoy the discussion of contractual terms in Wahl AG’s Opinion in C-595/17 Apple v eBizcuss. Not only does the issue entre around the precise implications of the wording of a choice of court provision. The Opinion (not yet available in English) also highlights the difficulty of translating the original English of the contractual term, into the languages at the Court.

Current litigation is a continuation of the earlier spats between Apple and eBizcuss, which led to the Cour de Cassation’s 2015 reversed stance on the validity of unilateral choice of court – which I discussed at the time.

The 2002 Apple Authorized Reseller Agreement (in fact the 2005 version which applied after continuation of the contract) included a governing law and choice of court clause reading

„This Agreement and the corresponding relationship between the parties shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Ireland and the parties shall submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of Ireland. Apple reserves the right to institute proceedings against Reseller in the courts having jurisdiction in the place where Reseller has its seat or in any jurisdiction where a harm to Apple is occurring.” (emphasis added)

Footnote 3 displays the translation difficulty which I refer to above: parties disagree as to the translation of the contractual clause in French: applicant suggest this should read  „et la relation correspondante”, defendant proposes „et les relations en découlant”. The AG suggest to include both for the purposes of his analysis „Le présent contrat et la relation correspondante (traduction de la requérante)/et les relations en découlant (traduction de la défenderesse) entre les parties seront régis par et interprétés conformément au droit de l’Irlande et les parties se soumettent à la compétence des tribunaux de l’Irlande. Apple se réserve le droit d’engager des poursuites à l’encontre du revendeur devant les tribunaux dans le ressort duquel est situé le siège du revendeur ou dans tout pays dans lequel Apple subit un préjudice.” In Dutch: „De door partijen gesloten onderhavige overeenkomst en de bijbehorende betrekking (vertaling van verzoekster)/de hieruit voortvloeiende betrekkingen (vertaling van verweerster) tussen partijen zullen worden beheerst door en worden uitgelegd volgens het Ierse recht, en partijen verlenen bevoegdheid aan de Ierse rechter. Apple behoudt zich het recht voor om vorderingen jegens de wederverkoper aanhangig te maken bij het gerecht in het rechtsgebied waar de wederverkoper is gevestigd of in een land waar Apple schade heeft geleden.”

This translation issue however highlights precisely the core of the discussion: ‘the corresponding relationship’ suggest a narrow reading: the relationship corresponding to the contractual arrangements. Infringement of competition law does not correspond, in my view. ‘La relation correspondante’ displays this sentiment. ‘(L)es relations en découlant’ suggests a wider reading.

In 2012 eBizcuss started suing Apple for alleged anti-competitive behaviour, arguing Apple systematically favours its own, vertically integrated distribution network.

The Cour de Cassation had rebuked the Court of Appeal’s finding of lack of jurisdiction. In its 2015 decision to quash, (the same which qualified the Court’s stance on unilateral jurisdiction clauses) it cited C-352/13 CDC, in which the CJEU held that choice of court clauses are not generally applicable to liability in tort (the clause would have to refer verbatim to tortious liability): the specific para under consideration is para 69 of that judgment in CDC:

‘the referring court must, in particular, regard a clause which abstractly refers to all disputes arising from contractual relationships as not extending to a dispute relating to the tortious liability that one party allegedly incurred as a result of its participation in an unlawful cartel’.

At issue in Apple /eBizcuss is essentially what kind of language one needs for choice of court to include infringement of competition law (for Dutch readers, I have an earlier overview in Jacques Steenbergen’s liber amicorum here).

Wahl AG emphasises (at 56) that it would not be in the spirit of Article 25 Brussels I Recast (which he analyses in extenso in the previous paras) to require parties to include the exact nature of the suits covered by the choice of court agreement. He is right of course – except those suits in my view do need to be contractual unless non-contractual liability has been clearly included: that in my view is the clear instruction of the CJEU in CDC.

The AG then continues the discussion (which will be redundant should the CJEU not follow his lead) as to whether the clause covers both follow-on (a suit for tort once a competition authority has found illegal behaviour) as well as stand-alone (private enforcement: a party claiming infringement of competition law in the absence of an authority’s finding of same) suits. He suggests there should be no distinction: on that I believe he is right.

Geert.

 

 

Thank you Chloe Oakshett for flagging [2018] CSOH 45 BN Rendering Limited v Everwarm Ltd, in which the Commercial Court in Edinburgh considered its jurisdiction to enforce an adjudicator’s award. Bone of contention was choice of court (ditto law) in the underlying contracts in favour of the courts at England (and English law). Both parties are domiciled in Scotland. Relevant works had to be carried out in Scotland. The Brussels I Recast Regulation does not formally apply between them: Scots-English conflicts are not ‘international’ within the meaning of that Regulation.

However Lord Bannatyne (at 16) points out that even for intra-UK conflicts, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982 (per instruction in section 20(5) a) must be interpreted taking into account the Brussels regime and its application by the CJEU. It is in this context that Case 24/76 Colzani resurfaces: ‘real consent’ needs to be established without excess formality.

At 28 Lord Banatyne lists claimant’s arguments:  the party’s contract was not signed by both parties; nevertheless the defender’s subcontract terms and conditions form part of the contract; the subcontract order refers expressly to the defender’s subcontract terms and conditions which includes the jurisdiction exclusion clause and lastly, that express reference meets the test for real consent to the jurisdiction clause.

Put in summary: At 49: Is an express reference in the defender’s subcontract order (sent to the pursuer) to the defender’s subcontract terms and conditions, which contain the jurisdiction clause (which document is unsigned by the pursuer) sufficient to satisfy the test that it is clearly and precisely demonstrated that the parties agreed to the clause conferring jurisdiction on the English courts? Or put another way, in order to satisfy the said test is it not only necessary for there to be an express reference to the defender’s subcontract terms and conditions but for the subcontract order to have been signed by the pursuer to demonstrate that the parties agreed to the clause conferring jurisdiction on the English courts?

The judge considers the answer to the above questions to be question 1, yes and question 2, no – and I believe he is right.

Geert.