Conflictoflaws

By Saloni Khanderia (Jindal Global Law School, India) and Sagi Peari (Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia) in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin, available for download here

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic will affect the performance of several contracts and is likely to increase the number of disputes before the courts. In agreements with a foreign element, the adjudication of the rights and liabilities will depend on the applicable law. Most legal systems have embraced the doctrine of party autonomy and, accordingly, permit the parties to expressly select the law to govern the disputes that arise from international contracts. India and Australia are no exception to this trend. In general, the courts in both the commonwealth countries have reported being influenced by judicial practices of one another to develop their own law. Despite their common-law roots, the interpretations attached to the doctrine of party autonomy in the choice of law have varied in some respects in these countries. The paper analyses the judicial trends on the subject and demonstrates the role that party autonomy will play in resolving international disputes where the performance has been affected by the eventualities such as the COVID-19 pandemic in India and Australia. The paper delves into the manner in which the courts in India and Australia may offer reciprocal lessons to each another to revolutionise the interpretation of the doctrine of party autonomy in the choice of law.

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Kindly allow us to inform you about the following decisions we had to take in view of our conference, originally scheduled for 25 and 26 September 2020:

As the University of Bonn does not allow on site events of a larger scale until the end of the Winter Semester 2020/2021 (31 March 2021) in order to avoid any Covid-19 risks and as we are also concerned about the risks you would take while travelling to our place, we decided against an on site event.

Originally, we thought that in this case a video conference would be a good substitute. However, after months of video conferences, classes and meetings, all of us are probably feeling quite exhausted, and another round of two long days looking at the screen did no longer appear appealing to us, all the more since we have gathered such a distinguished group of speakers, with whom the audience would certainly like to interact directly, to say nothing of ourselves. This is why we decided, in close cooperation with the HCCH, to reschedule our Conference at Bonn University on Monday and Tuesday, 13 and 14 September 2021.

Additionally, in order to keep our topic connected with the period of the German Presidency of the EU Council and also in order to react to requests by a number of interested colleagues from far distances who would have difficulties travelling to Bonn, we decided to offer a Pre-Conference Video Roundtable “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Prospects for Judicial Cooperation between the EU and Third States” on Thursday evening, 29 October 2020, 6 to 8 p.m. As things are standing at the moment, the Secretary General of the HCCH, Dr Christoph Bernasconi, will give us the honour to join us “live” and open this session, and an edited version of the Explanatory Report might be out at this point of time.

If you are interested in participating in the video conference, please register with sekretariat.weller@jura.uni-bonn.de. You will then receive an email with the access code to the video conference (via zoom) the day before the event.

We will inform you about the precise programme of our video round table in due time.

We do hope that you agree with our decisions. Looking forward to seeing you via video in October 2020 and on site in September 2021.

With best wishes from Bonn,

Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Philipp Reuß, Matthias Weller

This post is authored by Ana Coimbra Trigo (Associate Lawyer at PLMJ Law Firm; PhD Candidate at NOVA Lisbon Univ.; LL.M. China-EU School of Law (China Univ. Political Science and Law, conferred by Univ. Hamburg); Law Degree from Univ. Coimbra), with contributions from Gustavo Moser.

Today, on 7 August 2020, Decree 5/2020 of the Council of Ministers approved the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG or Convention), making Portugal its newest signatory state (link to the official publication here). The Convention will enter into force, in respect of Portugal, on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of approval.

Portugal joins the Convention alongside two historic moments. First, this is the year that marks the 40th anniversary of the Convention, and second, the current Secretary General of the UN, António Guterres, is a Portuguese national.

Portugal was in fact active in the preparatory works at UNCITRAL and present at the diplomatic conference that adopted the CISG in 11 April 1980. Although “arriving late to the party”, it is foreseen that the CISG will be advantageous for Portugal, both at the legal and commercial level.

First, as is well known, the CISG provides a uniform and neutral regime for cross-border transactions regarding carriage of goods, and related dispute settlement. The text is based on a common set of remedies inspired by the principle of favor contractusand structured to maximize economic benefits of the contract.

Second, the CISG provides for overall legal certainty, especially in cases where there is and there is not a (valid) choice of law. It is drafted in plain language and this is particularly advantageous for small and medium-sized companies.

Third, scholars highlight the balanced system of solutions included in the Convention that allowsefficiencies in transaction costs and thus more competitive prices for imported and exported goods. This is beneficial for overall trade, but from a Portuguese viewpoint, will also allow Portuguese final users to get more value for their money, and Portuguese exporters to sell their products at lower prices in global markets.

Fourth, the above benefits are emphasized when one considers that the CISG has been ratified already by93 states. This includes 24 of 27 EU Member-States (excluding UK, Ireland, Malta and not for long Portugal) and also the United States of America, Canada, Brazil, China, Japan and South Korea. Some of these countries are relevant trade partners of Portugal.

Lastly, Portugal will now benefit from 40 years of scholarly writings and decisions for guidance, including in the Portuguese language, since Brazil recently became the first Lusophone country to adopt the CISG.

The increased availability of materials on the CISG in Portuguese may boost capacity building and contribute to the affirmation of the CISG in other Lusophone countries.

Scholars and diplomats have clamoured about this potential accession over the years, so we anticipate that this will be viewed positively by the local and international legal community.

Moreover, this can be seen as strategic boost for Portugal in international trade in this demanding international context.

Shawn He reported recently on a Chinese judgment refusing the declaration of enforceability of an arbitral award issued by the Independent Film & Television Alliance Arbitration Court.

The Tianjin Intermediate People’s Court dismissed the application on two grounds: No standing to be sued of the Chinese company, and notification vices.

One point which should be highlighted is the duration of the proceedings: The application was filed on March 2018, and the judgment (in first instance) was rendered on May 2020…

by Professor Dr Robert Magnus

The chair of civil law III at the Faculty of law and economics of the University of Bayreuth offers a position as a

Doctoral researcher / PhD Student (m/w/d)

which should be filled as soon as possible. The position is limited for a period of two years and is preferably granted for the purpose of preparing a doctoral thesis. The position is part-time (50 % of regular working hours) with the salary and the benefits of a public service position in the state of Bayern, Germany (TV-L E13, 50 %).

The Doctoral researcher will be working in the department of law. His main task will be to assist the research projects of his supervisor in the area of civil law, civil procedural law, arbitration law, conflict-of-laws and comparative law. The position includes the possibility to prepare a doctoral thesis. Applicants should fulfill the requirements to prepare a doctoral thesis under the doctoral degree regulation of the University of Bayreuth. It is expected that the first state examination is accomplished at least with the grade “vollbefriedigend”. The position additionally requires the Applicant to be proficient in German.

Furthermore, the Applicant should be interested in the areas of expertise of the supervisor; preferably there is already knowledge in these fields. Desirable are good skills in English and IT-expertise.

Applicants with a disability as described in SGB IX (§ 2 Abs. 2, 3) will be preferred in case of equal qualifications. The advertising chair of civil law as well as the University of Bayreuth are interested in increasing the quota of women; therefore, we strongly encourage female candidates to apply.

Please send your application with the usual documents (especially CV, Abitur certificate, transcript of records, State Examination certificate(s) via email (preferably in a pdf file) to Ms. Birgit Müller, chair of civil law III at the Faculty of Law and economics, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth, Tel.: +49 (0)921 – 55-6071, E-Mail: ze3.sekretariat@uni-bayreuth.de.

On 31 July 2020, the Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) notified that the Marshall Islands acceded to the HCCH Service Convention. A six-month period for filing objections has been set to run from the date of the Depositary’s notification until 31 January 2021. In the absence of any objection from an already ratifying State, the Convention will enter into force for the Marshall Islands on 1 February 2021.

So far the Marshall Islands has made no declarations under the treaty (think for example of Articles 8, 10, 15 and 16). Nor has it designated Central Authority. While this can be done at a later date, it is undoubtedly of great importance that the designation of Central Authority be made as soon as possible for the treaty to operate smoothly and avoid potential objections, even if this is only a theoretical possibility as the objection-mechanism has never been used in practice.

In the Pacific region, there are a few other States already a party to the Service Convention, such as the Philippines (date of entry into force: 1 October 2020!), Japan and Australia.

The HCCH news item is available here.

Recently published paper The Reception of Collective Actions in Europe: Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation, authored by Csongor István Nagy, Professor at the University of Szeged, is a must read for those studying collective actions in EU. It is intended to identify the differentia specifica of the European collective actions as opposed to those in US, which in itself is not an easy task as there are various models in different Member States. However, the paper elegantly navigates these waters and offers a firm grasp of the history and present state on this increasingly important topic on this side of the Atlantic (you may track the EU developments at the legislative train site). For the rest, you need to read the paper…

It is published in Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, No. 2, pp. 413-443 (2020), and also available at SSRN.

Readers of this blog may be interested to hear of a new textbook on private international law, recently published by LexisNexis. The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject from a New Zealand perspective. Drawing on principles developed in common law countries while adopting a comparative perspective, it explains how New Zealand law has developed into an indigenous body of rules to deal with problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition of judgments and international civil procedure. The textbook may be of interest to scholars and academics outside New Zealand who are looking for a comparative treatment of problems in modern private international law, as well as any lawyers who find themselves interacting with New Zealand law in practice.

The first part of the book covers the four distinct functions of the conflict of laws: adjudicatory jurisdiction (including personal and subject-matter jurisdiction), choice of law, recognition and enforcement of judgments, and international civil procedure. The second part of the book addresses the conflict of laws rules as they relate to the main subject areas of private law, including obligations, property and trusts, succession, family law and corporations and insolvency

After years of discussion the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament have finally reached agreement on the reform of the Evidence and the Service Regulation. The new rules aim to improve the cross-border taking of evidence as well as the cross-border service of documents in particular through an enhanced use of information technology (notably electronic communication and videoconferencing).

The European Parliament’s official press release is available here. For a more detailed coverage see the contributions on the International Litigation Blog and the EAPIL Blog. 

Written by Vito Bumbaca, University of Geneva

On 16 July the CJEU issued its preliminary ruling in case E.E. & K.-D. E. (CJEU, C-80/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:569, not yet available in English). The case concerned, inter alia, the assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation No. 650/2012. Given the novelty of the ruling, which represents the very first CJEU assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation, we will focus on this particular aspect only.

Facts:

A Lithuanian mother and her son moved to Germany to live with the mother’s husband. Prior to her death in Germany, she drew up a testament in Lithuania, naming her son as her sole heir. The mother owned an apartment in Lithuania and when she died (in Germany), her son approached a notary in Lithuania concerning the apartment and in order to obtain a Certificate of Succession. This notary refused both requests based on their interpretation of the EU Succession Regulation according to which the deceased’s last habitual residence was in Germany at the time of death. The deceased’s son appealed against such a decision; subsequently the proceedings reached the Lithuanian Supreme Court (Lietuvos Aukš?iausiasis Teismas), which decided to stay proceedings and ask the preliminary ruling of the CJEU. The CJEU found that a person can have only one habitual residence.

Relevance:

This is the first CJEU ruling on the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation.

It is  welcomed to the extent that it provides a guiding assessment of the hierarchical order and practical implementation of recitals 23, 24 and 25. These are considered as explanatory rules for the determination of international competence and applicable law in matters of EU 25 cross-border succession based on habitual residence as a primary connecting factor.

Specifically, the Court clarifies which key factors should be assessed in the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence by virtue of the above-mentioned recitals and in line with the objectives followed by the EU Succession Regulation. Furthermore, it confirms that, when assessing the deceased’s habitual residence at the time of death, a lengthy determination of the deceased’s life circumstances preceding his/her death should be made. Lastly, it leaves unresolved the factual assessment of the manifestly closest connection criterion applicable on an exceptional basis.

Brief analysis:

According to the Court, the deceased cannot simultaneously have more than one habitual residence at the time of death (§ 41). This however does not exclude the possibility of acquiring an alternative and consecutive habitual residence at different points in time during the deceased’s life. The Court indicated that by virtue of recital 23 the main element in determining the deceased’s habitual residence is the stability of his/ her stay, and therefore of his/ her physical presence, at the time of death (§ 38). In the absence of stability, therefore on a subsidiary basis (§ 39), recital 24 advises national authorities, in some circumstances including notaries (§ 46), to refer to the deceased’s nationality (personal factor) and/ or assets (economic factor). Finally, the criterion relating to the “manifestly closest connection” in relation to the determination of applicable law will have to be applied in a strict manner and not subsidiary to the complex determination of habitual residence, in accordance with the principles of predictability and legal certainty as provided for by the EU Regulation (§ 37). The exceptional use of the “manifestly closest connection” criterion, however, is left to the judicial discretion of the first seised national courts (§ 45).

Ultimately, according to the Court’s reasoning, which follows the Advocate General’s Opinion of 26 March 2020 (§ 52), the element of stability relating to the deceased’s physical presence at the time of death must be sought in the reasons (subjective element) and the conditions (objective element) of his/ her stay showing a close and stable link between the succession and the given State, in line with the objectives of the EU Succession Regulation (§ 37). The assessment of both objective and subjective elements, and generally of habitual residence, should consider the deceased’s life circumstances at the time of death and the years preceding his/ her death (§ 23). Such a “lengthy” determination of the deceased’s life assessment leaves the debate open as to its pertinence in an increasingly globalised society within which cross-border settlements regularly occur, in particular when involving expats holding multiple nationalities and various assets in different countries.

Lastly, the Court has made clear that the habitual residence assessment must be twofold in matters of competence and threefold in relation to applicable law. With regard to competence, according to the Advocate General, the Court first seised will have to look primarily at the duration and regularity of the deceased’s settlement and subsidiarily at his/ her nationality and/ or assets. In relation to the deceased’s settlement, the Advocate General clarified that duration (time factor) cannot be considered, in itself, a decisive element and that it should be accompanied by other relevant factors such as the deceased’s family and social integration, or his/ her proximity to the State in question (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 54). Furthermore, the Advocate General confirmed that, in line with recital 24, the contexts typically falling under the subsidiary assessment of the deceased’s nationality and/ or assets are: (i) the scenario involving expats; and (ii) that involving a “peripatetic” cross-border movement and life not allowing the establishing of stable connection (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 55-57).

In relation to applicable law, the Court first seised should consider, as a last resort when none of the above elements can be traced, specific factors indicating a situation falling under “manifestly closest connection”. According to the EU Succession Regulation, and confirmed by the Advocate General (§ 25 of the Opinion), a typical situation falling under “manifestly closest connection” is when the deceased moved to his/ her new habitual residence fairly recently before his/ her death. Nonetheless, the Court has not yet identified any specific elements for the determination of the exceptional “manifestly closest connection” criterion (§ 59).

In January 2018, we reported on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia, a publication by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI).

The sequel to this publication, the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, will shortly be released by ABLI. This is a more ambitious piece of work which seeks to set out the principles which are common to the countries within the scope of the ABLI Foreign Judgments Project (namely the 10 ASEAN Member States and Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea). There are 13 principles in total and each principle is accompanied by a commentary which fleshes out how the various countries apply each principle.  Among other things, the principles cover the rules on international (or ‘indirect’) jurisdiction, reciprocity, the enforcement of non-money judgments, public policy, due process and inconsistent judgments. A detailed write-up on the project and principles can be found at Adeline Chong, ‘Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia’ (2020) 16 Journal of Private International Law 31-68 (https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2020.1744256).

ABLI has kindly offered to ‘soft-release’ the 13 principles which form the subject-matter of the 13 chapters of the Asian Principles to readers of conflictsoflaws.net. The 13 principles are set out below.

The Asian Principles will be released in eBook and hardcopy formats. Further details are available here.

Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Principle 1

As a general proposition and subject to these Principles, a foreign judgment in a commercial matter is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

Principle 2

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if the court of origin has international jurisdiction to render that judgment.

The typical grounds on which a court is considered to have international jurisdiction include:

(a) where the judgment debtor was present, resident or domiciled in the country of the court of origin;

(b) where the judgment debtor, being a corporation, had its principal place of business in the country of the court of origin;

(c) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by invoking its jurisdiction or by arguing the merits of the case against it; and

(d) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by way of a choice of court agreement for the court of origin.

Principle 3

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if it is final.

Principle 4

The court addressed must not review the merits of a foreign judgment, except to the extent necessary for the application of these Principles.

A foreign judgment may not normally be challenged on the ground that it contains an error of fact or law, or both.

Principle 5

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if there is reciprocity between the country of the court addressed and the country of the court of origin.

Principle 6

Monetary judgments that are not for a sum payable in respect of a foreign penal, revenue or other public law are enforceable.

Principle 7

Non-monetary judgments that are not preliminary or provisional in nature may be enforced.

Principle 8

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if the judgment was obtained by fraud.

Principle 9

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if to do so would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the country of the court addressed.

Principle 10

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if there was a lack of due process in the proceedings before the court of origin.

Principle 11

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with a judgment in a dispute between the same parties that is given by the court addressed.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another country between the same parties and on the same subject matter, provided the earlier judgment fulfils the requirements for recognition.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused on the ground that proceedings between the same parties and on the same subject matter are pending before the court addressed if the court addressed was seized of the matter before the court of origin.

Principle 12

A foreign judgment that has as its object a right in rem in immovable or movable property is eligible for recognition and enforcement.

Principle 13

A foreign judgment that is objectionable in part may be severed and the unobjectionable part recognised and enforced.

For the earliest possible starting date, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and Private International Law in Hamburg  is offering up to two positions as a

under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels in a full-time or part-time capacity.

More info here

Written by Fieke van Overbeeke, Legal Counsel at the International Institute for International and Foreign Law  – the Netherlands and research fellow at the University of Antwerp – Belgium

On 10 June conflictoflaws.net posted a piece about ‘new conflict of laws rule for minimum wages in road transport’. At that time it seemed that the EU institutions still needed to overcome severe difficulties. However, fully according to the course of events around this very unpredictable file, on 10 July the institutions officially reached a compromise: the directive with conflict of law rules for road transport was finally has adopted and it will enter into force 18 months after publication in the EU’s Official Journal.

In short about these conflict of law rules: 1) Transit operations do not fall under the Posting of Working Directive and the labour conditions, i.a. minimum wages, cannot be applied to this type of transport; 2) Cabotage operations do fall under the Posting of Working Directive and the labour conditions should be guaranteed to this type of transport (‘guaranteed’ because this only needs to be done in case these conditions are more favourable to the lorry driver, see Article 3 section 7 Posting of Working Directive); 3) Bilateral operations do not fall under the Posting of Working Directive, and some correlated crosstrade operations do not either; 4) Crosstrade operations are supposed to fall under the Posting of Working Directive (however, a clear rule about this is lacking and provokes many questions).

The third 2020 issue of RabelsZ has been released this week. It contains the following articles:

Reinhard Zimmermann, Pflichtteil und Noterbenrecht in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive (Compulsory Portion and Forced Heirship in Historical and Comparative Perspective), pp. 465–547

The essay traces the development of mandatory family protection from Roman law through the ius commune to the modern civilian codifications. The Justinianic reform of 542 AD had failed to streamline and simplify the pertinent rules of classical Roman law. It was left, therefore, to the draftsmen of the codifications from the end of the 18th century onwards to tackle that task. Two models were particularly influential; one of them can be found in the Austrian Civil Code of 1811, the other in the French Code civil of 1804. Germany adopted the Austrian model of a „compulsory portion“ (i.e. a personal claim for the value of a part of the estate). Outside of Germany, the French model of „forced heirship“ (part of the testator’s property is reserved to his closest relatives) was extremely influential at first. The essay then looks at reforms in a number of countries of the Germanic and Romanistic legal systems, with some of the Romanistic countries having undergone a change of system. Mandatory family protection by means of a compulsory portion thus appears to gain ascendancy. Apart from that the range of persons entitled to such compulsory portion tends to be drawn more narrowly today than in earlier times. Also, the quotas granted to persons entitled to mandatory family protection have, in many places, been lowered.

Characteristic for a number of legal systems and reform drafts is also an endeavour to render the law concerning mandatory family protection more flexible. The power to deprive a person of his right to a compulsory portion, or to become forced heir, has been extended in some legal systems. Finally, in view of the long-standing tradition in the continental legal systems of fixed quotas it is interesting to see that, time and again, the concept of a needs-based claim for maintenance has been considered, or even implemented, particularly for the surviving spouse.

Frederick Rieländer, Schadensersatz wegen Klage vor einem aufgrund Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung unzuständigen Gericht (Damages for Breach of an Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreement), p.. 548-592

Whilst the prima facie remedy for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause at common law had always been a stay of proceedings or an anti-suit injunction, English courts started to embrace the remedy of damages for breach of a choice-of-court agreement by the turn of the millennium. This trend is gradually spilling over to civil law jurisdictions as a recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice indicates. Although this judgment may be welcomed in policy terms, many issues remain unresolved. At the heart of the debate lies the question whether damages for breach of a choice-of-court clause are available in the intra-European context. If the non-chosen court gives effect to the jurisdiction clause by dismissing the proceedings, there is no reason to preclude an action for damages brought in another Member

State per se. An award of damages over and above any costs order awarded by the non-chosen court would not undermine the fundamental policy goals underlying the Brussels regime. While some commentators argue that damages should be available even if the non-chosen court decides to hear the case on the merits, this amounts to an inadmissible jurisdictional review and is likely to infringe the effet utile of cross-border recognition of judgments within the EU. Moreover, since Gothaer Allgemeine may be extended so as to apply to a decision by the non-chosen court on the merits in respect of the incidental question of the invalidity of the choice-of-court agreement, this decision could acquire the binding force of res judicata in all other Member States. Hence, the defendant in the court first seised will be precluded from establishing a breach of contract.

Jan Frohloff, Das anwendbare Recht auf Kollisionen im Weltraum (The Law Applicable to Collisions in Space), pp. 593-614

Dropping costs in both the manufacturing and launch of spacecraft have increased the orbital traffic around Earth. An ever-increasing number of spacecraft in orbit brings a rise in the likelihood of collisions between them. Assessing the claims arising from such collisions necessitates the determination of the applicable law. The determining factors should take into account the particularities of space and planetary orbits, in and on which spacecraft move differently and with considerably higher speeds than vessels on water and in the air.

In geostationary orbit, satellites sit in fixed orbital slots, which are limited in number and allotted to states by the International Telecommunications Union. Thus, a collision in this orbit is likely the result of a (defective) satellite drifting out of its orbital slot along the orbital arch into another slot. The law applicable to this collision should be the law of the state to which the orbital position in which the collision occurred is allotted. Although not a lex loci damni proper, applying the law of the state to which the orbital slot is allotted is the closest to the law of the state where the damage occurred in a space that is not subject to national appropriation.

In low Earth orbit and medium Earth orbit, satellites move relative to Earth. Here, the factors for designating the applicable law should be whether one of the satellites had a propulsion system and which satellite was in orbit first so as to incentiviseoperators to act against the most pressing problem in low and medium Earth orbit: the danger of defunct satellites and debris. As a result, where one of the satellites in the collision has a propulsion system and the other does not, the applicable law should be the law of the state to which the satellite with the propulsion system is registered (regardless of who was in orbit first). Where both satellites have a propulsion system or neither does, it should be the law of the state where the satellite in orbit first is registered.

These factors for the law applicable to collisions in space are easy to determine in practice and would enhance the foreseeability of court decisions, while at the same time ensuring a reasonable balance between the interests of the spacecraft operators involved.

Dorota Miler, Evasion of the Law Resulting from a Choice of Law under the Succession Regulation, pp. 615–636

Excerpt taken from the introduction]:

[This paper] will consider whether a German court can identify a case of evasion of the law as resulting from a choice of law made under the Regulation, based on different jurisdictions’ varying regulation of the circumstances that allow for a disqualification from forced heirship. Could the exercise of the right to choose the applicable law (Art. 22 of the Regulation) be challenged under certain circumstances as an evasion of the law under private international law? Particularly, where the aim of the testator’s choice was to deprive his descendants of a compulsory portion based on facts (disqualification by conduct) that would not support such an action under German law, could a German court conclude that the result would be inappropriate from the perspective of German law?

In considering these questions, [the paper] will first give some brief examples of factual circumstances that would, in jurisdictions outside Germany, allow a testator to deprive his family member of a forced heirship, these being circumstances that vary significantly from those provided under German law. Secondly, [it] will identify the conditions for finding an evasion of law under European and German private international law and, in turn, consider those instances where a choice of law under Art. 22 of the Regulation might serve to fulfil these conditions. In conclusion, [the paper] will reflect on the likelihood of a German court making a finding of evasion of law under private international law.

Konrad Duden, Richterwahl und parteipolitische Einflussnahme. Vergleichende Anregungen zum Schutz der Unabhängigkeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und der obersten Bundesgerichte (The Selection of Judges and Partisan Justice – Comparative Inspiration for the Protection of the Independence of Germany’s Federal Courts), pp. 637-665

In many countries, politicians are attempting to influence the selection of supreme court judges and to achieve a court composition favourable to their party’s positions. This paper highlights that it would be possible to achieve changes in the composition of Germany’s federal courts similar to those that have recently taken place in Poland and the USA. This observation poses a question: How can the courts be protected from partisan influence? One possibility would be a protection againstchanging the courts’ constitution by including core features of the courts’ institutional design into the German Constitution. Such an approach is not without flaws, however. Accordingly, this paper suggests to at least compliment such steps with measures to protect the courts when changing the courts’ constitution. The proposed measures do not seek to protect certain specific features of the institutional design; rather, they look to ensure that changes to that design are based on a consensus between the ruling government and the opposition. Such a consensus would support the presumption that undertaken changes do not aim at advancing the partisan influence of one political party.

University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law announces its call for RIDOC 2020: Rijeka Doctoral Conference. This conference has a stong international character and gathers promising law doctoral students, both from Europe and beyond. They will have the oportunity to test their working hypothesis before international panels composed of renown academics. Given the circumstances, the conference is planned as a hybrid online-onsite event or online only. The call may be downloaded here, while programmes of the former conferences are available at this site.

Important dates
Deadline for applications: 25 August 2020.
Information on the acceptance: 25 September 2020.
Conference and book of abstracts: 4 December 2020.

Applications and questions should be addressed to ridoc@pravri.hr.

In cooperation with the Asian Academy of International Law, the Hague Academy of International Law will hold its first edition of its Advanced Courses in Hong Kong from 7 to 11 December 2020.  The topic will be: “Current Trends on International Commercial Dispute Settlement“.

For this special programme, the Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law has invited leading academics and practitioners from Paris (Professor Diego P. Fernández Arroyo), New York (Professor Franco Ferrari), Bonn (Professor Matthias Weller), Singapore (Ms Natalie Morris-Sharma), and Beijing (Judge Zhang Yongjian) to present expert lectures on the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, international commercial arbitration, settlement of international commercial disputes before domestic courts, and the developments of the International Commercial Court. Registered participants will have pre-course access to an e-learning platform that provides reading documents prepared by the lecturers. At the end of the course, a certificate of attendance will be awarded.

For more information see here.

For the flyer see here.

In Ivanishvili, Bidzina v Credit Suisse Trust Ltd [2020] SGCA 62, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered a number of issues: (1) whether a plaintiff could amend its Statement of Claim at the appellate stage to tilt the balance of connecting factors towards Singapore; (2) whether a clause in the trust deed identifying Singapore as the “forum of administration” of the trust was a jurisdiction clause, and if so; (3) whether the clause covered hostile litigation in relation to the trust; and depending on the answers to the previous questions, (4) whether the Singapore proceedings ought to be stayed.

The case concerned Mr Ivanishvili, the former Georgian prime minister, who was a French and Georgian dual national. Mr Ivanishvili had set up the Mandalay Trust which was domiciled in Singapore. The trustee of the Mandalay Trust was Credit Suisse Trust Ltd, a Singapore trust company (“the Trustee”). The trustee’s asset management powers were delegated to the Geneva branch of Credit Suisse AG (“the Bank”). The Mandalay Trust suffered losses purportedly due to the actions of one the Bank’s employees (Mr Lescaudron) who was the portfolio manager of the Mandalay Trust. Mr Lescaudron was convicted in Swiss criminal proceedings for various forms of misconduct in relation to the Mandalay Trust. At first instance, Mr Ivanishvili and his wife and children, who were the beneficiaries of the Mandalay Trust, sued both the Trustee and the Bank alleging, inter alia, breaches of duties of care and skill and misrepresentation. A stay was granted by the court below on the grounds that Switzerland was a more appropriate forum for the action. At the Court of Appeal, Mr Ivanishvili et al strategically chose to discontinue proceedings against the Bank to strengthen their argument that Singapore was the appropriate forum for trial of the action and sought to amend their Statement of Claim to this effect. This also entailed reformulating some of the claims against the Trustee to remove references to the Bank. This was allowed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that absent bad faith, the appellants had the freedom of choice to choose its cause of action and to sue the party it wishes to sue.

On the second issue, the relevant clause provided that:

“2. (a) This Declaration is established under the laws of the Republic of Singapore and subject to any change in the Proper Law duly made according to the powers and provisions hereinafter declared the Proper Law shall be the law of the said Republic of Singapore and the Courts of the Republic of Singapore shall be the forum for the administration hereof.”

Clause 2(b) granted the Trustee the power to change the proper law and provided that if so, the courts of the jurisdiction of the new proper law would become the “forum for the administration” of the trust. Contrasting clause 2 with the equivalent clause in Crociani v Crociani (17 ITELR 624) where the relevant clauses referred to a country being the “forum for the administration”, the Court of Appeal noted that the references to “forum for the administration” in clause 2 was tied up with a reference to the courts. It therefore held that clause 2(a) was a jurisdiction clause. As a point of interest, it should be noted that it is immaterial whether clause 2(a) is an exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction clause after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Shanghai Turbo v Liu Ming [2019] 1 SLR 779 (previously noted here); as Singapore is a named forum, the “strong cause” test would apply to cases falling within the scope of the jurisdiction clause.

The question which had to be considered next was whether clause 2(a) covered hostile litigation concerning breach of trust issues (such as in the present case) or was confined to litigation over administrative matters. On this, the Court engaged in an extensive review of case law in other off-shore trust jurisdictions. While tentatively observing that “there is no legal rule limiting the meaning of the phrase ‘forum for [the] administration’ to an administration action in the traditional sense”(at [75]), the Court ultimately followed the reasoning of the Privy Council in Crociani and held that that the phrase “is intended to refer to the court or jurisdiction which would settle questions arising in the day to day administration of the trust, and to denote the supervisory and authorising court for actions the trustee might need to take which were not specifically by the trust deed or where its terms were ambiguous”(at [76]). Such clauses did not cover hostile litigation between trustees and beneficiaries. The Court observed that: “The trust deed is not a contract between two parties with obligations on both sides – rather, it is a unilateral undertaking by the trustee, and in our view this difference must play a part when we consider whether the intention of the drafters was to impose a mandatory jurisdiction clause for the resolution of contentious disputes regarding allegations of breach of trust”(at [78]).

That meant that whether a stay ought to be granted was to be determined under the Spiliada test on forum non conveniens rather than the “strong cause” test. On this point, the Court split. A majority of the Court (Menon CJ and Prakash JA), held that the balance of connecting factors pointed towards Singapore and allowed the appeal against the stay. The appellants argued that with the amended claim, the focus was on the Trustee’s breaches of trust, all of which occurred in Singapore. The Court was unconvinced of the respondents’ argument that most of the relevant witnesses, such as Mr Lescaudron, were located in Switzerland and not compellable to appear before the Singapore court. The location of witnesses was but a weak factor pointing in favour of Switzerland being forum conveniens relative to Singapore. The respondents had also argued that Swiss banking secrecy laws meant that disclosure of certain documents could only be ordered by the Swiss court but the Court gave little weight to this, holding that it was not clear that the Trustee could not obtain the requisite documents from the Bank itself. In contrast, the shape of litigation post the re-framing of the actions by the appellants meant that the trust relationship, rather than the banking relationship, was at the forefront of the claims. This pointed towards Singapore being the centre of gravity of the action. Further, Singapore law was the governing law of the Mandalay Trust and the rights of all parties under the Trust Deed: “There is no doubt that the Singapore courts are the most well-placed to decide issues of Singapore trust law, and the Swiss courts, operating in a civil law jurisdiction with no substantive doctrine of trusts, would be far less familiar with these issues”(at [110]). This comment may be to understate the competence of the Swiss courts in this regard, as internal Swiss trusts which are governed by a foreign law are not an uncommon wealth management tool in Switzerland. The Court was also not persuaded by the Trustee’s argument that there was a risk of conflicting findings of fact due to related proceedings elsewhere, holding that this was not a “sufficiently real possibility” (at [114]). Thus, a majority of the Court held that, on an overall assessment of the connecting factors, Singapore would be the more appropriate forum vis-à-vis Switzerland.

There was a strong dissent by Chao SJ on the application of the Spiliada test. His Honour was of the view that whether the Trustee would be prejudiced by having to defend itself in Singapore formed the crux of the stay issue. In relation to this, His Honour observed that Mr Ivanishvili was a hands-on investor who corresponded directly with the Bank officers. The Trustee was not always copied into Mr Ivanishvili’s instructions to the Bank. The alleged losses occurred in Switzerland and the acts and omissions of the Bank and its officers and the role of Mr Ivanishvili himself remained relevant in determining the Trustee’s liability. In contrast, the Trustee played a passive role and the operative events in Singapore were merely secondary in nature (at [153]). This belied the appellants’ insistence that the Bank’s alleged wrongdoing was no longer relevant in the Singapore proceedings given the amended claim. His Honour was concerned about the respondents’ ability to defend itself properly in Singapore given that the evidence and witnesses central to defending the claims were mainly located in Switzerland. Chao SJ was therefore of the view that the action had a greater connection with Switzerland than with Singapore “by a significant margin”(at [154]). His Honour went on to say that if he was wrong on stage one of the Spiliada test, stage two would also point towards Switzerland. On stage two, Chao SJ agreed with the High Court that the ends of justice would best be met by the Swiss court applying Singapore trust law. This is as the trustee’s conduct may only be properly understood against the backdrop of Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship with the Bank and the Bank’s conduct in relation to its asset management duties (at [154]).

A pdf of the judgment can be downloaded here.

The second issue of 2020 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Fernando Gascón Inchausti, Professor at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Does EU Law Ensure an Adequate Protection of Debtors in Cross-Border Enforcement? (in English)

• From a general perspective, cross-border enforcement of judicial decisions – and of authentic instruments – entails the need to coordinate different procedural systems, interacting with each other. From a practical point of view, however, cross-border enforcement is also a context of dialectic between opposing parties, typical of any judicial process. Its regulation, therefore, must be developed and interpreted taking into account the rights and powers attributed to the creditor and to the debtor, so that the promotion of efficiency – favourable to the creditor – is not detrimental to the debtor’s right of defense. This article assesses the extent to which the civil procedural law of the European Union adequately protects the debtor in cross-border enforcement and, where appropriate, what could be the most reasonable measures to improve it without unduly harming the right of the creditor to a prompt satisfaction of his right. Special attention shall be given in this framework to the legal position of consumers, due to their vulnerability and their special legal status according to EU protective law.

Maria Caterina Baruffi, Professor at the University of Verona, Gli effetti della maternità surrogata al vaglio della Corte di Cassazione italiana e di altre corti (‘Effects of Surrogacy in the Jurisprudence of the Italian Corte di Cassazione? and Other Courts’, in Italian)

• This paper examines the decision by means of which the Italian Supreme Court, in plenary session, on 8 May 2019 dealt with the issue of surrogacy, with particular regard to the notion of international public policy. The Court concluded that the ban on surrogacy constitutes a principle of public order aimed at protecting fundamental values, such as the surrogate mother’s human dignity. This decision is consistent with the advisory opinion given in April 2019 by the European Court of Human Rights, that, upon request of the French Supreme Court in the context of the Mennesson case, ruled that each State can discretionarily determine the modalities by which it guarantees the recognition of the parent-child relationship, including the possibility to adopt. Nonetheless, the difficulties in the application of public policy are apparent and the situations that may arise as a result of such application are equally complex, for instance as a result of genetic ties being established with different persons. Therefore, this paper puts forth new proposals, also in the light of the most recent French case law.

The following comment is also featured:

Roberto Ruoppo, Doctor in Law, Lo status giuridico di Taiwan e i suoi riflessi sul piano internazionalprivatistico (‘Taiwan’s Legal Status and Its Consequences from a Private International Law Perspective’, in Italian)

• This paper focuses on the consequences brought in the field of private international law by the lack of recognition of a State. In particular, the paper aims to understand if it is possible that actors of the international community give effect to the acts and decisions adopted by the authorities of an entity not recognized as a State. Notably, this work addresses the case of Taiwan which, despite the lack of recognition from the others States, owns all the factual requirements to be considered as an autonomous subject in accordance with international law. Relying to the principle of effectiveness and the analysis of precedent case-law – such as those involving the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic – this paper aims to demonstrate that the response to this question should be premised on the consideration of the interests involved in the specific case. The conclusion reached is that the acts of an entity which lacks recognition should be given effects in the other States when this is more consistent with the principle of legal certainty and the legitimate expectations of the individuals involved.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Roberta Clerici, Professor at the University of Milan: J. von Hein, E.-M. Kieninger, G. Rühl (eds.), How European is European Private International Law? Sources, Court Practice, Academic Discourse, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2019, pp. XXVI-373.

Nicole Grohmann, a doctoral candidate at the Institute for Comparative and Private International Law, Dept. III, at the University of Freiburg, has kindly provided us with the following report on a recent speech by Lord Jonathan Mance.

On Wednesday, 15 July 2020, the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC), Lord Jonathan Mance, presented his views on the future relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe after Brexit in an online event hosted by the Juristische Studiengesellschaft Karlsruhe. This venerable legal society was founded in 1951; its members are drawn from Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Supreme Court, the office of the German Federal Prosecutor, from lawyers admitted to the Federal Supreme Court as well as judges of the Court of Appeals in Karlsruhe and the Administrative Court of Appeals in Mannheim. In addition, the law faculties of the state of Baden-Württemberg (Heidelberg, Freiburg, Tübingen, Mannheim, Konstanz) are corporate members. Due to Corona-induced restrictions, the event took place in the form of a videoconference attended by more than eighty participants.

After a warm welcome by the President of the Juristische Studiengesellschaft, Dr. Bettina Brückner (Federal Supreme Court), Lord Mance shared his assessment of Brexit, drawing on his experience as a highly renowned British and internationally active judge and arbitrator. In the virtual presence of judges from the highest German courts as well as numerous German law professors and scholars, Lord Mance elaborated – in impeccable German – on the past and continuing difficulties of English courts dealing with judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the future legal struggles caused by the end of the transition period on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 31 December 2020. Lord Mance’s speech was followed by an open discussion regarding the most uncertain political and legal aspects of Brexit.

In his speech, Lord Mance highlighted the legal difficulties involved in the withdrawal of his country from the European Union. Since Lord Mance himself tends to picture the British as being traditional and generally pragmatic, he named Brexit as a rare example of a rather unpragmatic choice. Especially with regard to the role of the United Kingdom as a global and former naval power, Lord Mance considered Brexit a step backwards. Besides the strong English individualism, which has evolved over the past centuries, the United Kingdom did not only act as an essential balancing factor between the global players in the world, but also within the European Union. Insofar, the upcoming Brexit is a resignation of the United Kingdom from the latter position.

Subsequently, Lord Mance focussed on the role of the European courts, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights and their judgments in the discussions leading to Brexit. Both European courts gained strong importance and influence in the UK within the first fifteen years of the 21st century. Especially, the ECtHR is of particular importance for the British legal system since the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British law. Lord Mance described the Human Rights Act 1998 as a novelty to the British legal system, which lacks a formal constitution and a designated constitutional court. Apart from the Magna Charta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1689, the British constitutional law is mainly shaped by informal constitutional conventions instead of a written constitution such as the German Basic Law. Following the Human Rights Act 1998 and its fixed catalogue of human rights, the British courts suddenly exercised a stricter control over the British executive, which initially gave rise to criticism. Even though the British courts are not bound by the decisions of the ECtHR following the Human Rights Act 1998, the British participation in the Council of Europe soon started a dialogue between the British courts and the ECtHR on matters of subsidiary and the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation. The UK did not regard the growing caseload of the ECtHR favourably. Simultaneously, the amount of law created by the institutions of the European Union increased. Lord Mance stressed the fact that in 1973, when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, the impact of the ECJ’s decision of 5 February 1963 in Van Gend & Loos, C-26/62, was not taken into account. Only in the 1990s, British lawyers discovered the full extent and the ramifications of the direct application of European Union law. The binding nature of the ECJ’s decisions substantiating said EU law made critics shift their attention from Strasbourg to Luxembourg.

In line with this development, Lord Mance assessed the lack of a constitutional court and a written constitution as the main factor for the British hesitance to accept the activist judicial approach of the ECJ, while pointing out that Brexit would not have been necessary in order to solve these contradictions. The EU’s alleged extensive competences, the ECJ’s legal activism and the inconsistency of the judgments soon became the primary legal arguments of the Brexiteers for the withdrawal from the EU. Especially the ECJ’s teleological approach of reasoning and the political impact of the judgments were mentioned as conflicting with the British cornerstone principles of parliamentary sovereignty and due process. Lord Mance stressed that the so-called Miller decisions of the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary of State [2017] UKSC 5 and R (Miller) v The Prime Minister, Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland (Miller II) [2019] UKSC 41, dealing with the parliamentary procedure of the withdrawal from the EU, are extraordinary regarding the degree of judicial activism from a British point of view. In general, Lord Mance views British courts to be much more reluctant compared to the German Federal Constitutional Court in making a controversial decision and challenging the competences of the European Union. As a rare exception, Lord Mance named the decision in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, in which the UKSC defended the British constitutional instruments from being abrogated by European law. Indeed, Lord Mance also expressed scepticism towards the jurisprudential approach of the ECJ, because inconsistences and the need of political compromise could endanger the foreseeability and practicability of its decisions. Especially with regard to the recent decision of the German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 on the European Central Bank and the Court’s approach to ultra vires, Lord Mance would have welcomed developing a closer cooperation between the national courts and the ECJ regarding a stricter control of the European institutions. Yet this important decision came too late to change Brexiteers’ minds and to have a practical impact on the UK.

Finally, Lord Mance turned to the legal challenges resulting from the upcoming end of the transition period regarding Brexit. The European Union (Withdrawal) Acts 2018 and 2020 lay down the most important rules regarding the application of EU instruments after the exit day on 31 December 2020. In general, most instruments, such as the Rome Regulations, will be transposed into English domestic law. Yet, Lord Mance detected several discrepancies and uncertainties regarding the scope of application of the interim rules, which he described as excellent bait for lawyers. Especially two aspects mentioned by Lord Mance will be of great importance, even for the remaining Member States: Firstly, the British courts will have the competence to interpret European law, which continues to exist as English domestic law, without the obligation to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling according to Art. 267 TFEU. In this regard, Lord Mance pointed out the prospective opportunity to compare the parallel development and interpretation of EU law by the ECJ and the UKSC. Secondly, Lord Mance named the loss of reciprocity guaranteed between the Member States as a significant obstacle to overcome. Today, the United Kingdom has to face the allegation of ‘cherry picking’ when it comes to the implementation of existing EU instruments and the ratification of new instruments in order to replace EU law, which will no longer be applied due to Brexit. Especially with regard to the judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters and the recast of the Brussels I Regulation, the United Kingdom is at the verge of forfeiting the benefit of the harmonized recognition and enforcement of the decisions by its courts in other Member States. In this regard, Lord Mance pointed out the drawbacks of the current suggestion for the United Kingdom to join the Lugano Convention, mainly because it offers no protection against so-called torpedo claims, which had been effectively disarmed by the recast of the Brussels I Regulation – a benefit particularly cherished by the UK. Instead, Lord Mance highlighted the option to sign the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements which would allow the simplified enforcement of British decisions in the European Union in the case of a choice of court agreement. Alternatively, Lord Mance proposed the ratification of the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. So far, only Uruguay and Ukraine have ratified this new convention. Nevertheless, Lord Mance considers it as a valuable option for the United Kingdom as well, not only due to the alphabetical proximity to the other signatories.

Following his speech, the event concluded with a lively discussion about the problematic legal areas and consequences of Brexit, which shall be summarised briefly. Firstly, the President of the German Supreme Court Bettina Limperg joined Lord Mance in his assessment regarding the problem of jurisprudential inconsistency of the ECJ’s decisions. However, like Lord Mance she concluded that the Brexit could not be justified with this argument. Lord Mance pointed out that in his view the ECJ was used as a pawn in the discussions surrounding the referendum, since the Brexiteers were unable to find any real proof of an overarching competence of the European Union. Secondly, elaborating on the issue of enforceability, Lord Mance added that he considers the need for an alternative to the recast of the Brussels I Regulation for an internationally prominent British court, such as the London Commercial Court, not utterly urgent. From his practical experience, London is chosen as a forum mainly for its legal expertise, as in most cases enforceable assets are either located in London directly or in a third state not governed by EU law. Hence, Brexit does not affect the issue of enforceability either way. Finally, questions from a constitutional perspective were raised regarding the future role of the UKSC and its approach concerning cases touching on former EU law. Lord Mance was certain that the UKSC’s role would stay the same regarding its own methodological approach of legal reasoning. Due to the long-standing legal relationship, Lord Mance anticipated that the legal exchange between the European courts, UK courts and other national courts would still be essential and take place in the future.

In sum, the event showed that even though Brexit will legally separate the United Kingdom from the European Union, both will still be closely linked for economic and historical reasons. As Lord Mance emphasized, the UK will continue to work with the remaining EU countries in the Council of Europe, the Hague Conference on PIL and other institutions. Further, the discrepancies in the Withdrawal Acts will occupy lawyers, judges and scholars from all European countries, irrespective of their membership in the European Union. Lastly, the event proved what Lord Mance was hoping to expect: The long-lasting cooperation and friendship between practitioners and academics in the UK and in other Member States, such as Germany, is strong and will not cease after Brexit.

Anita Durakovic, Associate Professor at the University Dzemal Bijedic Mostar, and Jasmina Alihodzic, Professor at the University of Tuzla, co-authored a monograph titled International Surrogate Motherhood – Account of the Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the original: Medunarodno surogat materinstvo – osvrt na zakonodavstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini). The book was published earlier in 2020 by the Faculty of Law of the University Dzemal Bijedic in Mostar.

The book’s first pages are devoted to interdisciplinary approaches to the surrogacy phenomenon followed by the comparative perspective over substantive laws. The central part of the book is focused on the legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where particularly interesting for the readers of this blog are the sections devoted to recognition of cross-border surrogacy arrangements there at three distinct levels: within the proceedings on the merits before the competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the recognition of the status certified by the foreign authentic document, and as part of the recognition of the foreign judgment in which the decision is made concerning the personal status. In evaluating the difficulties which incoming intended parents would be faced with in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially against the background of the prohibition of surrogate motherhood in force in one of the territorial units there, the authors differentiate between situations where surrogate parents request issuing of the travel documents in order to enter Bosnia and Herzegovina with the child, and where subsequent to entering the country they attempt to regulate the child’s civil status. Further chapters are glancing through human rights aspects of the surrogate arrangements and efforts on international level to regulate these matters, particularly within the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The conclusion favours recognition of foreign authentic documents and judgments concerning the legal parenthood deriving from a surrogate arrangement as opposed to the long and costly family law proceedings to obtain decisions establishing fatherhood and adoption on the part of the mother. The authors also stress that the competent authorities need to take account of the best interest of the child when deciding in recognition proceedings and assessing whether to apply the public policy clause.

While this book offers some discussion on theoretical level, it is primarily intended to serve as a reference point for the competent authorities and potential intended parents as well as to advise legislator or the need to adjust legal framework. It would have been much more convincing if the actual cases rated to the Bosnia and Herzegovina could have been discussed. However, according to the authors, there are no official cases although it is known to have happened in practice. Perhaps this book will contribute to raising awareness not only among legal professionals but also in the local community about important interests at stake in surrogate parenting arrangements, especially that of the child.