On 26 and 27 June 2025, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Florian Heindler, and Simon Laimer organize the forth edition of the Austrian Private International Law Workshop. This year, it is hosted by the University of Graz, Austria. The organizers aim to facilitate an open and lively discussion on questions of private international law. Presentations will be delivered in German.
Confirmed speakers are Barbara Egglmeier-Schmolke, Burkhard Hess, Martin Lutschounig, Sören Segger-Piening and Bea Verschraegen.
Details can be found on the flyer and here. Participation is free of charge. Please register via ipr-workshop@uni-graz.at.
Just two days after losing to LOSC Lille in the Champions League, Real Madrid suffered another defeat against a French opponent. Among the 44 (!) judgments published this Friday by the CJEU – a flurry of decisions reminiscent of the madness that is the current Champions League format –, the Court decided a true ‘clásico’ of European private international law in Case C-633/22 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol.
The decision has long been awaited: eigth months after the Opinion by AG Szpunar (discussed here) has been published and almost 18 years since the facts of the case. It concerns an article published by leading French newspaper Le Monde in 2006, which claimed that both FC Barcelona and Real Madrid had retained the services of Eufemiano Fuentes, a sports doctor heavily implicated in numerous doping scandals. Real Madrid and a member of their medical team sought damages for the harm to their reputation and were eventually awarded payment of € 390,000 to the former and of € 30,000 to the latter by a Spanish court in 2014. Their attempts to enforce those awards in France were thwarted, though, with the Paris Court of Appeal holding that they were violating French public policy by deterring the media’s freedom of expression as guaranteed by Art 11. of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The French Cour de cassation finally referred the case to the CJEU in 2022, raising questions as to whether such a deterrent effect on freedom of expression would be a valid ground of public policy to refuse enforcement based on (what is now) Art. 45(1)(a) Brussels Ia and, if so, how it could be established.
In its decision (not yet available in English), the Court largely follows the Opinion of its Advocate General. After reiterating the importance of striking the right balance between swift recognition and enforcement of judgments between Member States and the defendant’s right of defence (paras. 29–31), the Court emphasises that – except in exceptional circumstances – the courts of the Member State of enforcement must not review the substance of the foreign decision (paras. 36–39) and may even have to presume that the fundamental rights of the defendant, including those derived from EU law, have been respected (paras. 42–43). Yet, a violation of the freedom of expression enshrined in Art. 11 of the Charter (and Art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights) may constitute such exceptional circumstances (paras. 45–53).
Focusing on the present case, the Court then goes on to emphasise the role of the press as a ‘public watchdog’ (using the English term even in the French original), not least with regard to reporting on doping in professional sports, and the risks of a deterring effect, relying extensively on jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights (paras. 54–56). According to the Court, it follows that in this context,
‘toute décision accordant des dommages-intérêts pour une atteinte causée à la réputation doit présenter un rapport raisonnable de proportionnalité entre la somme allouée et l’atteinte en cause.’ (para. 57)
In order to establish the existence of such a reasonable proportion, the courts of the Member State of enforcement may indeed consider, in particular, the amount awarded: if it exceeds the material and immaterial damage, or if it is significant in comparison to the ressources of the defendant, a deterrent effect may be found (paras. 62–64). What is more, the courts may also take into the account ‘la gravité de la faute [des personnes condamnées]’ (para. 68).
While it remains for the French courts to apply these criteria to the Spanish decision – and to potentially refuse enforcement to the extent (!) that it has a deterrent effect on freedom of expression (i.e. not entirely; see para. 72) on this basis –, the Court of Justice certainly appears open towards the possibility of such a deterring effect being found to exist in the present case.
Football : certaines des règles de la FIFA relatives aux transferts internationaux de footballeurs professionnels sont contraires au droit de l’Union
La Cour confirme largement la validité du Paquet mobilité
I. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depend, first and foremost, on whether the foreign court issuing the judgment was competent to hear the dispute (see Béligh Elbalti, “The Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts and the Enforcement of Their Judgments in Tunisia: A Need for Reconsideration”, 8 Journal of Private International Law 2 (2012) 199). This is often referred to as “indirect jurisdiction,” a term generally attributed to the renowned French scholar Bartin. (For more on the life and work of this influential figure, see Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, “Bartin, Etienne”, in J. Basedow et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law – Vol. I (2017) 151.)
Broadly speaking, indirect jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of the foreign court in the context of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Concretely, the court being asked to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment evaluates whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The term “indirect” distinguishes this concept from its legal opposite: direct jurisdiction. Unlike indirect jurisdiction, direct jurisdiction refers to the authority (international jurisdiction) of a domestic court to hear and adjudicate a dispute involving a foreign element (see Ralf Michaels, “Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions,” in E. Gottschalk et al. (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (2007) 35).
While indirect jurisdiction is universally admitted in national legislation and international conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the standard based on which this requirement is examined vary at best running the gamut from a quite loose standard (usually limited only to the examination of whether the dispute fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the requested court as legally determined in a limitative manner), to a very restrictive one (excluding the indirect jurisdiction of the rendering court every time the jurisdiction of the requested court – usually determined in a very broad manner – is verified). The UAE traditionally belonged to this latter group (for a comparative overview in MENA Arab Jurisdictions, see Béligh Elbalti, “Perspective of Arab Countries,” in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook (2023) 187-188; Idem “The Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Tool of Economic Integration – Views from Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf Countries, in P Sooksripaisarnkit and S R Garimella, China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law (2018) 226-229). Indeed, despite the legal reform introduced in 2018 (see infra), UAE courts have continued to adhere to their stringent approach to indirect jurisdiction. However, as the case reported here shows this might no longer be the case. The recent Dubai Supreme Court’s decision in the Appeal No. 339/2023 of 15 August 2024 confirms a latent trend observed in the UAE, particularly in Dubai, thus introducing a significant shift towards the liberalization of the recognition and enforcement requirements. Although some questions remain as to the reach of this case and its consequences, it remains a very important decision and therefore warrants attention.
II. Facts
The summaries of facts in UAE courts’ decisions are sometimes sparse in details. This one particularly lacks the information necessary to fully understand the case.
What can be inferred from the description of facts in the decision is that the dispute involved two Polish parties, a company as a plaintiff (hereafter referred to as “X”) and a seemingly a natural person as a defendant (hereafter referred to as “Y”) who has his “residence [iqamah]” in Dubai.
X was successful in the action it brought against Y in Poland and obtained a judgment ordering the latter to pay a certain amount of money. Later, X sought to enforce the Polish judgment in Dubai.
X’s enforcement petition was first admitted by the Execution Court of Dubai. On appeal, the Dubai Court of Appeal overturned the enforcement order on the ground that the international jurisdiction over the dispute lied with Dubai courts since Y had his “residence” in Dubai. Dissatisfied, X filed an appeal before the Dubai Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, X argued that Y’s residence in the UAE does not prevent actions from being brought against him in his home country, where the “event [waqi’a]” giving rise to the dispute occurred, particularly since both parties hold the same nationality. In addition, X claimed that it was not aware that Y’s residence was in the UAE.
III. The Ruling
The Supreme Court admitted the appeal and overturned the appealed decision with remand.
In its ruling, and after recalling the basic rules on statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“According to Article 85 paragraph [……] of the Executive Regulation of the Civil Procedure Act (issued by Cabinet Decision No. 57/2018,[i] applicable to the case in question), [……], “enforcement shall not be ordered unless the following is verified: “UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute [……], and that the foreign rendering court had jurisdiction according to its own laws.”
“This clearly indicates that the legislator did not allow enforcement orders to be granted [……] unless UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in which the foreign judgment to be declared enforceable was rendered. Therefore, in case of concurrent jurisdiction between UAE courts and the foreign rendering court, and both courts are competent to hear the dispute, this does not, by itself, prevent the granting of the enforcement order. This marks a departure from the previous approach prior to the aforementioned Executive Regulation, where, under the provisions of Article 235 of Federal Act on Civil Procedure No. 11/1992,[ii] it was sufficient to refuse the enforcement of a foreign judgment if the UAE courts were found to have jurisdiction over the dispute—even if their jurisdiction was not exclusive. [This continued to be the case until] the legislator intervened to address the issue of the jurisdiction that is exclusive to UAE courts [as the requested State] and concurrent jurisdiction that shared the foreign rendering court whose judgment is sought to be enforced [in UAE]. [Indeed,] the abovementioned 2018 Executive Regulation resolved this issue by clarifying that what prevents from declaring a foreign judgment enforceable is [the fact that] UAE courts are conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in which the foreign judgment was rendered. This was reaffirmed in [……] in [the new] Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Law issued by Federal Decree-Law No. 42 of 2022,[iii] which maintained this requirement [without modification].
[…] the appealed decision departed from this point view, and overturned the order declaring the foreign judgment in question enforceable on the ground that Y resides UAE, which grants jurisdiction to Dubai courts over the dispute […], despite the fact that [this] basis [of jurisdiction] referred to by the appealed decision [i.e. – the defendant’s residence in the UAE] does not grant exclusive jurisdiction to UAE courts to the exclusion of the foreign rendering court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the ruling misapplied the law and should be overturned.” (underline added)
IV. Analyses
The conclusion of the Dubai Supreme Court must be approved. The decision provides indeed a welcomed, and a much-awaited clarification regarding what can be considered one of the most controversial requirements in the UAE enforcement system. In a previous post, I mentioned indirect jurisdiction as one of the common grounds based on which UAE courts have often refused to recognize an enforce foreign judgments in addition to reciprocity and public policy.[iv] This is because, as explained elsewhere (Elbalti, op. cit), the UAE has probably one of the most stringent standard to review a foreign court’s indirect jurisdiction.
1. Indirect jurisdiction – Standard of control
The standard for recognizing foreign judgments under UAE law involves three layers of control (former article 235 of the 1992 FACP). First, UAE courts must not have jurisdiction over the case in which the foreign judgment was issued(former article 235(2)(a) first half of the 1992 FACP). Second, the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction in accordance with its rules of international jurisdiction (former article 235(2)(a) second half of the 1992 FACP). Third, the foreign court’s jurisdiction must align with its domestic law, which includes both subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction, as interpreted by the court (former Article 235(2)(b) of the 1992 FACP).
a) Traditional (stringent) position under the then applicable provisions
The interpretation and application of the first rule have been particularly problematic as UAE courts. The courts have, indeed, often rejected foreign courts’ indirect jurisdiction when UAE jurisdiction can be justified under the expansive UAE rules of direct jurisdiction (former articles 20 to 23 of the 1992 FACP), even when the foreign court is validly competent by its own standards (Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 114/1993 of 26 September 1993 [Hong Kong judgment in a contractual dispute – defendant’s domicile in Dubai]). Further complicating the issue, UAE courts tend to view their jurisdiction as mandatory and routinely nullify agreements that attempt to derogate from it (article 24 of the 1992 FACP, current article 23 of the 2022 FACP. See e.g., Federal Supreme Court, Appeals No. 311 & 325/14 of 20 March 1994; Dubai Supreme Court, Appeals No. 244 & 265/2010 of 9 November 2010; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 733/2019 of 20 August 2019).
b) Case law application
While there are rare cases where UAE courts have accepted the indirect jurisdiction of a foreign court, either based on the law of the rendering state (see e.g., Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 1366/2009 of 13 January 2010) or by determining that their own jurisdiction does not exclude foreign jurisdiction unless the dispute falls under their exclusive authority (see e.g., Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 36/2007 of 28 November 2007), the majority of cases have adhered to the traditional restrictive view (see e.g., Federal Supreme Court, Appeal No. 60/25 of 11 December 2004; Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 240/2017 of 27 July 2017 ; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 106/2016 of 11 May 2016). This holds true even when the foreign court’s jurisdiction is based on a choice of court agreement (see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 52/2019 of 18 April 2019). Notably, UAE courts have sometimes favored local interpretations over international conventions governing indirect jurisdiction, even when such conventions were applicable (see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 468/2017 of 14 December 2017; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 238/2017 of 11 October 2017. But contra, see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 87/2009 of 22 December 2009; Federal Supreme Court, Appeal 5/2004 of 26 June 2006).
2. The 2018 Reform and its confirmation in 2022
The 2018 reform of the FACP introduced significant changes to the enforcement of foreign judgments, now outlined in the 2018 Executive Regulation (articles 85–88) and later confirmed in the new 2022 FACP (articles 222~225). One of the key modifications was the clarification that UAE courts’ exclusive jurisdiction should only be a factor when the dispute falls under their exclusive authority (Art. 85(2)(a) of the 2018 Executive Regulation; article 222(2)(a) of the new 2022 FACP). While courts initially continued adhering to older interpretations, a shift toward the new rule emerged, as evidenced by a case involving the enforcement of a Singaporean judgment (which I previously reported here in the comments). In this case, Dubai courts upheld the foreign judgment, acknowledging that their jurisdiction, though applicable, was not exclusive (Dubai Court of First Instance, Case No. 968/2020 of 7 April 2021). The Dubai Supreme Court further confirmed this approach by dismissing an appeal that sought to challenge the judgment’s enforcement (Appeal No. 415/2021 of 30 December 2021). This case is among the first to reflect a new, more expansive interpretation of UAE courts’ recognition of foreign judgments, aligning with the intent behind the 2018 reform.
3. Legal implications of the new decision and the way forward
The Dubai Supreme Court’s decision in the case reported here signifies a clear shift in the UAE’s policy toward recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. This ruling addresses a critical issue within the UAE’s enforcement regime and aligns with broader trends in global legal systems (see Béligh Elbalti, “Spontaneous Harmonization and the Liberalization of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” 16 Japanese Yearbook of Private International Law (2014) 273). As such, the significance of this development cannot be underestimated.
However, there is a notable caveat: while the ruling establishes that enforcement will be granted if UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction, the question remains as to which cases fall under the UAE courts’ exclusive jurisdiction. The 2022 FACP does not provide clarity on this matter. One possible exception can be inferred from the 2022 FACP’s regulation of direct jurisdiction which confers broad jurisdiction to UAE courts, “except for actions relating to immovable located abroad” (article 19 of the 2022 FACP). Another exception is provided for in Article 5(2) of the Federal Act on Commercial Agencies,[v] which subjects all disputes regarding commercial agencies in UAE to the jurisdiction of the UAE courts (see e.g., Federal Supreme Appeal No. 318/18 of 12 November 1996).
Finally, one can question the relevance of the three-layer control of the indirect jurisdiction of foreign courts, particularly regarding the assessment of whether the foreign court had jurisdiction based on its own rules of both domestic and international jurisdiction. It seems rather peculiar that a UAE judge would be considered more knowledgeable or better equipped to determine that these rules were misapplied by a foreign judge, who is presumably well-versed in the legal framework of their own jurisdiction. This raises concerns about the efficiency and fairness of such a control mechanism, as it could lead to inconsistent or overly stringent standards in evaluating foreign judgments. These requirements are thus called to be abolished.
———————————————
[i] The 2018 Executive Regulation Implementing the 1992 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Cabinet decision No. 57/2018 of 9 December 2018, as subsequently amended notably by the Cabinet Decision No.75/2021 of 30 August 2021; hereafter referred to as “2018 Executive Regulation”.)
[ii] The 1992 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Federal Law No. 11/1992 of 24 February 1992, hereafter “1992 FACP”).
[iii] The 2022 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Federal Legislative Decree No. 42/2022 of 30 October 2022). The Act abolished and replaced the 2018 Executive Regulation and the 1992 FACP (hereafter “2022 FACP”).
[iv] However, since then, there have been subsequent developments regarding reciprocity that warrant attention as reported here.
[v] Federal Law No. 3/2022 of 13 December 2022 regulating Commercial Agencies, which repealed and replaced the former Federal Law No. 18/1982 of 11 August 1981.
(This post was drafted by Zhang Yong, a PhD student in the University of Macau and revised by Guangjian Tu)
The Annual Inter-regional and International Family Law Forum of Chinese Society of Private International Law was held on September 21, 2024 in Everwin Law Office, Guangzhou. Scholars, practitioners and notaries from all over the country working in the field came together to discuss the relevant issues. After the opening ceremony chaired by Prof. Guangjian Tu from the University of Macau, keynote speeches were delivered: 1, Prof. Yong Gan, School of Law of Wuhan University, who is a member of the Expert Group, introduced the progress of the Expert Group’s work on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project in the Hague Conference on Private International Law; 2, Prof. Faqiang Yuan, School of International Law of East China University of Political Science and Law, shared his research article titled “Annual Report on the Development of Rule of Law in the Field of Family Affairs: Domestic and Abroad in 2022-2023″.
In the parallel sessions, participants had heated debates and discussions on new developments in foreign-related family law in the Mainland China, foreign-related and Hong Kong and/or Macao-related marital property relations and agreements, parentage and maintenance support, recognition and enforcement of inter-regional marriage and family judgments, foreign-related and Hong Kong and/or Macao-related inheritance, and jurisdiction over inter-regional family issues etc.
Of course, the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in Matrimonial and Family Cases by the Courts of the Mainland China and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Arrangement) was the focus of this forum. The Arrangement was adopted on 20 June 2017 and came into effect on 15 February 2022. In order to achieve closer and more extensive judicial assistance in the area of marriage and family law between Mainland China and Hong Kong, except for inheritance-related issues, the Arrangement covers a broad range of matters, almost everything in marriage and family laws such as validity of marriage, marital property relationships, parentage, maintenance, adoption etc. This is very different from the Regulations enacted in the European Union, which regulated those issues one by one in a piece-meal approach.
Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)
The third issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2024 was released on October 1st. It contains four articles and several case notes. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will shortly be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).
The volume features a first article on L’ambiguïté de la notion de « reconnaissance » confrontée à la proposition de règlement de l’Union européenne relative à la filiation (The ambiguity of the concept of “recognition” in the light of the EU draft regulation on parenthood) authored by Prof. Christine Bideau (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3), who provided the following abstract :
The term “recognition” is often used in private international law, but it has very different meanings. So when the European Commission draws up a proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood, insisting on the permanence of the parenthood link regardless of the Member State in which the persons concerned are located, we can only wonder what meaning it intended to give to this “recognition” of parenthood that it advocates in its explanatory memorandum.
In the second article, Prof. Étienne Pataut (Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne) discusses the Perte de nationalité en Europe : la consolidation du contrôle de proportionnalité (Loss of nationality in Europe : the strengthening of proportionnality review). Its abstract reads as follows :
By two new decisions, the Court of Justice clarifies the content, in particular procedural, of the proportionality control in matters of loss of nationality. These solutions could have a significant impact on French litigation in this area.
In the third article, Prof. Gilles Cuniberti (Université du Luxembourg) embarks À la recherche d’une justification sérieuse à l’application de la Convention de 2004 sur l’immunité des États par le juge français (In search of a serious justification for the application of the 2004 Convention on State Immunity by the French judge). The abstract reads as follows :
Since 2011, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) has ruled that the French law of sovereign immunities is based on customary international law, and that it would be reflected in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. This Article surveys the case law of several European supreme courts and argues that it is doubtful that the Convention reflects customary international law. It concludes by proposing that French courts apply the Convention as such, instead of pretending to apply customary international law.
Lastly, Prof. Thibaut Fleury Graff (Université Paris II Panthéon Assas) conducts a review of recent French and European case law on droit des étrangers (aliens’ law). Entitled Du politique au juridique : qui est l’étranger ? Retours choisis sur la jurisprudence 2023 en matière de migrations (From the political to the legal: who is the alien? Selected case law on migration in 2023), the contribution offers a critical look at the boundary work constantly at play in the definition of the status of aliens.
The full table of contents is available here.
Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer