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The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

M. Wendland: Procedural challenges within the system of international jurisdiction according to the new European regulations on matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships: Well-known and innovative instruments from the experimental laboratory of the European Commission

As from 29th January 2019 two new EU regulations will apply establishing a comprehensive legal framework which regulates jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes (2016/1103) and of the property consequences of registered partnerships (2016/1104). The two regulations will close one of the last remaining gaps within the system of International Private and Procedural Law in family matters. Its regulative approach is as new as innovative even though not entirely unproblematic. This paper examines selected problems of both regulations from the perspective of International Procedural Law and presents possible solutions.

R. Magnus: The implied choice of law in international succession and family law

Recent EU Regulations have led to major changes in international succession and family law. This article compares the conflict of laws rules of the different Regulations dealing with the possibility to choose the applicable law implicitly. The main focus lies on a question not yet much discussed, namely whether or not the validity of the implied choice depends on the validity of the legal act from which it is inferred (e.g. will, agreement as to the succession, marriage contract, prenuptial agreement). As conclusion it is proposed that careful distinctions should be made taking into account the different reasons that might hinder the validity of a legal act (in particular the distinction between invalidity because of a lack of the required form and invalidity due to a conflict with public policy) and specific particularities of family and succession law.

F.Eichel: The jurisdictional concept of ‘the place of the event giving rise to the damage’ and international trade mark infringements spread through digital media

Both the German Federal Court (BGH, 19.11.2017 – I ZR 164/16) and the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH, 20.12.2016 – 4 Ob 45/16w) have applied to Article 125(5) of Regulation No 2017/1001 (EU trade mark regulation) the general case law on the determination of “the place of the event giving rise to the damage” in terms of Art. 7(2) of the Recast Brussels Regulation. If that was correct, Art. 125(5) would, to a large extent, lose its effectiveness. Contrary to the position of the OGH and the BGH, the ECJ rulings “Hejduk” and “Wintersteiger” on Art. 7(2) Brussels Regulation are not applicable to Art. 125(5), and neither is the ECJ ruling “Nintendo ./. BigBen” which has no jurisdictional dimension. Instead, Art. 125(5) Regulation No 2017/1001 (as well as Art. 82(5) Regulation No 6/2002) must be interpreted independently and should be aligned with Article 2:202 of the “CLIP Principles”. This latter model rule places jurisdiction for infringement claims upon the courts of a state when an alleged infringer who has not acted in this state has directed his or her activities to the forum.

P. Schlosser: International Jurisdiction in case of Transborder Transportation in Execution of a Single Order

The direct claim of the injured party, or its insurer, may be introduced alternatively in the court or the place of dispatch or in the court of the place of destination.

K. Thorn/C. Lasthaus: Legal Succession concerning Immovable Property under the European Commission’s Succession Regulation

The European Commission’s succession regulation 650/2012 aims to harmonise the application of succession law among EU member states. However, its material scope, in particular the ambit of the exemptions under Art. 1 para. 2, has remained contentious. In recent decisions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) leaned towards a narrow interpretation of the exemptions provided by Art. 1 para. 2 lit. k and l thereby extending the Regulation’s scope. The ECJ held that under Art. 1 para. 2 lit. k and l, 31 a legacy “by vindication”, which directly grants a proprietary interest in the bequeathed, in this case immovable, property to the legatee, should be given effect even in member states where proprietary interests cannot be directly transferred by legacy. The OGH discussed the scope of Art. 1 para. 2 lit. l concerning the constitutive effect of a recording in the public register provided by the law of the Member State in which the register is kept. In this legal review, the authors argue that while the courts’ intention to strengthen the Regulation’s objective is to be supported, their reasoning should have been more precise.

A. Golab: Cross-border implications of fictitious service and unreasoned judgements in the EU

In the present case the Federal Court of Justice addressed the issue of acceptability of effects produced by a Polish court’s recourse to fictitious service of documents from the perspective of German procedural public policy. The aim of the annotation is to assess whether the application of Article 1135 (5) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure met the criteria of public policy exception and how the conclusion of this analysis might apply to other similar instances where fictitious service is at play with regard to recognition or enforcement of judgements in the Brussels regime. In addition, the annotation will also address the issue of an unreasoned Polish judgment, which was also expounded on by the Federal Court of Justice.

A.-S. Tietz: The notarisation of articles of association incorporating a German Limited Liability Company (GmbH) by a Swiss notary based in the Canton of Berne

The Higher Regional Court of Berlin (Kammergericht) held that a German Limited Liability Company (GmbH) had been properly incorporated, even though its articles of association had been notarised by a Swiss notary in the Cantone of Berne in Switzerland. It reversed the decision of the District Court (Amtsgericht) of Charlottenburg which had refused to enter the company into the Commercial Register as it had deemed the content of the foreign deed invalid. The Higher Regional Court held that the foreign notarisation had substituted a notarisation carried out by a German notary, as the notarial deed had been read aloud to the participants in the presence of the notary, and subsequently approved and signed personally by the participants. It therefore ordered the District Court to enter the company into the German Commercial Register. Although this was the first time that a German Higher Regional Court had been confronted with this question, the decision has revived the debate on the “recognition” of legal relationships evidenced by foreign deeds under German corporate law. The article contributes to the discussion by addressing the legal questions resulting from the decision, which concern the applicable law to the formal requirements as well as the “substitution” of a notarisation by a German notary by a Bernese notary within the meaning of Sec. 2 German Limited Liability Companies Act.

S.L. Gössl: Regulatory Gaps and Analogies in Conflict of Laws – Example: Embryo Parenthood

The German Supreme Court (BGH) had to decide which law to apply to the (assumed) parenthood on embryos in California. The court developed a conflict of laws rule not reflecting the German substantive law regarding this issue. The article analyses and criticizes the decision. It focuses on the question how, from a methodological point of view, private international law deals with regulatory gaps, and how to close them by analogy. Eventually, the article proposes an alternative characterization of the issue and, consequently, an alternative conflict of laws rule. It furthermore shows that the most important gap lies in the (deficient) substantive law where regulation is needed urgently.

Twice last week did the Lugano Convention’s protected categories title feature at the Court of Justice. On Tuesday, Szpunar AG opined in C-694/17 Pillar Securitisation v Hildur Arnadottir (consumer protection), and on Thursday Saugmansgaard ØE opined in C-603/17 Bosworth (Arcadia Petroleum) (employment contracts).

The issues that are being interpreted are materially very similar as in Brussels I Recast hence both evidently have an impact on the Brussels I Recast Regulation, too.

At stake in Pillar Securitisation (no English version of the Opinion at the time of writing) is the meaning of ‘outside his trade or profession’ in the consumer title. Advocate General Szpunar takes the case as a trigger to fine-tune the exact relationship between private international law such as was the case, he suggests, in Kainz and also in Vapenik.

I wrote in my review of Vapenik at the time: ‘I disagree though with the Court’s reference to substantive European consumer law, in particular the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Not because it is particularly harmful in the case at issue. Rather because I do not think conflict of laws should be too polluted with substantive law considerations. (See also my approval of Kainz).’

Ms Arnadottir’s case relates to the Kaupting reorganisation. Her personal loan exceeded one million € and therefore is not covered by Directive 2008/48 on credit agreements for consumers (maximum threshold there is 75K). Does that exclude her contract being covered by Lugano’s consumer Title?

The Directive’s core notion is ‘transaction’, as opposed to Lugano’s ‘contract’ (at 30 ff). And the Advocate-General of course has no option but to note the support given by the Court to consistent interpretation, in Vapenik. Yet at 42 ff he suggests a narrow reading of Vapenik, for a variety of reasons, including

• the presence, here, of Lugano States (not just EU Member States);
• the need for consistent interpretation between Lugano and Brussels (which does not support giving too much weight to EU secondary law outside the private international law sphere);
• and, most importantly, Kainz: a judgment, unlike Vapenik, which directly concerns Brussels I (and therefore also the link with Lugano). One of the implications which as I noted a the time I like a lot, is precisely  its respect for the design and purpose of private international law rules as opposed to other rules of secondary law; and within PIL, the distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law.

At 52 ff Advocate General Szpunar rejects further arguments invoked by parties to suggest the consumer title of the jurisdictional rules should be aligned with secondary EU consumer law. His line of reasoning is solid, however: autonomous interpretation of EU private international law prevents automatic alignment between consumer law and PIL.

Should the CJEU follow its first Advocate General, which along Kainz I suggest it should, no doubt distinguishing will be suggested given the presence of Lugano parties in Pillar Securitisation – yet the emphasis on autonomous interpretation suggest a wider calling.

 

C‑603/17 Bosworth v Arcadia then was sent up to Luxembourg by the UK’s Supreme Court [UKSC 2016/0181, upon appeal from [2016] EWCA Civ 818] concerning the employment Title of Lugano 2007 (which only the other week featured at the High Court in Cunico v Daskalakis). As helpfully summarised by Philip Croall, Samantha Trevan and Abigail Lovell: do the English courts have jurisdiction over claims for conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt brought against former employees of certain of the claimant companies now domiciled in Switzerland.

Gross J at the Court of Appeal had applied Holterman and Brogsitter, particularly in fact the Opinion of Jääskinen AG in Brogsitter – albeit with caution, for the AG’s Opinion was not adopted ‘wholesale’ by the CJEU (at 58, Court of Appeal). The mere fact that there is a contract of employment between parties is not sufficient to justify the application of the employment section of (here) the Lugano Convention. Gross J at 67: “do the conspiracy claims relate to the Appellants’ individual contracts of employment? Is there a material nexus between the conduct complained of and those contracts? Can the legal basis of these claims reasonably be regarded as a breach of those contracts so that it is indispensable to consider them in order to resolve the matter in dispute?” – answer: whilst not every conspiracy would fall outside the relevant section, and those articles could not be circumvented simply by pleading a claim in conspiracy, in the circumstances of this case, however precisely the test was formulated, the answer was clearly “no”: key to the alleged fraud lay not in the appellants’ contracts of employment, but in their de facto roles as CEO and CFO of the Arcadia Group.

In the main proceedings, the referring court must therefore determine whether the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction to rule on those claims or whether it is the courts of Switzerland, as courts of the domicile of the former directors implicated, that must hear all or part of the claims.

The facts behind the case are particularly complex, as are the various wrongdoings which the directors are accused of and there is little merit in my rehashing the extensive summary by the AG (the SC’s hearings leading to the referral lasted over a day and a half).

Saugmansgaard ØE essentially confirms Gross J’s analysis. Company directors who carry out their duties in full autonomy are not bound to the company for which they perform those duties by an ‘individual contract of employment’ within the meaning of the employment section – there is no subordination (at 46). Note that like Szpunar SG, Saugmansgaard ØE too emphasises autonomous interpretation and no automatic colouring of one field of EU law by another: ‘the interpretation which the Court of Justice gives to a concept in one field of EU law cannot automatically be applied in a different field’ (at 49).

In the alternative, he opines that a claim made between parties to such a ‘contract’ and legally based in tort does fall within the scope of that section where the dispute arose in connection with the employment relationship and, secondly, that an ‘employer’ within the meaning of the provisions of that section is not necessarily solely the person with whom the employee formally concluded a contract of employment [at 109: what the AG has in mind are group relations, where ‘an organic and economic link’ between two companies exists, one of whom sues even if the contract of employment is not directly with that company].

It is in this, subsidiary section, at 66 ff, that the AG revisits for the sake of completeness, the difference between ‘contract; and ‘tort’ in EU pil in a section which among others will delight (and occupy) one of my PhD students, Michiel Poesen, who is writing his PhD on same. Michiel is chewing on the Opinion as we speak and no doubt will soon have relevant analysis of his own.

At 82 ff the AG points to the difficulties of the Brogsitter and other lines of cases: ‘the case-law of the Court is ambiguous, to say the least, in so far as concerns the way in which Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano II Convention are to be applied in cases where there are concurrent liabilities. It would be useful for the Court to clarify its position in this regard.’ At 83: it is preferable to adopt the logic resulting from [Kalfelis] and to classify a claim as ‘contractual’ or ‘tortious’ with regard to the substantive legal basis relied on by the applicant. At the very least, the Court should hold onto a strict reading of the judgment in Brogsitter’: at 79: the Court meant to classify as ‘contractual’ claims of liability in tort the merits of which depend on the content of the contractual duties binding the parties to the dispute.’, even if (at 84) this authorises a degree of forum shopping, enabling the applicant to choose jurisdiction, with an eye to the appropriate rules: for forum shopping particularly for special jurisdictional rules, is not at all absent from either Regulation or Convention.

There is of course an applicable law dimension to the dispute. The relationships between companies and their directors are governed not by employment law, but by company law (at 52). For an EU judge, the Rome I and Rome II Regulations kicks in. Rome I contains, in Article 8, provisions relating to ‘individual employment contracts’, however it also provides, in Article 1(2)(f), that ‘questions governed by the law of companies’ concerning, inter alia, the ‘internal organisation’ of companies are excluded from its scope (at 55). Rome II likewise has a company law exemption. That puts into perspective the need (or not; readers know that I am weary of this) to apply Rome I and Brussels /Lugano consistently.

One had better sit down for a while when reviewing these Opinions.

Geert.

Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9.

The American Society of Comparative Law (ASCL) has just issued a call for proposals for (1) concurrent panels and (2) a works in progress conference to be held in association with the ASCL 2019 Annual Meeting, which will be held at the University of Missouri School of Law between Thursday, October 17, and Saturday, October 19, 2019.  The event is open to ASCL and non-ASCL members.

The theme of the Annual Meeting is “Comparative Law and International Dispute Resolution Processes” and will feature presentations on how comparative law affects various types of cross-border conflict, including litigation, arbitration and mediation.  Concurrent panels and works in progress papers need not fall within this general theme, although of course they may.  Multilingual panel proposals will be considered as part of ASCL’s mission to foster plurilingualism.

Information on the event, including the call for panel proposals and works in progress submissions, is available at

http://law.missouri.edu/faculty/symposia/comparative-law-international-dispute-resolution-processes/  Proposals will be accepted until May 20, 2019.

Thank you Hélène Péroz for flagging 17-19.935 X v AS Monaco at the French Supreme Court, held December 2018. Claimant is a former physiotherapist employed by AS Monaco. His contract included choice of court ex-EU (not further specified in the judgment but one assumes, Monaco. Monaco is one of those micro-States with a complex arrangement with the EU).

The Supreme court first of all addresses the application of France’s jurisdictional rule R. 1412-1 of the Code du Travail. It assigns territorial jurisdiction in principle to the employment courts of the area where the employee habitually carries out the employment, with fall-back options which are similar to yet not quite the same as the provisions of Brussels I Recast:

Art. R. 1412- 1 L’employeur et le salarié portent les différends et litiges devant le conseil de prud’hommes territorialement compétent. Ce conseil est :

1 Soit celui dans le ressort duquel est situé l’établissement où est accompli le travail ;

2 Soit, lorsque le travail est accompli à domicile ou en dehors de toute entreprise ou établissement, celui dans le ressort duquel est situé le domicile du salarié.

Le salarié peut également saisir les conseils de prud’hommes du lieu où l’engagement a été contracté ou celui du lieu où l’employeur est établi. — [ Anc. art. R. 517- 1, al. 1er à 3.]

These provisions cast a slightly wider jurisdictional net than Brussels I Recast. That gap was even wider before Brussels I Recast had extended its jurisdictional reach to parties (the employer, or the business in the case of the consumer title) domiciled ex-EU. It is particularly its existence pre Brussels I Recast for which the provision is ranked among France’s exorbitant jurisdictional rules.

Now, coming to the case at issue. The Supreme Court first of all addresses the nature of the provision as lois de police and severely curtails same in the event of choice of court ex-EU: ‘ce n’est que si le contrat est exécuté dans un établissement situé en France ou en dehors de tout établissement que les dispositions d’ordre public de l’article R. 1412-1 font échec à l’application d’une telle clause.’ Only if the contract is performed in an establishment of the employer in France, or entirely outside such establishment (from the employee’s home or ‘on the road’) does Article R.1412-1 trump choice of court ex-EU. The lower court’s judgment had failed to assess these circumstances and therefore infringes the Article.

One suspects the Court felt it necessary to dot the i’s and cross the t’s on this issue for the natural order of analysis would of course have been to look at Brussels I Recast first: which the Court does after its analysis of the French law, thereby forgiving the lower court its incorrect application of French law. Reportedly the application of Brussels I to the issue is not something the Court has properly done in the past.

Article 21 Brussels I Recast requires assessment of the place of habitual carrying out of the work. Claimant worked mostly from the club’s training ground, which is in Turbie, France, and accompanied the club at fixtures. These however by reason of the football calendar clearly took place in Monaco only one out of two games (see the Count of Luxembourg for similar identification of the relevant criteria). Core of the employment therefore is France, notably in the Nice judicial area and therefore the lower court was right to uphold its jurisdiction.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.3.

The proceedings of the 29th edition of the Journée de droit international privé, the conference devoted to private international law topics organised yearly at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, have just been published under the title US Litigation Today: Still a Threat For European Businesses or Just a Paper Tiger?.

The volume, edited by Andrea Bonomi and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, discusses the current realities of US litigation for foreign companies. It features contributions by Samuel P. Baumgartner, Andrea Bonomi, Thirza Döbeli, William S. Dodge, Susan Emmenegger, Christoph A. Kern, Matthias Lehmann, Eva Lein, Linda J. Silberman, Symeon C. Symeonides, Karen Topaz Druckman, and Thomas Werlen.

For more information, including the table of contents, see here.

The Classical Liberal Institute and Willamette University College of Law invite you to a a symposium on “The Extraterritorial State.” The symposium will be held this Friday and Saturday, January 25th and 26th, in the Hearings Room of the Oregon Civic Justice Center. The symposium is free and open to faculty, students, and the public. The proceedings of the symposium will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Willamette Law Review. Please feel free to attend the entire event, or whichever panels are of most interest. Please find the complete list of presentation topics and schedule below.

Friday, January 25th

Hearings Room, Oregon Civic Justice Center (790 State Street, Salem, Oregon 97301)

9:30 – 10:00am: Registration (Continental breakfast available)

10:00 – 10:15am: Opening Remarks

10:15 – 11:45am: Session 1

Presentation 1: Bill Dodge, “Reasonableness in the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law”

Presentation 2: Frank Gevurtz, “Extraterritoriality and the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law: Opportunities Lost”

11:45 – 12:00pm: Break

12:00 – 1:30: Session 2

Presentation 3: Maggie Gardner, “Minding the Empagran Gap”

Presentation 4: John Coyle, “Party Autonomy and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality”

1:30 – 2:15pm: Lunch in the Oregon Civic Justice Center

2:15 – 3:45pm: Session 3

Presentation 5: Andra Burke Robertson, “Conspiracy, and Accomplice Liability under the FCPA”

Presentation 6: Yanbai Andrea Wang, “Exporting American Discovery”

3:45 – 4:00pm: Break

4:00 – 4:45pm: Session 4

Presentation 7: Richard Epstein, “Citizenship, Alienage and Territoriality”

Saturday, January 26th

Hearings Room, Oregon Civic Justice Center (790 State Street, Salem, Oregon 97301)

9:30 – 10:00am: Registration (Continental breakfast available)

10:00 – 11:30am: Session 5

Presentation 8: Kevin Benish, “Whose Law Governs Your Data?: Worldwide Injunctions, Extraterritorial Effects, And The Struggle To Regulate The Internet”

Presentation 9: Symeon Symeonides, “Injuries to Rights or Personality Through the Use of the Internet: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of Foreign Judgments”

11:30 – 11:45am: Break

11:45 – 1:15pm: Session 6

Presentation 10: Jim Nafziger, “Extraterritorial Enforcement of Judgments: Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, and the Protection of Cultural Property”

Presentation 11: Aaron Simowitz, “Defining Daimler‘s Domain: Consent, Jurisdiction, and Regulation of Terrorism”

1:15 – 2:00pm: Lunch in the Oregon Civic Justice Center

End of conference.

Thank you Dechert for flagging Case No. 16-00636 Cuzco v Tera (Chapter 11), in which Faris J with great clarity wades in on a motion to dismiss US Chapter 11 jurisdiction in favour of exclusive jurisdiction for the Seoul courts with respect to a Korean company shareholder derivative action.

The case is relevant to insolvency practitioners. More generally however it highlights the need for a court to keep a level heading when wading through to and fro litigation in various States.

A bit of factual detail is required to appreciate the ruling.

Cuzco USA filed a chapter 11 in Hawaii with its sole asset real property in Hawaii. Tera Resources Co., Ltd. (“Tera”), one of Cuzco Korea’s shareholders asserted that the Debtor and its insiders conspired to deprive Cuzco Korea of the value of the real property. Tera commenced an action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, piercing the corporate veil, unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust.

The defendants moved to dismiss, in favour of the Korean courts – and failed, both on arguments of forum non conveniens and on arguments of there being exclusive jurisdiction for the courts at Seoul. Defendant Mr Lee is purportedly the manager of Cuzco USA and the representative director of Cuzco Korea. Defendant Ms Yang is  shareholder and creditor of Cuzco Korea and an ally of Mr. Lee.

Cuzco USA had proposed, and the court confirmed, a Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. Briefly summarized, the Third Amended Plan provided that Cuzco USA would transfer the Keeaumoku (Hawaii) Property to Newco, a Hawaii limited liability company of which Mr. Lee is the sole member, that Newco would attempt to raise enough money through a refinancing to repay all of Cuzco USA’s creditors in full, and that if the refinancing did not occur by a date certain, Newco would sell the Keeaumoku Property at auction and distribute the proceeds to Cuzco USA’s creditors.

Tera and others filed motions for reconsideration of the order confirming the Third Amended Plan. Tera is a shareholder of Cuzco Korea. It also holds a judgment, entered by a Korean court, against Ms. Yang, and orders from a Korean court that, according to Tera, resulted in the seizure of Ms. Yang’s interests in and claims against Cuzco Korea.

Cuzco USA then moved to modify the Third Amended Plan and replaced it with a Fourth Amended Plan. Briefly summarized, this Plan eliminates the transfer of the Keeaumoku Property to Newco; instead, Cuzco USA will retain the property and either refinance it or sell it at auction. Tera and others vigorously objected to plan confirmation on multiple grounds. The court confirmed the Fourth Amended Plan.

Tera argued (among other things) that the Third Amended Plan was the product of a fraudulent scheme by Mr. Lee, Ms. Yang, and others to divert the equity in Cuzco USA from Cuzco Korea to themselves and to render Tera’s interests in Cuzco Korea worthless.

 

That Korean law covers governs the right to bring derivative claims on behalf of a Korean corporation is not under dispute between the parties. (It is therefore considered part of the rules on internal organisation which are subject to lex societatis). However Faris J dismissed defendants’ suggestion that the US court should also respect Korea’s jurisdictional rules that such suits be brought in Seoul only.

At B, p.10: US statutes confer subject matter jurisdiction on US courts. Statutes of another nation, such as the South Korean statute on which the moving defendants rely, cannot change the subject matter jurisdiction of a United States bankruptcy court under a United States statute.

Forum non conveniens was dismissed for there is a strong policy that favors centralization of claims against the debtor in the bankruptcy court that outweighs any other interest (at C, p.12). One would have to have strong arguments to push that aside and clearly these were not present here.

Geert.

Thank you Paul Davies for signalling the recent French decree on end of waste – EoW criteria. Such national initiatives are seen by some as being a sign of the failure of relevant provisions of EU Waste law (which suggest the EU should be developing such criteria). An alternative reading may suggest that national initiatives may be better places to read the technical and environmental and pubic health safety requirements at the local level, potentially preparing the way for EU criteria. Relevant procedures under EU law arguably are not the most efficient for the initial development of this type of detailed instrument, as the example of plastics and REACH also shows.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.

In March 2017, France’s ANSES, the relevant food, environment, and occupational health and safety agency, approved Monsanto’s Roundup Pro 360. That authorisation has now been annulled by the Courts at Lyon – around the same time the story broke of extensive unquestioned copy /pasting by regulators of industry dossiers.

At the beginning of its reasoning the court cites France’s environment charter, to which its Constitution refers. The Charter guarantees everyone in its first Article the right to live in a balanced environment and one with respect for human health. Article 5 entails the precautionary principle, with reference (of course) to scientific assessment and proportionality.

Yet this intro is made for dramatic effect only. The judgment is in fact nothing but a straightforward application of risk assessment requirements on the basis of prevention, not precaution, and a simple observation of infringement of EU law.

At 3 (p.7) the court points out the consequences of the relevant EU authorisation regime. Active ingredients such as glyphosate are authorised (or not; and potentially with conditions) by the EU. Applications in wich these substances are used, by the Member States.

France’s Centre International de Recherche sur le Cancer (CIRC) had classified glyphosate as ‘probably carcinogenic’. Its report on same is referred to by the court as a ‘handbook’, based on peer reviewed studies, the data of which are objectively verifiable as well as replicable. In the other corner, one study referred to by Monsanto (at 7). Relevant EFSA studies only look at the active ingredient and it is these studies upon which ANSES’ decision was based. These studies do not assess the active ingredients’ actual use in preparations such as Roundup Pro 360 which is 41.5% glyphosate. Consequently ANSES quite straightforwardly violates Regulation 1107/2009, particularly its Article 36(6), which prescribes that interaction between the active substance, safeners, synergists and co-formulants shall be taken into account in the evaluation of plant protection products.

The judgment is convincing and straightforward. The road to it was all but easy.

Geert.

EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, soft cover edition 2018, p.28 ff.

Professor Ronald Brand has published the second edition of his book, International Business Transactions Fundamentals, with Kluwer Law International. It is designed primarily for use in a course on International Business Transactions, but is suitable as a desk reference on important basic issues raised on cross-border contractual relationships. Unlike some International Business Transactions casebooks which focus on WTO-related aspects of international trade regulation, this book draws extensively on private international law and the ways in which it can be used to structure cross-border commercial transactions. Coverage includes basic commercial law issues including price-delivery terms and letter of credit financing, dispute resolution issues and how to avoid them by proper planning at the transaction stage, the legal framework for import and export regulations planning, contracting with foreign sovereigns, compliance with anti-corruption legislation, legal relationships created by foreign investment, antitrust regulation and compliance, and a chapter on professional responsibility and the unique legal representation issues raised in cross-border transactions.

The second edition incorporates nearly four decades of work by the author to present the fundamentals of the law of international business transactions organized in a manner designed to help the reader identify risks inherent in cross-border transactions; eliminate risks where possible; reduce risks that cannot be eliminated, and reallocate risks through the use of contractual relationships. It provides an organized progression of materials from the simple export-import transaction to complex international investments, all designed to help the reader understand how to avoid risk in transnational transactions through the use of the legal framework available for providing institutional protection; the purchased protection available for transnational transactions; and the ways in which negotiated protection may be provided to build on institutional and purchased protections

Professors interested in considering the book for adoption in a course may contact Laurien Roos at Laurien.Roos@wolterskluwer.com.

In [2019] EWHC 57 (Comm) Cunico v Daskalakis Baker J applies the employment and choice of court titles of the Lugano Convention 2007. Mr Daskalakis and the second defendant, Mr Mundhra, worked for the Cunico group. The group operated in base metals industries and markets. Defendants’ primary jobs were CEO and CFO respectively of Feni Industries AD (‘Feni’), the main industrial operating subsidiary of the group, incorporated and operating in FYR Macedonia. Feni owned and operated a ferronickel production plant in Kavadarci and the Rzanovo iron and nickel mine 50 km or so south of the city.

It is necessary to give a little bit of factual background to appreciate the jurisdictional issues.

Cunico Resources NV (‘Resources’) was incorporated in the Netherlands, to become the group holding company, in May 2007. Marketing was incorporated in Dubai, UAE, in July 2007, and operated in the Jebel Ali Free Zone as the main market-facing trading entity in the group. Resources had no operating activities. It existed as a holding company for the operating subsidiaries as investment assets, with a single dedicated (full-time) employee. Marketing traded by purchasing ore from other Cunico subsidiaries, and bailing the ore to a ferronickel plant within the group under a ‘tolling agreement’, for conversion by the plant to finished ferronickel. Marketing then sold the finished product to the market. Under the tolling agreement, fees for converting Marketing’s ore into finished ferronickel would be payable by Marketing to the operator of the ferronickel plant (e.g. Feni).

The Cunico group was owned, at the time of the events said to give rise to claims against the defendants, as a joint venture between International Mineral Resources BV (‘IMR’) and BSGR Cooperatief UA (‘BSGR’). Latterly, IMR has effectively all but bought BSGR out, via the intervention of proceedings in the Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber, so that today Resources is owned as to c.80% by Summerside Investments S.a.r.l., IMR’s parent company, with 50% of the remainder owned by each of IMR and BSGR.

Now, crucially (at 6): so-called ‘Advisory Contracts’ were signed as between Marketing and each of the defendants, in 2007 and again in 2010, that contained a jurisdiction provision in these words: “In case of disagreements, they shall be solved in the Court of the United Kingdom“. The claimants say that provision gives this court jurisdiction over their respective claims against the defendants under Article 23 of the Lugano Convention. It is common ground that the defendants were domiciled in Switzerland when proceedings were brought and that the claims brought against them are within the material scope of the Lugano Convention, so indeed it governs the question of jurisdiction in this case. It is also common ground that, in this international business context, the reference in the Advisory Contracts to “the Court of the United Kingdom” should be interpreted to mean the courts of England and Wales.

Marketing claims that defendants received bonus payments from Marketing to which they were not entitled and/or to procure payment of which they acted in breach of contractual and fiduciary duties owed to it.

The principal issue is whether the claims made are matters relating to individual contracts of employment so as to engage Section 5 of the Lugano Convention. Any claims that do engage Section 5 cannot be brought in England.

At 23: For each claim advanced by each claimant against either defendant, the question of jurisdiction gives rise to the following issues in this case:

i) Is that claim a matter relating to the employment of the defendant by that claimant, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Lugano Convention?

ii) If not, is that claim within the scope of the jurisdiction provision in either of the defendant’s Advisory Contracts?

iii) If so, for a claim by Resources or Feni, does that jurisdiction provision confer on the claimant an effective benefit? (This is a question under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, as each Advisory Contract was a contract only between the respective defendant and Marketing.)

Baker J decides following lengthy overview of the ’employment’ history of defendants that they were indeed employed across the group, and that Lugano’s employment heading therefore points away from jurisdiction in England. Surprisingly he does not refer at all to any CJEU precedent such as Holterman. The employment argument having succeeded, no assessment is made of Lugano’s choice of court provisions.

Geert.

 

Text provided by Laura Carballo Piñeiro – thanks!

A new online journal was born in late 2018: <http://www.rivitsproc.eu/en/>

The Italian-Spanish Journal of Procedure Law (RIEDP) is an editorial endeavour that aims to mainly publish clearly innovative papers, i.e. with the potential of making Procedure Law evolve by providing ideas and approaches that may help reform and enhance both civil and criminal procedures.

Papers written in Spanish, Italian or English are accepted for publication.

The Journal was launched by a group of scholar from Italy and Spain. Professors Jordi Nieva Fenoll, Michele Taruffo, Llorenç Bujosa Vadell, Giulio Illuminati, Rosa Ruggiero, Marien Aguilera Morales, Gina Gioia, and Laura Carballo Piñeiro have joined forces to offer a meeting point for authors that wish to share their innovative research with a wider audience. The essential requirement to be accepted for publication is the academic value of the paper regardless of whether it has already been published elsewhere. An anonymous peer-reviewed publication, RIEDP will publish accepted paper on an open-access basis and immediately after acceptance. In order to learn more about RIEDP, please visit its webpage.

Professor Dr Matthias Lehmann is looking for a highly skilled and motivated PhD candidate and fellow (Wissenschaftliche/r Mitarbeiter/in) to work at the Institute for Private International and Comparative Law, University of Bonn, Germany, on a part-time basis (50%) as of 1 April 2019.

The successful candidate holds a first law degree (ideally the First German State Examination) and is interested in the international dimensions of private law, in particular private international law, European law and/or comparative law. A very good command of German and English is expected; good IT skills are required.

The fellow will be given the opportunity to conduct his/her PhD project (according to the Faculty’s regulations). The position is paid according to the German public salary scale E-13 TV-L, 50% (about 1,300 Euro net per month). The initial contract period is two to three years, with an option to be extended; the candidate is free to leave before at any point subject only to timely notification. Responsibilities include supporting the Institute’s director in his research and teaching as well as independent teaching obligations (2 hours per week during term time).

If you are interested in this position, please send your application (cover letter in German; CV; and relevant documents and certificates, notably university transcripts and a copy of law degree) to lehrstuhl.lehmann@jura.uni-bonn.de by February 4, 2019. The University of Bonn is an equal opportunity employer.

I reviewed Bot AG’s Opinion in C-386/17 Liberato here. The Court confirmed last week. Whether lis alibi pendens applies, entails applying jurisdictional rules (in essence an assessment as to whether parties are the same etc.). Except in the very rare cases of (now) Article 45 1(e) Brussels I Recast, infringement of jurisdictional rules does not feature among the reasons for refusal of recognition. Alleged infringement of the lis alibi pendens rule does not therefore qualify as ordre public.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.3, 2.2.16.1.4.

 

 

As announced by the Department of International Law of the Organization of American States (OAS), registration is now open for the XLVI Course of International Law to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 22 July to 9 August 2019. Further information is available here in Spanish and English.

The preliminary draft agenda is available here.

A revised Draft Explanatory Report (version of December 2018) on the HCCH Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters is available in both English and French on the Hague Conference website.

In my opinion, particularly complex topics in this Draft Explanatory Report include intellectual property (IP) rights (in particular, Art. 5(3) of the draft Convention– there are several provisions dealing with IP rights in addition to this Article) and the relationship of the draft Convention with other international instruments (Art. 24 of the Draft Convention). Some of the text is in square brackets, which means that such text has tentatively been inserted due perhaps to a lack of consensus at the Special Commission meetings, and thus a final decision will be taken at the Diplomatic Session scheduled for the summer 2019.

With regard to intellectual property rights, the draft Convention distinguishes between IP rights that require to be granted or registered (such as patents, registered trademarks, registered industrial designs and granted plant breeders’ rights) and those that do not require grant or registration (i.e.  copyrights and related rights, unregistered trademarks, and unregistered industrial designs – this is a closed list for these specific rights). See paragraph 238 of the Draft Explanatory Report.

The draft Convention’s approach to IP rights, which is based on the territoriality principle, is set out very clearly in paragraph 235 of the Draft Explanatory Report. In particular, the draft Convention reflects a compromise according to which the State of Origin of the judgment will coincide with the lex loci protectionis i.e., the law of the State for which protection is sought, so as to avoid the application of foreign law to these rights (see also paragraph 236).

With respect to the relationship of the draft Convention with other international instruments, it is important to note that this draft Convention will cover, among many other things, non-exclusive choice of court agreements so as to give preference to the application of the HCCH Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements to exclusive choice of court agreements. See paragraphs 220-225 and 410-430 of the Draft Explanatory Report.

The latest information about the Judgments Project is available here.

On March 22-23, 2019, the Center for International Legal Education (CILE) at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law will host an international conference on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). The conference is entitled “The CISG at Middle Age.” It will be held in the Teplitz Memorial Courtroom of the Barco Law Building.

On Friday morning, panelists will discuss topics dealing with “The Past of the CISG: Its Successes and Failures.” This session will honor the memory of Peter Schechtriem and his suggestion that the CISG could provide “an International Linqua Franca.” The Friday afternoon panels will consider “The Present of the CISG: Is Uniform Interpretation Possible?,” honoring the memory of John Honnold and his exhortation towards “Resisting the Homeward Trend.” A dinner on Friday evening will feature a keynote address by Pitt Emeritus Professor Harry Flechtner on “The Past, Present and Future of the CISG (and Other Uniform Commercial Law Initiatives).” Saturday morning’s panels will focus on “The Future of the CISG: Have we come to Praise it or Bury it?”

The conference presents the opportunity to consider whether the widespread state ratification of the CISG indicates success in international law development, or whether the common practice of opting out of the CISG in private contracts demonstrates that its impact has been limited at best.

Conference speakers include: Ronald Brand (University of Pittsburgh), Petra Butler (Victoria University Wellington), Susanna Cook (Cohen & Grigsby), John Coyle (University of North Carolina), Milena Djordjevic (University of Belgrade), Johan Erauw (University of Ghent), Harry Flechtner (University of Pittsburgh), Henry Gabriel (Elon University), Jack Graves (Touro University), Joseph Gulino (Diaz, Reus & Targ), Stefan Kröll (Bucerius University), Ulrich Magnus (University of Hamburg), Francesco Mazotta (International Contract Manual), Chiara Giavannucci (University of Bologna), Vjosa Osmani (University of Pristina), Alejandro Osuna, (Tijuana, Mexico), Francesca Ragno (University of Verona), Ingeborg Schwenzer (University of Basel), Nina Tepic (University of Zagreb), Marco Torsello (University of Verona), Mark Walter (DAI Inc)

A link to more information on the conference, including additional links to the program and registration can be found here.

In RG 16/05579 DES v Clarins (I have a copy on file for those finding it difficult to get access) the Paris Court of Appeal on 19 September 2018 effectively applied the CJEU’s Granarolo judgment on jurisdiction, to issues of applicable law. Yet it leaves many questions unanswered and does not carry out a neat and tidy analysis at all.

The case was signalled to me by Christophe Héry, who has complete analysis here in French as well as here in English.

Companies belonging to the Clarins group (of France and Luxemburg) were sued for breach of their business relationship with a French company that distributed Clarins cosmetics in Algeria through local companies there, and for the alleged sudden halt in negotiations to try and resuscitate their contractual relationship.

The Court of appeal first of all (p.16-17 of the PDF version of the judgment) summarily rejects objections to the anchoring of non-France based defendants onto Clarins, with domicile in département 92 – Hauts de Seine: claimants request damages from all defendants, on the basis of the same facts and the same legal basis. So as to avoid conflicting judgments the Court sees no reason at all not to join the cases.

In terms of applicable law, the Court refers to Granarolo to qualify the relationship as contractual (reference is made to a tacit contract), yet then skips the application of the cascade rules of the Rome Convention (which applied ratione temporis rather than Rome I) to simply jump straight to the qualification as the relevant French rules as lois de police. As Christophe points out, there are plentry of the Convention’s default categories which could have applied to the case. Skipping the cascade to go straight to the exception is not the right way to go about conflict of laws.

The Court similarly cuts plenty a corner by summarily qualifying the sudden stop to negotiations to resuscitate a previous contractual relationship as non-contractual and applying French law as lex loci damni per Rome II (p.18), particularly as Rome II has a specific rule for culpa in contrahendo.

I am assuming an appeal with the Supreme Court is underway.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9; Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8, Heading 3.2.8.3).

Agatha Brandão de Oliveira, Senior Research Assistant at the University of Lucerne, brought to my attention a forthcoming publication bearing the above title. The official book launch will take place on February 7 in Paris

The book was edited by: Horatia Muir Watt, Professor of Law, SciencesPo Law School, Paris, France, Lucia Bíziková, Trainee in an international law firm, London, UK, Agatha Brandão de Oliveira, Guest Lecturer, Federal University of Espirito Santo (UFES), Brazil and member of the Brazilian Bar and Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo, Professor of Law, SciencesPo Law School, Paris, France. 

Contributors include: F. Antunes Madeira da Silva, S. Archer, C. Avasilencei, G.A. Bermann, R. Bismuth, L. Bíziková, S. Bollée, J. Bomhoff, S. Brachotte, A. Brandão de Oliveira, H. Buxbaum, L. Carballo Piñeiro, C. Chalas, D. Coester-Waltjen, G. Cordero-Moss, S. Corneloup, F. Costa Morosini, G. Cuniberti, J. d’Aspremont, J. Daskal, S. Dezalay, R. Fentiman, D.P. Fernández Arroyo, T. Ferrando, S. Fulli-Lemaire, U. Grusic, H. Harata, L. Hennebel, J. Heymann, P. Kinsch, H. Kupelyants, K. Langenbucher, F. Latty, O. Le Meur, G. Lewkowicz, F. Licari, F. Marchadier, T. Marzal, R. Michaels, A. Mills, H. Muir Watt, N. Najjar, V.H. Pinto Ido, E. Pataut, D. Restrepo-Amariles, D. Rosenblum, C. Salomão Filho, M. Sanchez-Badin, P. Schiff Berman, J. Sgard, D. Sindres, E. Supiot, C. Thomale, K. Trilha, H. van Loon, J. Verhellen, M. Weidemaier, M. Wells-Greco.

Key Features of the publication are presented as follows:
• the specific global scope allows the reader to gain a contextualised understanding of legal transformation
• each case has two commentaries from different viewpoints, ensuring a nuanced perspective on the implications of the global turn in private international law and its importance for adjudication
• an astute combination of theory and practice ensures readers gain an understanding of the relevance of innovative legal theories in interpreting concrete cases in a changing world
• comparative material and ground-breaking analysis make this book eminently suitable for use with students and a useful tool for researchers and courts confronted with novel topics or issues.

For more info, check here.

 

 

The Department of Law of the University of Turin intends to award three early-career fellowship grants. The value of each grant is 9.000 Euros.

Applications are welcome from young scholars, ideally with a PhD in law, in any field of law, including private international law.

Each grant is meant to finance a three-month research stay in Turin, as a result of which the grant-holder is expected to draw up a proposal for a Marie Sklodowska Curie Standard European Fellowship, indicating the Department of Law of the University of Turin as the host institution.

Candidates must not have resided or carried out their main activities in Italy for more than 12 months in the three years ending on 11 September 2019.

The deadline for applications is 11 March 2019 at 12.00 a.m. CET.

For further information see here.