Agrégateur de flux

In [2017] EWHC 2928 (Comm) Dana Gas v Deutsche Bank et al., Leggatt J treats his readers to a concise insight into islamic finance (particularly in para 10) which he needs to inform readers of the essence of the case. The operation essentially involves raising investment (with a view to restructuring), organised by the main agreement (of the ‘Mudarabah’ type), subject to UAE law, and supported by a purchase undertaking of the same date, subject to English law. The set-up therefore evidently is not one of dépeçage per se (this would require one and the same agreement being subject to different laws) however it comes close.

Inevitably following unfavourable market conditions, an anti-suit injunction was sought and obtained in the UAE, followed however by English proceedings which required the aint-suit to be lifted – something which Dana Gas did not succeed in as a result of shareholder opposition. The English proceedings were effectively saved from collapse by the involvement of a third party, BlackRock, who as a non-party to the UAE sharia proceedings, were not bound by the anti-suit injunction. The somewhat complicated result is that the English proceedings really can only limp along.

Dana Gas seek confirmation that the transaction is unlawful and all the relevant contractual obligations are unenforceable as a matter of UAE law. Leggatt J with neither emotion nor hesitation refers essentially to Rome I’s universal application: the Mudarabah agreement is subject to UAE law and he is happy to assume it is invalid under UAE law – hence not enforceable by an English court. See in this respect Article 10(1) Rome I.

That however leaves the viability of the purchase undertaking. (at 46) The fact that the contract or its performance would be regarded as invalid or unlawful under the law of some other country than England (for example, a country where one of the parties is domiciled or carries on business) is generally speaking irrelevant (reference is made to Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678.

At 48, Dana Gas sets out its case for unenforceability of the purchase agreement under English law. This includes reference to ordre public but also inevitably an attempt to ‘contaminate’ the purchase agreement with the Mudarabah agreement. Leggatt J justifiably turns this around: at 54: it is apparent from the purchase agreement’s terms that the risks against which the Purchase Undertaking is intended to protect the Certificateholders include the risk that the mudarabah and the transaction documents governed by UAE law will turn out to be invalid. That is why they needed to be separated. (In that respect merging the two agreements into one and applying dépeçage might give even stronger force to this argument: however I do not know whether under UAE law such constriction would be acceptable).

Further arguments swept aside, the Court turns to ordre public: Dana Gas nb employs both ordre public and, earlier Article 9(3) Rome I: overriding mandatory law: a rare treat indeed. Relevant English precedent is Ralli Brothers: Ralli Brothers v Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 1 KB 614: an English court will not enforce an obligation which requires a party to do something which is unlawful by the law of the country in which the act has to be done. However Dana Gas later abandoned that claim for (at 80) those rules of law are only applicable if and in so far as the obligations in question have to be performed in the UAE – quod non. A switch was then made to ordre public, now with Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 as leading precedent. However, here too, it is only if a contract has as its object and intention the performance in a friendly foreign country of an act which is illegal under the law of that country that the contract will be considered (at 82 in fine) contrary to English public policy.

Conclusion:  the Purchase Undertaking is valid and enforceable.

Without claiming anything near proper competence in Islamic finance law, it would seem that Dana Gas does not introduce new principles. However in diligently applying conflicts analysis, Leggatt J in my view does practice a great service: he re-emphasises the need for parties clearly to identify locus implementi: the place of performance of an obligation.

Geert.

(Handbook) of Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016: essentially, almost every section of Chapters 2 and 3.

Alongside the intensifying global efforts (the Judgments Project, HCCH) devoted to inter-country recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, a new stage has been witnessed of China’s positive treatment of foreign judgments ie China starts to reciprocate, following foreign courts’ initiative of recognizing and enforcing Chinese judgments. Dr. Wenliang Zhang, from the Law School of Renmin U, reflects on this new encouraging development and has just published a timely article in the latest issue of Chinese Journal of International Law (OUP) titled “Sino–Foreign Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Promising “Follow-Suit” Model?”.

“Abstract: Due to the upsurge in cross-border transaction, the movement of judgments between jurisdictions has become a hot topic. Unfortunately, China’s legislation and practice in this area has long lagged behind that of other countries, though China is not the only party to blame for the lack of a favourable Sino–foreign recognition mechanism. Encouragingly, in recent years some foreign courts have taken the initiative to recognize Chinese judgments, which Chinese courts have then responded to positively, forming a “follow-suit” circle in practice. A new opportunity has thus arrived for promoting Sino–foreign judgment recognition, and both Chinese and foreign courts should seize it, as it appears to be the most efficient and practical among possible solutions, including future domestic legislation or international treaties”.

The article is accessible at: Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 16, Issue 3, 1 September 2017, Pages 515–545, https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmx024 or it can be downloaded at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3077702.

Fixation de prix minima à la vente, concertation sur les quantités mises sur le marché, échanges d’informations stratégiques. La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) s’est prononcée par un arrêt du 14 novembre dernier sur l’articulation des règles de concurrence avec les objectifs fixés par les dispositions sur la politique agricole commune aux organisations de producteurs français d’endives.

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The Brazilian and Portuguese Branches of the International Law Association are organising a conference to be held in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 23 to 25 May 2018.

Those interested in participating may submit abstracts until 15 December 2017. More information here.

And I would be very happy to supervise. Thank you Nicolas Contis for flagging  Stockholm National Museum v X at the French Supreme Court /Cour de Cassation. Nul ne peut se contredire au détriment d’autrui: aka (here: procedural) estoppel. (The newly out Encyclopedia of Private international law, edited by Basedow, Ruhl, Ferrari and de Miguel Asensio, has a very good entry on it, discussing both public and private international law).

On the eve of a hearing on the ownership of an ancient artefact, a cup, defendants changed their stance and argued that the cup had belonged to their mother, for whom they were acting as representatives only. Previously, they had always presented themselves as owners. They suggested therefore that the suit was misdirected, hoping to sink it. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ motion on account of procedural estoppel. The Supreme Court disagreed: its stance means, as Nicolas summarises, that ‘to face the procedural penalty of dismissal, not only must the change of stance happen throughout the judicial proceedings (ie, notably, that a contradiction including a repeated allegation made before the launching of a suit could not pass the estoppel test), but the party at fault must also have changed its ‘pretentions’ – that is, its legal claims (meaning that changing the factual allegations presented to the courts could not pass the test either)’.

I do not see entirely clear in French civil procedure law but as I saw the case reported, the thought struck me: this would be a good topic for a PhD: a comparative study in procedural estoppel, specifically in a private international law context (especially if one were also to throw a comparison with arbitration in the mix).

Happy to discuss. Geert.

 

Rodrigues de Andrade
Rapprochement des législations
Les dommages causés par des véhicules qui ont vocation à être utilisés aussi comme machines de travail ne doivent être couverts par l’assurance obligatoire de la responsabilité civile résultant de la circulation des véhicules que lorsque ceux-ci sont principalement utilisés comme moyens de transport

Selon la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, constituent une violation de l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale), des accusations d’actes criminels violents dirigées envers une personne non inculpée et non reconnue coupable d’un tel crime, sans que les propos en cause ne soient étayés par des faits.

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(per Mathias Goldmann)

The German Law Journal has a successful tradition of publishing timely and innovative special issues. Some of these have become standard works in their respective areas of research. While some of the special issues are curated by the Editorial Board, the German Law Journal has often worked with guest editors. To ensure both the highest quality for our readers and the best possible experience for our guest editors, the German Law Journal has launched its third call for special issues and invites prospective guest editors to submit their proposals. The deadline is 31 January 2018. For more information, please visit http://www.germanlawjournal.com/call-for-special-issue-proposals

Cour d'appel de Paris, première chambre de l'instruction, 22 septembre 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de paris, Pôle 5, Chambre 5-7, 2 juin 2016

Tribunal de police d'Angers, 10 novembre 2017

Tribunal des affaires de sécurité sociale de Bobigny, 10 novembre 2017

Conseil Régional de Discipline des Avocats du ressort de la Cour d'Appel de Douai, formation plénière, 13 novembre 2017

Tribunal Correctionnel d'Ajaccio, 27 octobre 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 2, chambre 6, 25 avril 2017

Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Paris, 7e chambre correctionnelle, 03 mars 2017

This is effectively my second posting today on Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast.

In C-560/16 Dědouch, Wathelet AG Opined last week, on the scope of the exclusive jurisdictional rule of (now) Article 24(2) of Regulation 1215/2012. The issue arose in proceedings between Michael Dědouch et al, a group of minority shareholders on the one hand, and Jihočeská plynárenská a.s. (established in the Czech Republic) and E.ON Czech Holding AG (‘E.ON’) [established in Germany] on  the other, concerning the reasonableness of the sum which, in a procedure for removing minority shareholders (‘squeeze-out’), E.ON was required to pay Mr Dědouch et al following the compulsory transfer of their shares in Jihočeská plynárenská.

Mr Dědouch et al are suing both companies and are asking the Regional Court, České Budějovice, Czech Republic to review the reasonableness of the sum. In those proceedings E.ON raised an objection that the Czech courts lacked jurisdiction. E.ON argue that, in view of the location of its seat /domicile, only the German courts had international jurisdiction per (now) Article 4.

The regional court initially accepted jurisdiction on the basis of (now) Article 8(1): the anchor defendant mechanism (one of the two defendant companies being a Czech company). Eventually the High Court, Prague found that the Czech courts had jurisdiction under (old) Article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation: the special jurisdictional rules for contracts.

Wathelet AG suggests the case raises the complex issue of litigation in intra-company disputes. At 21 he writes that the facts highlight a structural problem in the Regulation, namely ‘the absence of a basis of jurisdiction dedicated to the resolution of internal disputes within companies, such as disputes between shareholders or between shareholders and directors or between the company and its directors.’ That is not quite correct: it is not because the Regulation has no tailor-made regime for this type of dispute that is has no jurisdictional basis for it. That a subject-matter is not verbatim included in the Regulation does not mean it is not regulated by it.

The AG then (at 23) considers that the issue under consideration is complicated by the difficulty of applying (now) Articles 7(1) and (2), ‘since the removal of the minority shareholders and the consideration decided by a resolution of the general meeting are neither a contract nor a tort, delict or quasi-delict.’ I am not so sure. Is there no ‘obligation freely assumed’ between minority and other shareholders of the same company? Are they not bound by some kind of ‘contract’ (in the broad, Jakob Handte sense) when becoming shareholders of one and the same company? That (at 24) ‘The principle of a procedure for squeezing out the minority shareholders is that the principal shareholder can start it without their consent‘ I do not find convincing in this respect. Plenty of contractual arrangements do not limit contracting parties’ freedom to act: except, their actions may have contractual consequences. The AG in my view focuses too much on the squeeze out being one-sided. An alternative view may see a wrongful deployment of squeeze-out a breach of an earlier contractual, indeed fiduciary duty between /among shareholders.

Unlike the AG (at 26), neither do I see great obstacle in the difficulty in determination of a specific place of performance of such contractual duties between shareholders in the company law context. They may not fit within the default categories of Article 7(1), however I can see many a national judge not finding it impossible to determine a place of performance.

On the basis of these perceived difficulties the AG dismisses application of Articles 7(1) and (2) and then considers, and rejects, a strict application of Article 24(2). In other words in the AG’s view Article 24(2) is engaged here.

This is a tricky call. Justified reference is made by the AG to C‑372/07 Hassett, in which (then) Article 22(2) was held no to apply to a decision made by the Board of the Health Organisation not to indemnify two of their members in cases of medical negligence: this was found by the CJEU to be an action relating to the way in which a company organ exercises its functions – not covered by Article 24(2). In Dědouch, the action relates to the amount which the General Meeting of the company fixed as the compensation E.ON was required to pay the minority shareholders following the transfer of the shares. Notwithstanding Czech company law being the lex causae in assisting the GM in that decision, I am not convinced this engages Article 24(2) (hence reserving jurisdiction to the Czech courts).

In summary, I believe the Court should reject application of Article 24(2), and instruct the national courts to get on with the determination of jurisdiction per Article 7, or indeed 8.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.11.1, Heading 2.2.12.1.