Agrégateur de flux

The group-of-companies doctrine allows attributing obligations of one group member to another. It may also be used to justify a head of jurisdiction to sue all members of one group at the same place.

Yet this doctrine does not apply under the Brussels I bis Regulation, at least not in the consumer contract context, as the CJEU has held in Club la Costa (judgment of 14 September 2023, Case C-821/21). In the same decision, the Court also clarified the burden of proof regarding the domicile of a corporation. The points of the judgment addressing the applicable law under the Rome I Regulation will be commented in a subsequent post.

Facts

A British resident had entered for private purposes into a timeshare contract through the Spanish branch of a British company (Club La Costa). The contract stipulated the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.

The consumer then brought a claim in a Spanish court against Club La Costa, which apparently went into liquidation subsequently, and various other British companies belonging to the same group.

Legal Issues

The Spanish court asked the CJEU whether the term ‘other party to the contract’ in Article 18(1) Brussels I bis Regulation could also refer to other group members. It furthermore wanted to know how the group members would have to prove that they are not domiciled in Spain but abroad.

Ruling on the Group-of-Companies Doctrine

The CJEU first underlines that the application of Article 18(1) Brussels I bis Regulation presupposes the existences of a contract, and that it is decisive “that the parties to the dispute are also the parties to the contract in question” (para 48) (on the wider scope of Article 7(1) Brussels I bis in this respect, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-274/16, C-447/16 and C-448/16, flightright v Air Nostrum, paras 62-65). Therefore, a consumer’s action under this head of jurisdiction must be brought against the other party to the contract (para 50). Consequently, it cannot be brought against other members of the group, with whom the consumer had been contractually linked as well, but not by the timeshare contract.

The Court of Justice distinguishes this case from its decision in Maletic (Case C-478/12). In the latter, a consumer couple had booked a vacation trip with an internet platform and a travel agency. The CJEU had ruled at the time that the contractual relationship with the platform operator was ‘inseparably linked’ to that with the travel agency and that both would therefore fall under the consumer heads of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Regulation. This is, however, not the case with the contracts between the consumer and the members of the group in Club La Costa, which can be neatly separated from each other.

Ruling on the Proof of Corporate Domicile

The second question requires a little more explanation. The domicile of corporations is determined by Article 63(1) Brussels I bis in a three-fold manner (statutory seat, central administration and principal place of business), with a special definition of the statutory seat of British companies in Article 63(2). The burden of proof for these places is a procedural question, thus falling outside the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Yet the reference for a preliminary ruling reported the opinion of some Spanish courts which interpret Article 63(2) Brussels I bis Regulation as merely creating a ‘presumption of fact’. If it were ascertained that a defendant company carries out activities in Spain, the international jurisdiction of the Spanish courts would be justified. Hence, it would be for the defendants to show that their domicile is located outside of Spain (para 31).

The CJEU gives this interpretation short shrift. It underlines that Article 63 Brussels I bis must be subject to autonomous interpretation under EU law (para 60). The provision gives the consumer the right to choose between the three locations set out there (para 63). Hence, it does not limit the consumer’s choice (para 64), but on the contrary expands it. The provision of Article 63(2) Brussels I bis, in turn, provides a clarifying definition of the statutory seat of English companies (para 65). It can therefore not be accepted that these provisions would merely create presumptions that could be rebutted (para 66).

Assessment

On both points, the ruling of the CJEU is clear, straight-forward, and firmly anchored in the text of the Regulation. The binding wording must be upheld against the tendency to disregard it when this suits the consumer in the individual case. As important as the goal of consumer protection is, it does not justify bending the rule of law.

— Thanks to Paul Eichmüller for reviewing this post.

 

Dès lors qu’elle n’était pas expressément visée par les dispositions de l’article 127 de l’Accord de retrait, mentionnant par exception les engagements non applicables durant la période transitoire fixée jusqu’au 31 décembre 2020, la Convention de Lugano, par laquelle le Royaume-Uni était lié comme État membre de l’Union européenne, demeurait applicable jusqu’à cette date.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Les grands arrêts de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne Voir la boutique Dalloz

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The first edition of the HAIL Advanced Courses in Hong Kong, organised in cooperation with with the Asian Academy of International Law and (AAIL) and the Hong Kong Department of Justice, will take place on 11-15 December 2023 with a focus on “Current Trends on International Commercial and Investment Dispute Settlement“.

For this special programme, the Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law (Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin) has invited leading academics and practitioners from around the world to Hong Kong, including Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (Science Po, Paris), Franco Ferrari (New York University),  Natalie Morris-Sharma (Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore), Matthias Weller (University of Bonn) and Judge Gao Xiaoli (Supreme People’s Court, China), who will deliver five expert lectures on:

Lecture 1: ‘The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation’ (Natalie Morris-Sharma)
Lecture 2: ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (Diego P. Fernández Arroyo)
Lecture 3: ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ (Franco Ferrari)
Lecture 4: , ‘Settlement of International Disputes before Domestic Courts’ (Matthias Weller)
Lecture 5: ‘Latest Developments of Dispute Resolution in China’ (Judge Gao Xiaoli)

This course is free of charge. However, full attendance is mandatory. Interested candidates are invited to send the completed application form to events@aail.org by 13 October 2023. All applications are subject to review. Succesful applicants will receive email confirmation by October 31. Registered participants will have pre-course access to the HAIL e-learning platform that provides reading materials prepared by the lecturers. A certificate of attendance will be awarded to participant with a perfect attendance record.

For further information provided by the organisers, please refer to the attached HAIL eFlyer and application form.

Wuhan University and Fudan University are co-organising an International Symposium “Legalisation of Foreign Relations in China” on 14 Oct 2023. This symposium will discuss the two most important developments in Chinese law relating to foreign relations, i.e. the Foreign Relations Law and the Foreign State Immunities Law. Some presented articles will be published in the special session of the Chinese Journal of Transnational Law. This symposium will be held in person and online. Everyone is welcome. For more information and the link to attend the symposium online, please follow the event page: https://online.fliphtml5.com/nrdjx/fnwu/

On Tuesday, October 10, 2023, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 37th monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00-12:30 (CEST). Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (Sciences Po Law School) will speak, in English, about

Transnational Commercial Arbitration as Private International Law Feature

A significant part of private international law (PrIL) disputes is nowadays solved by means of arbitration. At the same time, the range of arbitrable issues has been growing up for decades. Consequently, arbitration is no longer ignored by PrIL scholars, who, nevertheless, hesitate about how to deal with it. Many of them are only attracted by the fact that arbitral tribunals are often confronted to ordinary problems of determining the law applicable to a particular issue. Through the lens of this classical-PrIL approach, they identify sometimes conflict-of-law rules in arbitration instruments. Without denying any interest to this option, we will try to provide a more comprehensive view, starting by revising the very respective notion of arbitration and PrIL as well as their interaction, and concluding to challenge the excessive role played by the seat of the arbitration.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

A book edited by Anselmo Reyes, Wilson Lui, and Kazuaki Nishioka on Choice of Law and Recognition in Asian Family Law has just been published in the Hart Studies in Private International Law -Asia.

The blurb read as follows:

This thematic volume in the series Studies in Private International Law – Asia outlines the general choice of law and recognition rules relating to family matters of 15 Asian jurisdictions: Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India. The book examines pressing questions and proposes ways in which their systems may be reformed. A concluding chapter considers the extent to which Asian cross-border family law systems can and should be harmonised.

The book provides a comprehensive analysis of cross-border family law challenges, including child surrogacy, child abduction, the recognition of same-sex unions, the recovery of maintenance, and the regulation of intercountry adoption. These are among the matters now testing Asian institutions of private international law and acting as forces for their modernisation.

With contributions by leading Asian private international law experts, the book proposes necessary reforms for each of the jurisdictions analysed as well as for Asia as a whole.

A book edited by Kazuaki Nishioka on Treatment of Foreign Law in Asia  has just been published in the Hart Studies in Private International Law -Asia.

The blurb read as follows:

How do Asian courts ascertain, interpret, and apply a foreign law as the law governing the merits of the case? What should judges do if parties do not raise or disagree on the content of foreign law? This thematic volume in the Studies in Private International Law – Asia series analyses the treatment of foreign law before judicial authorities, that is, how the courts of Asian states deal with the proof of foreign law in court litigation involving cross-border elements.

The individual chapters cover 15 Asian jurisdictions: Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India.

The Introduction and Conclusion examine similarities and differences in the approaches taken by the 15 Asian states with a view to assessing the extent to which those approaches are consistent or different from each other. The book also puts forward suggestions for harmonising differing approaches, especially between Asian common law and civil law states.

The book is a one-stop reference guide on the treatment of foreign law in Asia and will be indispensable to judges, practitioners, and scholars not just in Asia, but worldwide.

Sofatutor
Approximation of laws
Le droit du consommateur de se rétracter d’un abonnement souscrit à distance, initialement gratuit et reconduit automatiquement, est garanti une seule fois

Lydia Lundstedt, Senior Lecturer in Private International Law at the Stockholm University and in Intellectual Property Law at the Linköping University, has accepted the invitation of the editors of the blog to present her recent book, titled ‘Cross-Border Trade Secret Disputes in the European Union: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law’, published by Edward Elgar.

In today’s knowledge-based and data-driven economy, information is a company’s most valuable asset. The most common form of legal protection for information are laws that protect trade secrets. In contrast to patents, copyright, and trademarks, whose importance for protecting intangible assets is well-recognised, trade secret protection has often come in their shadow as the less important form of protection. The importance of legal protection for trade secrets is however gaining acceptance and many states have sharpened their laws on trade secret protection. In determining the form and level of trade secret protection, states consider (often constitutional) rules on the freedom of information, the freedom to compete and operate a business, employee mobility, and privacy. Depending on the social, political, and economic environment of the state, the form and level of protection may vary considerably.

To ensure a ‘sufficient and consistent level’ of protection under the laws of all the Member States, the European Union (EU) enacted Directive 2016/943 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (Trade Secrets) against their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure. The Directive is in the form of a minimum directive, so Member States may provide for more far-reaching protection. Complicating matters is the fact that trade secret protection is a bit of a ‘strange bird’, which is reflected in the diverging doctrinal basis for trade secret protection. This divergence continues even after the implementation of the Trade Secret Directive, where some Member States continue to provide protection under unfair competition law, others have introduced a sui generis form of protection, and one Member State protects trade secrets as an intellectual property (IP) right. In addition, all Member States continue to protect trade secrets under contract law, and under the legal systems of some Member States, a trade secret holder may raise concurrent claims based on contractual and non-contractual grounds.

Trade secret protection is even more diverse on the international level. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) guarantees only a minimum level of protection for ‘undisclosed information’ and leaves a wide margin of discretion with respect to how Members can afford protection. The inclusion of trade secret protection in a treaty on intellectual property adds to the confusion about the correct classification of trade secrets.

With the ease of digital communications, employee migration, and international trade, trade secret violations can easily have a cross-border, and even a global dimension.  Unlike physical assets, information can move at the speed of light and become ubiquitous instantaneously.  In this respect, trade secrets are like (traditional) IP rights in that trade secrets and IP rights consist of commercially valuable information that are often exploited over national borders in order to take full advantage of their economic potential. In another respect, however, trade secrets differ from IP rights, which pursuant to the territoriality principle, may be in the public domain in some states without affecting their protection in others. This is not the case for trade secret protection because if the information becomes freely accessible, it will no longer fulfil the criterium of secrecy that is required for its continued protection.

Within the EU, one would expect that the environment would be conducive for the litigation of cross-border trade secret disputes because the rules on private international law are harmonised at the EU level. Despite this, cross-border litigation and enforcement of trade secrets is considered to be extremely difficult and is also rare. This may be due to the varying doctrinal bases for trade secret protection and the fact that trade secret violations can take place in contractual and non-contractual contexts. Moreover, if the trader secret holder brings proceedings against a former employee, weaker party rules will affect the choice of forum and applicable law. Another complicating factor is that in some cases, jurisdiction and the applicable law is based on the location of damage, which is difficult to localise as trade secrets are intangible and can be acquired, disclosed, and used everywhere. What is more, there may be a number of potential defendants located in different countries that allegedly violated the trade secrets, and it may be difficult to join them all in one proceeding and under one law.

The book investigates how the EU private international law rules can be interpreted to facilitate the objectives of the EU Trade Secret Directive when trade secrets are litigated and enforced over national borders. A basic assumption for this study is that effective and consistent protection of trade secrets in cross-border situations is facilitated when the parties can resolve their dispute before one court that has jurisdiction over the entire dispute and under one law, resulting in a judgment capable of being enforced in all Member States. When analysing which Member States have jurisdiction and which law or laws are applicable as well as the scope of the jurisdiction and of the applicable law, the book considers the competing interests of the parties and the EU public interest in general.

The book concentrates on three common categories of defendants, namely, contractual partners, employees, and competitors, and describes and analyses where each respective category of defendant can be sued and what law(s) is(are) applicable from an EU private international law perspective. The book also considers whether any of the rules in the Trade Secret Directive might be overriding mandatory rules, public policy (ordre public), or non-excludable rules that displace corresponding rule in the lex causae.

Pour apprécier si l’excuse de bonne foi peut être retenue au bénéfice du prévenu poursuivi pour diffamation, il appartient aux juges, en premier lieu, de rechercher si les propos litigieux s’inscrivent dans un débat d’intérêt général et s’ils reposent sur une base factuelle suffisante puis, en deuxième lieu, lorsque ces deux conditions sont réunies, si l’auteur des propos a conservé prudence et mesure dans l’expression et était dénué d’animosité personnelle.
 

Sur la boutique Dalloz Pratique du droit de la presse Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Jürgen Samtleben just published a collection of his work on the PIL of Latin America; he kindly shared the following announcement with us:

Jürgen Samtleben has authored numerous articles over the years on private international law and international civil procedure in Latin America. These contributions have now been updated and systematically organized into a single volume, thereby offering a unique overview of the conflict of laws in Latin American countries. The collection of articles in German, Spanish and English is supplemented by a comprehensive volume containing the relevant statutory materials in their original language as well as in German translation.

The indices of volume I (‘Rechtsordnungen’) and volume II (‘Gesetzestexte’) can be found here and here. More information is available here.

Ascenza Agro et Industrias Afrasa / Commission
Agriculture
Le Tribunal rejette le recours contre le non-renouvellement de l’approbation de la substance active chlorpyriphos-méthyl, utilisée dans des produits phytopharmaceutiques

A webinar on early marriages, organised by the Interest Group on Private International Law of SIDI, the Italian Society of international Law, will take place on 5 October 2023 at 4 pm CET.

The event will specifically concern the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, of 2023, on the constitutionality of the German law combating child marriages of 2017, and aims to provide comparative reflections on early marriages and their regulation in national and international law.

The main speaker will be Nadjma Yassari (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), while Giacomo Biagioni (University of Cagliari) will act as a discussant.

The webinar, in English, will be broadcast through Microsoft Teams. Those interested in attending are invited to use this link to connect as the webinar begins. No registration is required.

I have already reported that the UK Supreme Court ruled on the meaning of a “matter” in Article II(3) of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC) in its judgment of 20 September 2023 in Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) [2023] UKSC 32.

On the very same day, the Privy Council, speaking through Lord Hodge (other judges were Lord Reed (President), Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs, and Lord Kitchin), gave a judgment on Article II(3) NYC in FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation [2023] UKPC 33. This case was decided on appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands.

While there is a degree of overlap between the two judgments, the facts of the two cases are different and FamilyMart raised a broader range of issues.

Facts

A traveller to the Far East can be surprised by the number of convenience stores and the range of goods and services they offer. This case concerns a dispute between FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd (“FMCH”) and Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation (“Ting Chuan”), the shareholders of China CVS (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp (“Company”), a Cayman Islands company that operates some 2,400 convenience stores in China under the “FamilyMart” brand.

The relationship between the shareholders is governed by a shareholders’ agreement, which contains a clause providing that “any and all disputes in connection with or arising out of this Agreement [shall be] submitted for arbitration” in Beijing.

In 2018, FMCH presented a petition in a Cayman Islands court to wind up the Company on the just and equitable ground under the Companies Law (2018 Revision). The petition was based on alleged misconduct by Ting Chuan in connection with the management of the Company. Ting Chuan applied to strike out or stay the petition under section 4 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act, which applies to foreign arbitrations and implements Article II(3) NYC into Cayman Islands law. It provides as follows:

Staying of certain court proceedings — If any party to an arbitration agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, commences any legal proceedings in any court against any other party to the agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to the proceedings may at any time after appearance, and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceedings; and the court, unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed or that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred, shall make an order staying the proceedings.

Kawaley J in the Grand Court struck out a part of the petition and granted a stay of the remainder. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision on the basis that no part of the winding up petition was arbitrable and that, consequently, the arbitration agreement was “inoperative”. The parties agreed that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. The central dispute was whether the FMCH’s petition had made the matters raised in that petition non-arbitrable.

Judgment

To decide the appeal, the UKPC had to rule on the meaning of a “matter” and “inoperative” in section 4 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act/Article II(3) NYC.

Regarding the first issue, the UKPC essentially set out, albeit in more detail, and relied on the same principles that the UKSC set out and applied in Mozambique. Since I addressed this issue in a previous post, here I want to focus on the second issue, namely the meaning of “inoperative” and the arbitrability of the subject matter and the remedies sought in the court proceedings.

The UKPC stated that there are two broad circumstances in which an arbitration agreement may be inoperative: (1) where certain types of dispute are excluded by statute or public policy from determination by an arbitral tribunal; and (2) where the award of certain remedies is beyond the jurisdiction which the parties can confer through their agreement on an arbitral tribunal. The UKPC referred to the first type as “subject matter non-arbitrability” and to the second as “remedial non-arbitrability” ([70]).

The underlying concept of subject matter non-arbitrability is that there are certain matters which in the public interest should be reserved to the courts or other public tribunals for determination ([72]). For example, by preventing parties by agreement from contracting out of an employee’s right to have access to an employment tribunal and the courts, section 203 of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996 and section 144(1) of the UK Equality Act 2010 preserve a right of access to the courts ([71]). Similarly, a subject matter will be non-arbitrable if “there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the public policy considerations involved in that particular type of dispute” ([71], referring to [44] of the SGCA case of Larsen]. While there is no agreement internationally as to the kinds of subject matter or dispute which fall within subject matter non-arbitrability ([72]), the court can refer to the jurisprudence of the courts of other common law jurisdictions ([74]).

Remedial non-arbitrability is concerned with the circumstance in which the parties have the power to refer matters to arbitration but cannot confer on the arbitral tribunal the power to give certain remedies. There is a general consensus in the common law world that the power to wind up a company lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts ([75]). There is also a general consensus that an arbitral tribunal can grant inter partes remedies, such as ordering a share buy-out in proceedings for relief for unfairly prejudicial conduct in the management of a company under section 994 of the UK Companies Act 2006. This is because no third party has a legal interest and there is no public element in the dispute ([76]).

That is why even in an application to wind up a company there may be matters in dispute, such as allegations of breaches of a shareholders’ agreement or of equitable duties arising out of the parties’ relationship, which can be referred to an arbitral tribunal, notwithstanding that only a court can make a winding up order ([77], [78]).

Following these principles, the UKPC decided that some matters were arbitrable, while others were non-arbitrable. Arbitrable matters were: whether FMCH had lost trust and confidence in Ting Chuan and the management of the Company; and whether the parties’ relationship had irretrievably broken down. A stay was granted and the parties were referred to arbitration in relation to these matters. Non-arbitrable matters were: whether it was just and equitable to wind up the company; whether an order should be made requiring Ting Chuan to sell its shares to FMCH; or whether a winding up order should be made. The parties were not referred to arbitration in relation to these matters. Nevertheless, a stay was ordered because the determination of the arbitrable matters would be an essential precursor to the assessment of the non-arbitrable matters.

Commentary

This is an important judgment that offers not only an authoritative interpretation of the concept of a “matter” in Article II(3) NYC (like its sister UKSC judgment in Mozambique) but also of the concept of “inoperative” in this provision.

Importantly, the UKPC clarified the difference between “subject matter non-arbitrability” and “remedial non-arbitrability”. However, the judgment can be criticised on two bases.

First, the efforts of the UKPC to decide the case by reference to comparative law are commendable. Still, the court’s focus on the jurisprudence from the “leading arbitration jurisdictions in the common law world” ([57]; similarly [74], [75], [77]) has a whiff of parochialism. The same criticism can be levelled at the UKSC judgment in Mozambique, which focused on the jurisprudence of the “leading jurisdictions involved in international arbitration in the common law world” ([71] of that judgment).

Second, the court could have gone a step further in its dealing with the concepts of “inoperative” and set out some kind of test for determining whether or not a matter is arbitrable. Provisions like 203 of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996 and section 144(1) of the UK Equality Act 2010 that expressly prohibit contracting out are an exception. When it comes to non-arbitrability for reasons of public policy, one is left to wonder when exactly “there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the public policy considerations involved in that particular type of dispute” or when there is “no public element in the dispute”. The instruction to the courts to look at “the jurisprudence of the courts of other common law jurisdictions” to answer these questions is not necessarily helpful. Can the courts look at the jurisprudence of the courts of non-common law jurisdictions, which are the majority of NYC jurisdictions and include some very important arbitration centres? Does this instruction even make much sense in a world where the NYC and the UNCITRAL Model Law have done so much to transcend the common law – civil law divide in international commercial arbitration?

Article 1 of the following decision confirms the participation of Ireland to e-Codex: Commission Decision (EU) 2023/2099 of 28 September 2023 confirming the participation of Ireland in Regulation (EU) 2022/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (e-CODEX system), OJEU L 241, 29.9.2023, p. 144

Source: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/2099/oj

Par un arrêt du 14 septembre 2023, la Cour de justice se prononce sur la question de la loi choisie par les parties pour régir un contrat de consommation et sur l’étendue des restrictions qui sont faites à ce choix par l’article 6 du règlement Rome I.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de la consommation 2024, annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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A new conflict of laws article was just published today on the African Journal of International and Comparative Law. It is titled: CSA Okoli, A Yekini & P Oamen, “The Igiogbe Custom as a Mandatory Norm in Conflict of Laws: An Exploration of Nigerian Appellate Court Decisions.”

The abstract reads as follows:

Under the Igiogbe custom of the Bini Kingdom of Edo State Nigeria, the eldest surviving son exclusively inherits the ancestral home of his deceased father. This custom is a mandatory norm in conflict of laws. Litigation on the custom has been described as a matter of life and death. There is a widely shared view among academic writers, practitioners, and judges that this customary law is absolute. Contrary to this popular view, this work argues that the Igiogbe custom can be displaced by statute and other customary or religious laws. To substantiate this position, this article examines all the reported appellate court decisions on the Igiogbe custom and other connected principles. It is often taken for granted that every Bini man is subject to customary law, thereby leading to the overriding application of the Igiogbe custom. Recent developments in case law suggest otherwise. There is a conflict of personal law question that is often ignored in most litigation concerning the Igiogbe. Careful consideration of this question can potentially lead to the application of other systems of succession law (statutory, religious, and other customary laws) other than the Igiogbe custom. Besides, these conflict of laws techniques and constitutional human rights norms can be used to strike the appropriate balance between competing interests and reasonable legitimate expectations of the deceased and their heirs.

 

Originally posted in the NGPIL website

The Nigeria Group on Private International Law “(NGPIL”) invites submissions for the annual NGPIL Conflict of Laws’ Competition. The winner will be awarded for the best essay on any aspect of Nigerian conflict of laws. Entries will be accepted from the following: an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any Nigerian lawyer five years call or below practising and residing in Nigeria. The essay should be unpublished at the time of submission. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Submitted essays should also be within five to eight thousand words. Competitors may be citizens of any nation, age or gender but must be an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any lawyer below five years post-call experience practising and residing in Nigeria.

The first prize is  150,000 Naira (NGN), and the winner of the competition will be encouraged to publish the paper in any high-quality peer reviewed journal on private international law (conflict of laws). The second prize is  90,000 Naira (NGN), and third prize is  60,000 Naira (NGN). The prize is sponsored by and will be awarded by NGPIL.

Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received no later than January 15, 2024. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. The winner will be announced no later than 2 months after the deadline. Decisions of the NGPIL on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to ngpilaw@gmail.com. All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.

Previous Winners

Oluwabusola Fagbemi (Winner for the 2022/2023 session)

Solomon Adegboyo (Winner for the 2021/2022 session)

 

The Court of Justice will not be extremely busy with private international law this October, but I am pretty sure the three cases – one of them in particular- have generated a lot of expectation beyond the usual crowd.

Advocate General J. Richard de la Tour will deliver his Opinion in case C-566/22, Inkreal, on Thursday 12. In the request for a preliminary ruling, the Nejvyšší soud (The Supreme Court, Czech Republic) submits the following question to the Court:

From the perspective of the existence of an international element, which is required for [the Brussels I bis regulation] to apply, is the application of that regulation to be based solely on the fact that two parties with their seat in the same Member State agree on the jurisdiction of courts of another EU Member State?

The main proceedings concern an application for the payment of EUR 153,740 plus interest and ancillary costs. The applicant, a company incorporated under Slovak law and established in Slovakia, is asking for the determination of the court having territorial jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case pursuant to Law No 99/1963 – the code of civil procedure- as amended (the ‘CCP’).

The amount of EUR 153,740 corresponds to receivables assigned to the applicant by means of an agreement dated 8 December 2021. The receivables arose from an Agreement on a Financial Loan dated 29 June 2016 and Agreement on a Financial Loan dated 11 March 2017, entered into by the applicant’s legal predecessor, as the creditor, and the defendant, as the debtor. Both creditor and debtor are domiciled in Slovakia.

According to the Loan Agreements, ‘any ambiguities or disputes arising from the Agreement and in connection therewith shall be first resolved by negotiation aimed at reaching a solution acceptable for both parties. If the parties are unable to settle such a dispute, the dispute shall be settled by a court of the Czech Republic having substantive and territorial jurisdiction, in line with Law No 99/1963, the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended.’ The applicant holds that this is a valid prorogation agreement in a private law relationship involving international elements, pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Brussels I bis regulation, and there is no special or exclusive jurisdiction of another court pursuant to the regulation. The applicant states that, in view of the fact that the defendant is a legal entity having its registered office abroad with no plant or organisational unit in the Czech Republic, and that, at the same time, international jurisdiction of the courts of the Czech Republic is given pursuant to the Brussels I bis regulation, territorial jurisdiction cannot be determined in the standard fashion, as the conditions for determining territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the CCP are lacking or cannot be established. The applicant asked the Supreme Court to determine which court will hear and decide the matter.

The case will be decided by a chamber of five judges, with A. Kumin as reporting judge.

On the same day, the Court will publish its decision on C-21/22, OP, on Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 on matters of succession. I reported on the case here. In his Opinion delivered on 23 March 2023, related only to the second question asked, Advocate General M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona suggests the Court of Justice replies to the Sąd Okręgowy w Opolu (Regional Court, Opole, Poland) as follows:

Article 75 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 …, in conjunction with Article 22 thereof, is to be interpreted as not precluding a situation where, pursuant to a bilateral treaty concluded between a Member State and a third country before the accession of that Member State to the European Union, a national of the third country, who is resident in the Member State bound by the bilateral treaty, does not have the right to choose the law applicable to his or her succession.

Finally, on 17 October 2023, a hearing will take place in case C-633/22, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol. Here, the French Court of Cassation requests the interpretation of the ‘old’ Brussels Regulation in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU:

1) Must Articles 34 and 36 of the [Brussels I] regulation and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a financial penalty imposed for harm caused to the reputation of a sports club by the publication of a story in a newspaper can manifestly infringe freedom of expression and therefore constitute a ground for refusing to recognise and enforce a judgment?

2) In the event of an affirmative answer, must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the court in which enforcement is sought may find that the penalty is disproportionate only where the damages have been categorised as punitive either by the court of origin or by the court in which enforcement is sought and not where they have been awarded as compensation for non-material damage?

3) Must those provisions be interpreted as meaning that the court in which enforcement is sought may take account only of the deterrent effect of the penalty in the light of the resources of the person on whom the penalty is imposed, or may it have regard to other factors such as the seriousness of the wrong or the extent of the harm?

4) Can the deterrent effect in the light of the resources of the newspaper in itself form a ground for refusing to recognise and enforce a judgment due to a manifest infringement of the fundamental principle of freedom of the press?

5) Must the deterrent effect be understood as meaning that the financial stability of the newspaper is threatened or may it simply refer to an intimidating effect?

6) Must the deterrent effect on the newspaper publishing house and on a journalist as an individual be assessed in the same way?

7) Is the general economic situation of the print media a relevant factor when assessing whether, beyond the newspaper in question, the penalty is likely to have an intimidating effect on the media overall?

Background of the preliminary reference is a Spanish decision sentencing the newspaper Le Monde and one of its journalists to pay damages to Real Madrid and to AE, a member of its medical team, for damage to their reputation. Real Madrid and AE asked for the recognition and enforcement of the decision in France; the Paris Court of Appeal refused. On cassation, the referring court asks the Court a series of questions relating to the reason for refusal of recognition based on public policy (Article 34, point 1, of the Brussels I Regulation), read in the light of Article 11 of the Charter.

Judge T. von Danwitz will act as reporting judge for a decision to be taken by the Grand Chambre, benefiting from an Opinion by Advocate General M. Szpunar.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a jugé que le législateur français, en subordonnant au consentement du donneur de gamètes l’accès aux données personnelles le concernant à la demande de l’enfant conçu par AMP avec tiers donneur, avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi du 2 août 2021 relative à la bioéthique, n’a pas violé l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme garantissant le droit au respect de la vie privée.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code civil 2024, annoté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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